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ABSTRACT
A small stock market may be less efficient in the weak sense than
a large one, because it is often less elaborately organised
technically. Hence, information about stock price formation may
spread only gradually through the financial community.
Consequontly, stock prices may display e greeter degree of non-
randomness because traders are unable to eliminate this.
The objective of the study is to test the weak form efficiency in
Kuwait Stock Exchange, a segment of the Kuwait Long Term capital
market.	 In addition, the study explores the impact of several.
factors on market efficiency.
In Chapter One the role of the stock market and its relationship
to the economy will be discussed. The efficient market hypothesis
is explored in Chapter Two.
Chapter Three is devoted to surveying the empirical findings of
other rese3rchers i n Ilk, U=A 2nd some other internat1on=1.
markets. A number of authors have applied Lhe ffiixit mdrkeL
hypothesis to actual stock market data, .=epPr- iPil y in the pa=t
twenty years. Some critical analyses are discussed in Chapter
Four. The empirical question of the relations between market
efficiency and stock valuation is explored in Chapter Five. An
efficient market should price the security, so as to fully
reflect the firms earning power. The uncertainty surrounding the
stream of future income clouds this issue and has prompted debate
among economists and financial analysts as to how the market
values a given stock at arty time.
The characteristic of Kuwait Stock Exchange are the subject of
Chapter Six. Chapter Seven presents empirical findings on the
behaviour of Kuwait q t nr.k 7xnhAn7P in th= r:ont pxt nC pCricipnt
market theory. These findings will be compared with those
related studies based on data from the United States and Europe.
Chapter Eight will discuss the Kuwait Gulf Stock Exchange ( over-
the-counter market) or Al-Manakh. The 1982 crash of Al-Manakh is
explored in depth in Chapter Nine and some of the important
solutions will be discussed.
In Chapter Ten the discussion Focusses on the three hypothesised
Factors leading to market efficiency (market information,
governmental rules and regulations, and market support
facilities).
Finally. in Chapter Eleven, general conclusions are drawn and
rPcominendations presPnted with suwAestions for further reseat-ch.
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GLOSSARY
Active strategy. An investment strategy where the investor buys
and sells securities actively for the purpose of exploiting
perceived price discrepancies, and/or holds a portfolio which
represents no more than a subset of the market portfolios.
Allocational Efficiency: If a securities market works as an
efficient resource allocator, then the pricing of securities is
such as to establish equivalent rates of return or cost of
financing on comparable investments, i.e. comparable in terms of
the risk inherent in the projects undertaken.
Buy and hold policy: The policy of buying a representative
selection of the market portfolio and transacting only to the
extent necessary to maintain the balance of the portfolio (also
known as passive strategy).
Chartist: An analyst who seeks to predict future price movements
from the study of past price movements.
Cost of Capital: The rate of return appropriate in the market to
compensate investors for the risk of holding a specific asset or
group of assets.
Direct Evidence: Evidence relating to market efficiency which
focuses on the market's speed and quality (direction and magni-
tude) of response to specific information items.
Exploitable Inefficiency: An exploitable inefficiency is one
which is identifiable, can be authenticated, is material in
amount, and is persistent enough to allow investors to profit from
it.
Funadamental Analysis: 	 The analysis of publicly available
information as a basis for predicting future price movements.
Indirect Evidence: Evidence relating to market efficiency which
focuses on the use of information by experts and their relative
success in pursuing an active strategy versus a simply buy-and-
hold policy.
Insider: An investor who has access to privileged, price-
sensitive information and who exploits his position for investment
purposes.
Intrinsic worth: The best estimate of security's value in rela-
tion to the total set of information available. 
Information Efficiency: The market is informational efficient,
when the security prices reflect all available information.
Market portfolio: The portfolio of all marketable risky assets in
the world in their value-related proportions.
Near Efficiency: The market is near efficient at, say, the semi-
strong level if its prices approximate to their semi-strong worth
to a degree that makes it unprofitable for any investor other than
the very skilled analyst to pursue an active investment strategy
using publicly available information.
Operational Efficiency: The market is operationally efficient if
the services of raising new capital and transacting are carried
out at the lowest possible cost.
Passive Strategy: See Buy-and-hold policy.
Perfect Efficiency: The market is perfectly efficient at, say,
the semi-strong level if its prices are at all times so close to
their semi-strong worth that even the most skilled expert is
unable to cover the costs of trading actively on the basis of
publicly available information.
Perfect Market: A perfect market is one which, in addition to
having a perfectly rational investor, with equal access to (and .
universal understanding of) all relevant information, and where
there are no transaction costs of corporate and personal taxation
differentials.
Semi-strong Efficiency: The market is efficient at the semi-
strong level if securities prices adjust rapidly and without bias
to all public information.
Strong Efficiency: The market is efficient at the strong level if
prices respond rapidly and without bias to all information includ-
ing published data.
Systemic Risk: Risk that cannot be diversified away.
Technical Analysis: The analysis of past security price movements
as a method of predicting future price movements.
Weak Efficiency: The market is efficient at the weak level if it
responds rapidly and without bias to the information set contained
in the history of the past prices.
3
INTRODUCTION
Capital market 'efficiency' is one of the most important concepts
in the field . of investment. It implies that new information is
widely, quickly and cheaply available to all investors, that this
information includes what is knowable and relevant for judging
securities, and that it is very rapidly reflected in security
prices. In other words, the efficient market hypothesis suggests
that the market digests all the relevant financial information
and arrives at an equilibrium price for securities in which all
information available is fully reflected.
It was not until .1970 that this idea became widely accepted by
academics and important financial institutions. Most of the
empirical research done in this area was related either to the USA
or UK until recently when some research has been done on other
European stock markets and the Far East. Very little research
has 'osan earried out to test market s=flcienoy in dev21cping
countries, although the need for testing this hypothesis in these
countries is becoming more important as time goes by. The
findings of these tests should also help the policy makers in the
developing countries to evaluate and improve market performance.
Kuwait, one of the major oil producing countries, has the second
largest stock market in Asia (after Hong Kong). The
institutional characteristics of the Kuwait Stock Exchange (KSE)
are very different from Western and Far-Eastern standards. There
Is no institutional investment in the conventional sense of
collective savings organisations seeking income from investment.
Up to the first quarter of 1988 only Kuwaiti and some Gulf public
companies shares were allowed to trade, and only Kuwaitis could
own charoc.
The chief weakness of the Kuwait market is that too much money is
chasing too few shares (this weakness will be explained i n lAi-or
chapters). Although the Government permits Kuwaiti's to hr,IA
securities anywhere in the world, there are cn=r= in t. ,.rms of
	  risks and overseas withh,NIAin,,, f=v==	 Tr=,(iinp:
1
activity on the official stock exchange tends to reflect the
strengths of the Kuwaiti economy. There are some 42 listed
Kuwaiti companies and seven Gulf public company shares traded in
Kuwait in the last quarter of 1987.
Some potential sources of inefficiency (for the reasons to be
discussed in later chapters) in the Kuwait Stock Market are:
1	 Lack of regulation in the KSE.
2	 Increasing numbers of speculators.
3	 Lack of.disclosure laws.
4	 Lack of market makers.
5	 A. dearth of skilled professionals in financial areas.
This shortage of skilled manpower impedes the .process of
generation, dissemination and interpretation of information which
retards the achievement of market efficiency.
Some of the potential consequences of inefficiency in an y capital
market include:
1	 Scarce financial resources are allocated less than
optimally.
	
An allocation Is less than optimal if the
companies with lower earning prospects . receive more than
their share of the available resources. Any mechanism,
other than an efficient market, however well it performs,
may eventually lead to non-optimal allocation of resources.
This, of course, would reduce future economic growth.
2	 The investors in the market may gain or lose unduly because
of inappropriate pricing.
3	 The company's performance may never improve because
management may be isolated from the disciptine of the
market. Such an isolation may permit inappropriate
financing and investment decisions by the companies. The
former distorts the true cost of capital to the firm.
whereas the latter reEtrict the investment opportunity
both of which cnil prt1v ,=.1 v may exert a negative i mnAr't on
2
the firm's efficiency.
4 Finally, because of shortage of data on the relative
performance of companies, criteria for determining the
efficiency of business organisations may be distorted.
This study is aimed at testing the Kuwait Stock Exchange
efficiency in the context of the random walk model, and also to
open a discussion concerning the three factors (i.e. market
information, Government rules and exchange regulations, and
market facilities) leading to stock market efficiency.
THE RATIONALE OF THE STUDY
Although numerous theories explore the consequences of efficient
capital .markets and prove the existence of efficiency in
developed markets, they generally give little consideration to
the means by which market efficiency - a highly desirable social
phenomenon - can be achieved or enhanced. In the first place,
the study involves a pioneer investigation of efficiency in
Kuwait's stock market, using the weak form of random walk model.
Additionally, it provides eome hypo i-h = c = c r.oncern i ng meior
factors leading to market efficiency.
Efficiency in the developed markets, such as that of the United
States and United Kingdom, is not an historical accident nor has
It been generated spontaneously. Market efficiency can be
augmented if the factors which lead to market efficiency are
improved. The question of the importance of the factors which
generate or enhance efficiency remains to answered.
	 The
dissertation discusses some commonly hypothesised factors.
The Kuwait stock market, in its early stage of development, seems
to constitute an appropriate case for study for a comparative
analysis of the impact of the hypothesised factors on market
efficiency. The unique data existing at the early stage of
market development can be of great assistance in this respect.
In addition, a stock market at its incipient stage of development
is less likely to display market efficiency than is a well
Anyo1nn=r1 one. It is fruitful, therefncp, hn nompare the factors
hypothesised to influence market efficiency in the Kuwaiti market
to the situation in the United States market, which has been
shown to be remarkably efficient.
4
FOCUS OF THE DISSERTATION
This dissertation focusses on an investigation concerning market
efficiency in the Kuwait Stock Exchange. In addition, it
explores the impact of the factors that have a negative
relationship with market efficiency. The study contains eleven
chapters excluding the Introduction.
Chapter One is an introduction. It discusses the importance of
the stock market. Its relationship with real economy, and
finally, the meaning underlying economic efficiency in the
financial market.
Chapter Two discusses the efficient market hypothesis in a
theoretical framework. It covers the definition of efficiency,
conditions of the efficient market hypothesis, and the form of
efficient market hypothesis, and the types of price behaviour
models.
Chapter Three is a review of the literature rnnr.erninz the'
efficient market theory, the random walk, semi-strong and the
strong form of efficient market hypotheses, and covers well-
developed countries, including those of Europe and the Far East.
The implications of an efficient market hypothesis are also
discussed in this chapter.
The critique of the efficient market hypothesis will be explored
in the fourth chapter.
The Important question of the relation between market efficiency
and stock valuation is explored in Chapter Five. An efficient
market Should price the security so as to fully reflect the
firm's earning power. The uncertainty surrounding the stream of
future income riouds this issue and has prompted debate among
economists and financial analysts as to how the market values a
given stock at anytime.
Chapter Six reviews the historical development, organisation and
regulations of the Uwait Stock Exchange.
Chapter Seven 4- ,=,c t c for the existence of Pffir-i=nry in ths Kuwait
-5-
Stock Market and the methodology of the study. - In examining the
Kuwait Stock Exchange, the weak form of efficient market
hypothesis is tested. Two different series of data are utilised
to explore the randomness of successive stock price changes.
Strong independence of successive price change may signify a high
degree of market efficiency in KSE. The finding of significant
correlation between price changes for the securities would imply
that investors can use trading rules to make abnormal profits.
The issue underlying the existence of over-the-counter market and
a new development in the market that is the establishment of the
Gulf Public Companies will be described in Chapter Eight, while
Chapter Nine contains a detailed analysis of the 1982 crash in
the over-the-counter market in Kuwait, which may have been the
cause of inefficiency in KSE.
Chapter Ten examines the factors whose impact on efficiency
appears to be significant. We are of. the opinion that
information, government rules and exchnnze rezulations as well as'
market facilities, particularly in the form of human resources,
play an important role in upgrading market efficiency. We shall
explore the poor regulation of the Kuwait stock exchange, which
has contributed a great deal to the weakening of the market.
This factor is apparently the most important obstacle to the
organisation of the market.
Government rules and exchange regulations are necessary to market
development, particularly at its incipient stage. They may, to a
great extent, facilitate public access to the information
imperative for investment decision-making. Information, the
backbone of market efficiency, passes through three phases before
it is reflected in prices: generation, dissemination and
interpretation. If all three function properly the market will
be informationally efficient which is a prerequisite for
a l lorational efficiency. If, for any reason, accurate and
sufficient information is not promptly reflected in prices,
market efficiency will further deteriorate. The phases
seneroticm and int prpretation call for rnatower wIth r-•cg"sir
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expertise in the areas of finance, accounting alad allied fields.
We shall explore the total size of this human resource to measure
its adequacy in the Kuwait capital market. We hypothesise that
the shortage of expertise at the present time impedes stock
market development. 	 /-
To conclude the study, in Chapter Eleven we present some
recommendations. We hope that this contribution may lead to the
enhancement of Kuwait's stock market efficiency. Since even a
light improvement will have a large pay-off for the aconomy,
this study is worthwhile. This study's general recommendations
may also benefit the stock markets of other developing countries.
7
CHAPTER ONE
THE STOCK MARKET AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY
1.1 INTRODUCTION
In this introductory chapter we are concerned with a discussion
of the Stock Market and its relation to the real economy; the
determinants of the level of stock prices; the terms efficient
market versus perfect market; economic efficiency in the
financial market; and, finally, information efficiency in the
securities market.
The major socio-economic role of a stock exchange is the
provision of an 'efficient' market for stocks and shares .1 If we
took back to the historical origins of the stocK marKer, we rinci
that it came into being as a place where those who had subscribed
to industrial and commercial enterprises, or to Government loans,
could reconvert their securities into cash. It came into being
as a mechanism whereby a form of investment which is not
inherently liquid could receive the attribute of liquidity, where
Investment in companies . would be reconverted to cash at the
option of the investor without inconveniencing the company. By a
paradox this role - the primary role the market came into being
to fulfil - is today described by economic commentators as the
'secondary' market and the 'primary ' market is regarded as the
original issue of securities by companies so that they-can obtain
finance.
Thanks to this reversal of terminology the Stock Exchange is now
often held to be at fault because industry finds itself at times
unable to raise capital by public issue of securities on terms
that are attractive to the borrowers. The fact of the matter is
that the ex i stence of an active securities market is first and
-8-
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foremost a service to the investing public. The ability of
Government and companies to have recourse to the public for
capital finance is a consequence of the existence of such a
market but not its main purpose.
The flows in the market for securities are illustrated in Figure
1.1 in which a large part of the transactions are carried out
through the medium of the formal Stock Exchange; there are
however, many private deals in unquoted securities, such as over-
the-counter (OTC) trading. ..
The term ' .securities market' adopted here denotes the locus of
the organised market where stocks (common and preferred claims of
equity ownership) and bonds (including debentures and convertible
bonds) are bought and sold using the services of brokers, dealers
and underwriters. Also we use 'stocks and bonds' and 'securities'
synonymously. The emphasis is on the activity of the market
transactions (buying and selling) occurring through stocks
'securities) exchense.2
The stock market plays an important role in the allocation of
scarce capital resources. The allocation of these scarce
resources is influenced in both a..direct and anindirect manner by
the stock market. Direct influence comes from the new-issue and
rights-issue markets (primary markets). Here the company is
seeking additional external finance. Whether such finance is
forthcoming, and at what price, depends on the stock market
assessment of the firm involved and on its prospects. Although
the stock market's reaction to new issues tends to go in cycles
with consequent bunching of issues, there are still significant
differences in the reaction to individual issues, for example,
some firms have found it impossible to raise new finance on the
stock market. whilst others, at the same point in time', have
found it to be quite easy. Thus the stock market does exert
influence on whether companies can raise fresh finance.
Indirect influence on resource allocation is effected by the
stock market in the form of pricing existing shares And
9
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investment comment. If a company has performed badly and if the
immediate prospects appear poor, then we can expect the firm to
almost certainly be showing a relatively poor share price
performance. This will deter or prevent the firm from going to
the stock market to raise new capital and in addition may attract
takeover interest. Potential bids are likely as the bidder will
be hoping to improve the returns on the assets of the firm, which
are at a low level.
Thus, the 'proper' valuation of securities is important as it
provides signals for the allocation of the scarce capital
resources.	 That is, investment funds are channelled towards
companies which can use them most profitably. The efficient
allocation of scarce capital resources need not be stressed too
strongly here; suffice it to say that it is a main determinant of
a nation's growth and standard of living perforbance. The
provision of a well run market-place along with accurate pricing
is required if individuals are going to invest in private enter-
prises either via some investment institution such dS a unit Lrust
or on their own behalf. If the market is not well run, and
securities are incorrectly priced, then many individuals will stop
investing which will seriously reduce the availability of funds to
expanding companies.
1.2 THE STOCK MARKET AND THE REAL ECONOMY
The stock market and economic activity move in similar patterns
as demonstrated in Figure 1.2. This fundamental relationship has
important ramifications. First, it is solid evidence that stock
market prices are meaningful in the sense of reflecting real
economic variables and not simply random numbers driven by the
psyche. Second, it helps explain why the stock market is
reported in so much detail by the media and why it is followed
with concern by so many people.
The general correspondence between stock prices and the business
-10 -
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cycle is evident in Figure 1.3, where a weighted moving average
of a stock price index is mapped against the peak and troughs of
business cycles since 1948. A number of studies investigating
this relationship between stock prices and the national economy
have found that changes in stock markets tend to precede changes
in business conditions by an average of about four months. As a
result, the stock price index is a major component of the index
of leading economic indicators, which consistently provides a
warning about changes in economic activity. 4
 In many ways the
stock price index is the most exciting of the leading economic
indicators. Unlike other components, the stock price index is
available hourly and can be followed as closely as football
scores.
Downturns in business cycles occur when business decisions to
expand are cancelled or postponed and cost-cutting measures and
lay-offs are introduced. . These decisions are made when the
prospects for profits diminish. Since the inherent motivating
force is the eNpectation of profits, i t 4 3 not eurpri',,ir4sthat
the stock market is a leading indicator. Stock prices are set by
the interaction of investors backing their expectation of
corporate profits. The rewards for being the first to identify
changes in the corporate outlook are such that stock prices
reflect an intense competition for information on future profits.
The consensus of expectations regarding the stock market is
consistently one of the best predictors of economic conditione.
1.3 THE DETERMINANTS OF THE LEVEL OF STOCK PRICES
The relationship between stock market indexes and real economic
verimbles provl.des m clue about the determinants of ctock LJricc
levels. The value of a corporation's stock is determined by
expectations regarding future earnings of the corporation and by
the rate at which those earnings are discounted. In a world of
no uncertainty, all sccurities would offer a certain return equal
to the real rate of return on capital. In a world of
uncertainty, returns are not easily explained. In our uncertain
world, feeling about securities can be summarised by a personal
estimate of the likelihood of various changes in future earnings.
The weighted average or the mean of these possible changes is
called expected changes. The greater the mean or expected value
of the possible changes, the higher the price of stocks, other
things being equal. In the risk-averse world, the greater the
uncertainty, the lower the price of stockc. To reiterate, two
determinants of stock price levels are the expected level of
earnings and the degree of investor uncertainty in estimating
what future earnings will be. The third determinant of stock
price levels is the rate at which a prospective stream of certain
earnings is discounted to determine its present value.5
1.4 UNIQUENESS OF THE SECURITIES MARKET
Although much of the efficient market theory has potential
relevance for markets other than the securities market, it needs
to be stressed, however, that the efficiency of security markets
should be reached independently of any perception one might have
of the efficiency of these other markets, not least because a
number of factors combine to make the securities market more
likely than most to be capable of generating prices that fully
reflect the intrinsic value of the assets being traded. 6 These
factors include the homoiseneity of the product, it 1ndcp2ndr-nc
from investors' tastes, its location independence, and the
market's extensive informational support.
1 - Homogeneity
The securities market comprises substantially a single product.
the c l aim to future returns subject to risk. Although the
industrial operations that underlie securities are diverse And
individualisti c , the securities themselves provide essentially
the same type of product and are therefore highly cubstitutable.
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Whatever class of security or type of industry is involved,
whatever the location of the enterprise or the .currency in which
the securities are expressed, all securities are reducible to two
important variables - expected return and risk - and this
provides a degree of comparability within the price structure of
the securities market that distinguishes it significantly from
most other markets.
2 - Taste Independence
The value of a security is substantially independent of taste. A
specific risk-return combination can be aszumed normally to have
a particular value to investors whatever its mode. The only
aspect of a security which might conceivably be vulnerable to
investors' preferences is the level of its risk. Certainly, in
aggregate, their tastes will affect the value of the market
portfolio of all risky assets relative to the value of a riskless
asset, but taste should not affect the value of individual
securities relative to one another.
3 - Location-Independence
The values of most commodities are in part at least, dependent on
their physical attributes, but the values of intangible assets
such as securities are substantially independent of location. As
Keane put it, the shares of a company located in America,
mispriced, are potentially no less of interest to the New Yorker
than to the San Franciscan, and may be of equal interest to e
Londoner (if foreign exchange barriers are absent). Securities
are therefore more likely then most rr:mmoditiesto bnunder
constant and intense scrutiny.7
4 - Information Support
Perhaps the most outstanding feature of the securities market,
and the one that more especially sets it apart from others, is
the highly organised and elaborate information machinery which
services it. It differs from most other markets not simply in
the quality and amount of the information supply, but in the
rapidity with which the information is disseminated amonst
- 13 -
market participants. In the securities market information
communicators have made the fullest use of curnent technology to
a far greeter degree than is found in most other markets, which
presumably owes much to the influence of the three preceding
characteristics. Thus, the homogeneity of the product reduces
the compass of the informational demand and establishes the focus
of relevance on the two variables, risk and expected return.
Taste-independence reduces the range of investors' potential
information needs. Location-independence provides the necessary
motivation for seeking rapid and widespread dissemination.
These characteristics are not enough in themselves to ensure an
efficient market, but they do distinguish the securities market
from most other markets sufficiently to cause it to come nearer
to the economist's concept of the perfectly competitive markeL
which will be discussed next.
1.5 EFFICIENT MARKET vs PERFECT MARKET
In order to describe efficient capital markets, it is useful
first of all to contrast them with perfect capital markets. The
following conditions are necessary for perfect capital markets:
a) markets are frictionless, i.e. there are no transaction
costs or taxes, all assets are marketable, and there are no
constraining regulations;
b) there is perfeci competition in product and securities
markets. In product markets this means that all producers
supply goods and services at minimum average cost, and in
the securities market it means that all participants are
pr i ce takers;
c) markets are informationally efficient, i.e. information is
costless, and it is received simultaneously by all
individuals;
-14-
d)	 all individuals are rational expected-utility maximisers.
Given these conditions, both product and securities markets will
be allocationally and operationally efficient. (Operational
efficiency deals with the cost of transferring funds). In the
idealised world of perfect capital markets, transaction costs are
assumed to be zero, therefore we have perfect operational
efficiency,8
Capital market efficiency is much less restrictive than the
notion of perfect capital markets. In an efficient market,
prices fully and instantanaously reflect all available relevant
information. This means that when assets are traded, prices are
accurate signals for capital allocation.
To see the difference between perfect markets and efficient
markets, we can relax some of the perfect market assumptions.
For example, we can still have efficient capital markets if
markets are not frictionless. Prices will still fully reflect
all available information if, for example, security traders have
to pay brokerage fees. 9 More important, there can be imperfect
competition in product markets and still be efficient capital
markets. Hence, if a firm can reap monopoly profits in the
product market, the efficient capital market will determine a
security price which fully reflects the present value of the
anticipated stream of monopoly profits. Hence we can have
allocational inefficiency in product markets but still havaa
efficient capital markets.
Finally, it is not necs....y to hove costles3 informatiou
efficient capital markets. As long as markets for information
are competitive and no one has monopolistic access to new
.information, then capital markets can be efficient,10
1.6 ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY IN THE FINANCIAL MARKETS
Financial markste exist for the trading of securities by which
-1R-
the issuers of the' financial claims acquire funds to finance
their operations, and individuals form portfolios with the
purpose of maximising the expected utility of their lifetime
consumption. These markets function in the double role of
raising fresh capital by supplying new securities, as well as
revising portfolios within the existing stock of securities.
The need for the primary securities market to be supplemented by
a secondary market stems from the demand for liquidity. Since
the basic purpose of individuals is to satisfy their consumption
needs through time. they should be able to liquidate their
portfolios readily.
For the markets of financial assets to perform their role
according to the prerequisites of economic efficiency, their
performance ought to fulfil two criteria: (1) allocational
efficiency, and (2) operational efficiency.
1.6.1 Allocational Efficiency
The a-^nom i c mar 4 t of a security lies in the fact that it.
facilitates the financing of the productive operations of
society, and provides the holder with an array of future payoffs
for his future consumption. Therefore, in appraising the
efficiency of the pricing mechanism of the market, we face two
problems: (1) the problem of distributive efficiency, i.e.
whether trading of securities leads to a consumer/investor Pareto
optimality,
	 and (2), the problem of the efficiency of
investment. 11
 This latter problem traditionally has been
referred to as the problem of Allncmtinnml efficiency in the
financial markets.
If a securities market works as an efficient resource allocator.
then the pricing of securities is such as to establish equivalent
rates of return or cost of financing :Al comparable investments,
i.e. comparable in terms of the risk inherent in the projects
undertaken. This Will ensure that firms that promise to pay the
highest expected rewards on their securities for a given level of
risk will attract funds with priority, and nt the lowest possible
- 16 -
cost. 12
 This follows from the fact that the value of securities
depends on the size of the future cash flows to be received by
the investor, accounting,of course, for the inherent risk. The
higher the market price of the securities, the larger the flow of
capital to the firms and consequently, the lower their cost of
financing. As Baumol has pointed out, in this case, the
economy's available funds will be directed toward those users who
can make the best use of them by providing the maximum possible
profits, according to the profit maximisation principle that
rules the production equilibrium of the firm.13
In this respect therefore security prices, and particularly stock
prices, should incorporate the perceptions of the market
participants about future earnings prospects of the firms; thus
the ability of the market to adjust prices so as to reflect a
long-term competitive equilibrium in the allocation of capital
appears to be of utmost importance for the preservation of the
allocation efficiency of the market.
First, there is the possibility that the conditions and costs of
financing may be such that these factors will induce firms to
avoid the primary market to raise fresh capital, thus downgrading
the importance of the allocational role of the market.14
Second, there may be a lack of utilisation of the proper and
relevant informatidn by the market participants in their trading
of securities.ls
Third, the existence of market operational costs, although
competitive, may cause price distortions that rr,oult in return
differentials not directly explained by the expected rewards
promised by firms.16
All of the above distortions constitute impediments that can be
found extensively in the operation of =meil capita) markets.
1.6.2 Operational Efficiency
The financial markets, besides being allocationally efficient,
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should also function with technical or operational efficiency.
This is the property of those securities markets where the
services of raising new capital and transacting are carried out
at the minimum possible cost. In other words, this property is
akin to a situation where the operations of the market are
organised in a competitive fashion to ensure that the relevant
costs are driven down to their minimum level.
The costs which are relevant for judging the operational
efficiency of the securities market consist of the underwriting
and flotation costs of new issues of securities, the commission
fee paid in the public transfer of outstanding issues, and the
costs for the immediacy of transacting. The lower these costs
are, the greater the operational efficiency of the market.
Friend's operational efficiency' (in Stigler's terminology is
technical efficiency) which depicts an idea that capital market
cost reduction is the main determinant in market efficiency.
Stigler's concern about an efficient capital market centres
around the investor's Interest. He states:
Efficient capital markets are more important than protection
of investors ... in fact, efficient capital markets were the
major protection of investors."17
He explains technical (operational) efficiency in Friend's
terminology. Stigler contends that the criterion of efficiency
is the cost of consummating a transaction. The lower this cost,
the higher would be the efficiency of the market. 18 Stigler
believes the eize of the issue is a major determinant in fast
consummation of each transaction. Further he argues:
... an efficient market is commonly expected to display the
property of resilience (to use an unfamiliar word for a
property whose absence is called ithinness').1g
is the ability to absorb a market bid or ask order (i.e.
without a price limit) without an appreciable fluctuation in
price .20
Stigler's definition of an efficient market seems ap,.„,.iate
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since the limit of efficiency is pure competition, and in pure
competition all homogenous goods would be sold at almost the same
price.
However,. resilience does not depend solely upon the size of the
.	 .
issue as Stigler suggests; one more factor is vital - the number
of shareholders in a corporation. Obviously, it would make a
greet difference if the bulk of shares of a corporation were
owned by one, or a few investors, rather than thousands. For
instance, the transaction motive of 1000 may be a thousand times
larger than the transaction motive of one investor. a Thus, the
number of holders of each issue affects the resilience of the
issue and, -in the aggregate, the resilience of the market as a
whole.
An allocationally and technically (operationally), efficient
market serves the interests of both savers and users of funds.
In such a market, no investor can gain anything at the expense of
another. Thus, gains or losses are based on the true changes in
the earning power of the firm.
1.7 INFORMATIONAL EFFICIENCY IN THE SECURITIES MARKETS
In the previous section, the allocational and operational
efficiencies were defined and discussed. It was shown that the
fundamental goal of the securities market is to allocate
efficiently the economy's capital resources. The degree with
which this task is accomplished depends greatly on the level of
operational efficiency attained by the market.
The consequences of the realised overall efficiency of the market
will be reflected in the prices of the traded securities. Thus,
the question that naturally arises Is how the securities should
be priced relative -to each other at any point in time so that the
allocational end operational efficiencies of the market are .
ensured. Or, to put it another way, how should security prices
-1g-
behave in efficient capital markets.
The answer to this question has led to the recognition of an
additional approach to describing an environment of market
efficiency which is referred to as informational efficiency. The
contribution of the latter for the formal study of the securities
market lies in the development of hypotheses and models of price
behaviour that can be tested.
The substance of informational efficiency is that in an efficient
market, prices 'fully reflect' available information.22
Therefore the market is supposed to be an efficient mechan i sm in
the processing of information. According to Fama:
First it is easy to determine sufficient conditions for
capital market efficiency. For example, consider a market
in which (1) there are no transaction costs in trading
securities, (2) all available information it costlessly
available to all market participants for the current price
and distribution of future prices of each security. In such
a market the current price of a security obviously 'fully
reflects' all available information.a
Firstly, it is apparent from the above quotation that the
description of an efficient market abstracts from the existence
of positive transaction costs in terms of either transfer fees or
liquidity costs for immediacy of transactions. Therefore, the
information which is required to be reflected in security prices
must be intrinsically related to the variables that determine the
value of securities in the perfect market.
Secondly, the given definition of information efficiency and the
statement about the conditions for such efficiency to be obtained
do not clearly suggest how security prices should behave either
contemporarily or intertemporally. The specification of en exact
structure of prices requires the supplement of an hypothesis
about the behavioUr of security prices which conforms to some
market equilibrium model. Additionally, any such hypothesised
model must be cast in a testable form so that its support or
refutation is empirically feasible.
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As information arrives at the market randomly, it should be
reflected very rapidly in the prices, so that no one can take
undue advantage of the new information. Thus, prompt adjustment
of security prices to new information is one property a model of
Informational efficiency ought to be able to test. Fast and
uniform assessment of new information by the market participants
will make sure that the expected and realised prices of the
securities coincide, thus precluding the monopolistic exploit-
ation of information by some investors.
Furthermore, the investors should utilise their information in a
way that establishes future security prices which are the same as
those that would have been obtained if the true and relevant set
of information were indeed utilised. In Fama's words, this
... emphasises that market efficiency means that the market
is aware of all available information and uses it
correctly. ' 24
This new specification of informational efficiency avoids the
earlier shortcomings, whereby misinformation was not conceptually
excluded from the pricing of securities.
For the above statement to become operationally testable, we need
a market equilibrium model fOr security prices that compares the
pricing outcome of the market to that hypothesised by the
theoretical model. Therefore, "any test is simultaneously a test
of efficiency and of the assumptions about the characteristics of
market equilibrium."25 In turn, any such model of equilibrium
security prices should be consistent with the goal of
allocational efficiency of the market.
To summarise, in an efficient market, security prices should
reflect all available information necessary to lead to
allocational and operational efficiency.
1.8 CONCLUSION
In this chapter we have .discussed the important role of the stock
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market, and its relation to the real economy. The stock market
Is considered to be a leading indicator in the economy. The
difference between a perfect market and an efficient market is
discussed, and we show that we can relax some of the perfect
market assumptions and still have an efficient market. The final
section explored economic efficiency in the financial market. We
stated that for the markets of financial assets to perform their
role, their performance must fulfil two criteria, allocational
and operational efficiency.
The next chapter discusses the efficient market hypothesis and
outlines in more analytical detail the various theoretical models
that have been advanced with respect to the behaviour of security
prices. More specifically, we will begin the next chapter with a
discussion of the background of the efficient market hypothesis,
definition of the hypothesis, forms of market efficiency, and
types of price behaviour models.,
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CHAPTER TWO
THE EFFICIENT MARKET HYPOTHESIS
2.1 INTRODUCTION
From the early part of the 20th century until the 1950's, there
was a curious and extremely important controversy about- the
process which determines stock prices. Initially the controversy
focussed on the extent to which successive changes in stock
prices were independent of each other. In more technical terms,
the issue was whether or not stock prices follow a random walk.
If they do, knowledge of the past sequence of prices cannot be
used to secure an abnormally high rate of return.
As evidence accumulated that the walk is random, academic
attention shifted to an investigation of the kind of market-.
making process or price-setting process which would produce such
a result. This led to the theory of efficient markets. The
nature of the efficient market hypothesis can be explained as the
following: an efficient market is a place where the prices
prevailing are the best available guide to the value of the
commodity being traded. Thus there is no better indicator of the
value of a share than its current market price. The
revolutionary nature of this concept lies in three major
implications :1
1	 Chartism (i.e. looking at historic prices) is a waste
of time.
2	 Much investment analysis has little economic value.
3	 Professionally managed funds on average do no better
and probably worse than a naive policy of buy and hold.
The efficient market hypothesis is largely confirmed by the
evidence. The presence of many investurs, einalysts, stockbrokers
etc., in the market place for shares ensures that competition is
fierce and as a result, share prices are generally right. That
is to say, shares in general are neither cheap nor dear. In
fact, the stock market is quite a safe place because you are
unlikely to pay too much for any particular share. Equally,
bargains will not come your way. However it must be clear that
If share prices are efficient, then a good deal of investment
research is probably wasted. Indeed, the whole investment
process can be called into question; should any time at all be
devoted to investment analysis if share prices are efficient? Of
course, the answer is yes, for it is this type of activity which
makes for efficiency. (See Section 2.4)
2.2 DEFINITION OF EFFICIENT MARKET HYPOTHESIS
An efficient market has been defined in many ways but perhaps the
simplest, yet most general statement of the proposition
offered by Fames:
"Market efficiency requires that in setting the prices of
securities at any time t, the market correctly uses al]
available information"2
Another useful definition is from Jensen
"A market is efficient with respect to a given information
set if it is impossible to make profits by tracking on the
basis of that information set. By economic profit is meant
the risk-adjusted return net of all costs"3
2.2.1 Controversy on a definition of Efficient Market Hypothesis 
There is almost general agreement about the general or loose
definition of market efficiency where a market is considered as
efficient if prices always 'fully reflect' all available
information. Because the terms 'folly reflect' And 'available
information' are vague and non-operational, there is a need for
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an accurate, testable definition of market efficiency and here
exists the controversy between writers.
The first attempt to provide a practical definition for market
efficiency came from Fame (1965) 4 when he considered a market to
be efficient with respect to some information if 'the abnormal
expected returns from trading strategies based on that
information are zero'. That was what he called a fair game. The
fair game and abnormal expected returns definition suffers from
certain weaknesses.
First abnormal returns should be relative to some base, normal
expected returns. The question here is how to determine the
normal returns and what is the basis for distinguishing normal
from abnormal returns. Fame does not consider this.
Secondly, it is well known that the returns of any portfolio are
related to the risk of the portfolio, so some of the returns
could be due to the differences in portfolio's risk which should
be considered in defining abnormal returns. The use of the risk
adjusted returns is not considered at all in Fame's definition.
Thirdly, the definition did not consider that investors may hold
heterogeneous beliefs and this may affect their required rate of
return on securities.
Many researchers tried to avoid Fama's weaknesses in defining
market efficiency: Jensen (1978) 5 , Brealey and Myers (1981)6,
Rubenstein (1975), but unfortunately all of the definitions
provided suffer again from some of these weaknesses.
Beaver (1981) started by explaining what produces inefficient
markets, in his attempts to provide a definition avoiding the
weaknesses of Fame's definition, because he thought that the
discussion about efficient markets becomes easier after
determining the causes of inefficiency. He shows how some
individuals can perceive a discrepancy between assessed intrinsic
value and price, and determined the three conditions under which
such
	
On the bAsiA of this Beaver defined
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market efficiency as follows:
"A security market is said to be efficient with respect to
an information system if, and only if, the prices act as if
everyone observes the signals from that information system.
In other words, prices act as if there is universal
knowledge of that information.	 If prices have this
property, they 'fully reflect' the information system."7
Beaver has therefore successfully avoided the three weaknesses of
Fama's definition.	 Rather than comparing abnormal with normal
returns, which is so difficult as mentioned before, Beaver
compares the share price with its assessed intrinsic value which
Is possible and more meaningful, thus he avoids the first
weakness. Talking about the intrinsic value should by necessity
include the consideration of the portfolio's risk. .Lastly, his
definition considers the heterogeneity of investor's belief by
stating that everyone acts as if he observes the signal from the
information system.
2.3 CONDITIONS OF EFFICIENT MAR= HYPOTHESIS
Before dealing with the forms of market efficiency, which involve
the process by which information becomes reflected in prices, it
may be worthwhile to discuss briefly the conditions under which
the hypothesis of efficient market works.
Many writers, including, Kihlstrom and Mirman (1975) and Fame
(1970) 8 investigated these conditions. Kihlstrom and Mirman
talked in general terms about the conditions under which the
inside information will be accurately disseminated to outsiders,
"...when information becomes common knowledge among outsiders as
well as insiders." 9 Under these conditions the writers suggest
that all traders who have the same initial beliefs will agree
about the expectations for the future. Fame was more determined
in putting the condition under which the hypothesis works.
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These conditions are:
1	 There are no transaction costs in trading securities.
2	 All available information is costlessly available to
all market participants.
3 All agree on the implications of current information
for the current price and distribution of future prices
of each security.
Fame noticed that these conditions ara not applicable in real
life where there are transaction costs, information is costly and
individuals do not necessarily agree on the implications of the
information. Consequently, he stated that "Fortunately, these
conditions are sufficient for market efficiency, but not
necessary."
In fact, there is no need for such inapplicable conditions to
determine market efficiency: the consideration which is of
paramount importance for market efficiency is the availability of
the relevant information for investors' decision making. If
information is available to investors and relevant for Judging
securities, this information will be rapidly reflected in
securities prices.
After showing the needlessness of any inapplicable conditions for
market efficiency, the question is how the information is
reflected in price. In fact, this question has been of major
Interest to many writers during the past few years and each has
approached it from his own angle. The sum of these constitutes
the theory which involves the process by which information
becomes reflected in stock prices.
Ersalsy end Myers (198 1 ) 10 and Honfrey et.a l .,( 1 977) 11 covRred
economic angle, that is they explained the process on the basis
of economic theory.	 From the economic viewpoint, if a major
disparity between price and investment value exists (intrinsic
value), this will be quickly noted by alert analysts who will
seek to take advantage of their discoveries. If securities were
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priced below value they would be purchased to take advantage of
the low price, creating an increase in demand and pressure for
the price to increase. Conversely, securities priced above their
value would be sold, creating an increase in supply, which pushes
the price down. This can be explained in another way, once
information is publicly available, investors try to purchase
those securities which are expected to show strong growth and Lo
dispose of the less attractive properties. By these actions, the
price of securities which are expected to do well are bid up to a
price which reflects the average expectations and vice versa.
Thus, from the economic viewpoint, it is the action of competing
decision makers that makes the market efficient.
Verrucchia viewed the same point from a different angle. He
constructed a model in which the price acts as an aggregator of
beliefs (as distinct from an aggregator of information). As the
number of individuals increases, prices behave as if everyone
observed the 'ungarbled signal', and there is no explicit'
learning from the prices involved. Hence, while prices reflect
the ungarbled signal, individual beliefs or portfolios may not
reflect this information.	 Thus, he concluded that given equal
information and transactions costs for a number of securities,
...those securities for which there are more market participants
(proxied by trading volume, number of shares outstanding, or
number of shareholders) will show lower quasi-profits than those
securities for which there are fewer market participants".12
In this context, it seems that there is no well constructed and
generally accepted theory (yet) to show the process of how
information becomes reflected in price. All the ideas presented
above explain this process from different angles but there is
still a lack of general theory to connect all these pieces
together in a framework.
2.4 FORMS OF EFFICIENT MARKET HYPOTHESIS
The total amount of Information that r:an h p ntilispd at any point
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Figure 2.1: Overview of efficient market hypothesis
Efficient Market
Hypothesis
Form of EMH	 Type of price behaviour model
week for*	 aemi -strong strong 	 Fair game	 Random walk+ aubmertinvale
+The Kuwait Stock Market will be tested in the week form efficiency in terms of the randomwelk model
in time can be broken down into three parts. The first component
includes information that refers to the history of prices (or
returns) up to a given point. The second component includes all
new information that becomes publicly available. Lastly, the
third component allegedly contains additional information that is
held monopolistically by some of the investors. It is very
important to distinguish between the three forms because the
market may be efficient with respect to some information systems,
but not to others. The three forms will be discussed in the
following lines on the basis of Fame's classification (See Figure
2.1), which shows the three forms of the efficient market
hypothesis and the three price behaviour models which generated
the EM!-!.
2.4.1	 Weak Form Efficiency
The weak form asserts that current prices fully reflect the
Information implied by the historical sequence of prices. In
other words, investors cannot enhance their ability to select
stocks by knowing the history of successive prices and the
results of analysing them in all possible ways. The hypothesis
tested in this case is that knowledge of the past history of
prices (or returns) cannot help the investor to predict futue
prices resulting systematically in excess profit. In a market
regime where this hypothesis stands up well the implication is
that the goal of technical analysis (chartism) becomes
fruitless.14 It is impossible to discern any pattern in the
sequence of security prices, therefore predictions wil l
 not
improve the fortunes of the investor.
There are six major statistical techniques used for testing for
weak form efficient market hypothesis:
1	 serial . correlation test
run test
3	 filter technique
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4	 fixed proportion maintenance strategies
5	 moving averages
6	 spectrum analysis.
These techniques generally fall into two categories: those that
test for trends in stock prices and thus infer whether profitable
trading systems could be developed (such as the serldi
correlation test and runs test), and those that test such
mechanical systems directly. In this dissertation we will use
the serial correlation and runs tests to test weak form
efficiency in the Kuwait Stock Market. Both tests will be
discussed in detail in Chapter Seven. Others will be explained
in Chapter Three.
2.4.2 Semi-Strong Form Efficiency
The semi-strong form asserts that current prie--; fully reflect.
public knowledge (information) about the underlying companies and
that efforts to acquire and analyse this knowledge cannot be
expected to produce superior investment results. For example,
one cannot expect to earn superior rates of return by analysing
financial reports (accounting), announcements of dividend changes
or stock splits, etc.
The condition set is actually the new information which is
released to the public. This information may refer to economy-
wide, industry-wide, or firm-specific news. The hypothesis is
that in an efficient market, security prices reflect promptly and
properly the information as the latter unfolds itself through
time in a publicly accessible manner.
The hypothesis is concerned with the testing of the speed of
price reaction of the traded issues to new information. If the
market functions inefficiently in this respect, it means that
prices adjust to new information with a lag, and consequently, if
one is able to determine issues that behave this way, the
=urras=iva trIce movements could be anticipated, and excess
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profit reaped. Thus, although prices may indeed reflect all
available new information, if they do so with a significant lag,
then the semi-strong form of efficiency is violated.
The semi-strong form can only be tested indirectly, namely by
testing what happens to prices on days surrounding announcements
of various types such as earnings, dividends and stock split.
(See Chapter 3 for details of the test of the semi-strong form).
2.4.3 Strong Form Efficiency
After discussion of the weak and semi-strong forms of the
efficient market hypothesis, we will examine the strong form,
namely that stock prices reflect not only what is generally known
through public announcements, but also what may not be known
generally.
In the strong form of an efficient market:
The concern is whether any investor or groups (e.g.
managements of mutual funds) have monopolistic access to any
information relevant to the formation of prices.15
Certain groups have monopolistic access to information. The
ardent quest for original insights end small revealing clues by
legions of security analysts could also confer superior ability
to predict the future course of stock prices. Analyses of the
performance of portfolios managed by groups that might have
special information constitutes a test of the strong form market
efficiency.	 These tests consist of an examination of the
performance of professionally managed portfolios.
The argument is that the performance of professionally managed
portfolios, where they were consistently superior to market
performance as a whole, or to relevant subsets in that market,
would indicate an element of inefficiency in the price-setting
process. Consistent superiority would suggest that some people
have superior access to relevant information not reflected in
stock pricss.	 .'TL.. most visible c; the profes-4ionnlly 11:.m:7tqed
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portfolios are the mutual funds). Tests of the stronger form of
efficient market hypothesis include testing mutual fund
performance (unit trusts), the trading of specialists on the
floor of the stock exchange, tests of the profitability of
Insider trading, block trading etc. (See Chapter Three for tests
concerning the strong form).
In conclusion, the concern in all cases (forms) is 'abnormal
profit'. Were the market not efficient, abnormal profit would
exist for some investors at the expense of others; in addition,
prices would not reflect the earning power of the . firm.
Therefore, the market would'
 neither serve the interests of
Investors or allocate the resources to their best use.
Practically, the benefit of testing market efficiency with
respect to three different sets of information is the;t it enables
us to find out to what extent the market mechanism functions
efficiently and at what point it breaks down.
2.5 TYPE OF PRICE BEHAVIOUR MODELS
According to Fama's classification, 16 the tests of the efficient
market hypothesis originated from the following models of
security prices. First, the random walk model, second, expected
return or 'fair game' model; third, the submartingale model.
Fame reviews Ihe theory of efficient markets by looking into all
three models, each explained below.
2.5.1 Random-walk Model 
The random-walk model can be stated in the following form.
Price at time t = price at time t-1 + residual at time t
where the residual series ha 3 zero mean and is uncorrelated with
all previous terms in the residual series. In symbols the model
becomes:
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P t = Pt-1 + U t
Where the expected value E(U t ) mg 0, and the covariance,
COV(U tUt-s ) = 0, all S * 0,
P
t = current price of the stock and
U
t the residual series (the price changes).
If this model is true it immediately follows that the best
predictor of tomorrows price is todays price or, equivalently:
price changes cannot be predicted from previous prices.
This theory claims that price movements are not predictable, and
these movements are random about the true intrinsic value. Note
that the random-walk theory does not claim that the prices are
random numbers; rather, the prices represent the best estimate of
the intrinsic value.
In the literature the * cm 'random walk' is often misinterprsx:i
as if price changes are random, due to chance, without any causal
reason. This is not true. The efficient market model assumes
that prices change when the market receives new information about
the activities of the corporation or general condition of the
economy. Such information causes the investors' perceptions
about the prospects of their investment to change. Continuous
changes in investors' perception with respect to their
investments causeth the consummation of transactions. The
efficient market model assumes that changes in perception are
random.. Thus, at any moment in time, the next price change is
random with respect to knowledge at that moment.
Random-walk theoreticians believe that the future path of the
price level of a security is no more predictable than the path of
a series of cumulated random numbers. In statistical terms, the
theory says that successive price changes are independent,
identically distributed random variables. Most simply, this
Implies that the series of price changes hac no more memory ,that
IS. the past cannot he used Fo predict the future En 2,:nv
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P(E2 )
meaningful way. However, the random-walk model- implies that the
distribution of price changes is stationary over time, although
future price changes are completely independent of past
information.
That is:
f(Rj,t+1 II t ) = f(Rj,t+1 )
	
(1)
The above statement says that the conditional (on the information
set I) and simple distributions of an independent r3ndom vzrinbic
are identical. In addition, the density function f must be the
same for all t. To explain the meaning of conditional
probability let E l and E2 be any two events. The conditional
probability of E l , given E2 has occurred is written as
	
P (E 1 /E2 )	 and defined
P (E and E2 )Pr(E 1 /E2 ) =	 1
f is the probability density function (P.d.f) of continuous
random variable which is a function that allocates probabilities
to all of the ranges of values that random variables can take.
In addition the statement implies that future expectation does
not depend upon past information (I t ). In other words, since past
information has been fully captured and capitalised in the
present price, it is irrelevant for future price change. As a
consequence, future pricc changPs are totally der)endnn i- on np,a
information that has not yet reached the market.
Example 1 
We will consider an example to better clarify the concept of
random walk, which will be tested in this dissertation..
Assume a service company consisting solely of £1,000 in liquid
assets (treasury bills say), and having 1,000 shares in issue.
In a simple world the share price will be it. Now suppose the
'firm tenders for a contract which is worth £1.000 in Caen.
Suppose further that there is competition for the contract and
(2)
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that our firm's chances of getting it are only 2/5ths •2 out
of 5). If the company announces it has Ei 40 percent chance of
securing a £1,000 contract, the share price would immediately
rise to discount the value of possibility. The value of
possibility is the mathematical expectation. This is simply the
sum of the probabilities of each outcome multiplied by the value
accruing to the firm under each outcome.
In our example, it is the following sum:
Two possible outcomes
1	 Firm wins contract
chances X value of outcome = 2/5th x £1,000 = £400
2	 Firm loses contract
Chances X value of outcome = 3/5ths x
	 £0 =	 0
=£400
Then the value of the firm would rise to £1,400 to reflect the
possibility of winning the contract. If the firm is successful
and announces as the winning of the contract the value of the
firm will rise to £2,000 and the share price will rise to £2 per
share to discount fully the value of the contract. If on the
other hand the contract is 'awarded elsewhere, our firm's share
price will fall back to its original level of El reflectin g no
permanent change in the firm's value.
The three distinct states of the firm are set out below.
Time = 1
	
Time = 2	 Time = 3 Time = 3
Announcement
	
Announce tender	 Announce Announce
offer and chances	 success	 failure
of success •
Value of firm	 £1,000.	£1,000 +2/5ths
x £1.000	 £2,000	 £1,000
Share price	 El	 1.40	 E2
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The change of share price between the second and third periods is
a random movement. The analysis has shown that we cannot predict
any more accurately the value of the firm prior to the award of
the contract. The price movement between period 2 and 3 is due
entirely to chance. This does not mean that the firm placing the
contract is behaving irrationally or indeed in a random fashion.
2.5.2 Expected Return or 'Fair Game' Model 
This theory in general states that the equilibrium price, or•
expected return on securities, given past information, is a
function of its risk, as follows:
(1) E(I5j,t+1 II t ) = Pjt+E(K	 Ij,r+1 I t )Pjt
Where:
P = Price of security j
I
t
 = information at time t
R = CPj,t+1 - Pjt )/3t = one period total return on security j
(including dividend)
- indicates that the relevant variable is random
E651,t+1 II t ) =	 )P.
When E is the expected value operator.The conditional expectation
notation (conditional on information I
t
) in the above equation is
meant to imply, however, that whatever expected return model is
assumed to apply, the information in I t is fully utilised in
determining equilibrium expected return.	 This is the sense in
which I, is fully reflected in the formation of the P .it
Equation I indicates that conditional to some set of information
the equilibrium of price security J at time t+1 is a function of
its price at time t plus the one-period expected return (the
equilibrium return) on that security. Furthermore. Lhe informat-
ion set I
t
 has been fully reflected in R . Since the pcicea
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reflect all available information, the market is said to be
efficient. The major assumption of this theory is that the
condition of market equilibrium can be stated in the form of
expectation that fully reflects the set of available information
to the market at the time when the expectation is formed. This
critical assumption rules out the possibility of systematically
abnormal profits or windfall gains.
Fama formally demonstrates the above phenomenon as follows:
- E(5j,t+1 II t ),(2) 11 j,t+1 = F j,t+l
where: CIj,t+1 is the excess profit on security j (i.e. the
difference between observed price (Pj,t+1) and expectation
E(-5t+l ). If the 'fair game' theory holds true then:j, 
(3) E(il.
	 II ) = 0j,t+1
	 t
or, equivalently:
K.	 I,(4) Yj,t+1 = R j	 -,t+l	 EC j,t+1I t ) and
(5) E(?
+l ) = 0
where:
Yj = excess return on security j
R = the rate of return on security j
Relationships (3) and (5) imply that the sequence of fi j and ?
are fair game given the information set (1 1. ). If we consider
e portfolio composed of n securities with Z . invested in each
then the total abnormal profit (Tit) would be
(6)
Tnt+1 = E Zj (I t ) CRj,t+1 - E(Rj,t+1 lit)]j=1
IT	 1
=	 ECYJ,t41,t,
j=1
j = 1,	 n
n = numbPr
risky assets'
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(7) T1t
t+1 =
Where Tit = Total abnormal profit.
Example 2 
The assumption that a 'fair game' or expected return rules out
the possibility of abnormal profit (excess profit is zero) can be
explained in the following example.
Suppose that we have a speculator (in the stock market) and he
can afford to continue playing (investing) in the long run.
Then, according to the fair game theory, he should come out even,
making neither abnormal gains nor abnormal losses. Referring
back to the example one, we can calculate the mathematical
expectation of a shareholder buying at the end of period 2 at
£1.40.
There are two possible outcomes:
(1) Firm wins contract, price rises to £2.
A profit of £0.60.
Probability x value of outcome = 2/5ths £0.60 	 = 24p
(2) Firm loses contract, price fall to £1
A loss of £0.40
Probability x value of outcome = 3/5ths(-£0.40)	 = -24p.
Mathematical expectation = Zero
The expectation is zero.	 Thus we can be as confident buying
shares as when betting on a fair game.
2.5.3 The Submartingale Model 
This theory is a special form of 'fair game' model. The theory
simply assumes that if the market fully reflects the information.
then the price would be determined so that the expected return
would be either greater than or equal to zero. A negative
expected return cannot occur; if the expectation on a security
were negative, cash, the expected return on which is zero, will
be held instPad of that security.	 One exception. however, is
worth mentioning: a security that is negatively correlated with
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the market is bought to reduce the portfolio's -risk, not for its
positive expected return. According to Famé,.if:
P'or I = Information set(8) E(1.5 j,t+1 II t )
P	 = Price of security at time t+1j,t+1
(9) E(A	 II )	 0
then:
...the price sequence (P . ) for security j follows ai
submartingale with respect to information sequence (It).
...If (7) holds as an equality (so that expected returns and
price changes are zero), then the price sequence follows
martingale.17
The three models are summarised below:
Random Walk model: f(R j t+1 II t ) = f(Rj,t+1 )
Expected Return Model: 
E(15j,t+1 II t ) = Pjt + E(14d,r+1 II t )P jt
Submartingale model:	 E(15j,t+1IIt)	 P
2.6 CONCLUSION
This chapter started with a discussion of how the efficient
market hypothesis has come about. An efficient market is one in
which many buyers and sellers react through a sensitive and
efficient mechanism to cause market prices to reflect fully and
virtually instantaneously to what is known about the future of
companies whose securities are being traded. This view caused a
transformation from random walk hypothesis to efficient market
hypothesis.
The importance of market efficiency must not be understated. The
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efficiency of the capital market is one powerful reason investors
are so willing to invest in that market. They are protected by
this efficiency and can be confident, when buying or selling
shares, that they are not at a disadvantage since the price they
trade at incorporates all that is publicly knowable about those
stocks.
In addition, the three forms of efficient market hypothesis were
explored. We stated that: strong form efficiency is concerned
with whether individual investors or groups have 	
access to any information relevant to price formation. One would
not expect such an extreme model to be an exact description of
the world, and it is probably best viewed as a benchmark against
which the importance of deviations from market efficiency can be
Judged. In the less restrictive semi-strong form tests the
information subset of interest includes all obviously publicly
available information, while in the weak form tests, the
information subset is just historical price or return sequences.
The random walk model, fair game model and submartingale model
are the three models where the test of an underlying efficient
market hypothesis originated.
In the next chapter we will explore the literature review of
efficient market hypothesis. The chapter is divided into three
parts. Part one will cover the evidence supporting the efficient
market hypothesis, according to the form of efficiency (weak
form, semi-strong or strong). The second part discusses some
evidence of other, smaller stockmarkets. Finally, in part three
the implication of efficient market hypothesis will be disciJssed
in detail.
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CHAPTER THREE
REVIEW OF EMPIRICAL LITERATURE
AND THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE
EFFICIENT MARKET HYPOTHESIS
3.1 INTRODUCTION
In order to better understand the ramifications of the efficient
market hypothesis to the Kuwait stock market; it will be helpful
to review the historical development of the 'efficient market
hypothesis. Like many theories the concept of market efficiency
evolved from practical interest in a real world problem: the
possibility that an investor might gain abnormal profit from the
application of tradinK rules to the I.A.u%.1.0e and sale of
financial securities, and that various kinds of market
information could be used in formulating such rules. As usually
happens in science, a coherent theory of the efficient capital
market was produced by investigations which lacked scientific
rigour but shared certain intuitive tenets and often reached
quite similar conclusions.
The literature review presented in this chapter will consist of
parts. Tn part one the Pvidenre supporting the efficient
market hypothesis will be covered. We will study the empirical
results of investigations based on increasing levels of
information available to the investor. The weak form hypothesis
of market efficiency employs only past price data. The semi-
strong form considers the effect of all publicly available
Information. Finally, the strong form includes information used
by insiders. In addition, the history of the transformation from
random walk to efficient merket hypothesis will be discussed. In
fart two the evidence of efficiency in other countries with
smaller markets will. be .coveled and fioplay the implications of
the efficient market hypothesis will be discussed.
The reader should bear in mind Fama's observation that for price
to reflect fully all available information is an extreme
hypothesis for which , perfect realisation is unlikely.
Nevertheless, the weight of evidence presented suggests that
market efficiency gives a very credible approximation to the real
world. 1.
3.2 WEAK FORM TESTS REVIEW
The majority of weak form tests try to establish whether prices
on the market follow a Random Walk, but there is a distinction
between the weak form efficient market hypothesis and the random
walk hypothesis. The former requires only that the average of
price changes at time . t be independent of all previous prices.
If large price changes tend to be followed by even larger price
changes (but not in a predictable direction), the random walk
hypothesis is violated while the weak form efficient market
hypothesis is not. Thus, if security prices follow a random
walk, support for the weak form of efficient market hypothesis
follows. This is however, not necessarily the case in reverse.
3.2.1 Background
• The earliest formal study of stock market efficiency is
attributed to Bachelier (1900) 2 . His work with commodity prices
in France provided convincing evidence that speculation in
commodities is a fair game model (in particular the expected
profits to speculators should be zero) : that the expected future
price of a commodity based on past and current price equals the
current price. Thus, though his contributions were ignored for
sixty years, His was the first statement and test of the random
walk model.
As with other early invstisations
	 !).11-ket
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Bachelier's studies purported to establish the presence of the
more restrictive random walk model. With the development of the
theory of statistic processes, others have demonstrated that, in
fact, this early research is concerned with that which is now
defined as the fair game. More specifically, Bachelier's model
is now identified as an example of a martingale, that is:
ECP
t+T IP t' P t-T ...) = P t
	 (1)
Where P t = current price of a security at time t
P t+T = future price of security at time t+T
t-T = past price of a security at time t-T.
Formula (1) implies that a martingale then is simply a sequence
of prices for a security such that the predicted price in the
next period based on current and past information equals the
price in the current period.
• Unaware of Bachelier's work, the Russian economi st Slutskya
conducted independent research into the random walk theory in
1927, with results reported a decade later (Slutsky 1937) His
study confirmed the validity of the fair game theory of Stock
price changes but also suggested the presence of cyclical
patterns. This work went unnoticed by both scholars and
practitioners. • A third, independent study of a non-rigorous form
of random walk model was performed by Working in 1934 on
commodity prices. From his findings he concluded that "To an
important extent where prices resemble a random difference
series, they resemble most closely that which might be derived by
cumulating random numbers drawn from a slightly skewed population
with standard deviation vary ing rather systematically throurzh
time." 4 Thus, Working's finding again pointed towards
speculation market 'efficiency.
The modern work on this subject (random walk) did not begin tintil
1959, when two original and provocative papers were publiAhed.
• In one nAnor . Roberts wAc able to Airmilte tint= AnpesrAnrP nf ?
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Figure 3.l a: Actual Changes in Weekly Stock Prices for 52 weeks
Changes from Friday to Priday (closing) January 6th 1956-Decether
26th 1956, Dow Jones industrial Average
Figure 3.1b:	 Simulated Changes in Weekly Stock Prices for 52
weeks
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Source: Roberts, Stock Market Patterns, pp5-6
chart of a market index by adding random humbers together.
Starting with a number (445 in the diagram) he them added a
random number to obtain the change on the first week, and a
second random number to obtain the change in level between week 1
and week 2 and so on, thus obtaining a simulated chart of an
index5
 See Figure 3.1.a and b.
Looking at charts 3.1a and 3.1b, the similarity is striking. An
observer with an inclination to see familiar patterns in these
wavy lines could detect the well-known head and 3hculd2rp
formulation and other patterns both in the stock prices series
and in the random series. However, this analogy helps to explain
the nature of the random walk hypothesis. Each price change is
Independent of the previous change in the same way as random
numbers are independent of each other. So, any chant of a share
price over a period of time must look like a "wandering series".
This does not, however, imply that the price change is in itself
random. Price movements are merely reflections of - changes in
investors' expectations of returns. These expectations are based
on rational assessments which vary as events occur (for example,
the winning of a contract given as an example in the previous
chapter).	 It is these events which occur at random and which
therefore give rise to random share price movements. The role of
the investor in this process is completely rational. However,
although strongly suggestive, this type of graphic representation
does not necessarily 'prove' that share prices follow a random
walk.	 It certainly has a powerful impact but it was left to
other researchers to provide scientific evidence.
• The_se•nd work appearing in 1959, which provoked controversy and
stimulated resear ,	 •sborne.6	 Osborne, a natural
physicist, scien tA ysed
.
 share prices to determine
whether price movements behaved according to the laws governing
the movements of small particles in suspension - Brownian motion.
In particular, he was interested in seeing whether share price
movements were similar to the movements of very small particles.
He found a very high degree of conformity :between the stock price
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Table 3.1 Average Correlation
Time
Interval
Average
Serial
Correlation
Country
KENDALL/ 1 week 0.131 U.K
ALZ(AICER 2 weeks 0.134
(19 indices) 4 weeks 0.006
8 weeks -0.054
16 weeks 0.156
MOOR 1 week -0.056 U.S.
(30 companies)
COICTNER 1 week -0.047 U.S.
(45 companies) 14 weeks 0.131
FAMA 1 day 0.026 U.S.
(30 companies) 4 days -0.039 U.S.
9 days -0.057
16 days -0.009
KING i month 0.018 U.O.
(63 comenies)
DRYDEN 1 day 0.086 U.K.
(14 companies) 4 daym 0.009
GRIFFIThB 9 days -0.026 U. K.
(50 companies)* 1 month 0.011
movements and the law governing Brownian motion. Specifically,
the variance of price changes over successively longer intervals
of time increases as the square of the length of time. This
implies that the logarithms of price changes are independent of
each other. Although Osborne's point of view is different, his
findings are consistent with Roberts' work.
The work by Osborne and Roberts was taken seriously by only a
small group of academics at first. Both pieces of work suggested
on the basis of preliminary and tentative investigation, that
stock price changes were random. The first reactions in the
academic community were to devise various ingenious tests of this
randomness using bodies of data considerably more extensive than
these used by either Osborne or Roberts. Those tests will be
reviewed next.
3.2 2 Serial Correlation
Serial correlation is a measure of association between a series
of numbers punctuated by a constant time interval. The serial
correlation method is discussed fully in Chapter 9.
• In the early 1950's, Kendall ? produced the most impressive
Findings confirming the random walk hypothesis. His main work
concerned the analysis of economic time series. He calculated
the first twenty-nine lagged serial correlations of the first
differences of twenty two time series representing speculative
prices. Twenty series of London Industrial share prices on a
weekly basis (see Table 3.1 below). Two of the remaining three
were cash wheat at Chicago one weekly and one monthly, and the
last was spot cotton prices at New York, monthly. Essentially,
Kendall was asking with respect to each weekly series, 'how goo‘-]
is the beet estimate we can make of next week's price change if
we know this week's price change and the changes of the past
twenty nine weeks and correspondingly for the monthly series'.
In other words, Kendall based his finding on the study of a&rial
correlation. Contrary to the zeneral impression amonw, trbddr
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and analysts that stock and commodity prices follow trends.
• Kendall found that knowledge of past price changes yields
substantially no information about future price changes. More
specifically, he found that each period's price change was not
significantly correlated with the preceding period's price change
nor with the price change of any earlier period. • He concluded
that from the behaviour of wheat prices and the stock prices, the
speculative markets do not generate auto-correlated price
changes.
Moorea collected a random sample consisting of Friday closing
prices for thirty common stocks listed in New York for the period
1st January 1951 to 24th December 1958, 417 weeks. He calculated
the first 30 lagged serial correlation coefficients and found an
average serial correlation of -0.06 for weekly price changes.
This degree of association is judged to be so small that it is not
significantly different from zero. 4, To all intents and purposes
such a correlation could not permit sufficient returns to cover
trading costs.
In 1966, Cootner g , tested a sample of 45 stocks all drawn from
the NYSE between 1956 and 1960. He tested for serial correlation
coefficient and found that all the data for 45 American companies
Indicated auto-correlations which are generally small in
magnitude. Cootner reported that prices appeared to move randomly
when studied at one week intervals. However, for intervals of 14
weeks he found evidence of trends in the same data. 0 He concluded
that no single random walk model is appropriate, but instead.
different models describe price fluctuations for different time
intervals.
Famai0 (1965) studied the daily proportion price changes of the
30 industrial stocks in the Dow Jones Average for approximately
five years, ending in 1962. The serial correlation coefficient
for the daily changes are small, the average being 0.03. °The
investigation was extended to test the possibility that lagged
price changes show some dependence. Again, the coefficient does
not differ substantially from zero.	 In other wurds, the
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correlation coefficient is very low. In addition, King11
estimated for 4 sub periods of 100 months and obtained average
serial correlation coefficient of 0.102, -0.110, -0.047 and -
0.054. He concluded that the correlation coefficient is not
significantly greater tha=ero. Others have followed the example
of the preceding authors using different databases and a summary
of their results is presented in Table 3.1 below.
Looking at Table 3.1, the only estimate which deviates from the
rest is that of Kendall's. The general change in pricc levels
during the data period and a variation in statistical technique
is probably the cause. Consensus opinion seems to point to the
fact that estimates obtained are consistently near zero. .This
lack of dependence in stock market prices is consistent with the
random walk hypothesis and therefore the weak form efficient.
3.2.3 Runs Tests 
A run is defined as a sequence of price changes of the same sign.
For example, a plus run of length i is a sequence of i
consecutive positive price changes preceded and followed by
either negative or zero changes. For stock prices there are
three different possible types of price changes and thus three
different types of runs. If there is a. tendency for movements in
price to have some inertia, the number of runs will be greater
than if the series of changes were independent of each other.
Runs test will be discussed in more detail in chapter seven.
The first use of a technique related to run analysis was by
Cowles and Jones 12 which was later revised by Cowles in 196013.
They .considered the number of sequences and reversals in the
series of (+) nnd (-) signs, a sequence being either ++ or -- and
a reversal being either +- or -+ if consecutive changes are
Independent then the number of sequences and the number of
reversals should be roughly equal. Cowles reported that ising
very long series of United States Hata with time intervALs of one
day, one week, one month and one yeAr , the nbQervari numbpr of
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sequences was always greater than the number of reversals, which
suggest that positive correlation is present. On the other hand,
it has been pointed out that trends in price levels may be
responsible for the bias towards sequences.
Roberts (1959) 14 studied the weekly changes of the Dow Jones .
Industrial Averages.	 He concluded that the history of market
levels behaves very much as if these levels had been produced by
the accumulation of results generated by chance models. Roberts'
important contribution lies in the statistical sussastions (runs
test) to financial analysts seeking to examine and test the
random walk hypothesis.
Alexander (1961) 15 , collected Wednesday closing prices of cash
wheat over the period 1883-1934, excluding 1915-1920. A total
observation of 2,379 weeks. Each week was classified as being a
week of price rise or fall, and the lengths of the runs were
totalled. By using runs analysis, he concluded that at least the
sequence of directions of changes in weekly wheat prices might
have been produced by a random walk. Furthermore, Fama's 16 work
in 1965 represents the most comprehensive analysis to date. In
addition to total number of runs, he considered the number of
runs of each sign and distribution of run lengths. He considered
the daily log price changes of thirty different U.S. companies
with samples ranging from 1200 to 1700 observation. The result
shows that the actual number of runs observed was usually
slightly less than the expected number but the difference rarely
appeared to be significant. Fama concludes that this analysis of
runs shows no indication of dependence between price changes of
any importance either from investment or from a statistical point
of view. No statistically significant results were reported from
various studies. All of the results are consistent with the weak
form of efficiency.
3.2.4 Spectral Ane1y91s 
This technicil le hah only been introduced !nto hh p r p seerrh letely.
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Figure 3.2b: Estimated Power Spectrum of
Composite Weekly SEC Index
(Original Series).
, Source: Granger, C.W.J & Morgenstern, 0.:
'Spectral Analysis of the NYSE'
upper 95*/0 tine
suggested Center
lower 95 0/0 tine
5
2
Figure 3.2a: Power Spectrum of First Differences of SEC
Composite Weekly Stock Price Index, 1939-1961
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Source: Granger, C.W.J & Morgenstern, 0.:
'Spectral Analysis of the NYSE'
Its application to various securities and exchange commissions
(SEE) weekly price series (1939-1961), monthly price series for
six US companies (1946-1960) in New York Stock Exchange, the
Standard and Poor Common Stock Price Index (1915-1961) and the
Dow Jones Index (1915-1961) by Granger and Morgenstern 17 is the
most widely cited to date. If the'random walk hypothesis'is
correct, the spectrum of the errorseries snould be completely
flat. They found that the resulting spectrum was very flat over
the whole frequency range with minor exceptions (see Fig 3.2a,b).
Seasonal variation and 'business cycles' were shown to be of
little importance. Little connection between volume and price
was evident. From their results, they voiced their support for
the random walk hypothesis. Their previous work on the NYSE also
strongly supported the random walk hypothesis
3.2.5 Mechanical Trading Strategies
The successful use of mechanical strategies requires soma
dependence in the price series. In a random walk market with
little or zero drift, no mechanical trading rule applied to a
single security should . outperform .a simple buy and hold
strategy. Where substantial profit over costs can be earned by
close adherence to a particular mechanical strategy, inefficiency
in the market is suggested.
Various 'successful' strategies have been publicised and adopted
by investors but academics have raised two objections, that:
1) the basis of these profitable strategies is statistical
and uses economically spurious testing;
2) these profitable strategies are profitable only when
applied to the sat of data from which they were
derived. • Application to other sets of data may produce
different results. (This of course means that the rule
cannot be used to generate profit in the future)
However, the advantage of this approach to infer market
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efficiency is that complex relationships existing in the market
which elude statistical testing will be picked up by intensive
application.
a) Filter Rules
This method was originally implemented by Alexanderle and later
adopted by Fama and Blume 19 , Dryden20 in the U.S. and U.K.
respectively. Filter rules are thought to represent a more
sophisticated test to identify relationships in stock prices.
Filters are specified in percentages. For example, an X% filter
is defined as follows: if the daily closing price of a particular
security moves up by at least X%, buy and hold the security until
its price moves down by X% from a subsequent high, at which time
sell and go short simultaneously. Short position is maintained
until the daily closing price 'rises at least X% above a
subsequent low, at which time short position is covered in
addition td entering a long position. Moves of less than X% are-
Ignored. It is believed that 'for values of X, if the market has
moved up by X%, it is likely to move up more than X% further
before it moves down by X%,'21
Alexander used filters ranging from 5 to 50% on the Dow Jones
Industrial Average and the Standard and Poor. He found that in
general, filters of different sizes for different real time
periods yield substantial profits, greater than a simple buy-and-
hold policy. Mandelbrot 22 suggested that profits from the filters
were exaggerated because of the assumption that buying always
occurred at a price exactly equal to the low plus X%, while
selling always occurred at the high minus X%. Alexander's second
paper23 reworked the filters to account for the suggested errors
and found that not only profits were reduced substantially, they
were also not adequate to cover trading costs.
Fame and Blume's study simulated filters from 0.5% to 50%. They
reported that all filters below 12% and above 50% produced
negative average returns per security after transactions costs.
Those fIlters between 12% and 25% did yield a positive rRturn,
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but compared to the buy-and-hold, all security averagereturn of
0.098%, they were small. Three filter sizes - 0.5, 1 and 1.5,
had average returns per security on long positions greater than
0.098% these smaller filters being able to pick up dependencies
better. They suggest that for floor traders who enjoy the
advantage of not having to meet transaction costs, two methods
may be profitable. They are:
1	 using a 0.5% filter, opening and closing long and short
positions whenever the filter is triggered,
2	 operate a 0.5% filter only on long positions when
signalled by the filter.
Yet, it has been found that out-of-pocket transactions costs
would still wipe out the excess profit over a buy-and-hold
policy. They conclude that their results, for all practical
purposes, support the random walk hypothesis.Further, Alexander's
filters are as powerful as standard statistical approaches.
Dryden suggests24
 a reduction of up to 20% in the buy-and-hold
rate of return is required as quid pro quo for a methodological
bias in Fame and Blume's study.
His own work on U.K. indices used filters up to 0.05% since
little trigger points (and hence transactions) were found in the
data if larger filters were used. Filter profits were generated
Well in excess of the buy-and-hold average. He went on to assert
that the filters, when extended to individual share analysis,
failed to suggest even remotely the pattern of rates of return
one expects if share prices followed a random walk hypothesis.
Dryden states quite clearly that his filter profits have yet to
face transaction costs. Nevertheless, his results seem to be at
odds with Fame and Blume.
With all due respect to Dryden's work, filter rule trading.
judging from the work of others, has not been able to beat a
simple buy-and-hold. More often than not, the transactions
costs,. commissions .. nei other expenses make filter trad i nsc A
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profitable possibility only for the stockbroking agents.
b) Relative-strength (Portfolio Upgrading) Tests
These Strategies involve ranking shares in terms of price
performance over some period and investing in the top X percent
and disinvesting from the bottom Y percent.
The relative strength trading rule is defined by Levy,R., 1967, .
as fro-lows,
Define PI	 to be the average price of the jth security overjt
the 27 weeks (or n periods) prior to and including time
t,
Let PRjt (= Pjt /P jt ) be the ratio for the price
at time t to the 27 week average price at time t.25
Then, define:
i) a percentage X and a 'cast out rank' k, and invest
equal money amounts in the XX of the securities under
consideration having the largest PRjt ratio at time t;
ii) in the week t+1 for i = 1,2,...n, calculate 
PRj,t+1 for
all securities, ranking them from high to low and sell
all securities currently held with ranks greater than
k;
iii) reinvest all funds from such sales immediately in the
X% of the securities at time t+1 for which 
PRj,t+1 is
the greatest.
The author reported a significantly better performance from this
rule than the buy-and-hold. Maximum returns from his sample
.(unadjusted for risk) at 20 and 26.1% were obtained when X = 10%,
= 111 , ..nri X = k = 140. Having observed that the random
walk hypothesis cannot be refuted until risk level carried by a
trading rule is lower than that of random selection but yet
producing greater returns, Levy went on to reject the random walk
hypothesis in no uncertain terms.
	 Such was the strength of
Levy's claims that Jensen : sos
 comment on the study proposd ihcIL
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in spite of the buy-and-hold average return of 13.4%, Levy's
evidence was not conclusive enough. Further, Jensen and
Bennington27
 contend that the technique should work as well on
other data sets before such a claim is valid. To this end, they
adopted Levy's two successful rules to test seven non-overlapping
5 year periods (1931-1965, NYSE data) for 3 to 5 non-overlapping
randomly selected samples of securities in each period., No
substantial profits were found over buy-and-hola after
transactions costs.
Indeed, after adjusting for risk to a level 'equivalent to buy-
and-hold, average returns from relative-strength were -0.31% and
-2.36% less than buy-and-hold.
	 Therefore, their evidence
seriously questioned Levy's claims and the superiority of the
relative-strength criterion.
c) Fixed Proportion Maintenance Strategies
vvans29 f i xed proport i on strategy (FP) i s defined es the purchase
of in securities at time t, with their sale at time t+i, where i
is a predetermined period. Equal money amounts are invested in
each of the m securities. During the holding period, all
dividends are. reinvested but not necessarily in the securities
they were received on. The initial results from Evans' work was
that the PP strategytends to be superior to buy-and-hold over all
portfolio sizes with respect to both risk and return. Aver-age
returns of FP were 0.6-0.7% higher, with similar percentages of
standard deviations lower than buy-and-hold. Again, trAnsrtions
costs and taxes eliminated excess profits over buy-and-hold.
Latand and Young29
 used ex post annual holding period returns to
test methods for allocating resources among portfolio assets. No
significant excess over buy-and-hold was found either.
d) Moving Averages
The arithmetic moving average formed by Van Horne and Parker 20 as
a mechanical trading rule is defined in the following manner: if
the daily closing price exceeds the moving average of past prices
by X% for 2 consecutive Hays, a 'tInv i signs] is indicated as the
stock is assumed to be rising. Conversely, if 2 daily closing
prices are below the moving average for 
- 2 consecutive days a
'sell' signal is indicated and all positions are liquidated.
Moving averages for each security for 100, 150, and 200 days
prior to each day's closing price were used, with penetration
percentages X set at 0,2,5, and 10%. Out of the 30 variations
possible, none produced any significant profits in spite of
ignoring transactions costs. Even the use of weights in the
moving averages to account for the importance of recent past
prices vie-ii-vis distant past prices brought no fundamental
change to the results. Moving averages were also employed by
Cootnera and James32 without much success.
3.3 SEARCH FOR A THEORY
Ir	 the early 1960's, academic researchera continued
investigate the randomness of stock prices and the financial
community continued to be indifferent, indignant or amused. The
variety of opinion stemmed from disbelief in the validity of the
findings33 or from the misconception that randomness implied a
kind of senselessness in the determination of stock price. After
a substantial body or evidence had accumulated that stock prices
did indeed seem to follow a random walk, the inquisitive members
of the academic community wondered about the economic process
that could produce such results. The explanation of the apparent
randomness of stock prices lies in understanding the market-
making mechanisms. In an efficient market where information is
freely available, the price of a security can be expected to
approximate its intr i nsic value because of competii7ion Amc.r.F.
investors. 34
	Intrinsic values can change as a result of new
information.
	 If however, there is only a gradual awareness of
new information and its implications, successive price changes
will exhibit dependence.
	 If the adjustment to information is
virtually instantaneous, successive price chanses will be at
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random.
4 The first specification of efficient markets and their
relationship to the randomness of prices for things traded in
that market is attributable to Samuelson35 and Mandelbrot 36.
 If a
market is free to all interested parties, and if all market
participants and potential participants have the same time
horizons and expectations about prices, the market will be
efficient and, as Samuelson has proved, prices will fluctuate
randomly.
The assertion that a market is efficient is vastly stronger than
the assertion that successive changes in stock prices are
independent of each other. The latter assertion (the weak form'-f--.-
of the efficient market hypothesis which will be tested for the
Kuwait Stock market) says that current stock prices fully reflect
the historical sequence of prices so that a knowledge of that
sequence is useless in forming expectations about future prices.
The assertion that a market is efficient implies that current
prices reflect and impound both the implications of the
historical price sequence and all that can be publicly known
about the companies whose stock is being traded. This stronger
assertion has proved to be especially unacceptable to the
financial community, since it suggests the fruitlessness of
efforts to earn superior rates of return by the analysis or all
public information. Although some members of the financial
community were willing to accept the implications of the weaker
assertion about the randomness of price changes and thereby give
up technical analysis (chartist), almost no community members
were willing to accept the implications of the stronger from and
thereby give up fundamental analysis37
One of the objections to the assertion of market efficiency and
that current prices reflect all that is knowable about companies
is the misconception that these assertions contradict an
observable fact - that the market has risen during almost all
reasonablm long-time periods. How is it that current prices are
unbiased estimates of future prices or that current priccs
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impound all that is knowable about the future, if investors
usually earn positive rates of return on common stocks as a
consequence of their upward secular trend?
The problem is not so vexing as it first seems. For example, it
is possible to construct a coin that, on average, comes up heads
6 times in 10. The sequence in outcomes from tossing the coin
will follow a random walk, even though heads appear more
frequently. the probability of a heed on any toss is unaffected
by the outcome of previous losses; it ia always C.5, no matter
haw many times heads have occurred before. Thus the probability
that the market will rise is greater than 0.5. At the same time,
the probability that the market will rise in any day, week or
month is unaffected by the sequence of price changes in preceding
days, weeks or months. In other words, the distribution of price
changes has a non-zero mean. Furthermore, the true probability
of this biased coin, if generally understood, would not permit
anyone to earn abnormal returns.
Perhaps a better explanation is provided by the reflection that
investors would be willing to incur the risk of holding common
stocks if there was an expectation of positive rate of return.
In addition, the expected rates would have to exceed the rates of
less risky assets, such as insured savings accounts. Efficiency
in a market for such stocks would result in prices at each point
in time which lead, on average, to the expected rate of return.
This modifies the earlier formula that current prices are
unbiased estimates of future prices. The more reasonable
assertion is that current prices produce rates of return that, on
average, will be positive after accounting for taxes, transaction
costs, and other costs.	 It is not necessary that the expected
rate of return for different stock be the same.	 In fact, it
would be astounding if they were. The rates of return that
people anticipate must be different for .different stocks in order
for investors to want to hold them.
Once it was rR8lised that the theory of efficient markets
provided an explanation of the observed randomness of successive
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changes in stock prices, the controversy centred on the
efficiency of the market. Efficiency implies much more than
randomness in successive price changes; it implies the probable
fruitlessness of analysing public information to secure superior
rates of return. This concept is known as the semi-strong form
of the efficient market hypothesis. The rest of this section
will be a review of the evidence on the semi-strong form, and
strong form efficiency.
3.4 SEMI-STRONG FORM EFFICIENCY,
The evidence presented in section 3.2 indicated that historical
share prices could not be profitably used to forecast future
price movements. The logical question to ask then is: to what
extent other publicly available information, relevant to a
particular company (e.g. balance sheets), can be used to forecast
price movements? In other words, would the analysis of published
information lead to estimates of the value of share prices more
accurate than merely taking actual share prices, as suggested by
the weak form hypothesis? The semi-strong hypothesis answer this
question with the following statement:
'The share price of a pmpany, at any point is time.
represents and fully reflects (fully discounts) all the
knowledge that is publicly available and relevant to that
company and the valuation of its shares.'38
It will be immediately clear that the weak form hypothesis is
merely a special case of the semi-strong form - historic share
price data is part of the available knowledge, relating to a
company and, according to this form of the hypothesis, any value
this information might have is already discounted in the share
price. If the semi-strong form of the hypothesis is true, then a
fortiori the weak form must be true. This does not mean that
publicly available information has no impact on share prices, nor
does it mean that such information is irrelevant. It is simply
that the information is discounted into the share	 pt
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r and
moment it is released. There is no opportunity between the.
moment of publication of new information, and the time when the
share price has adjusted to reflect fully that information,
during which to buy or sell shares advantageously. Studies of
this form of hypothesis seek to analyse share price movements to
see exactly how long it takes for the share price to digest and
respond to new information. Depending on how quickly and
accurately prices react, it may or may not be possible to use the
duration of the digestion process to make abnormal profits.
3.5 SEMI-STRONG FORM-TESTS
The general approach of these tests is to establish ythether share
prices react precisely and quickly to new information. If prices
do not react in this way, then this indicates that the market
cannot correctly interpret economic	 that potential'
exists for some cleverer investors to make abnormal returns. The
general methodology involved in these studies has been to take an
economic event and measure its impact on the share price. The
impact is measured by taking the difference between the actual.
change in price and the change in price that would have prevailed
had there been no such event. This latter figure has usually'
been derived from the market model suggested bvSharp.a.30
Cumulative average residuals (the market model) and abnormal
performance indluee uee uGually employed izieemi-eLvon6 form
tests. 40
 The research has been carried out on two major types of
economic events.
First, events which have a precise impact.
dividand pcymcntc.
Examples include
Thzca	 thc
soundest basis for.research.
Second, events which do not have a precise impact, but for which
the general direction can be e .ltimated fairly confidently.
Examples include rannouncements of large industricl hr)idingn,
MONTH RELATIVE TO
ANNUAL REPORT ANNOUNCEMENT
6	 OATE42
Figure 3.3 Average price movements during months preceding
and succeeding earnings announcements of company
stocks.
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block trading, etc. All that can be done in sUch research is to
see if the actual price reacts in the right direction and that
the adjustment procedure is completed speedily.
The following section will review the literature of empirical
work which has been undertaken to assess the impact of these
different variable (events) on stock prices when they are made
public.
3.5.1 Earnings and Income
It is fair to expect that firms with superior earning prospects
should command a higher price for their stocks in the market.
What is of interest in the context of the efficient market
hypothesis is how fast prices adjust to new information on a
company's earnings and earning prospects.
Ball and Brown, 41 estimated whether a firm had shown
exceptionally good earnings (above expected) or exceptionally
poor earnings (below those expected). They measured the share
price behaviour of the shares of their sample firms using the
market model approach. The results are shown in Figure 3.3. The
upper panel shows that firms whose results were better than
expected earned significantly above average market returns, in
the period from one year prior to the 'release of the accounting
Information up to date, and vice-versa for firms whose earnings
were below those expected. Ball and Brown concluded that the
market is able to forecast earnings quite well i.e..most of the
abnormal rise or fall in share prices took place before the
.earnings announcement, and that 50 percent or more of the
information about en individual firm that becomes available
during a year is captured in that years earning figure.
The effects of quarterly earnings reports on prices are
investigated by a number of researchers. The more frequently
cited of these is the study by Jones end Litzenberger 42 because
their conclusions qu A ti r,n those of Bali And Rrown, Tho Former
argue the case against the markets ability to discount the full
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succeeding earnings announcements.
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information content of quarterly earnings reports. Consequently,
market professionals are able to earn an economic return for
their activities.
The market evaluates thiror\quarter and annual earnings reports
differently from the first and second quarters. The reason seems
to be that annual reports are adjusted and audited with third
quarter reports slightly preemptive of the annual report. the
prices of high growth companies also adjust somewhat differently
from medium and low growth companies. May43 finds that relative
price changes in response to quarterly earnings information are
not significantly less than the response to annual earnings.
,4 Yet, price _changes in the weeks of quarterly earnings,
announcements are greater than the average price changes. This
implies that quarterly data influences the basis of investors'
decisions. This conclusion is supported by Brown and Kenelly44
who also found that quarterly earnings per share (EPS) reports
improve the predictive ability of the EPS series by 30-40%.
The dependence of investors on annual earnings reports is
established by Beaver. 45 He used data consisting of 143 firms (a
total of 506 earnings announcements) for the period 1262...Uthrough
1968. He  measured the volume of trading for each week in the
weeks atrer. The results in Figure 3.4 show a strong jump in
investment activity in the week of the earnings announcement
(week 0) with average volume 33% larger than volume in the other
weeks.	 Beaver concluded that the announcement of earnings
--
figures does have a significant impact on investment decision-
taking, and the results indicated that the information value of
the earnings announcement took place immediately after the
announcement.
In another study,.Firth 45 looked at four sectors in the United
Kingdom.	 Share price behaviour was studied using residual
.analysis around the t i me of the announcement of prItli_11015
results dur i ng 107 1 AnA 1974- Each s p t oc re, quita was classified
as exceptionally good or bad depending on whether the price-
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residual was positive or negative following the announcement.
Each category was taken separately and the residuals of the
remaining companies in the sector were measured at the same point
in time. The result shows that exceptionally good results were
matched by price rises in the rest of the sector, averaging 2.1%
while exceptionally bad results produced falls averaging 3.7%.
Firth concluded that virtually all of the abnormal price
adjustment occurred on announcement, thus providing no
opportunity for dealing and confirming the efficient and rapid
Incorporation of new information into share prices.
3.5.2 Dividends and Stock Splits 
If investors' reactions are susceptible to any one variable, it
is dividends. The struggle to maintain dividend levels to avert
the consequences of the failure to do so is a main preoccupation
of management. Dividend announcements are thus a rich source of.
information. They contain an assessment of future earnings
prospects, since higher dividend are paid only when they can be
maintained in the future.
Having said this, the information content of dividends is
relative to the accuracy of the announcements.
Petit47
 found that the market reacts very dramatically when
dividends are substantially increased or reduced. Hence, the
implicit information in dividend announcements is rated very
highly. In fact, the implicit information contained in a
dividend announcement far exceeds that of an earnings report.
The market is Judged to be fairly efficient in the study, with
the market making an unbiased estimate and fully reflecting the
information in the announcement month.
Watt's48
 conclusions are somewhat different towards finding
potential information in dividend news. He found the information
content to be trivial. If an investor receives the potential
Information before anyone else, a profit cannot be made in spite
of this advantage, he concluded. Against all studies, Taylor4
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has pointed out that most of the models used by researchers into
the information content of dividends are counter-intuitive.
Additionally, model specification for empirical testing is with
almost insurmountable problems.
In theory, stock splits (or bonus issues) should not alter
shareholders' wealth as market prices react to account for the
capitalisation. It has been suggested that a stock split may
result in greater total market value for the outstanding shares
because
i) a split effectively lowers the price of the stock and
brings it into a more 'popular trading range'. This
broadens the market for the stock which implies greater
demand and higher prices.
II) a split may be viewed as an expression of management's
confidence and prices may rise subsequently as a result
of competitive bidding.
In one study,by Johnson (1966) 50 statistically significant price
changes were found when splits were announced, which prompted the
author to suggest that if management intended to increase the
cash dividends, a split action may also be taken in order to
Increase the total market value of the stock.
The most widely cited work on stock .splits is by Fame, Fisher,
Jensen and Ro11. 51 They investigated the speed of price
adjustment to split action via the behaviour of security returns
In the months surrounding the split. Where unusual behaviour of
returns is noted, the relationship between splits and other
fundamental variables were subject to further investigation.
They found that
a) companies tend to split shares during exceptionally
good times, especially those- who perform well;
b) the market interprets an anticipated or announced split
as a probable ci=a1 of substantially increased
forthcoming dividends;
C)	 given the upward stickiness of dividend levels, large
- 65 -
Figure 3.6:	 Abnormal daily returns around the announcement of
stock splits.
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price increases prior to split action could be a result
of changing expectations with respect to earnings
potential.
On the possibility of trading profits arising from lagged or
biased response to information, the adjustment process was found
to be so rapid that expected returns cannot be increased by
purchasing split stocks after the effective date had elapsed.
Average return vis-a-vis market return quickly resumes normality
(see Figure 3.5). Even purchase as soon as a split is announces
precipitated no increase on expected return. Fame et.al .
concludes that the market is efficient as far as speed of
adjustment by prices is concerned. Also, price reaction is
initiated more by the dividend implication inherent in splits
than the split itself.
The conclusions of Fame et.al . are reinforced in a subsequent
study by Reilly and Drzycimski, who extended the earlier work by
analysing the stock price reaction to the publicArmour.r=ment n:
the split. 52 Results of this later study are summarised in Figure
3.6. Over the 15 days prior to and including the announcement
day, stock holders earn positive abnormal returns of 4.25%,
indicating that some of the pre-split positive performance
observed by Fame et.al . is associated with the announcement of
the split. After the announcement, there is no evidence of
abnormal returns. This strengthens the Fame et.al . conclusion of
market efficiency, and any information in the split is impounded
in stock prices by the end of the announcement day.
3.5.3 Block Trading and Investment Holdings
Th i s section offers one subsidiary aspPct of tbp revw of
information impact on prices. It is postulated that block
trading and the blinding up of large investment holdings may be
interpreted by investors as a sign that those engaging in such
activities possess information they (the investors) do not enjoy.
There are three basic reasons by investors sell (and conversely,
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buy) their holdings of a company's stock: 	 They may be
liquidating positions, re-balancing portfolio proportions or
reacting to adverse information. If selling action is a
consequence of adverse news, the expected value of this
information must take effect in the way of falling prices.
Therefore, a buyer pays not only the transaction costs but also
for the information of the seller.
Scholes investigated the price effects of large secondary
offerings (sales of large blocks of already outstanding cor7crate
shares in U.S .53
 Folklore contends that such sales will force
the price of stocks down because investors require an inducement
to purchase these additional shares. This lower price is the
required sweetener, and it is quickly reversed after the block
sale. Since the price pressure hypothesis presumes that the
value of a corporations's outstanding stock is the same before
and after the block sale, the hypothesised temporary price
decline is inconsistent with market efficiency.
In an alternative hypothesis Scholes proposed that the block sale
could release information to the market of an expected decline in
a company's future performance. The information hypothesis
predicts that any change in the stock price is permanent and, in
an efficient market, rapidly impounded into price.
Using the market model and methodology similar to Fame et.al .
(1969), Scholes found that block sales were associated with an
average decline in stock price of 1-2%. However, this A=1-/im°
was permanent and therefore inconsistent with the price pressure
hypothesis. To further examine the information hypothesis Scholes
categorised block sales by type of seller and argued that large
secondary offerings by corporate insiders as well as investment
companies, are more likely to be motivated by adverse information
about future company performance than are sales by estates,
trusts and the like. The data supported his view, and the price
decline is greater for the former categories. 	 In his study,
6choles use closing prices and could find no evidence ni."
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Figure 3.7:	 Rates of return to investing in large block sales
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temporary price depression associated with the block sale.
However, Krems and Sto11 54 used intraday prices in U.S. data and
found some evidence of a price reversal after the block sale and
before the close of trading. Their results confirm that there is
a permanent price decline, but this decline is after some post
sale gains have been earned on the sale day.
These results were subjected to close scrutiny by Dann, Mayers,
and Raab55 who collected transactions data for the day of a block
sale. They calculated the returns to a trading rule of buying
shares at thetime of a block and selling at the end of the day.
They were careful to calculate returns to this strategy net of
all actual commissions and taxes. Their results are presented in
Figure 3.7, where the net returns to the trading rule are
calculated for stock purchases at varying times after the block
trade. They concluded that to earn a positive return, investors
would have to make their purchases within five minutes of Lhe
block sale.	 Within 15 minutes of the sale, the prices have
completely adjusted to their subsequent closing levels,
	 the
speed with which the stock prices reach equilibrium following the
block sales provides a good empirical measure of the market's
efficiency.
Firth. 56
 investigated the information content of large investment
holdings announcement made in 1973 in U.K. He used the residuals
analysis to examine share price behaviour subsequent to the
announcement. He concluded that, despite a long adjustment
period, ,
 the market discounts the bulk of new information quickly
and may be regarded as efficient.
Interestingly, Firth observed abnormal share price behaviour in
the 30 days preceding the announcement, This could be explained
by the activities . of the investor in the market place becoming
known, or information leaks.
Figure 3.9: Abnormal returns to stockholders
of target firms in tender offers
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Figure 3.8: Abnormal returns to stockholders
of target firms in mergers.
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3.5.4 Takeovers and Acquisition
Perhaps the transactions that best illustrate both the speed and
unbiased nature of the efficient capital market are corporate
takeover and acquisitions. The economic consequences of mergers
of public corporations have long been of concern to economists,
regulators and legislators. Also, the dramatic price effects of
corporation combinations have fascinated investors. Unlike the
negotiated merger agreement, a tender offer involves direct
invitation to stockholders to exchange their shares for a statea
cash or security consideration. If sufficient offer is tendered,
control of the corporation is transferred.
Dodd57 used the data of a sample of New York and American stock
exchange firms that were targets of tender offers and merger
proposals between 1962 and 1978. The dramatic stock price
consequences of attempted transfers incorporate control are
evident in Figure 3.8 and 3.9. The figures show the abnormal.
return (i.e. returns net of market wide price movements) to
stockholders of the target companies over the 60 trading days
(approximately three months) before and after the first public
announcement of the acquisition attempt, which is defined as day
zero. The striking results include the magnitude of the stock
price effect and the speed with which the market reacts.
concluded that investors who purchase all target shares of the
sample in Figures 3.8 and 3.9, on the day after the announcement
of the offers and held those shares through the date of the final
outcome, earned zero abnormal returns.
Frank, Broyles and Hecht, 58 covered 70 successful mergers in the
Breweries sector between 1955 and 1972. They used Residuals
Analysis to study abnormal share price behaviour around the time
of the merger. The objective was to see how the gains, if any,
were allocated betwe4 .1. 31...22adlue!..: The results show
that virtually all the price movement ensuing from the mergers
announcement is complete before the month is up. They suggested
that an invcc:tment in thr, p•-cuirer irredi.tely =fi-or
announcement would probably not yield sufficient over the month
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to cover transaction costs. In addition, these results only
confirmed that the market takes less than one month to fully
discount merger information. They concluded that the market is
efficient in the semi-strong form. Furthermore, Firth, 59 has
studied UK mergers announced in 1973/1974, and observe.as did
Franks et.al ., abnormal share price behaviour (a consistent price
rise) in the acquiree's share price prior to the bid. Firth used
this phenomenon to derive a simple trading rule to see if profits
could be made. He concluded that the result may therefore be due
to chance alone.
There have been many other studies that provide evidence of semi-
strong market efficiency. The fact that the market absorbs or
anticipates information in a manner which prevents exploitation
provides de facto evidence in support of the efficient market
hypothesis. The evidence has been so persuasive that it is fair
to conclude that semi-strong form market efficiency is now an
accepted working assumption in financial economic research.
3.6 STRONG FORM TESTS REVIEW
The final class of studies of capital market efficiency involves
the hypothesis that traders having monopolistic access to inside
information have no special advantage in their market dealings.
In a fully efficient market, prices will reflect all available
Information, including those facts which are not made public.
The research in this area is necessarily limited by the
difficulty in obtaining reliable data on insider activities.
It is generally accepted that the individual with knowledge of a
firm's private operations enjoys certain benefits over other
investors, the issue addressed by most researchers concerns the
degree to which an insider can obtain expected returns which
reflect a distortion of the efficient market: Obviously the
semi-strons form end week form hypothesis Are Apeci A l rases of
the strong form hypothesis.
	 Historic share price dota.and
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publicly available information about a company can be known
.
easily. It the strong form hypothesis is true, then a fortiori,
the semi-strong and weak form hypotheses are also true.
The tests involved here consist of an examination of the
performance of professionally managed portfolios (mutual funds,
unit trusts). The argument is that the performance of profess-
ionally managed portfolios, which were consistently superior to
market performance as a whole or
that market, would indicate an
to relevant subsets of stocks in
element of illeffiLiency it Lh=
price-setting process. Consistent superiority would suggest that
some people have superior access to relevant information not
reflected in stock prices.
The first comprehensive study of mutual fund performance was done
by Irwin Friend and his associates. 59 The study covered 189
funds from December 1.952 to September 1958. The major conclusion
was that, on average, the performance of the mutual funds studied
was insignificantly different from the performance of an
unmanaged portfolio with similar asset composition. Rates of
return on the latter were measured by the Standard and Poor's
Indices.	 The results show about half of the funds performed
worse, and half of the funds performed better than the unmanaged
portfolios.	 There was no evidence of consistently superior
performance by any of the funds.
The study of William Sharpe, 60 differs in design and coverage
from the first study by Friend, but the conclusions . ar-
consistent. • Sharpe- studied the performance of 34 mutual funds
for the period study accounts for rates of return and risk, as
measured by variability in rates of return for individual funds.
He found that, if the funds expenses are ignored. 19 of the 34
out performed the Dow Jones Industrial Average, after taking risk
into account. If expenses are considered, only 11 funds did
better than the Dow Jones portfolio, and 23 did worse. This
finding lends support to the view that the capital market is
highly efficient And that good menegrs concentrAt .= on eveluetinn
risk and providing diversification, spending :Little effort .(and
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money) on the search for incorrectly priced securities. Sharpe's
major conclusion therefore is that mutual fund performance
provides evidence that the market for common stocks and other
financial assets is highly efficient.
Michael Jensen, 61 covered the performance of 115 mutual funds for
the period 1955-64. He followed Sharpe in that he did not take
account of rates of return alone. Jensen compared the
performance of mutual funds with randomly selected portfolios of
equal risk. Assuming the funds had no expenses other thau
brokerage commissions, he found that about half performed better
and half performed worse than the control portfolios. When the
incurred expenses are accounted for, only 43 of 115 mutual funds
had superior performance. Jensen concluded that, on average, the
mutual funds did not outperform randomly selected portfolios.
In the U.K. market, Ward and Saunders, 62 studied 49 unit trusts
over the nine year period 1964-72. They used the Capital Asset.
Pricing Model to calculate performance measures for each trust.
The results showed that of the 49 trusts, only 7 managed to beat
the market. Their general conclusion was that the unit trusts on
average do not do any better then a naive investment policy of
buying a random portfolio and holding. Such trusts therefore do
not justify their research expenditures. Firth, 63 concentrated
on 72 unit trusts in the U.K. market, in existence from the
beginning of 1965 through the end of 1975, a total period of
eleven years. Capital asset pricing model was also used, and
Firth found unit trusts did not outperform the market's index for
their given level of risk.
In its strictest sense, the strong form of the efficient market
hypothesis is clearly refuted. To the extent that announcement
by corporate officials convey information to the stock market,
thus insiders can profit by trading before making the
announcements. Pate11 64 presents evidence that public earning
anaouncements forecast by corporate management are associated
with positive stock price movements, Thus managcment could earn
substantial positive returns by trading in their firms' stock
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prior to announcing the forecast. Jaff 65 fui• ther studied the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) official Summary of
Security Transactions and Holdings, in an effort to clarify the
Information content of this report, with an examination of
residuals from the market model before and after information
disclosures. He concludes that insiders may in fact realise
higher than average profits.
Another example of the value of inside information is the trading
performance of specialists on major exchanges. Niedarhoffer aud
Osbornew found that specialists make profits by trading on
Information on executed order. Of course, entry to the
specialist industry is not free, and price for specialist seats
reflects the profits that can be earned. There is no doubt that
the excess to inside information such as that evailable to
corporate officials and specialists enables investors to beat the
market.
With the substantive literature against superior performance by
mutual funds, it is unjust to form the impression that they leave
much to be desired. Their performance has been used as a window
to gain insight into market efficiency. That they earn the
market average, like everyone else should, in no way diminishes
their important role in the capital market. On the contrary, they
have an important ' role. Perhaps their most important function
has been persuading large numbers of individual investors that
common stocks are an appropriate investment for ordinary people
of modest wealth. The long history of rates of return on common
stocks, compared with other financial investments, suggests that
this persuasion by managers of mutual funds has proved beneficial
to the investing public. In addition, mutual funds provide 'a very
efficient ways of a relatively small investor to achieve
effective diversification which is highly desirable.	 Mutual
funds also provide useful bookkeeping and custodial services, and
they are increasingly able to buy brokerage services
relatively favourable terms. Thus, we can conclude that evidence
on mutual Fund performance supports the strong form of efficienE
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market hypothesis, but it does not indicate either lack of
competence by mutual fund managers or the foolishness of
Individual investors who use mutual funds as an outlet for their
savings.
3.7 EMPIRICAL RESEARCH FINDINGS IN OTHER COUNTRIES
Empirical research regarding market efficiency in countries other
than USA and UK has been carried out by different authors. The
evidence suggests significant difference between USA and UK stock
markets and stock markets in other countries. • Some writers think
that this difference is due to what are called thin and thick
stock markets (see Silber, 67); and some think that this
difference is due to the rules and regulations on disclosure of
information that govern the stock market.
In this section, empirical research will be divided into three
categories: Europe, Far East, and Other Countries.
3.7.1 Europe 
(i) Belgium
Hawanini and Michel68 sought to answer the broad question about
the efficiency of the Brussels Stock Exchange. They used the
random walk model and the efficient market hypotheses. The two
tests of efficiency used were:
(i) a statistical study of first order serial correlation of
historical price charges;
(ii) a statistical study of the structure of leads and lags which
exist between . certain stocks and the rest of the market.
The authors found that there was not sufficient statistical
dependence on a sample of twenty six stocks tested weekly to
permit the pred i ctione of price movement by using the hictory of
price changes themselves, while in the short run, price changes
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were not predictable using linear combinations ofprevious price
changes.	 The result provides some evidence of efficiency.
The second test analysed stock price behaviour to determine if
certain stock price movements preceded, occurred simultaneously
with, or followed, movements in the market index. 	 An efficient
market would show such evidence.
	
Arbitrage would bring leading
or lagging prices in line with the market movement. The tests
showed that no one stock out of twenty six had significant lead
or lag statistic markets which were better than those of the
market model with zero lag regression, again some indication of
efficiency.
In an article by Pogue and Solnik, 69 the authors draw inferences
from the application of the market model for the efficiency of
European Stock Markets, including Belgium. Belgium had the
longest adjustment lags to movements in equity prices among eight
countries examined. It also had the largest percentage variation.
in equity returns explained by market movements. In an efficient
market, the beta value would not be sensitive to the length of
return interval, i.e. beta should not vary with data taken over
daily, weekly, or monthly intervals.
	 It was highest (least
efficient) for Belgium. On the positive side, for Belgium,
measures of total and systematic risk were as predictable as for
any other country i.e. equities were properly priced. Belgium, by
these measures is one of the least efficient stock markets.
(ii) France
McDonald and Jacquillat 70
 have made a number of studies of the
efficiency of initial equity issues or introductions on the
French Bourse. In their study of the French sealed-bid auction
for initial equity issues (a modification of the competitive
auction system), the authors found ' that, between 1968 and 1971,
using a sample, mean offering price was only slightly below mean
market price in early trading. The efficient market hypothesis
requires fairly rapid adjustment to equilibrium value, and this
was satisfied.	 Initial price adjustment was rapid in terms of
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the available information, and market-adjusted returns following
the close of first-day trading were small in the subsequent four
weeks. .
In 1978, Bertonechei tested the weak form efficiency of Paris
Bourse by using the random walk hypothesis. Bertoneche cal-
culated the coefficient of autocorrelation on daily and twice-
weekly series of observations of equity prices. For the period
1966-1974, using daily data, the French data showed on average
coefficient of autocorrelation of -0.069. Since the random walk
hypothesis specifies autocorrelation should be zero, it can be
rejected for French data within the limits of 95% confidence.
(iii) Germany
In an early study by Solnik, n the distribution of th-e,:serial
correlation coefficient of 35 separate equities was calculated.
They were tested then for deviations from the random walk and
also the degree of stability over time investigated. No evid;-mce
was found of negative serial correlation, and the deviations from
the random walk became less significant for longer time
intervals. The serial correlation coefficients for individual
equity lines were fairly stable over time. Solnik concluded there
were some inefficiencies in the German market, certainly more
than in a similar statistical comparison of random walk behaviour
of US equity prices.
Conrad and JUttnern
 demonstrated that German equity prices did
not fluctuate randomly; that dependent price changes were
present. The statistical techniques applied were runs and serial
correlation tests. The daily closing prices of 54 German equities
provided the basic data. Correlations were generally high to
indicate dependence and the Stock Exchange could not be called
inefficient.
(iv) Italy
Giovanni Cristinin tested market data on equity yields. On the
basis of the values or al..to,,..1.,tion ccefficint'n found between
expected yields and yields in the preceding period, the weak form
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efficiency was supported. In a further test of how the market
reacted to firms' announcements about the distribution of
dividends, Cristini found both the timing and the market's
anticipating action to be slow and erratic.
Biffignandi and Stefani investigated equity price behaviour on
Italian Stock Exchanges by applying tests of randomness on
Italian financial time series through autocorrelation analysis.
Daily price observations on the stock exchanges did not show
random walk behaviour, out weekly and monthly ones did.
(v) Netherlands
Among several studies, Kolk and Schoor1 75 considered data for the
Amsterdam market from the points of view of the capital asset
pricing model and the efficient market model. They found the
distribution of yields of equities in the market to be highly
concentrated around the mean.	 It was more normally distributed
over a longer period. Much of the variation in equity yields
was the result of using specific information on equities. The
authors could not reject the weak form efficiency.
(vi) Greece
Two studies on the Athens Stock Market have been carried out.
Niarch8s76 tested the monthly price data for fifteen companies
and two indices for the period January 1957 to December 1958.
His results suggested that the Athens Stock Market was efficient
in the weak sense. More recently a study b y Bletsas and Tebbutn
has provided contrary evidence to the existence of weak form
efficiency in the Athens Stock Market. They carried out various
form statistical tests using 16 investment performance indices.
They have also utilised a longer run of more recent data and
covering the period from January 1965 to December 1976. Their
results indicated inefficiency in the Athens Stock Market in the
weak sense.
3.7.2 The Far East 
CO The Malaysian Market
Standard weak form tests were performed on the Kuala Lumpur stock
exchange by Limn 6 sector indices and the price series of 30
companies. The results of his study suggested efficiency in the
weak sense and that historical price data can not be used to
trade profitably.
A study by Siong79 using daily and monthly data indices and a
sample of 16 stocks. Siong applied three statistical tests and
his results show that the daily evidence refutes the random walk
hypothesis while the weekly data provided support to the weak
form efficiency.
(ii) Singapore
Koo90
 used the monthly data for the sector indices covering the
period from January 1973 to December 1980. A sample of 20
companies was also investigated in the context of the random walk
hypothesis. Runs test, serial coefficient and spectral analysis
were applied in his study. His results support the claim to weak
form efficiency although short run departures were observed.
(iii) Hong Kong
The three common statistical weak form tests for market
efficiency (serial correlation, runs test, spectral analysis)
were made on Hong Kong Stock Market by Kwong. 91
 He used monthly
data indices covering the period from January 1970 to May 1981
for the Hang Seng Index, May 1971 - May 1981 for the Far East
Index and August 1973-May 1981 for the Kam Ngen Index. His
findings suggest market efficiency in the weak form.
3.7.3 Other Countries
<i) Australia
A study on the Australian Stock Exchange had been carried out by
JULtner and McHugh.52 This involvsd two statistical tests to ths
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daily prices for a randomly selected sample Of 188 Australian
companies listed on the Sydney Stock Exchange. Their results do
not appear to support the randomness hypothesis. For nearly all
cases in the tests relating to the total number of runs,
statistical significance stemmed from a deficiency of runs
relative to the expected number. In addition, the serial
correlation tests for the one day lag suggests that the past
record of prices changes may be a helpful guide for the
prediction of future changes.
However, the earlier studies by Praetz 83 with Australian data,
suggested that there were only small departures from the random
walk hypothesis in share price series. Whereas Jiittner and McHugh
found that the Australian Stock Market is "...not even efficient
in the weak sense". They offered three reasons for.the lack of
efficiency:
(a) Transactions costs for share dealings were large.
(b) There was a failure to prevent insider trading by
existing regulations at that time.
(c) A significant	 time lapse occurred between the
announcement of an event and the event occurring.
(ii) South Africa
The Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) was suspected of
inefficiency by Roux and Gilbertson. 84
 They contend that the
market is thin (compared to the NYSE) with a poor information
disclosure process and the existence of privileged information
channels. Especially, shares in mining companies for a sig-
nificant proportion of the total market capitalisation of the JSE
and being under the technical and financial administration of
mining houses, the latter enjoy a privilege as regards
Information.
Using daily prices froM 24 mining and industrial shares listed on
the JSE from February 1972-February 1975, serial correlation and
runs tests were performed. Althou gh small deviations were found,
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Table 3.2:	 Research Findings in Other Countries.
Countries Researcher(s) Type of data
Series
Type of test Market*
efficiency
1. Belgium - Hewanini & Michel
C75)
Weekly Serial
correlation X
Pogue & Solnik (74)	 II Market Model X
.	 • ..,.	 .
2. Prance BertoneChe	 (78) Deily/Twice Serial
Weekly Correlation X
3. Germany Solnik (73) Rule, serial
Conard & JUttner Doily correlation X
(73)
4. Italy Cristini (78) S. Correlation
Biffignandi Deily
weekly & monthly
X
S. Netherlands Holk ,I. Schoorl Market Model I
.-	 -	 -
6. Greece Niarchoe (72)
Bletses & Tebbut
monthly
different
S. Correlation I
X
7. Malaysia Lim (80) monthly Runs & S.Corr I
Siong (82) Deily & monthly II II I
8. Singapore Mao (82) monthly II II I
9. Hang Kong Wong (81) Monthly II II
10 Ametrelie JUttner &
McHugh (76) Deily II 12 X
11.South Africa Roux &
Gilbertson (78) Deily X
* (I) indicetee ,....,erket efficiency
(X) indicates merket inefficiency.
they constituted enough evidence to suggest that prices were not
independent. See Table 3.2 for a comparison of the findings.
3.8 THE IMPLICATIONS OF EFFICIENT MARKET HYPOTHESEIS
In the previous sections, we presented substantial evidence
regarding the validity of the various efficient market
hypotheses. The conclusion is not that superior performance is
impossible, but merely that consistently superior performance for
a given risk level is extremely rare. If that conclusion is
generally true, the value of security analysis and portfolio
management would be quite different than if it were not. This is
a curious paradox. In order for the hypothesis to be true, it is
necessary for many investors to disbelieve it. That is, market
prices will promptly and fully reflect what is knowable about the
companies whose shares are traded only if investors seek superior'
returns, make conscientious and competent efforts to learn about
the companies whose securities are traded, and analyse relevant
Information promptly and perceptively. If that effort were
abandoned, the efficiency of the market would diminish rapidly.
the paradox is striking, but it barely differs from the paradox
of all effectively competitive markets. Entrepreneurs search for
ways to create a competitive advantage over their rivals, and
this rivalry results in prices of goods and services being
lowered so as to offer no promise of abnormal returns to
potential rivals. Investors continue to compete in an effort to
arrive at superior judgements. The likelihood of being
'consistently superior is apparently quite small, but the rewards
for success can be enormous. Clearly. I is a game worth winnir,F,
although it may not always be a game worth playing. The next
section will discuss the appropriate strategy for investors who
accept the major conclusions of the efficient market hypothesis
and its implications for security analysis and for portfolio
management.
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3.8.1 Security Analysis - Introduction
Security analysis is carried out by almost all investors and
financial institutions. The individual investor typically makes
casual inquiry about securities through conversation with
brokers, scrutiny of the financial pages of the press, reading
annual reports, and so forth. Financial institutions are more
systematic and professional in their approach. They employ
thousands of security analysts whose credentials entitle them to
hold membership of the various security analysts' societies.
Although amateur and professional security analysts' methods
differ substantially, they both attempt to identify under-valued
and over-valued securities. Implicit in this identification
process is the notion of intrinsic value. The security analysts
try to assess the magnitude of negative and positivs differences
between current market prices and what the price should be, that
is, intrinsic value. Various theories of security valuation are
used and most attach greet importance to the level of earning pef
share, expected growth in earning per share, riskiness, and
dividend payments.85
The impact of these different variables upon intrinsic value
varies according to the statistical techniques or the type of
Intuition used on the problem. Security valuation is carried out
with the belief that portfolios resulting from the process will
provide rates of return superior to those produced by any other
process, especially random selection. As indicated earlier,
there is substantial evidence that the classical process of
security evaluation for identifying under-valued and over-valued
securities does not produce the superior rates of return which
are sought. This seems true even though some financial
Institutions perform the task of security evaluation extremely
well. With the use of large files of financial information in
machine-readable form and highly trained staff of economists and
statisticians, sophisticated models of security evaluation are
created and large number..T. of securitiec are evaluated.
Unfortunately all of this. f7nmpet2nt though it is, oeldom
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produces the desired results.
Implications:
The most general implication of the efficient market hypothesis
is that most security analysis is logically incomplete and
valueless. A typical analytical report is based on public
information, perhaps supplemented by a company visit, and
indicating the prospects for either improvement or deterioration
in the company's profitability. After what is often a detailed,
lucid, accurate and perceptive analysis, the analyst concludes
with a recommendation that the stock be bought, held, sold, or
sold short. The logical incompleteness consists of failing to
determine or even consider whether the stock's price already
reflects the substance of the analysis. For believers in
efficient markets, a recommendation to buy or to sell cannot rest
solely on one's opinion about a company, it must be based on a
significant difference between that opinion and the opinion of.
other investors who determine the stock's current price. A very
optimistic forecast of a company's future earnings is no
justification for buying a stock, it is necessary that the
analyst's forecast be significantly more optimistic than other
forecasts. Such marked differences in opinion are the basis of
abnormal gains and losses. A l proper analytical report includes
evidence of the existence of such a difference and support for
the analysts own view.
The evidence indicates that stock prices react when information
that alters the expectation of a firm's future earnings is
released. Clearly one legitimate function of security analysis
is to discover such information before the competition and reap
tho reward when the market learns of it. Indeed, it is this
competition for information' that limits the opportunity for above
average returns and ensures market efficiency..
In addition, security analysts forecasts of corporate earnings
are more accurate than time-series projection of past earnings.
Through company visits and aggregation and disaggregation of
industry data, analysts make forecasts Of the expected
profitability. These forecasts generate abnormal investment
performance only if they are better than the consensus of all
other analysts and investors.
This search and analysis is costly, and higher than average
returns are required to compensate for these costs. The
Importance of allowing for the cost of inquiry and analysis when
assessing investment performance is illustrated in a study of 70
mutual funds by Mains. 86 Before operating expenses and
transaction costs, he found that 80 percent of funds outperformed
the market. After allowing for expenses, the funds' performance
was no better than the market. The funds were able to outperform
a naive investment strategy, but only enough to cover the costs
of their research and analysis.
It is extremely unlikely that superior rates of return can be
consistently earned by analysing public information in
conventional ways. Although originality may be coupled with
unsoundness and unproductivity, the only hope for superiority in
results lies in seeking unique ways of forming expectations
superior to others in the market.
Another implication of an efficient market is the possibility of
economies of scale in security analyses . and portfolio management.
The search for under-valued and over-valued securities cost about
the same whether the amount available for investment is, for
example, £1,000 or El billion. If the occasional success of the
-search - and nothing has been said to suggest inevitable failure-
could produce superior returns of say, 0.5 percent,. this would
produce an additional £5 return on the £1,000 investment, and £5
million return on the El billion investment. Clearly, the quest
might make sense for large financial institutions, while it would
not make sense for'smaller investors.
A belief in an efficient market is not exactly equivalent to a
disbelief in the possibility of superior security analysis-
There are individuals who have a quicker or more profound
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understanding of the economic consequences for individual firms
of changes in the economic environment or changes within the
firm. Truly talented professional portfolio managers try to make
sure that they can identify such rare and valuable talent when it
is encountered.
3.8.2 Portfolio Management 
Currently, portfolio management as practised by professionals in
financial institutiorl is easily described as follows. Security
analysts classify securities in categories according to their
attractiveness as investments. Investment committees consider
the recommendations for security analysts and create a list of
securities, which are approved for purchase by portfolio
managers. Portfolio managers then select securities from the
approved list as a result of their own appraisals and in response
to individual preference of clients, whose funds are being
invested. In creating the i ndividual portfolios, Ihe portfolio
manager is often constrained by general policies specifying the
minimum number of securities which must be held, the maximum
proportion of the portfolio which can be in any single security
or industry, the minimum number of industries in which
Investments must be held, and so forth. Adjusting portfolios to
the tastes of the individual investor is described by Brealey:
It is a commonly held view that the mix of common stock
maintained by an investor should depend on his willingness
to bear risk. According to this view, a broker or
investment counsellor is a kind of financial interior
decorator, skilfully designing portfolios to reflect his
clients' personality.87
Appropriate Changes:
Those who believe, as Brealey does, in the efficient market
hypothesis would change the process of portfolio management.
Except on rare occasions, no money or energy would be expended in
predicting the rate of return on individual securities. The rare
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occasions would arise when portfolio manager had strong reason to
believe that the security analyst or some other member of his/her
financial institution had either confidential information or an
especially original and valuable insight into a corporation's
prospects. On the other occasions, the professional portfolio
manager would consider the following things:
(1) The degree of diversification.
This means that the portfolio manager should ensure that
virtually all of the fluctuations in rates of return on the
portfolio are determined by fluctuations in the general
market for common stock. The market on average provides
superior rates of return for risk which cannot be avoided
(risk of owning securities in general) but does not provide
superior rates of return for risks which can be avoided
(risks caused by the independent fluctuations in the value
of a group of common stocks apart from market fluctuations.
as a whole).
(2) The riskiness of the portfolio.
The level of risk that the client or beneficiary should
assume must be determined either by consultation with the
client or independently by the professional adviser when the
client's views are of no value, such as, when the client is
an infant or a senile person. The appropriate level of risk
is determined by the client's resources, needs, tastes, and
whether the client is an individual, corporate trustor, or
an endowed institution.
.(3) The maintenance of the desired risk level.
The portfolio should be selected and maintained in
accordance with the appropriate level of risk. The
conventional view of risk level maintenance requires custom
tailoring to the client's needs. Modern portfolio theory,
on the other hand, asserts that all clients can hold the
same group of common stocks and that the appropriate Ievai
of risk is achieved by dampening volatility through. the
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injection of short-term government securities or by
increasing volatility through buying on margin.
(4) The tax status of the investor.
Returns on investments usually consist of interest or
dividends and capital gains. For investors subject to
taxation, the proportions of the total return coming from
these sources matters because they are taxed at different
rates. Clever tax advice can minimalise these differences.
(5) Transaction Costs.
Possibilities for reducing transaction costs have increased
substantially in recent years with the growth of the 'third'
and 'fourth' markets, creation of an automated quotation
system for over-the-counter-trading, and the use of
negotiated rates for the trades on the exchanges.
Agreeing with the foregoing list, Fisher Black advocates that
88
almost all portfolio managers should be passive.-:1 That is, they
should:
a	 select a diverse portfolio;
b . leverage it through borrowing to a higher degree of
risk, or dampen it through the purchase of government
securities to a lower degree of risk;
• maintain the appropriate degree of risk;
• realise tax losses when appropriate;
• meet the investor's demands for funds;
maintain efficient diversification through periodic
shifts in securities, and
• minimalise transaction costs.
These tasks are difficult and important, but they are not the
task conventionally believed to be necessary for the professional
portfolio manager. The professional portfolio manager must also
stand ready to review the investor's circumstances to make sure
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that the portfolio's riskiness is appropriate or the client at
all times.
3.9 CONCLUSION
This chapter has reviewed some of the major empirical tests of
the efficient market hypotheses in the U.S. and U.K. markets, and
In other countries (smell' markets). Most of the research
involved	 in	 these	 studies have	 concluded	 that	 their
investigations provided no significant evidence against the
efficient markets hypothesis, however, there do not appear to be
many present day tests which can provide sufficient evidence on
the validity of the efficient market hypothesis using the
generally accepted definition of market efficiency.89
However, for the weak and semi-strong forms, the weight of the
evidence is overwhelmingly in favour of efficiency. That is to
say, the evidence suggests that the stock market rapidly and
accurately discounts new information into share prices. This
implies that any system based on historical price data (e.g.
Chartism), is futile, and further, that no use can profitably be
made of publicly available information. However, for the strong
form hypothesis, the evidence is not quite so powerful. At an
aggregate level, efficiency is demonstrated. But as individual
cases of superior portfolio performance have been observed, the
market cannot be said to be fully efficient. It is perhaps a
question of degree. The most important discovery is that the
majority of funds (mutual and unit trust), fail to match the
performance of the market index. In other words, professionally
managed funds do not even match the performance of a naive index
portfolio. This single fact must argue for a reassessment and
reorganisation of the investment process.
r- We have also traced the development of the random walk hypothesis
ofA
	
in this rh,..pf-..r. At first, investigators studied the bronertipq
of changes in stock prices and found them substantialiy
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independent. This independence caused stock prices to follow a
random walk. This result was surprising and interesting. The
quest for an explanation led to the theory of efficient markets
which has implications far beyond the mere statistical
independence of successive changes in stock prices. An efficient
market is one in which many buyers and sellers react through a
sensitive and efficient mechanism to cause market prices to
reflect fully and virtually instantaneously what is knowable
about th2 future of companies whose securities are being trade'
This view caused a transformation from the 'random walk'
hypothesis to the 'efficient market hypothesis' which now
dominates most discussion of this subject. Furthermore, the
accumulating evidence regarding the validity of the random walk
or efficient market hypotheses has changed some conceptions as to
the appropriate form of security analysis and the appropriate
role of the portfolio manager. The ardent quest for under-valued
or over-valued securities by the army of trained security
analysts has made it extremely unlikely that more than small and
transient margins of superiority can be achieved by any of these
analysts. These margins can be profitably exploited only by
portfolio managers of financial institutions with large amounts
of assets. Large financial institutions can seek originality in
analysis techniques of conventional . information, hoping to
improve the speed and accuracy with which public information is
organised, analysed, and interpreted. Other security analysts
must develop their originality in other ways. Perhaps it will
prove fruitful to seek new, objective data on corporate
performance or to view old data from fresh perspectives to get a
clearer vision of individual corporations' profitability.
Even though stocks are bought and sold in efficient mitark,
there remains a need for estimates of contributions which
individual securities make to the riskiness of diversified
portfolios. This riskiness tends to change slowly. Careful
analysis of historical data is still valuable knowledge of the
re l at i onshi p between risk And reward mnd is one nf thp fPw kinds
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of knowledge whose value is not diminished seriously by its
general dissemination.
The role of portfolio managers, too, has been changed by
increasing convictions that the securities market is efficient.
Unless one has strong feelings, backed up by hard evidence, that
the portfolio manager has superior skill, much is to be said for
a strategy of passivity. Under this strategy, the portfolio
manager has the following tasks to perform:
first:	 determination of the appropriate level of risk for the
portfolio;
second: achievement of the desired level of risk by
constructing a portfolio of well-diversified common
stocks, which is either dampened through inclusion of
riskless assets, or leveraged by purchasing on margin;
third:	 periodic review of the appropriateness of the level of
risk;
fourth:	 maintenance of the desired level of risk;
fifth: management of additions to and deletions from the
portfolio to minimalise taxes and provide either for
additional investment or for reduction of investment in
order to make disbursements;
six:	 minimalisation of transaction costs.
Based on the empirical findings and the implication of thR
efficient market hypothesis, the next chapter will contain a
critical analysis of the efficient market hypothesis. The
emphasis of the critique will focus on the three forms of
efficiency.
NOTES TO CHAPTER THREE
1 Eugene F. Fame, 'Efficient Capital Market: A review of
Theory and Empirical Work', Journal of Finance, 25, 1079
pp.383-417
	
2	 Louis Bachelier,	 'Theory of Speculation', Journal of
Finance, (14) No.1 (1959) pp.1-10
	
3	 E Slutsky; 'The Summation of Random Causes as Sources of
Cyclic Process' Econometrics, (2), 1937 pp.105-46
4 H. Working, 'Price Relation Between July and September.
Wheat Futures at Chicago since 1885,' Wheat Studies (9),
1934 pp.187-238
5 Harry V. Roberts, 'Stock Market Patterns and Financial
Analysis.' Methodological Suggestions, Journal of Finance 14
(1959) pp.1-10
	
6	 M.E.M.Osborne, 'Brownian Motions in the Stock Market,'
Operations Research, (7) 1959 pp.5-73
7 M.G.Kendall, 'The analysis of Economic Time Series - Part I:
Prices.' Journal of the Royal Statistical Society (Series
A), (96) 1933 pp.11-25
	
8	 A.B.Moore, 'Some Characteristics of Changes in -.Z.'offnrsn
Prices 1962', in Cootner, 1964. pp.139-161
	
9	 P.H.Cootner, 'The Random Character of Stock Market Prices.'
M.I.T. Press, Cambridge, Mass. 1966
	
10	 Fame, op.cit. p.1
	
11	 B.F.King, 'Market and Industry Factors in Stock Price
Behaviour',	 Journal	 of	 Business Studies,	 39,	 1966
Supplement, pp. 139-190
12 Alfred Cowles, & Herbert E. Jones, 'Some Posterior
probabilities in Stock Market Action', Econometrica, (1937)
5, pp.280-94
13 Alfred Cowles, 'A Revision of Previous Conclusions Regarding
Stock Price Behaviour' Econometrica, (1960) 28, pp.909-15
	
14	 H.V.Roberts, op.cit. p.9
15 Sidney S. Alexander, 'Price Movements in Speculative
Markets: Trends on Random walks' Industrial Management
Review. (2) 1961 pp.7-26
	
16	 Eugene F.Fama, 'The Behaviour of Stock Market Prices',
Journal of Business, 38 (1965) pp.34-105
	
17	 C.W.J.Granger & 0 Morgenstern, 'Spectral Analysis of New
York.StodkPrices s , Kyklos, 1963 pp. 16287
	
18	 S. A l exander, op.cit.
19 E.F.Fama & M. Blume, 'Filter Rules a-nd Stock Market
Trading.' Journal of Business, Special Supplement, 39, 1966
pp. 226-41
20	 M.M.Dryden 'Filter Tests of U.K. Share Prices', Applied
Economics, 1, 1970, pp.261-75
21	 S. Alexander, op.cit.
22	 B. Mandelbrot,	 'The Variation of Certain Speculative
Prices', Journal of Business, 36, 1963 pp.394-419
23 S. Alexander, 'Price Movements in Speculative Markets:
Trends or Random walk No. 2', Industrial Management Review,
Spring 1964
24	 M.M.Dryden, 'A Source of Bias in Filter Tests of Share
Prices', Journal of Business, 42, 1969 pp.321-5
25 R.A.Levy. 'Random Walks: Reality or Myth?' Financial Analyst
Journal Nov/Dec 1967, pp.67-77, also by Levy: 'Relative
Strength as a Criterion for Investment Selection' Journal of
Finance, Vol 22, Dec. 1967 pp.596-610
26 M.C.Jensen, 'Random Walks: Reality or Myth? 	 A Comment'
Financial Analyst Journal, Nov/Dec 1967, pp.77-85
27 M.C.Jensen & G.A.Benninton, 'Random Walks and Technical
Theories: Some Additional Evidence', Journal o Finance, Vol'
25, May 1970, pp.469-82
28	 J.L.Evans,'Analysis of Portfolio Maintenance Strategy',
Journal of Finance, Vol.25, June 1970 pp.561-71
29	 H.A.Latand & W.E.Young, 'Test of Portfolio Building Rules,'
Journal of Finance, Vol 24, Sept.1969, pp.595-612
30 J.C.Van Horne & G.G.Parker, 'The Random Walk Theory: An
Empirical Test,' Financial Analyst Journal, Vol 23. no.1,
Dec.1967, pp.81-92
31 P.H.Cootner, 'Stock Prices: Random vs Systematic Changes,'
Industrial Management Review, Vol.3, No.2, Spring 1962.
pp,24-45
32 F.E.James, 'Monthly Moving Average - An Effective Investment
Tool?' Journal of Finance and quantitative Analysis,
Sept.1968, pp315-26
•
33	 See Section 3.2 for the finding.
34	 V = D(1+x) where V = intrinsic value, D = dividend just paid
r-g
r = discount rate,
g = growth rate nt which dividends are expected to grow.
Samuelson, 'Proof that Properly Anticipated Prices Fluctuate
Randomly indurstrial Management Review, 6 (1965), pp.41-4g
36 Mandelbrot, 'Forecasts of Futures Prices, Unbiased Markets
and Martingale Models', Security Prices: A Supplement,
Journal of Business, 39, 1966, pp.242-55
37	 'Fundamental Analysis'.
	
This term will be discussed in
Chapter 5.
38	 Paul H. Richards, 'U.K.and European Share Price Behaviour:
the Evidence,' Kogan Page, London, 1979
39 For more discussion on the market model, see Sharpe,A
Simplified Model for Portfolio Analysis,' Management
Science, (Jan.1963) pp.277-93
40	 Ibid, p.278
41 R. Ball & P. Brown, 'An Empirical Evaluation of Accounting
Income Numbers,' Journal of Accounting Research (Autumn
1968)
42 C. Jones & R. Litzenberger, 'Quarterly Earning Reports and
Intermediate Stock Price trends', Journal of Finance (March
1970) pp.143-48
43 R. May, 'The Influence of Quarterly Earning Announcements on
Investors' Decisions as Reflected in Common Stock Price
Changes', Empirical Research in Accounting: Selected
Studies, 1971. pp119-63
44 P. Brown & J.W. Kenelly, 'The Information Content of
Quarterly Earnings: An Extension and Some Further Evidence.'
Journal of Business Studies, Vol.45, 1972, pp.403-15
45 W.H.Beaver, 'The Information content ' of Annual Earning
Announcements,' Empirical Research in Accounting: Selected
Studies 1968, Supplement to the Journal of Accounting
Research, 1968, pp.67-92
46 M. Firth, 'An Empirical Investigation of the impact of the
Announcement of Capitalisation Issues on Share Prices',
Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, Vol.4, No.,1,
Spring 1977, pp.47-60
47 R.R.Petit, 'Dividend Announcements, Security Performance and
Capital Market Efficiency,' Journal of Finance, Vol.27,
Dec.1962, pp.993-1007
48	 R. Watts, 'The Information Content of Dividends,' Journal of
Business, Vol.46, 1973, p.191-21151
49 P.A.Taylor, 'The Information Content of Dividend Hypothesis:
Back to the Drawing Board?' Journal of Business Finance and
accounting, Vol.6, NO.4, Winter 1979 pp.495-526
50	 K.B.Johnson, 'Stock Split and Price Changes', Journal of
finance, Vol.21, Dec.1966, pp.675-86
51 E. Fame, L.Fisher, M. Jensen, R. Roll. 'The Adjustment of
Stock Prices to New Information', International Economic
Review, Vol.10, No.1, Feb.1969, pp.1-21
- 92 -
52 Frank K.Reilly and Eugene F. Drzycinski, "Short-run Profits
from stock splits', Financial Management 52, Summer 1981,
pp.64-74
53 M.S.Scholes. 'The Market of Securities: Substitution vs.
Price Pressure and the Effects of Information on Share
Prices', Journal of Business, Vol.45, 1972, pp.172-211
54 A. Kraus & H.R.Stoll, 'Price Impacts on Block Trading on the
New York Stock Exchange', Journal of Finance, June 1972,
pp.569-88
55 L.Dann, D.Mayers & R.Raab,'Trading Rules, Large Blocks and
the Speed of Adjustment', Journal of Financial Economics 4
(Jan.1977) pp.3-22
56	 Firth, op.cit.,
57 Dodd, The Effect on Market Value of Transactions in the
Market for Corporate Control', Proceedings of a Seminar on
the Analysis of Security Prices, Centre for Research in
Security Prices, University of Chicago, May 1981
58 J.Frank, J.Broyles & M.Hecht, 'An Industry Study of the
Profitability of Mergers in the United Kingdom', The Journal
of Finance, Vol. XXXII, 1977
59 Irwin Friend, F.E.Brown, Edward S. Herman, and Douglas.
Vickers, 'A Study of Mutual Funds', (Washington D.C. U3
Government Printing Office) 1962
60 William E. Sharp, 'Mutual Fund performance', Security
Prices: A Supplement, Journal of Business, 39, 1966, pp.119-
38
61 Michael C. Jensen 'The Performance of Mutual Funds in the
Period 1945-64', Journal of Finance, 23, 1968, pp.389-416
62 C. Ward & A Saunders, 'UK Unit Trust Performance 1964-74',
Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 3/4, 1976
63 M.A.Firth, 'The Investment Performance of Unit Trusts in the
Period 1965-75', Journal of Money, Credit and Banking,
November 1977
64 James M. Patell, 'Corporate Forecasts of Earnings per Share
and Stock price Behaviour: Empirical Tests', Journal of
Accounting Research, 14 (Autumn 1976), pp.246-76
65 J. Jeff, 'The Effect of Regulation Changeson Innsider
Trading', Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science,
Spring 1974, pp.93-121
66 Victor Niederhoffer & M.F.Osborne, 'Market Making and
Reversal on the Stock Exchange', Journa l of the American
Statistical Association, 61, December 1 966, pp.897-916
67 W. Silber,'Thinness in Capital Markets: The Case of the Tel
Aviv Stock Exchange', Journal of Finance and Quantitative
Analysis. March 1975
68 G.Hawanini & P.Michel, 'Market Efficiency of the Brussels
Stock Exchange (1975) Unpublished Paper, in P. Stoneham,
'Major Stock Markets in Europe', Gower Publishing Co, 1982.
69 C.H.Pogue & B. Solnik, 'The Market Model Applied to European
Common Stocks: Some Empirical Results', Journal of Financial
and Quantitative Analysis, Dec. 1974
70 M. McDonald & B.Jacquillat, 'Pricing of Initial Equity
Issues: The French Sealed Bid Auction', Journal of Business,
January 1974
71	 Marc Bertoneche, Sept 1978, in P. Stoneham, op.cit. (70)
72	 B. Solnik, 'Note on the Validity of the Random Walk for
European Stock Prices', Journal of Finance, 1973
73 K. Conard & D. JUttner, 'Recent Behaviour of Stock Market
Prices in Germany and the Random Walk Hypothesis,' Kyklos,
1973
	
74	 Giovanni Cristini, 1978, in P. Stoneham, op.cit. (70)
75 M. Kolk & J. Schoorl, 'Die Effici gnte Markttheorie en de
Amsterdamse Effectenbeurs Research Memorandum No. 8011,
University of Amsterdam, Department of Economics, 1980.
' 76 N. Niarchos, 'The Stock Market in Greece',-in G.P.Szego & K.
Shell, 'Mathematical Methods in Investment and Finance',
1972
77	 Bletsas & Tebbut, op.cit.
78 L. Lim.,'The Efficient Market Hypothesis and Weak Form Tests
on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange', 1980
79 S. Siong,'The Behaviour of Malaysian Stock Market Prices
1973-1981: A Statistical Study,t , Malaysian Stock Exchange
Publication, 1982
L. Koo, 'The Stock Exchange of Singapore in the context uf
the Efficient Market Hypothesis', Singapore Stock Exchanges
Publication, (annual) 1980
81 C. Wong, 'Comparative Study of Capital Efficiency for Three
Pacific Basin Stock Markets: Hong Kong, Kuala Lumpur,
Singapore', Far East Stock Exchange Papers, 1981
82 D. JUttner & N.Hugh,'Is the Australian Stock Market Really
Efficient in the Weak Sense?','The Investment Analyst April
1976
83	 P. Praetz. 'Australian Share Prices and the Random Walk
Hypothesis', Australian Journal of Statistics 1969
84	 F. Roux & B. Gilbertson, 'The Behaviour of Share Prices on
the Johannesburg Stock Exchange', Journal of Business
Finance & Accounting, Summer 1978]
	 .
-94-
85	 For more detail see chapter five.
86 N.E.Mains, 'Risk, The Pricing of Capital Assets, and the
Evaluation of Investment Performance: Comment', Journal of
Business, 50, (July 1970) pp.371-84
87 A. Brealey, 'An Introduction to risk and Return from Common
Stocks', Cambridge, Mass. MIT Press, 1968, p.115
88 Fischer Black, 'Implications of Random Walk Hypothesis for
Portfolio Management', Financial Analysts Journal. 27,
(March 1971) pp.1-7
89	 See for example, Fame, op.cit. p.383
CHAPTER 4
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF EFFICIENT MARKET HYPOTHESIS
4.1 INTRODUCTION
One of the important theories developed by financial academics is
the so-called efficient market hypothesis and the random walk
theory. There has been considerable discussion over the past
decade or so on the validity of the random walk theory as a
description of share price behaviour. The advocates of the random
walk theory contend that, on average, investment analysts cannot
outperform the market index and that it is not worthwhile for
investors to engage in any additional research (see previous
chapter for more detailed information). That sounds like a
sweeping statement to make and so it seems. That is why we have
devoted this whole chapter to the logic and tests of the
efficient market hypothesis. We need to understand the efficient
market hypothesis not because we 'expect that it is universally
true and relevant, but because it may lead us to ask the right
questions.
4.1.1 Efficient Market Hypothesis as a Binary Concept
In the first place, it must be noted that market efficiency is
not a binary concept. Fama i has identified the three levels of
efficiency test: weak, semi-strong and strong form. Each of
these levels can be evaluated with or without the consideration
of taxes, transaction costs and information costs. 	 By simply
taking combinations of these (far from exhaustive) possibilities,
we can arrive at 21 levels of efficiency testing. The least
ri gorous would be a finding that a market is weakly efficient
after allowing for taxes: transaction costs and information
costs, while the most rigorous woulo ne a finding of strong •form
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efficiency without consideration of the other factors. Existing
evidence indicates that the capital markets of most developed
countries lie between these two extremes. In particular, the
most rigorous test of efficiency has not been met by any market
(i.e. the ability to trade costlessly on inside information
remains profitable in all markets of which we have knowledge).
Potential sources of inefficiencies to the model exist in the
forms of transaction costs, information that is not freely
available to all and to differences among investors about the
implications of the given information. Consequently, much of the
empirical work so far have been mainly measuring whether past
series of share prices can be used to predict successfully future
share prices.(i.e. weak form tests).
4.1.2. Chartists and Efficient Market Hypothesis
Efficient market hypothesis holds that all pr!ce sensitive
information is immediately discounted in the relevant share
prices, thus making traditional investment analysis difficult and
perhaps impossible. This form of the hypothesis is so well
supported by numerous random walk studies of share prices that a
good deal of argument has been entered on the logic of the
efficient market hypothesis and its statistical infrastructure.
Yet, after all these years, there are still many analysts engaged
in chart analysis and many investment decisions are still made on
the basis of this. Perhaps this is because less attention ha=
been given to the other approach to the problem: i.e. to test by
suitably objective means the claims of the chartists themselves.
Apart from the interest of a study which contributes, to a
possible resolution of the controversy about share analysis which
existed many years before the efficient market hypothesis was
developed, one should be aware that the testing of chart analysis
is of essential importance to the efficient market hypothesis
itself. If objective tests ofchartist techniqu es should establish
for them a certain degree of significant validity, then, sihce
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the random nature of stock prices is one of the fundamental
consequences of the efficient market hypothesis, the hypothesis
itself would have to be questioned or reformulated.
Some chart analysts may have superior forecasting analytical
ability. Their Judgement may be superior to that of the market
as a whole and therefore their estimate of what the share price
should be may be more accurate than that of the market. That
such people exist would not necessarily be revealed in the
studies reviewed in the previous chapter.
One feature of the evidence presented throughout most past
studies is that
	
either	 have been publiihedZor have been
publicly available.. Now if work has been undertaken which has
isolated market inefficiencies, then it is possible that the
researcher may first construct a system to exploit the
inefficiencies before publishing the results. In other words,
there may be a bias in the evidence presented in that only the
research which confirms efficiency is published. Hence, either no
one has discovered any inefficiencies, or, any inefficiencies
which have been discovered are still being exploited. Of course
once details of an inefficiency are published, it would dis-
appear. The published results will form part of the body, of
information about shares and will therefore be incorporated into
share prices. The point made above is that any currently
profitable trading rule is likely to be kept a secret by its
inventor and thus the only publicised 'successful' rules are
those which are no longer profitable.
4.1.3 Conditions of Strong Form Efficiency
The task then is to determine which analysts, if any can provide
information or advice which has some economic value: that is
information which is not already discounted in the share price.
These problems can be avoided to some extent by tests of the
strong and semi-strong form. One r.„- of	 form test is to
analyse the performnnre of i nstitutinnal portfolios. This tef:t
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is without doubt the most powerful test of merket efficiency.
Compared with other investors, the institutions have their own
full-time research and investment teams, plus the benefit of the
pick of the brokers' research which has been received. If such
institutions cannot beat the market, then there will be
compelling evidence for market efficiency. There is therefore
evidence to suggest that efficient market hypothesis is no longer
regarded as a topic of solely academic interest while academic
researchers still continue to investigate 'successful' investment
rules promulgated by practising analysts. As described earlier,
we might expect these 'rules' to no longer work (why else should
the analyst publish the rule?) although this does not disprove
the inefficiencies that could have existed earlier. Fama2
emphasises that efficiency in the strong form has not been
clearly met and markets are not generally efficient in this
sense.	 Thus, we are led to consider tests of the semi-strong
form.
4.1.4 Conditions of Semi-Strong Efficiency
Having defined an efficient market as one where prices fully
reflect available information on a firm, the efficient market
hypothesis implies that the complete body of 'publicly available'
knowledge about a company's prospects is interpreted correctly in
the share price, i.e. the arrival of new information is impounded
almost instantaneously into the price.
In practice, no existing stock market is perfectly efficient in
the terms described above. Major shortcomings include that the
complete body of knowledge about a company's prospects is usually
not publicly available and that even if such information were
available it is doubtful whether it would be interpreted in a
completely accurate fashion in the share price. These
shortcomings can impinge quite seriously on the efficient market
hypothesis such that it could break down altogether. This, of
course, gives academic research considerable scope to justify
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itself by attempting to measure the performance of the stock
market and the relevance of the efficient Market hypothesis.
In addition, semi-strong efficiency depends on imprecise and
potentially	 circular	 definitions of	 the term
	 'publicly
available'. Yet it is clear that financial statements and the
information they contain do not become available simultaneously
to all interested parties.
In addition, semi-strong efficiency depends on imprecise and
potentially circular definitions of the term 'publicly
available'. Yet it is clear that financial statements and the
information they contain do not become available simultaneously
to all interested parties.
On one hand, if information is deemed 'publicly available as soon
as it is known to anyone outside the management group of a
corporation, there is a good chance that it will be useful to
someone identifying mispriced securities.
On the other hand, if information is considered 'publicly
available' only after it is available to everyone, the likelihood
is extremely high that it will be already impounded by stock
prices by the time it is (finally) available to everyone. In this
case it would be possible to define publicly available
information empirically as that which has been fully impounded
into stock prices. Such an approach would obviously assume that
the market is semi-strong efficient.
This lack of precision in the meaning of 'publicly available' is
important for two reasons. Firstly the different efforts to test
the hypothesis that a market is efficient in the semi-strong form
might not be testing the same hypothesis and it is dangerous to
accept evidence as being consistent with market efficiency
without examining the evidence to see exactly what it did test.
Secondly, it is essential that efforts to infer policy
implications from evidence showing market efficiency should
specify precisely what the evidence shows and how it rolateo to
the conclusions drawn.
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In 1980, an article of Beaver's3 suggestion that, if the market
is efficient in the semi-strong form, the role of accounting
information is limited to auditing and insuring continued
disclosure of information relevant to share values and to the
assessment of risk. This suggestion can be valid only if one
defines semi-strong form efficiency as such that all information
contained in financial statements is fully impounded in stock
prices by the time that the statements are released. It would
not appear to follow from existing evidence that the information
contained in financial reports is impounded quickly and without
bias immediately after the statements are released. This
situation does not preclude the possibility that some small
number of individuals, who are the first to obtain the
statements, would be able to profit from the information thus
received.
What we have argued in the last section does not discredit the
entire notion of capital market efficiency theory. We have marPly.
pointed out that the theory, if formulated in terms of the
prevailing ambiguous definition of information, is philosoph-
ically objectionable due to circularity of the definitions of
information. This is a definitional issue that ought to be
clarified.
4.1.5 Limitations of Weak Form Efficiency
This • leads us to consider efficiency of the weak form and
indisputably the volume of research in this area far outnumbers
the more recent semi-strong and strong form studies. In essence,
these studies consider whether information gathered from the
analyses of historical price movements can enable traders to
realise above normal returns. If the market does operate
efficiently (in the sense of setting prices that fully reflect
all information) one expects that these studies would not yield
information that could be used for the formulation of invpstment
strategies. In Chapter Three we reviewed some of the empirical
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researches that have been conducted in the context of weak form
efficient market hypothesis. Basically the approach to these
studies were the same as Fama's4 but the results of some of the
tests did yield,evidence of 'positive' dependence in the day-to-
day price changes and returns on common stocks.
Other studies have broadly shown that
i) share price changes are independent
ii) prices do adjust correctly (however, apart from a few cases,
this approach is incapable of determining whether prices
adjust 'perfectly');
ill) there was no evidence to show that many investors made large
and consistent above-average returns.
What items i) and iii) above have tested is whether 'share prices
are predictable either by mechanical means or by certain
individuals. In a weakly efficient market where prices should .
reflect past available information, one expects that the next
period's price change would be unpredictable. The unpredict-
ability of share price returns is only consistent with, but on
Its own not sufficient for, the efficient market hypothesis.
The argument being put forward here is that the research
methodologies that have been applied in investigating the
efficient market hypothesis have not been wholly sufficient to
test its applicability.
Hence there appears to be no quantative way in which the
efficient market hypothesis can be adequately tested. All that
one can do is to subjectively appraise the processes at work in
the stock market and then reach an opinion as to its efficiency.
4.2 ACCOUNTING AND THE EFFICIENT MARKET HYPOTHESIS
The notion of efficiency concerns the question of what
information, at a point in tire ... , i s imounded in the market
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prices of common stocks or shares. If markets are perfectly
efficient, market prices would adjust immediately to all new
Information concerning the value of each stock. The market price
of a share would at any time reflect the impact of all
information relevant to its value. Under such conditions
(commonly described as strong form efficiency), it would not be
possible for anyone to gain access to information that is not
already impounded in market prices.
Because such an extreme degree of efficiency is both Intuitively
improbable and inconsistent with empirical evidence describing
existing markets, the question of the role of accounting
Information in perfectly efficient markets may not be a pressing
public issue at the present time. If this were not the case,
there would be some important implications for the accounting
profession; for example, the confidentiality attached to advance
information about the accounts of quoted companies would be
unnecessary. But the strong form has never been tested
satisfactorily and such evidence as there is suggests that it
does not hold in practice.
Before proceeding further, it is essential to remind ourselves of
what is meant by the theory of efficient markets. They can be
defined as follows:
'An efficient securities market is typically defined as one
in which the prices of all securities traded in the market
at all times reflect without bias all information relevant
to-the value of each security.15
Thus, the efficient market hypothesis is really a theory which
suggests a strong and positive relationship between market prices
and the use of publicly available information relating to tra1
securities. Publicly available information about companies
contains a large subset of data of an accounting nature,
including that in annual and interim financial reports. In other
words, the efficient market theory and related evidence suggest
that all available accounting data are quickly and effectively
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impounded into security prices by the stock market, despite their
acknowledged complexity and related measurement problems; despite
their questionable relevance to investment decision making and
despite the varying degrees of accounting 'sophistication'
present amongst report users. The danger of this view of
financial accounting is that the case for market efficiency can
be overstated and the problems of accounting either over-
simplified or assumed not to exist. For example, Dyckman et.al .
have stated:
'... the trend toward increased financial disclosure
apparently has not resulted in over-complicated financial
statements ... it appears that most readers of financial
statements have relatively little difficulty understanding
these statements and that the investing public generally is
not very critical of the complexity of these statements.,6
Briston's relatively similar thoughts are:
'There is a growing body of evidence to suggest that
accounting information is already very quickly absorbed into
share prices and that share prices at any point of time tend
to reflect all available information regarding the company
concerned. This process is able to take i place because of
the existence of investment analysts and financial
journalists who analyse both available and predicted
accounting data and through their influence upon investors
produce a reasonably efficient market in which shares are
correctly priced at any specific instance of time. It can
thus be argued that it does not matter either to
shareholders or to the stock market whether or not
shareholders are able to interpret annual reports so lon g as
they respond to the financial, press and to stockbrokers'
reports and the evidence of all the surveys is that they do
this. '7
4.2.1 The Expert and Efficient Market Hvpothesii 
The first implication of such evidence of efficient markets is
that the reactions of the market to financial accounting
information override those of the individual, in the sense that
the individual cannot outperform the market by analysing all
available public information. Thus, the efficient market approach
tends to emphasise the value of accounting information to a
society rather than its value to the individual. It also tends
to lead to statements in which the implication is that published
accounting information can be left to the so-called
'sophisticated' user - typically the investment analyst or
manager employed by an institutional investor. That, however,
leads to a number of questions.
First, does the 'sophisticated' user understand reported
accounting information sufficiently to be left to determine the
degree and extent to which it is impounded into share prices?.
Some research into the use and understanding of financial
information by institutional investors reveals good but not
outstanding levels of comprehension by those responsible for its
use, and certainly not sufficient to justify complete reliance on
their abilities in this area.
Likewise, although several efficient-markets studies suggest that
the market is sufficiently expert not to be fooled by accounting
information, there is a worrying number of cases which suggest
the opposite conclusion. These markets have been surprised Loo
many times in the past to suggest that their agents (even
collectively) cannot be fooled by available information. There
is ample evidence in the history of stock markets to the effect
that investors can be fooled and misled by what is reported.
That they have been misled has often not emerged for long
periods, from months to years, after the release of the
information. The day-to-day buyers and sellers of the stock of
these companies could not, before their collapse, have had any
inkllug of what lay ahead of them.
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Secondly, should the 'sophisticated' user have a monopoly use of
available financial information to the virtual exclusion of the
so-called 'naive' investor? This is a major social as well as
financial question, concerning a problem of human rights in the
sense that external accounting reports could eventually ignore
the needs of the individual. 	 Evidence of this erosion of
individual rights	 has already been highlighted by Lee and
Tweedie in their study of private shareholders:
'Accountants could therefore be criticised for not
fulfilling one of their.main roles ... that is, reporting to
shareholders on their company's profit and loss and state of
affairs, each in a form which is reasonably comprehensive to
all recipients. The evidence of this study suggests that
accountants have, however unintentionally, produced a
financial reporting system which is capable of being used
thoroughly and reasonably understood only by accountants and
equivalent profes41onals.'8
This practice has also been criticised in the 1977 U.K. Green
Paper on company reporting which recommended that "Annual Reports
shoUld, where feasible, be simplified and made more intelligible
to the shareholder and to the general reader".
Thirdly, there is the considerable danger that this approach will
eventually reinforce the viewpoint that no vital reforms in
financial reporting are necessary, given that the 'sophisticated'
user, on behalf of the market, will sift through the available
information, using what is relevant, adjusting where necessary
and discarding what is inappropriate. This approach, firmly
bedded in the efficient markets school, has already produced a
proposal that the need for accounting standards is not necessary9
and a suggestion that efficient markets evidence could
significantly reduce the liability, of the auditor.i o In
addition, it results in an inevitable call for more disclosure
thereby making financial reports even more incomprehensible to
all but the most expert user:
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...the best service that accounting can Fender the average
investor is to provide more and better information to the
professional analyst."li
In other words, the implications of the 'sophisticated user'
approach to financial reporting, largely founded on the efficient
- markets evidence, raise doubts as to the ability of such users
to assume such a responsible task. For example, are they able to
do this, and if they do, does the individual investor have
grounds for a law suit against th professional analyst when the
latter wrongly impounds the information into an inappropriate
security price, thus causing the individual investor to be misled
as to the 'fair value' of that security? Additionally, the
efficient - markets approach is likely to further isolate the
already beset individual investor . in terms of his use of
available financial information. It also raises serious questions
as to the nature and necessity for financial accounting reforms.
None of these matters appears to be trivial enough to causa.
acceptance of the efficient-markets evidence as sufficient reason
for concentrating on the 'expert' information user and for
ignoring the need to reform financial accounting where necessary.
4.2.2 The Role of Accounting Information
The existing evidence from efficient-markets researches may have
consistently indicated that publicly available accounting
information is very quickly absorbed into share prices. Such
evidence however says nothing of how the market ought to react to
specific and different types of information which is essential to
an assessment of why the market reacted in the way it did. In
other words, the efficient-markets evidence measures the size and
timing of the price reaction to publicly available information,
but has nothing to say about the reasons for it. As such, this
conclusion has certain serious implications for accounting policy
makers:
a-	 Unless there is a proper differ;Intiation between the speed
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and effectiveness of the absorption of accounting
information, there is a danger that such policy makers may
attempt to judge the desirability of various accounting
measurements and disclosures in terms of the speed with
which they are utilised, rather than the effectiveness of
their use. This effectiveness (presumably to be judged in
terms of the accuracy of the predictions resulting from
information use, requires normative and prior statements of
expected reactions which can be used for comparative
purposes. Even if such comparisons are to be made, the
efficient-markets evidence should not be used by accounting
policy makers for judging the desirability of accounting
information.
b- The available evidence can cause a dangerous assumption to
be made about the use of accounting information within the
stock market, i.e. that its influence in security prices can
be adequately separated from the effects of other c'ources
available information (and from the effects of insider
information.12 Given the existing evidence of investors'
use of number of important information sources,13 it does
seem rather strange that efficient-markets researchers
should assume accountants to have a monopoly regarding the
supply of usable information to the market. What accounting
policy makers must therefore guard against is being misled
by the efficient-markets evidence into believing that formal
financial statements and reports are the only influence on
stock market prices. Few would deny that the role of
accounting information is crucial to the stock market, but
this position ought not to be overstated, otherwise the
Present onerous responsibilities of accountants and auditor
may well become untenable or impossible to achieve
satisfactorily.
.4.3 ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES
As the Undernoted alternative definition of an efficient market
indicates, the role of accounting information is seen by certain
.of its proponents as an aid to the optimal allocation of market
resources.
"An efficient capital market is defined as one in which
security prices always fully reflect all publicly available
Information concerning the securities traded. such a market
Is efficient in the sense that it properly fulfils the
primary role of a capital market - the optimal allocation of
resources..."14
The available evidence, however, raises three important issues for
accountants.
The first is that, even if it is assumed that the market can use
available accounting information to achieve to so-called optimal
allocation of resources, the market is able to distinguish
between relevant and irrelevant information for this purpose.
This is an extension of the comments made earlier about the
market not being 'fooled' by available information. This begs
questions about the sufficiency of existing accounting standards
and disclosure requirements to provide investors with the means
of judging effectively the quality of published accounting
information - i.e. in terms of its ability to describe adequately
the reality of corporate activities and transactions. Given the
degree of subjective judgement involved in producing accounting
numbers (despite the existence of standards and disclosure
rules), it is not clear how the efficient-markets evidence is of
benefit in assessing the quality of reported information and
hence, it is equally unclear as to how it can be used to assess
whether or not resources have been allocated optimally. Already.
Chambers has warned that the quality of accounting information as
a whole is notorious for its variety and variabilityJ5	An
efficient market In the fullest 	  would, by tn. prics-4
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established in it, secure the support of enterprises or projects
of companies which have demonstrated earning capacity superior to
that of other companies. But if earning reports are
differentially distorted by the asset valuation and income
calculation rules adopted by different companies - and there is
considerable evidence of this - the stock market cannot
discriminate between the more and the less efficient companies.
As mentioned earlier, there is evidence of specific cases to
suggest that the stock market can be misled as to the quality cf
available information. It is therefore dangerous in the extreme
to suggest that efficient-markets evidence reveals that the
market is capable of properly assessing that quality. Accounting
policy makers must therefore remain vigilant about the need to
improve information quality. As Chambers has noted:.
"The efficient market hypothesis has little to do with
efficiency, in the sense of securing the distribution of
available funds in favour of firms that are demonstrably
more competent than others in using them while ever the
information on financial and commercial competence is of
dubious quality" •16
Secondly, the need for accounting policy makers to consider the
validity of alternative forms of reportable accounting
information vis-a-vis the needs of report users is of paramount
concern at the present time. It may therefore be tempting to
look at efficient-markets evidence of price reactions to
alternative accounting measurements and disclosures and thereby
Judge the suitability of these alternatives (regarding the
allocation of scarce resources) in terms of such reactions.
However, this would tell the policy makers nothing about the
suitability of accounting alternatives; all it does show is that
there has (or has not) been a price reaction to them. The
optimal resource allocation question and its relationship to the
relevance of accounting alternatives is therefore not answered by
the efficient-markets evidence.
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Thirdly, the use of available accounting information in the
allocation of scarce resources in the stock market and indeed,
the entire area of efficient stock markets, presupposes that the
stock market is the sole consumer of such information. This is
patently not the case in practice, as is seen in the number of
actual and potential user groups which have multiplied over the
years. It is therefore potentially misleading to take the
efficient-markets evidence as grounds for making policy
judgements about accounting developments. To do so is to cater
solely for the needs of the stock market to the exclusion of the
needs of other groups which may be concerned with other aspects
of optimal resource allocation.
What the above comments on the efficient-markets theory and
evidence have attempted to do is to remind readers that these
matters are not simply limited to questions about the efficiency
of trading in the securities market and the 'fairness' of the
established market prices. They also include very real issuRs of
concern to accountants -.particularly those responsible for
policy making and development in the area of corporate financial
reporting. The main danger centres on the 'authority' of the
efficient-markets evidence which could, unless fully understood,
provide so many easy and lazy answers to the existing problems of
financial accounting. For example:
1 that these issues can be resolved by increased disclosure in
financial statements for the benefit of the 'sophisticated'
investor;
2 that the desirability and quality of accounting information
can be judged in terms of the speed and size of security
price changes;
3	 that accounting information is the only important source of
information to investors and
4	 that the stock market is the most important consumer of such
information.
As Chambers has warned:
... it is almost beyond question, if one is a market
watcher, that non-accounting information and judgements and
events have a more severe and more frequent and a more
readily identifiable impact on prices than does accounting
information."17
4.4 CONCLUSION
This chapter has evaluated the relatively non-controversial weak-
form tests (where the information set consists of past prices or
return data) and the rather inconclusive strong-form tests (where
insider information is included in the set). The discussions then
centred on the semi-strong form tests (where the information set
included public information) which are the ones most directly
relevant to accounting data.
All three studies reviewed in the previous chapter have basically.
invoked Fama'sI8
 fair game model which implies that the expected
excess or abnormal return in relation to a given information set
is zero (referring to equation 1 in Chapter-2). Yet this model
implies nothing about information production that we can discern.
Gonedes notes that
"There is, however, nothing in the efficient capital market
model that provides theoretical insights on the nature or
properties of the mechanism through which information
becomes available"i9
This chapter has also rather consistently exuded an uneasiness
about the efficient market model for empirical research because
even though the efficient market hypothesis may provide
investment managers with a basis for thinking about security
prices, this does not mean that they now have to elevate market
efficiency into a divine law. Although few simple economic
theories are as well supported by the evidence as the efficient
market hypothesis, it is not an exact description of reality even
in its weakest form. There have been, for example, suggestions
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previously that prices are more likely to rise on a Friday than a
Monday, but the potential gains may not necessarily cover the
trading costs. 20
 Certainly costs should be weighed against
benefits but we submit that any policy criterion on the desir-
ability of alternative accounting rules should be sufficiently
robust to include this dimension in its assessment rather than
assuming it away.
The efficient markets theory may be strong, but how strong is it?
We know that no theory is perfect, there must be exception.
What are the exceptions and how important are they? When we come
to the semi-strong form of the hypothesis, the exceptions are a
little more important. For example, some researchers have found
that investors could have made superior profits by buying stocks
after a favourable earnings announcement or when PEs were
low. 21 . 22 Perhaps this was just a coincidence or perhaps there was
something wrong with the tests - we do not have enough evidence
to be sure one way or another.
There also appears to be some strong form inefficiencies. For
instance, NYSE specialists seem to have made consistently
superior profits; so have company managers when they have traded
in their own companies' stock. 23 Even prevailing evidence on the
performance of professional investment managers is not exact.
There is just not enough evidence in the studies that we have re-
viewed to indicate whether investors can, say, earn an extra 0.1
or 0.2 percent a year even though such a gain might be quite
large in money terms, let alone infer market inefficiency.
Aside from implications of specific research efforts,. perhaps the
most significant general point to be derived from our critique is
the recognition that efficient-markets research is a useful but
presently imperfect tool of accounting research. Results of
future .efforts in this area should be considered along with
results of other research approaches in the continuing effort to
provide a sound basis for the development of the best possible
system of production end dissemination of financial information.
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CHAPTER FIVE
MARKET EFFICIENCY AND VALUATION PROBLEMS.
5.1 INTRODUCTION
Related to the issue of market efficiency is the general problem
of security valuation. The valuation of a stock is of central
importance to determining the efficiency of the market for that
stock. Unless the prices of securities fully reflect the earning
power of the firms whose securities are traded on the market, the
market can not be efficient. The security prices should fully
reflect the intrinsic value, and the value of a security should
be equivalent to the discounted present value of the true stream
of its future income. A comparison of future income with present
prices measures the accuracy of the valuation and hence the
efficiency of the market. However, complicated problems are
involved. As an example, how should future income be determined?
The measurement of future income involves data (financial
statements and other information) problems, which open new
issues in accounting theory. In addition, problems of fore-
casting in general further complicate valuation. Assuming that
financial statements are available and forecasted future figures
can give a close approximation of future income, other problems
remain. How should forecasted future income be compared with
current price? This query brings up the issue of opportunity
cost and the appropriate discount rate, which are controversial
issues in finance theories.
Unlike bonds and preferred stocks, both of which offer investors
a promised stream of cash income, the common stock makes no
outright guarantee. To be sure, it represents a residual
financial claim on the assets of the firm and on any incomes
earned.	 However, even if earnings materialise, the firms
directors may choose to retain them for business expansion rather
than pay dividends.
In this chapter, we discuss the concept of valuation and we will
review the theories of valuation. We shall also investigate the
indirect impact of an appropriate valuation of share prices of
market efficiency. This indirect but continuous force stimulates
the manager to perform efficiently and thus to increase market
and economic efficiency. We study the problems of valuation to
shed some light on information necessary for enhancing the
efficiency of a stock market.
5.2 VALUATION
The efficiency of a capital market depends upon the accuracy of
value of the corporate shares listed on the market. If the market
assessment . Of the value of the firm deviates from the intrinsic
value of the firm, the market cannot be efficient. If the market
cannot distinguish between efficient firms, (i.e. those with
sufficiently promising opportunities) and inefficient ones, then
it cannot allocate scarce financial resources to their best uses.
Baumol argues:
'If low earning firms were as likely to encounter favourable
fund market conditions as was one offering higher return, a
tangible incentive to efficiency would be destrnypd.'1
The question then is, what is the yardstick against which to
Judge the efficiency of a firm? One simple yardstick is the
share prices of corporations. The allocation of resources takes
place through the vehicle of price. Considering such a crucial
role, we may ask how the price should be determined so that every
corporation receives the capital it deserves. Determination of
the share price, or the valuation concept, is one of the most
controversial subjects among students of economics and finance
We shall briefly review some of their views.
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5.2.1 Valuation Theories 
There are three general schools of thought concerning security
valuation: technical, random walk and fundamental.
The technical approach views future prices as being a reflection
of past prices, implying that future share prices can be
predicted by the exclusive use of price theory. The logic behind
such an idea stems from the assumption that market prices are
totally dependent upon the forces of supply and demand. However,
since supply and demand are determined by .a large number of
complex factors, it is difficult to develop an analytical model
that explains future price movements.
Whatever the forces of supply and demand are, they are influenced
by some unexpected economic rewards that accrue to investors in
the future. Such future rewards obviously cannot be independent
of future earnings (and hence dividends) of the corporations.
Future earnings, in turn, largely depend upon firms' investment
opportunity set and management efficiency, neither of which can
easily be predicted.
Furthermore, evidence has been presented in Chapter 3 that future
price changes are random and do not follow past price patterns of
firms' shares. Thus prediction, even with present statistical
methods, seems a difficult task.
Although the technical approach enjoys certain popularity among
some market analysts, it suffers from a lack of scientific logic,
and therefore has not attracted the support of the academic
community. Such a method of price assessment cannot lead to
efficient allocation of scarce financial resources because it is
completely divorced from the underlying earnings power of the
firm. Therefore the technical approach is almost ignored as a
valuation method by theoreticians.
The random walk theory, which is a special form of fair game
theory, had been extensively discussed in the previous chapters.
(See Chapters Two and Three). In the fundamentalist approach, the
security is viewed as having an intrinsic value.	 The
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fundamentalist theory states that the value of a share or stock
can be determined scientifically. The stock market fundamentalist
relies upon economic and financial statistics and information.
He investigates corporate income statements, balance sheets,
dividend records, management policies, sales growth, managerial
ability, plant capacity and competitive forces. He looks to the
daily press for evidence of future business conditions. He
analyses bank reports. Taking all these factors into account
corporate earnings are projected and a satisfactory earnings
multiplier (price—earnings ratio) applied to arrive at the
intrinsic value of the security under observation. This intrinsic
value is then compared to the existing market price, and, if the
former is sufficiently higher the stock is regarded as a purchase
candidate2.
Although several differing views are apparent within the group of
fundamentalist theoreticians, all of their views are academically
oriented and are based on scientific logic. These theoreticians
believe that the value of a share of a corporation t-=Ln
predicted by scientific methods. Four such valuation models (i.e.
the investment opportunities approach, the discounted cash flow
approach, the stream of earnings approach, and the stream of
dividend approach to share valuation) have been accepted widely
and extensively discussed in literature.
According to the investment opportunities theory, the intrinsic
value of the firms shares is equal to the present value of the
return from existing assets plus the present value of the firm's
return from future investment opportunities. The discounted cash
flow theory forsees the intrinsic value of the corporation's
shares as the present value of all future cash flows between the•
corporation and its shareholders.
The stream of earnings theory contends that the value of the firm
can be computed by the sum of the present value of :the firms
future earnings.
Finally, the stream of dividend theory assumes that the market
value of the firm's shares can be computed as the sum of the
present value of all future dividends to be paid by the firm.
Theoretical differences among assumptions underlying each model
have caused a controversy between the two main branches of the
fundamentalists. Some financial writers - Miller and Modigliani,
as well as their proponents (i.e. the earning theorists) believe
that, given the investment plans of a corporation, its earning
power is the sole determinant of the value of the firm (its
shares) and its dividend policy has no impact upon the value3.
Certain other financial writers - Gordon and proponents (i.e.
dividend theorists), believe that the dividend policy of the firm
will affect the value of the firm by influencing the
capitalisation rate, because risk averse investors are likely to
perceive current and near future dividends as lese risky than
distant future dividends.
Therefore a corporation's dividend decision to reduce the current.
dividend in favour of increased future income (and hence
dividend) reduces corporate value because it converts present
dividends (less risky) to future dividends (more risky)4.
5.212 Valuation and Dividend Policy
Miller and Modigliani have thoroughly proved that all four models
formally lead to equivalent results. Thus, value according to
dividend theory is the same as value according to the other three
approaches5 . In perfect certainty, and perfect capital markets
assumption, Miller and Modigliani show that given the investment
plans of the firm, dividend policy neither has an impact on the
value of a firm, nor does it affect the return to the firms
owners. Their basic tenet is based on the logic that the value
of the firm is affected not by the Tom in which earnings are
distributed, but only by the corporations earning power, which is
dependent upon the firm's investment opportunities.
let
P t . 
= the price of the share of each company at time t;
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N
t
 = the number of the company's shares outstanding at the time t
m
t+1 = the number of new share issues at time t+1;
n
t+1 = n t + mt+1
T t	= one period of return;
Dt
	= the total dividend declared at time t;
V
t
	= the value of the Corporation at time t;
I t
	= the investment level;
X	 = the . level of earnings during time t;
RE t = retained earnings
then:d t	= dividend per share at time t;
(1) T
t 
= d
t
+ P
t+1 - P t
Pt
This relationship indicates that the return on a security is
composed of dividends received during a period plus capital gains'
at the end of a period relative to the initial investment.
P
t
cp
t
= d
t
 + P
t+1	 P t
1 
(2) P
t
(1 + T
t
) d
t
+ P
t+1
multiplying both sides of eqution (2) by N t WR obtain:
(3) V
t
 = 1	 (D
t + N t x P t+1 )
to delete the effect of new shares (if they were issued during
the year, equation (3) can be written:
V = 1 (I)
	 + N.+1t	 t+1	 t1+Tt
P	 - M
	 .P	 )t+1	 t+1	 t+1'
(4)	 V
t
=1 (D.	 /
	
t	 s- t+1	 M t+1 13+1
1+Tt
The fourth equation implies that the value at time t is a
function of rost of capital, dividend to be received during the
coming period and value at time t + 1 minus the equity increased
during the period.
(5)	 X
t
- D
t
= RE
t
• The above relationship shows the amount of retained earnings in
the corporation.
(5) I. = RE + (P	 ) (M	 )
	
t+1	 t+1
Substituting (5) in (6) we obtain:
(7) (Mt+1)(Pt+1) = I t - (Xt	 Dt)
substituting equation (7) in (4) and simplifying we obtain:
(8) V = 1 (V	 +X - I )
t	 1+9	 t+1	 t	 t
which is independent of the size of dividend paid by the
corporation. The above relationship (8) shows the irrelevancy of
the dividend for the current period. In addition such a
proposition, according to Miller and Modigliani, can encompass
imperfections in the capital market if investors can satisfy the.
criteria of systematic market rationality.
"Such rationality is defined as ... first that every market
participant behaves rationally in the sense of preferring
more wealth to less and being indifferent to the form in
which his wealth increment is received; and secondly that
in forming his expectations, he believes that every other
market participant both behaves rationally and believes that
all others also behave rationally..s
Two major logical assumptions constitute the basis for the above
analysis and lend support to the earning theorists. The first
assumption is that managers make rational investment decisions.
The second assumption is that investors are rational in the
market. A manager is assumed to be rational in the sense that he
will attempt to maximise the present value of currently
outstanding shares, and to fulfil this aim, he will undertake
opportunities as long as these opportunities will cover the cost
of capital to the corporati,,n as determined by the market.
Consequently dividends from zero to 100 percent of the total
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earnings would be paid, depending upon tne -abundance of the
prospective projects7 . Such rationality- bestows the priority
upon investment and considers the dividend as a residual
decision. Furthermore, such rationality warrants segregating
investment decisions from financing decisions (dividend policy),
because the firm's objective is to invest in prospective
projects. Thus, such projects should be financed irrespective of
dividend policy. Once management is committed to undertake and
finance a given investment programme, an increase in the dividend
in any period should lead to a corresponding amount being brought
into the corporation in the form of external financing to replace
them. Curtailment of prospective opportunities would be
Inconsistent with the norms of investment rationality.
The second assumption requires that every investor in the market
behaves rationally. This means that the investor prefers more
wealth to less, and is indifferent to the form in which income
from each investment is received. Besides, rational behaviour
requires that each investor behaves rationally in the sense that
he believes that all other investors in the market behave
rationally.
'...if an ordinary rational investor had good reason to
believe that other investors would not behave rationally,
then it might be rational for him to adopt a strategy he
would otherwise have accepted as irrational.8
Such an assumption implies that all investors in the market will
value two firms with equal earning prospects the same, although
one firm's dividend payout may differ from the other's.
The argument of the dividend theoreticians begins with the
observation that there are in practice some market imperfections
(i.e. different tax treatments of dividend and capital gains and
transaction costs)' and the outcomes of the corporation's income
are subject to uncertainty, and reaches the conclusion that
prices depend upon the dividend policies of corporations-
Therefore, the more generous dividend will generate higher prices
-123-
in shares.g.
The rationale for this, as Gordon explains, is due to dependency
of the discount factor upon dividend payment ratio.io Later
dividend would be discounted at a higher rate by the market than
early dividends because of higher uncertainty low dividend
payment stocks would always be undervalued by the market.
'...if they were undervalued when purchased and undervalued
when sold they would offer no extraordinary gain to the
purchaser. '11
Baumol argues that if the market undervalues the low dividend
payment shares, then the buyer of such a share would not be
better off that others in any period, and hence in the long run.
Based on these premises, Baumol concludes that the market forces
the stock prices to reflect the earning power of the firm.
Thus it appears that earnings do ultimately and solely
determine the value to be derived by shareholding and that
If shareholders do learn at all well from experience their
purchasing pattern will, in the long run, force stock price
to conform rather closely to these prospective earnings
opportunities of the firm whose shares they buy.12
If the market is to be efficient, for whichever of the reasons
stated in this section, prices must reflect the intrinsic value
of the firm, so that resources can be correctly allocated.
Consequently,
	 the fundamentalists'
	 thesis gives a more
appropriate basis for valuation. However, even within this
group, the earning doctrine, which conforms to the norms of the
efficient market model and has gained the support of many
academicians, seems superior to the other views.
5.2.3 Valuation and Debt Policy
In the previous section we described why, given the firms'
investment plans, dividend policy does not affect the value of
the firm in a perfect market.
	
A perfect market with rational
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investors values the firms' earning prospects' which depend on
future income, future growth, management etc., but not on
dividend policy. In this section our discussion explores the
question of whether the debt policy of the corporation changes
its value.
In their classical article, Franco Modigliani and Merton Miller
argue that given that the market is perfect (no taxes, no
transaction costs, no information costs, homogenous expectations,
equal cost of borrowing and lending, no bankruptcy, rational
investors etc.), and given that the investment policy of the firm
is known, the capital structure of the firm does not influence
its market value which depends, rather, only on its total
expected return13 . This theory is based on the premise that both
the total expected return, and the total risk for all holders of
a firm's securities, are not altered by changes in the capital
structure of the firm. In this context, the total value of the
firm is the value of debt and equity. Thus, the market valups.
the whole package of earnings (gross return) considering its
total risk and ignores the debt policy of the firm. It is true
that the rate of return to stockholders changes with the change
in capital structure, but so does their risk. As the debt
capital structure changes, the total fixed cost of the firm also
changes, causing a similar alteration in variability of return to
the equity holders.
Accordingly, while the average cost of borrowed funds to a
company will tend to increase as the debt rises, the risk to
equity holders also rises. This excess risk is compensated for
by the excess return rising from debt financing at lower cost.
This theory has been questioned by many other theoreticians.
David Durand, for example, argues that the model is not practical
because of many restrictive assumptions 14 . Durand and many other
theoreticians believe that moderate amounts of debt increase the
value of the firm because of the existence of market
imperfections, difficulties in distinguishing similar risk
classes, etc. To the e vtent that market imperfections such as
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tax advantages of debt exist, the capital structure matters.
Consequently, a firm can decrease equity by an appropriate amount
of leverage. This argument is valid in the presence of market.
Imperfections. However, in a perfectly efficient market, where
market imperfections are totally absent, debt policy does not
change the firm's value, and securities' prices are based upon
their risk and return.
In conclusion, unless the earning power of the firm increases, or
its total risk (the affiliation of the firm's income to the
market as a whole) decreases, an efficient market does not pay a
higher price for the security of this corporation as a result of
augmentation of debt in its capital structure. This mechanism,
and hence allocational efficiency, is hampered to the extent that
imperfections exist in the market, because the advantages arising
due to the imperfections are not allocated to the most efficient
firms. The most influential or the larger business enterprises,
but not necessarily the efficient nnes, may benefit the most:
However, as the market approaches overall efficiency, most of the
imperfections vanish.
5.3 MARKET EFFICIENCY AND VALUATION
The difficulties to the investor of exact stock valuation
notwithstanding, the stock market performs essential functions in
a capitalist economy. Perhaps the most important of these is the
influence exerted by the market, along with other financial and
non-financial institutions, in allocating a nation's scarce
financial resources.
All of the conceptual thinking of the writers on efficient market
explicitly or implicitly revolves around the ideal distribution
of scarce financial resources for its existence would contributed
to higher economic growth, which is a desired goal for every
society. It seems impossible to locate efficient users, one by
one, in an economy and to allocate . their shares of scarce
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financial resources. 	 No matter how efficiently the task is
performed, some may be overlooked, while undue preference will be
given to others.	 Any criterion used to distinguish efficient
firms from the inefficient would be highly arbitrary. An
efficient capital market, however, given sufficient accurate and
timely information, by its invisible hand performs this task
effectively with a simple tool. The price of shares of the firm,
which accurately reflects the 'intrinsic value' of the firm,
comprises this tool. Consequently, the market approaches
efficiency as securities prices approach their intrinsic value.
Efficiency and the valuation theOry, therefore, seem to
constitute two inseparable parts of an efficient market model.
Baumol argues that an efficient market has the function of
supervising performance of the listed firms and moves these firms
individually (and the economy as a whole) towards efficiency. He
views the stock exchange as a competitive market, since all
products (shares) in the market are homogeneous and perfect
substitutes for each other. Many sellers and many buyers exist,
most of whom are relatively small compared with the market as a
whole. Furthermore, free exit and free entry exist in such a
market. Anyone who wishes to buy or sell a share can easily do
so. Prices are set by forces of supply and demand, and no-one
alone can set the price.
In the parlance of economics, everyone in the market is a price
taker, as opposed to a price setter.
Furthermore, Baumol argues, the efficiency of the capital market
leads the economy as a whole toward efficiency. The capital
market can be efficient when it values
...a stock in the same manner on the basis of capitaliuud
value of the company's expected future earnings as
determined by investment opportunities available to the
firm. '15
The vital role of the market value or a firm in allocai:ed
effi r-lency Is the cro= determinant of the f i rm's pfficiAnry And
-127-
hence, market efficiency.
	
If this price reflects the true
earning power of the firm, then the funds will be
'....provided most abundantly and at the most reasonable
terms to the most promising innovator who, according to the
classical theory of economic development, has the greatest
use for them and who is the one that can obtain profits
which will serve as the investor's reward.'16
Another advantage of a valuation in terms of the true earning
power of the firm is the continual feedback to the management
whose operations are inefficient or unprofitable.17
In a society with a great number of economic units, how can we
detect which firms are more efficient than others? A direct
detection by authorities seems an impossible task. Indirectly,
however, the enterprise that produces commodities in demand and
sells them at a competitive price is serving the wishes of
society. If such enterprises cannot finance their own expaasii:kz
(which is normal since their expansion requires vast amounts of
funds), then society's wishes are not fulfilled and the economy's
growth will suffer. However, if such institutions have access to
the capital market at any time, the one with the more promising
opportunities ceteris peribus, can attract the needed capital.
A society has varying kinds of enterprises, each of which
produces the commodities needed by the society. Those whose
products and services are highly demanded seem to be more
desirable. In many cases, the profit of such enterprises would
be higher than the rest, and the earnings powers of these firms,
due to existing promising opportunities, would be high. Their
high earning power, in turn, would enable them to pay higher
compensation to their shareholders in the form of higher share
prices. The phenomenon which indicates that such enterprises can
be favourably entertained by the market. If all firms received
equal amounts of scarce financial resources, the market would not
be efficient, and competition would not be ottracted to share in
the high returns.	 Without competition, society pays a higher
price for goods or services.
In his theory, Baumol addresses himself to the following
questions: Who gets the resources? How efficiently are resources
used by the recipients? What role does the stock market play in
contributing to the efficiency of the utilisation? His response
to the first question illuminates the vital importance of the
function of the stock exchange in an economy.
In the absence of an efficient market, there can be no assurance
as to who receives the resources, as to what should be the
criterion for Judging which enterprises should receive the
resources, and as to the amount and price of fund allotment. 	 In
the presence of an efficient market the inefficient firm would be
deprived of easy access to the funds, whereas efficient firms
would be able to obtain the required resources cheaply and
easily. Implied in this argument is the answer to the third
part of the question: an efficient market can act as a controller
of management performance by rewarding this performance by
providing ample, competitively priced funds to efficient firms
(or vice-versa in the case of inefficient firms).
Baumol argues:
"The most direct measure of its (firm's] efficiency of the
operation is the company's stream of earnings; and only by
offering high prices for the stocks of the companies whose
prospects are brightest can the market provide capital to
them on better terms."18
In addition, firms make several decisions at varying levels of
management during a day.
	 How can stockholders know the
consequences of these decisions? Certainly, awareness of these
decisions is difficult, if not impossible. The consequence of
those decisions, however, is manifested in the earnings of the
enterprise. The problem still remains of how shareholders can be
informed of these consequences. If a firm is isolated from Lille
mm rket, the ohareholderc' 	 of the rmnqqmuenr == Is
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perhaps brought up to date only once a year or so, which might be
too late for appropriate actions. However, the consequences of
the decisions made by listed companies reach an efficient market
frequently, leading to continual evaluation of management's
performance in the form of price changes.
This continuous surveillance improves management performance
leading to higher efficiency in the firm, which, in the
aggregate, increases economic growth and hence, improves the
economic well being of society as a whole.19
The question is whether or not the market can allocate financial
resources to their best uses or exert its regulatory power on
firms despite the negligible amount of new issues relative to the
magnitude traded or inventories available for trading, and
despite the fact that they did not use the capital'market as a
source of their financing, the evidence shows that American firms
have long been avoiding the equity market and have been financing.
a major segment of their expansion by means of retained earnings.
During 1947-1961, less than 4 percent of the total expansion of
the firms was financed by new stock issues. Yet, despite the fact
that firms bluntly avoided the market for financing, the result
of various studies indicates remarkable efficiency in the United
States Stock markets.20
Retained earnings constitute:. indirect equity financing, whether
or not firms perceive it as such. Although firms may not resort
to the market for financing, the market facilitates retained
earnings financing by means of a price mechanism The price of
a security increases: as a result (among other things) of the
retention of earnings. Investors in need of liquidity, instead
of receiving dividends, will liquidate part of their investment.
Consequently, the undistributed dividend is financed indirectly
on the market. Not only do some investors in need of liquidity
turn to the market for funds, but other investors also
continuously look for superior securities either to add to their
portfolio or to replace inferior ones. This continuous search,
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which affects the prices of securities, :constantly draws
management's attention to the market. As we shall discuss in the
next section, a continuous preoccupation of management with
market prices upgrades its performance and, hence, the efficiency
of the firm.
5.4 MANAGEMENT PERFORMANCE AND VALUATION
The finance and micro-economics theories state that the overall
objective of the firm is the long run maximisation of its
stockholder's wealth, where wealth is defined as share ownership.
Accepting this objective, we argue that management's concern
should be the -;well-being of its stockholders, which in turn
Implies managements continual preoccupation with the problems of
corporation's share prices. We reject this hypothesis that
management is indifferent to the market reaction concerning the
share prices of enterprise. Baumol posits that management concern
in this respect adds to the power of the market to oversee
management's behaviour and concludes:
If the stock price values reflect rather closely the
prospective earnings and the efficiency of the company's
operations, the impersonal forces of the market, its
invisible hand, will be provided with a very visible club
which can keep the corporation's in line a rare
management ... is willing to despise and ignore the market's
valuation of the company.21
Whatever the motive, management seems to be deeply concerned
about market reaction to its company's value. A direct
consequence therefore, is that the market supervises management's
performance. Alert to this critical factor, management
endeavours to increase the efficiency of its performance, and
hence, the efficiency of the firm 22
Acrording to Baumol, public relations of a business. its
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relationship with the stockholders and corporations credit-
worthiness hinge upon the success of the managementin keeping
the price of its security high, for failure is undesirable
everywhere, especially when it is announced publicly. We are of
the opinion that continuously inefficient performance by a firm
would be a gradual suicide for the management of the corporation,
since a gradual decline in the stock prices would be inevitable.
Such a decline in prices may lead the shareholders to be
dissatisfied with management. Although they do not control
management's day-to-day performance, the shareholders may voice
extreme dissatisfaction by exercising their voting power to
change the management. However, if the management is efficient,
relationships leading to even greater efficiency will likely be
established between management, creditors and the equity capital
market. The more efficient the firm, the easier are the terms
for borrowing from creditors and the more favourable the
financing from the equity capital market, and vice versa. The
management may have to behave in a manner that is logically
congruent with the overall goal (i.e. maximising shareholder's
wealth) in order to survive.
Inthe light of the above reasoning, itwould be Logical to believe
that self-interest alone would stimulate management to a
continued search for upgrading its efficiency, the efficiency of
the enterprise, and hence, the efficiency of the economy as a
whole.
In the absence of a capital market, (the case in some
underdeveloped countries), a corporation in need of long term
funds may rely on friends or on internally generated funding,
both of which may be insufficient and difficult to commit for
long periods. On the other hand, the capital market allows
short-term, relatively abundant funds to be used for long-term
projects (stock or long-term bond), because the holder of a
security (saver) can liquidate his claim at any time without
interrupting the firm's operation.
	 More importantly, such an
amol Int, hr,wever 1.nrEc nnd vital to the firm, mny be a minting
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part of the total market wealth. Such a phenomenon contributed
greatly to the economic growth of industrialised nations in the
past century. Not only can the investor liquidate his investment
easily in an efficient market, but also he has limited liability
and the opportunity to diversify further and reduce his risk.
West and TiniC, like Baumol, argue that "...an economy cannot
expect to remain efficient unless it allocates its capital
efficiently."23 One reason for this position may be that the
decision concerning the capital resource requirement depend:: upcn
the decision about the real goods.
"The allocation of capital resources manifest themselves as
the supply and demand condition in the market for real
capital. U24
Thus the interconnection between the demand and supply of capital
goods with the demand and supply of capital resources may
eventually lead the economy towards efficiency since capital is a.
basic need, if the market were perfectly efficient, inefficient
enterprises could hardly survive.
If all organisations were equally efficient, (i.e. returns on
their investments, adjusted for their risks, were fairly close to
each other), they could not pay different prices for the same
factor of production in other markets. Therefore, prices of
similar factors of production tend towards equality, leading
other markets, and the economy as a whole, towards efficiency.
In such an environment, market segmentation cannot exist.
West and Tinic, like Baumol, validly conceptualise the role of
prices as a critical element in market efficiency. However, the
estimation of the true intrinsic value of a corporation or a
security is not an easy task to perform because of lack of a
comprehensive theory and because of practical problems. In the
next and final section of this chapter, we shall conceptualise
some of the valuation problems that may eventually hamper the
assessment of market efficiency.
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5.5 PROBLEMS WITH EFFICIENCY
Unless securities' prices reflect the intrinsic values of firms
as we have stated, the market cannot be perfectly allocationally
efficient. Further, we explained that an intrinsic value can be
obtained from the information relating to the economic activities
of the firms. This information comprises the core of market
efficiency.
Accurate, consistent, sufficient and timely information can help
in upgrading market efficiency. 25
 However, because of reasons
that will be explained shortly, information reaching the market
may not have these characteristics. If so, prices cannot be a
close estimation of firms' economic opportunities.. Thus, they
detract from, rather than contribute to, market efficiency. We
shall now consider the characteristics of information separately
in detail.
5.5.1 Accuracy of Information
To mobilise the market to operate efficiently, the information
supplied by firms should be a true linkage between tangible and
intangible assets underlying the earning power of the corporation
and financial assets representing this. If the information
presented to the market were accurate enough to enable the
investors to estimate the necessary parameter of the model
appropriately, ceteris paribus the market might function
efficiently.
There are two kinds of information to reach the market -
accounting and other information. The latter involves filtur
plans, growth prospects, earning prospects, the general level of
the economy, changes in management and the like. Usually, only
limited information is provided by the firm to the investor, and
the investor must estimate a major portion of the information.
Of	 course,	 estimation,	 guesses,	 hunches,	 etc.,	 however
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approximate they are, suffer from problems of -estimation, which
detracts from market efficiency. The usual sources of accounting
Information are the balance sheet, the income statement and the
cash flow for individual projects or for the firm as a whole.
The balance sheet represents the resources and commitments of the
firm, which provides the basis for its future cash flow. Costs
of assets acquired in various periods, at different prices, are
added together to comprise the total assets utilised by the firm.
In addition, inventories may be evaluated upon the bases of
average cost, FIFO (first in, first out), or LIFO (last in, first
out). Two similar corporations using different inventory
evaluation methods will have unequal income and inventory figures
in their balance sheets. In addition, the adoption of a specific
depreciation method for long-term depreciable assets may have a
significant impact on the income computed by the firm and on the
size of assets reported in its balance sheet. We mentioned only
three factors - price changes, inventory valuation and.
depreciation methods - out of numerous possible factors that
might cause under- or over-estimation of figures reported in the
financial position of the firm.
In utilising such heterogeneous ' figures, how can an investor
arrive at some meaningful conclusion about the firm's earning
power, the major determinant of its price? It is a very difficult
task. If the financial position of the firm were presented in
the form of both historical and current cost items, then it might
be of more assistance to the investor. Unfortunately, however,
the balance sheet is not presented in the current cost, nor is it
an easy task to do so. Thus, at least for the present, the
investor is bound to use the balance sheet prepared on historical
costs and other deficiencies- His estimation of the value of the
firm might not be accurate from this information, although
accuracy is required buy the efficient market model. An
efficient market therefore, requires a high level of skill among
those charged with analysing information concerning potential
investments.
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A second source of information is the income statement of the
firm, when testing the market for its efficiency, the researcher
usually assumes that the ex post data are equivalent to the ex
ante expectations. Although past information such as dividends
may not be utilised to determine market prices, it seems relevant
for determining the distribution of price changes. Such infor-
mation would then be used to estimate return and risk to the
security as part of the derivation of its price.
The main problem seems to originate From the above assumption.
First, at most, all accounting figures are given on the accrual
basis; thus, depending on the lags and leads in the income and
expenses and the methods used to adjust such leads and lags, the
Income may be over- or under-estimated. Furthermore, varying
methods used by similar firms in valuing their inventories - such
as average cost, LIFO, FIFO and so on, will affect the net income
of the corporation. Thirdly, varying methods of depreciation used
by similar companies will have an impact on their income.
Finally, and most importantly, the asset cost, which is
traditionally historical, underlies the depreciation.
Accordingly, depreciations of those assets purchased recently are
more accurate than of those bought in the distant past.
Therefore, heterogeneous depreciation charges are used to arrive
at the income figure. If we extend the situation and consider
similar firms on the market, each using a different combination
of the methods of accounting in computing their income, we may
observe that those figures can hardly be used as a basis for
determining firms true earning power. In the long run, however,
the effect of such irregularities would be reduced because in the
period of twenty years, for instance, almost all of the long term
costs (fixed assets) acquired at the beginning of this period
might be converted into cash . and the overall results of the
firm's long run operation might better reflect the firm's true
performance. In the shorter . period, though, the investor's
Interest may not be served with such information. In such
circumstances, th s market mny not function as efficiently as it
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otherwise could.
The final source of financial information is the cash flow
arising from the firm's operation, derived by the firm or
investor. Usually cash flows are not provided by the corporation
to be released to the public. This basic statement, if released
by the firm, will contain valuable information such as future
plans, earning prospects, future growth, contingencies, etc. If
this information is not provided by the firm, the estimation of
price becomes highly difficult, if not impossible. The cash flow
is related to a single asset, or to the whole Organisation, based
upon information given in the balance sheet and income statement
(plus some other factors such as economy, competition and the
like) and is constructed to provide the price of the asset or of
the firm's value.
In addition, in predicting the future earnings and cash flow of
the firm, the investor should consider predicted changes in
environmental influences, such as acts of competitors, market
conditions, the general level of the economy, and several other
factors, most of which may be highly uncertain, and which, in
turn, blur the outcome of the investors' prediction uncertainty
is no less important than other previous problems.
The estimate of the life of an asset, its salvage value, and the
incomes and costs arising from holding it are all uncertain with
respect to time. Uncertainty of the real magnitude of all the
above factors makes any outcome of the prediction highly
arbitrary. The efficiency of the stock market is inevitably
influenced by several factors beyond the control of the investor,
some of which were explored briefly. After all, the .accurate
value, of the security is a major determinant of market
efficiency. An estimate of the value itself is dependent upon
the forecasting of the factors described above. Forecasting of
even very elementary. information possesses a high degree of
uncertainty, which ultimately shows up as a lack of consistency
In the risk-retlirn relationships.
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5.5.2 Consistent Information
Lack of consistency in financial information, if not revealed to
the market, may mislead investors. If the consistency of
financial information provided by the firm changed from one
period to the next, the financial data of the corporation could
easily mislead investors' analysis of the data. If so, the
parameters needed in decision making would deviate from their
true value, which, in turn, may detract from market efficiency.
It is Important, therefore, that information be adequate Lo
reflect correctly	 such inconsistencies in the financial
information.
5.5.3 Material Information
Material Information is that which may affect significantly the
market value of the firm, and hence, market efficiency. This
information, if released, might Aid the pred i ction of the type
parameters required by investors in their decision processes.
The critical issue here is the distinction between material and
other information.	 A piece of data would be material if it
affects the value of the firm. Hence, one may logically argue
that the knowledge of such information would affect the decisioni
of individual investors, which in turn might have some impact on
market efficiency. Depriving the market of such information
would, of course, lead to fewer optimal decisions by the
investing group in the market, with the eventual consequence of
diminution in market efficiency.
5.5.4 Timeliness.
Finally, but most importantly, the interest of both buyer and
seller of financial assets is only served by the market if it can
provide the investing public timely information. If material
information needed to make a decision was not made available, the
decision would have to be less than optimal and , as a result,
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some investors may gain at the expense of others. This
phenomenon would be inconsistent with the norms of pareto-
optimality and the characteristic of the efficient market
mode1. 26 In practice, decisions may be made by a firm at any
time, however, the related information reaches the market
periodically: To the extent that when a piece of material
information reaches the market late any transactions that might
have been affected by that information would be less than
optimal.
5.6 CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter, we have reviewed valuation theories as well as
the impact of dividend and debt policies on the value of the
firm. It was shown that, given investment plans and absence of
imperfections in the market, dividend policies do not influence
the market and the debit is also irrelevant to the value of the
firm. No matter what the dividend or debt policy, if the market
is to be efficient, for whichever of the reasons stated in the
former chapters, the prices of securities traded should reflect
the intrinsic value of the firm. Moreover, the impact of
appropriate valuation on market efficiency and role of an
efficient market on management's performance were explored.
Finally, the problems of efficiency were conceptualised. We
argued that several problems are inherent in the data used to
estimate prices. Therefore, the market prices might deviate to a
great extent from the intrinsic value of the firm.
If the above arguments are valid, then the achievement of
absolute market efficiency will be impossible. However,
augmentation of relative efficiency is possible by creation of a
mechanism that can achieve a good approximation of true prices.
If a market can create an appropriate pricing mechanism such that
overpriced or undervalued securities are rare, then such a market
will approach stridency.
In chapter seven we shall utilise the serial correlation and Run
Test techniques presented in the previous chapter, to test weak
form efficiency. The next chapter will trace the development of
the Kuwait Stock Exchange, including its organisation and
Regulations.
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CHAPTER SIX
THE KUWAIT STOCK EXCHANGE
6.1 INTRODUCTION
The development of Kuwait's stock market did not take place until
after World War II when the financial resources of the country
started to grow rapidly as a result of the increase in oil
production and export. Before the oil discovery the main
professions of the people were diving for pearls and selling them
to neighbouring countries; fishing and boat building; and trade
(re-export trade). All these activities were based on small
individual ownership with very limited capital. Therefore, they
were completely self-financed: and there was no actual need fnr
external financing. On the other hand, the then prevailing low
income levels did not provide a substantial amount of savings in
the domestic economy that could be used for intermediation
purposes.
Kuwaiti public shareholding companies began to spring up after
the discovery of oil. Although Kuwaiti's, encouraged by the new
wealth, began to think along the lines of establishing share-
holding companies as early as the fifties, reform of the banking
system came first in view of its importance and the high risk
introduced. The only bank operating throughout Kuwait at the
time was the British Bank for the Middle East (BBME). Opened in
1941 1 and owned by foreign shareholders, it had a monopoly of all
banking business and Lransactions. The opening c.f a branch of
the British Bank for the Middle East signalled the birth of the
financial sector in Kuwait.
	 From 1946 onwards the oil sector
became the dominant sector in the Kuwaiti economy. This
transformation led to the elimination of traditional activities,
and the introduction of drastic structural changes in thw
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economic fabric of the country, while producing at the same time
opportunities for accelerated economic growth and development.
The rapid economic expansion and continuous increase in financial
resources generated a growing demand for financial assets and
gave strong impetus to monetary and financial development.
Domestic financial markets were actively promoted by state and
private sectors as a means of enhancing Kuwait's position as a
financial centre, investing more efficiently the abundant
domestic savings and contributing to the diversification of
national income sources.
Over the past twenty years the Kuwait stock market grew
spectacularly to become one of the biggest in terms of turnover
at the beginning of the 1980's. At the same time, stock trading
became the number one investment activity for the majority of
Kuwaiti investors.
This chapter will trace the historical development of the Kuwaiti
public shareholding companies listed in Kuwait Stock Exchange,
since the first appearance of domestic equity stocks in the
economy, with particular emphasis on market development in the
1970's when organised stock dealing came into existence. Also
the (6rganisation, management, information disclosure, and the
recent performance will be covered in this chapter.
6.2 HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE KUWAITI SHAREHOLDING COMPANY
The emergence of the public shareholding company heralds a
Gignificant transition in the development of modern societies.
Private enterprise founded on a small capital base had been
veiled by the 'public shareholding company with multiple
resources. Whereas management enterprise in a private company
Is limited by the talent and will of the owner, the public
shareholding company owned by an assembly of sharehold ers can not
be run by all shareholders at the same time.
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As a result, the appointment of a separate managerial body-became
crucial, which released the potential to develop business
management skills.2 With the growth and expansion of the
economic structure and the start of economic and social
development plans, the road was clear for investors to put their
funds into such companies.
The history of Kuwaiti Stock Exchange went through four stages oF
development. Stage one covers the period from 1950-1960; stage
two, the period from 1960-1970; the third stage from 1970-1980,
and finally stage four from 1981-1986.
6.2.1 First Stage
In the period between 1950 and 1960 a study was undertaken to
establish a Kuwaiti National bank that would be owned and run
exclusively by nationals, but it was met with such vigorous
opposition that it very nearly failed. However, by the end of
1951 personal interests triumphed and the decision to establish
the bank was approved. The bank opened on 25th September 1952
with a capital of MD 19,465,875 (US$66,183,975)3
It became Kuwait's first shareholding company. As shares were
open for public subscription, this heralded the start of the
country's stock market. Encouraged by the success of the venture,
investors began to form other public shareholding companies.
The second was the National Kuwaiti Cinema Company, formed on 5th
October 1954 with capital of KD1,630,263 (US$5,542, -894) and
followed by Kuwait National Airways (1956). 4 On 19th September
1957 Kuwaiti Oil Tankers was established with capital of
KD25,936,605 (US$88,184,457) in which the Kuwaiti gnverrmPrit tnok
a 53 per cent stake. 
5
The existence of these three public companies allowed the first
buying and selling of shares. Trading in new company shares
became so popular that several newly formed compniPQ were over-
subscr i bed ter times, A 1-41 Pnomonrm which reflected
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strong interest in channelling their savings into good
investments. However, the individual investor's lack of business
acumen, .combined with the fact that speculation was unknown in
this field, meant that the circulation of stocks was limited to
what was virtually a closed circle of wealthy families. In this
stage (1950-1960) the small size of the issued shares did not
allow any significant stock trading. Besides, the rapid growth
of the companies' assets and their high profitability during this
period, made share ownership a lucrative investment.
We can conclude that this period witnessed the formation of the
first public shareholding companies and the appearance of
corporate equity issues which were the first type of traditional
securities in the Kuwaiti economy.
6.2.2 Second Stage (1960-1970) 
The second period, between 1960 and 1970, which witnessed the
actual emergence of the public share holding companies sector,was
an effective and important sector in the Kuwaiti economy. In the
years 1960-1962, following the promulgation of the Commercial
Companies Act, 13 public companies were formed, With a total
capital base of KD35.8 million. The state which played: an
important part in the formation of these companies, invested
about KD15.4 million in seven of the 13 new companies,
representing 43 percent6 . The objective and activities of the
newly-formed companies fell into three sectors: financial,
industrial and transport and services, the largest of which (in
terms of number of shares and capital invested) was the financial
sector, which included banks and insurance companies. The
reasons for the popularity of the financial sector, which had
attracted so much more investment than the industrial sectors,
was due to two factors7:
First, because of the high cost involved, the return on capital
Invested in industry was considerably lower than capital invested
in finnnci al assets. Secnndly, ,any s=,i nc from
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investment would only be long term. Investmen€ in the financial
sector had the following advantages: quick and rapidly realisable
profits, the possibility of rapid transfer of assets into cash,
and good prospects for capital gains. Industrial companies, on
the other hand, included the Kuwaiti National Petroleum Company,
the National Industries Company and the Kuwaiti Flour Company.
Their total capital amounted to KD4 million or 11% of the
cumulative capital of newly established companies.
As the professional market lacked a strong and sounJ
organisational structure, and because of easy acquiescence with
the existing regulations and the absence of any legislation
designed to protect the market during this stage of development,
the door was wide open for insider exploitation.
During its first years, the market thrived. Oil revenues were
high, the government was spending abundantly on infrastructure,
public amenities, roads and housing, and making generous.
compensation to people whose property had been affected by the
new planning schemes8 . Individual's assets were highly liquid at
the time, and they entered the market in several ways. These
years saw the beginning of large scale stock exchange activity
and the pace increased as people with widely varying sums to
invest began to deal in stocks. The period also witnessed
considerable activity by speculators. A high level of speculation
caused share prices to soar to levels quite unrelated to the
companies's performance. Unqualified" brokers, with little
knowledge of the markets and whose only experience was estate
agency, rose to prominent positions as dealers. Such people could
affect efficiency and hinder the development of the stock market
in the early stages.
In the absence of any regulatory or legislative framework,
organising stock trading activities during 1960-1962 in Kuwait
did not hinder eager dealing taking place in the stocks of all
the newly established companies.
Table 6 . 1	 contd .
Company Date of Authorieed Total number
Foundetion Cepitel MD* of shares
Tramport and Communicatione .
Kuwmit Oil Tankers 19.09.57 25,936,505 25.935,505
Kuwaiti Comunications 20.09.62 4,000,000 4,000,000
Kuwaiti Navigation 19.01.65 21,000,000 21,000,000
Cattle Transport and Trading 28.11.73 9,842,04O 9,842,040
Land Transport 16.07.77 10,000,000 10,000,000
Property
Kuwait Reel Estate 16.05.72 15,000,000 15,000,000
United Reel Estate 16.06.72 23,260,000 23,260,000
National Reel Estate 16.07.73 12,600,000 12,600,000
Services
Kuwaiti Cinema 05.10.54 1.630,263 1,630,263
Kuwaiti Hotels 12.05.62 4,235,229 4,235,299
Kuwaiti Storage end
Refrigeration Manufacturing 08.02.73 4,000,000 4,000,000
Kuwaiti United Poultry 	 . -	 06.01.79 4,000,000 4.000.000
Farm Products 26.09.76 10,000,000 10,000,000
General Ukkarehouses 17.09.79 25,000,000 25,000,000
Kuwaiti Dinars
a, All chimes were owned by the Government in 1976.
- 1.	 The Kuwait and Middle East Bank replaced the British Middle East Bank which had been
granted a licence in Kuwait in 1941.
2. Decree - Lew NO 72/1977 (published in issue NNO 113 oof Kuwait Al Yam) authorised the
Ministry of Amef and Islamic Affairs, the Ministry of Justice (Department of Palace
Affairs), and the Ministry of Finance to establish a Kuwaiti joint Stock Company under
the name of the Kuwaiti Finance House with a capital of )0 10e. The company was to
undertake finance end other investment free of interest or usury as laid down in the
Compeniee Articles of Association.
The number of compenies increased in 1960, 1973, 1975 and 1976: in other years, no
companies or not more than one, were established. This indicates that companies were
not set up for genuine economic reasons but in response to share trading boons.
Source: 'Izz el-Din Merj6n, Encyclopaedia of Kuwaiti Commercial Legislation (Egypt: Al-Ahrie
Commercial Press, 1978); Centre/ Bank of Kuweit:Ecommic Survey of the Kuwaiti Economy
 ten yeere 1969-79; reports of Kuwaiti Ministry of Commerce and Industry.
.Table 6.1: Kuwaiti Public Companies 1952 - 80
Company	 Date of	 Authori?ed
Foundation	 Capital HD*
Total number
of shares
Banks
National Bank of Kuwait 19.05.52 19,46,875 19,465,875
Kuwaiti Commercial Bank 19.06.60 18,144,000 18,144,CCO
Gulf Bank 23.11.60 10,080,000 10,080,000
Kuwaiti Al-Ali Bank 23.05.67 12,000,C00 12,000,000
Kuwait end Middle East Banki 24.02.71 9,600,000 • 9,600,000
Kuwait Peel Estate Bank 13.05.73 9,101,408 9,101,408
Bank of Bergen 27.12.75 10.000,000 10,000,000
Kuwaiti Finance ibuse2 23.03.77 10,000,000 10,000,000
Investment
Kuwaiti Investment 25.11.61 21.073,268 21,073,268.
Kuwaiti Commercial, Contracting
end Foreign Investments 16.01.65 25.000,000 25,000,000
Kuwait International
Investments 22.09.73 15,639,000 15,639,000
Kuwait International Oil
Investments 10.12.80 100,000,000 100,000,000
Insurance
Kuwait Insurance 30.07.60 5,250,000 5,250,030
Gulf Insurance 09.04.62 4,147,200 4,147,200
Al -Ahli Insurance 12.06.62 2,700,000 2,700,CCO
%arta Insurance 24.10.76 4,000,000 4,000,000
Industrial
Kuwaiti National Oil 05.10.60 15,000,000 15,000,03014
National Industriee 10.08.60 15,245,858 15,245,858
Kit Flour Mills 23.10.61 2,000,000 2,000,000
Petrochemicals Industry 23.07.63 32,000,000 32,000,0XA1
Kuwaiti Foods (Americana) 29.12.63 2,230,800 2,230,800
Kuwaiti Metal Pipes
Manufacturing . 24.08.66 6,160,000 6.160.=
Kuwait Cement 09.11.68 5,000,000 5,000,000
Kuwaiti United Fisheriee 07.02.72 11,000.000 /1,000,000
National Motor Cars Trading
and Manufacturing 16.07.73 3,600,000 3,600,000
Ship Building and Peoeire 0e.04.74 15,030,000 15,000,001
Gulf Cables and Electric
Industriee 13.04.75 3,000,000 3,003,000
Sanitary Equipment
Manufacturing 13.08.75 6,750,000 6,750,016
Melamine Manufacturing 25.04.76 6,000,000 6,000,003
Kuwait Tyres 28.11.76 2.830,000 2,830,000
Trading was carried out either directly between trader and stock
owners, or through unofficial brokers - often land and real
estate agents. However, stock prices differed from one broker's
office to another according to the stock demand and supply
situation with each broker. Kuwaiti investment Company (MC)
research on stock price movements during the years 1962-1963
indicates that during 1962 the market was very active and that it
reached its peak towards the end of the year. Lack of data makes
it difficult to draw conclusions as to the total trading and which
companies or sectors attracted most traders, and the velocity of
turnover of stocks among traders.
Two of the factors that contributed to the expansion of the
activities of the stock market in Kuwait during 1961 and 1962 are
the increase in the domestic liquidity resulting from government
land acquisition payments which amounts to KD148 million during
the fiscal years 1960/61 and 1961/62 and the increase in bank
credits to the private sector during this period.
In the beginning of 1963 the downward trend in the stock market
activity seems to have started. This. was. demonstrated by the
lukewarm reception of newly floated companies and the general
drop in stock price. There was a moratorium on the formation of
new companies between the years 1963 and 1969, when only eight
were incorporated. This compares with nine companies incorporated
between the years 1961 and 1962 (see Table 6.1). The eight
companies which were incorporated during this period were all
established in the years 1963-1968 and none was founded during
1969-70..
Substantial shareholding by the state of as much as 60 percent of
total authorised capital in the new companies was a
the reluctance of the public and private sector to get involved.
Out of the eight companies six could be classified as industrial,
one as an investment company (where the government had a 98.72%
participation), two classified within the transport and service

sector, and the tenth was Al-Ahli Bank of Kuwait which was fully
owned by the private sector.
By the end of 1968, there were 25 shareholding companies, with
total nominal capital KD100 million, of which 43 percent was
owned by the government and 57 percent by the private sector, and
the tenth was Al-Ahli Bank of Kuwait, which was fully owned by
the private sector. By the end of 1968, there were 25
shareholding companies, with total nominal capital KD 100
million, of which 42 percent was owned by the government and 57
percent by the private sector.
The majority of investment was then taken by the industrial
sector, due to the growth of the petrochemical industries which
represented Kuwait's industrial base, and this was characterised
by heavy capital investment and the financial sector dropped to
second place.	 The transport and service sector also witnesssed
an impressive expansion with the incorporat ion of the Kuwait
Transport Company and the Kuwait Food Company.
The increase in trading activity during the period of 1963 and
1964 and the expansion of the new issues base was mainly
attributed to the incorporation of new companies and the increase
of the capital of existing ones. By the end of 1968, the number
of shares of the public shareholding companies had reached
11,841,045.	 If we exclude the share of the government and the
stocks of the closed companies, however, these decrease to
6,026,118 shares.	 Lack . of information on the exact number of
stockholders makes it difficult to assess the expansián of the
shareholder's base.	 In the absence of systematic regulation to
organise trading operations, and the unavailability of
Information regarding the volume of transaction, it is difficult
to discuss in detail trading activities and the levels of prices
In the sixties. However, the general trend of stock prices for
the period 1964 - 1966 could be traced on Figure 6.1 which
depicts the move of the stock price index prepared by the Kuwait
Investment Company.
6.2.3	 Third Stage 1970-1980
By the beginning of the seventies, it became evident that the
local stock market was in urgent need of new regulations that
would reflect its growing size and importance. During the period
1970-1980 the stock market underwent important developments and
changes that resulted in increasing its capacity to absorb and
circulate funds. This included the issuing of a number of laws
and resolutions which laid the organisational basis for the
trading operations of Kuwaiti public shareholding companies, zne
which paved the way for the emergence of the Stock Exchange.
These developments greatly enhanced the role of the stock market
in the Kuwait economy. Thus, we can say that the seventies may
.be considered the actual history of the Kuwait Stock Market, when
its peculiar features and characteristics became evident.
During this period several acts and government restrictions were
brought into force to govern dealings in shares and securities,
precursors to the founding of the Stock Exchange. In November
Law No. 32/1970 was promulgated. It established the basis for
trading the securities of Kuwaiti companies. On August 8th,
1971, the Minister of Trade and Industry issued a resolution
entrusting the Companies and Insurance Supervision Section in the
Ministry the task of regulating trade in securities, to compile
statistical analyses of stock movements and profits of Kuwaiti
shareholding companies and to publish an official statement on
the prices of stocks. The Ministry also ordered all stockbrokers
to register with the Ministry of Trade and Industry and to report
all share transactions and negotiations. Other.articles governed
the conditions to be met by applicants for entry into the Stock
Market brokers register.
After subjecting the stock market to legal, organisation and
government supervision, especially after the emergence of the
Stock Exchange, trading in the official market was limited to the
shares of public Kuwaiti shareholding companies. At the end of
1973 the total number of public shareholding companies numbered
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Table 6.2: Shareholding Companies Classified by Sectors
1970	 1973
SECICR NO. of	 Cumulative
	 Capital	 No of	 Cumulative	 Capital
Companies Capital
	 Distribution	 Companies Capital	 Distribution
. (MD)
	
According to	 (MD)	 According to
Category (Z)	 Category (t)
Banks 4 11,412,500 12.4 6 23,670,000 12.8
Insurance 3 2,250,000 2.4 3 2,500,000 1.4
Ihvestment 2 17,500,000 19.0 3 38,347,500 20.8
Industria1 ' 7 39,800,000 43.1 9 70,400,000 38.2
Transport 2 13,752,690 14.9 2 20,502,690 11.1
Commercial and
Service 4 7,576,442 8.2 5 15,576,442 8.5
Peel Estate - 3 13,306,900 7.2
TMML 22 92,291,632 100.0 31 184,303,532 100.0-
Source: Kuwait Stock Exchange (Publication Department)
31, as a result of incorporation of eleven companies during the
period 1971 - 1973. Total nominal value of public shareholding
companies' capital rose to KD 140 million at the end of 1972, and
to KD 184 million in 19739.
Eight new property companies were formed between 1972-1974 (see
Table 6.2), which allowed the small investor to have a stake in
their profitability at a time of generally restricted investment
opportunity.Property share prices rose by 250 percent within two
y=ars of the formuiciLion of these companies, leading to heavy
speculation in land and property and to overvaluation of their
assets. Large numbers of small investors entered the market
backed by freely available bank credit, which increased the
number of share applications to the point that some new share
issues were over-subscribed several hundred times io . • Share
values rose by 73 percent in 1972, and by a further 50 percent in
1973. However, most of the 1973 increase took place in the third
quarter of the yearn..
One of the most spectacular innovations was the growth in futures
trading12, (deferred payments, see Appendix A) where shares were
traded at market value plus a premium or margin, depending on the
period for payment, the rate of price rises and the prevailing
interest rate. The feature which distinguished these transactions
as a form of bank credit was that the buyer could sell the shares
for cash before paying the account in full, because of trust
between dealers and the absence of any legal or regulatory
controls. 19 This type of trading was one of the reasons which
caused the 1982 crisis in the stock market, and in turn may
affect the efficiency of the Kuwait Stock Market.
Table 6.2 shows the number of stock issued increased from 11.05
million at the end of 1970 to about 21.33 million in 1973.
At the same time, the number of government-owned stocks increased
from 5.03 million to 8.2 million in the same period. However.
it share of the total decreased from 45.5: to 38.4: The totbi
number of tradeable stocks increased from 6.02 million to about
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13.4 million, an increase of 118%. Furthermore, the average of
stock prices in general increased from about KD 15 in September
1970 to KD 20.4 in September 1971, and to more than KD 45 at the
end of 1973, that is, an increase of more than 200% over the
period 1971-1973. (See Table 6.3).
By 1974, the share market was stagnant compared to the record
levels it had reached in 1973. Turnover dropped from 10.5
million (1973-1974) to 3.9 million (1974-1975). The continuing
increase in stock prices and volume of trading came to a stop
towards the end of 1973, when both began to drop steadily.
Between January 1974 and the end of March 1975, the average
monthly trading decreased by 58% in volume and 68% in value
terms. There was an 8.2% decrease in the average stock prices
between 1973 - 1975. Trading monthly volume averages during
1974 - 1975 was only 1.9% of the total stock issued and only 3.2%
of the total tradeable stocks, compared with 3.9% and 6.3% for
1973 respectively. This contraction in the market activities was
a natural reaction to the intensive activity which characterised
the market in 1973 and to the continuous rise in the stock
prices. The sharp drop in future transaction is another
important factor contributing to the decline in the market
ectivity14.
During 1974, the market base expanded by the incorporation of Lwo
new public shareholding companies thus increasing the number of
shareholding companies to 33. The total cumulative capital of
these companies increased to KD 214 million, of which the
government had a 41% stake.
The period of 1975 - 1976 is considered the most important period
in the third stage in the development of the Kuwait stock market.
It witnessed an unprecedented outburst of trading activities end
an excessive surge in prices, which also affected the new issues
market. This period also saw major amendments in the Companies'
Law aimed at closing some of the legal loopholes relating to the
regulation of issuing and subscription procedures And disclosure
of information in public companies stocks, wnich were wiclely
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exploited by company insiders and undermined the orderly
behaviour of the market.
To guarantee that shares were available to the widest possible
number of people, a commission	 was set up in 1974 under
the supervision of a planning council to study public companies,
recommended that a ceiling be imposed on subscriptions, designed
to enable more small savers to enter the market 15 . An Amiri
Decree No. 3/1975 set the minimum nominal share value at KD115,
as compared to MD 7.5 under the earlier Act No. 15/1960. The
commission also recommended that a study be undertaken on the
body of law regulating public companies, which would put forward
amendments aimed mainly at improving the regulation of new issues
offered for public subscription and dealt only marginally with
trading operations. However, it affected of course', the supply
of stocks offered for trading.
During 1975 - 1976, the Kuwaiti stock market experienced a larse.
expansion similar to that which took place in 1973. In the period
from April 1975-November 1976, seven new public shareholding
companies were incorporated with a total capital of MD 45.75
million. On the other hand, the shares of the two biggest
industrial companies, the Kuwait National Petroleum Company and
the Petrochemical Industries Company were withdrawn from the
market following their full acquisition by the government. As a
result of the nationalisation the Government's share in the
market dropped enormously.
The overall outcome of the stock market development at the end of
1976 was a substantial expansion in the new issues and
fundamental changes in their sectional distribution as reflected
in Table 6.4.
The malpractices and irregular operations observed in the market
during 1973 reappeared again on a large scale in 1976. The
Ministry of Commerce and Trade in an effort to cure the situation
and develop the organisational framework of the market, issued in
November 1076 A r= =zniution, Nn.61, establishing the Securities
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Committee with broad authority of the organisation of securities
trading in the market see Appendix B for ' details on Resolution
No.61-1976.
1976 Crisis: 
The first signs of sharp market reversal began to appear on the
horizon at the end of 1976, and the authorities began to fear the
possibility of the total collapse of the market. Some of the
dampening ' factors which helped to speed the collapse are as
follows:
a) The rising share prices made many shares virtually
unmarketable while putting increasing strains on
dealers resources.
b) The loss of momentum of speculative activities in the
real estate market and the downward trend in land and
real estate prices which commenced from the middle of
the year.
c) At the same time future deals accumulated in the hands
of speculators and amounted to hundreds of millions of
	
,	 KD's.
2
Some of these obligations of future deals were within short
intervals of time. Thus, the possibility of the contraction of
the market and the decrease in prices threatened the successful
conclusion of these deals, especially the extraordinary
activity of the stock market attracted many small and medium
sized investors who entered the market with mainly borrowed money
and had very few extra resources to maintain a depreciating
portfolio for a Ions period.
In 1977, business in shares dropped to 66 percent of shares in
circulation compared to 1976. The main reason for the recession
in prices and circulation in 1977 lay in the rise recorded in
1976 (especially during the first half); share prices recorded
an average increase of 134.7t during 1975
	 f.Ses Table 5.4)..
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cope with the situation, the Security Commissibn lifted the ban
on futures dealings in Securities under Minister Order No.
31/1977.	 In an attempt to reflate the market it stipulated
certain restrictions in respect of mode of payment, duration of
the contract and its registration with the Ministry of Trade.
20
Further measures were taken in August 1977 to improve the
efficiency of the market in its early stage of development:
1 Provisional suspension of the formation of public companies
(public subscription) to enable the market to absorb
existing newly-formed companies. From the date of this
suspension until the end . of the first half of 1979, no new
public companies were formed until the Public Wharehouses in
June 1979.
2 Increase of capital in public companies was restricted to a
minimum. No public companies offered new issues in 1978,
capital increases were restricted to scrip issues paid
either from profits or reserves (a factor that contributed
to the tumbling share prices discussed in the next section).
When restrictions on capital were lifted, in 1979, companies
rushed to launch new issues to the value of KD 27.6 million,
at an issue premium amotinting to MD 63 million, in addition
to scrip issue values of about MD 31 million.
3 On the Government's behalf, the Foreign Investment
Corporation began buying up private sector shares at minimum
market prices. This continued from December 1977 to April
1978, during which period the Government bought shares to a
total value of about MD 150 million.
4 A reduction in interest rates was agreed by the banks, so as
to ease the financial burden on the customers; an extension
of loan repayments over two years was granted by the banks
to finance share transactions, renewable in accordance with
the circumstances of each borrower; this was so as to enable
investors to retain shares rather than dispose of them at a
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loss. The move reduced the supply and halted the fall in
prices.
The ban on the formation of new companies remained until mid 1979
when the authorities allowed the incorporation of some companies.
The first was the General Wherehouse Company, which was
incorporated on 17th September 1979 to set up, manage and lease:
stores and wharehouses. Trading in General Wherehouse, whose
capital amounted to KD 25 million, began only in 1981, when the
Government took up 50 percent of the shares. The Government's
stake in local companies as at 31st December 1979 amounted to KD
152,262,476 out of a combined authorised capital of KD
429,560,331 (35 percent).
The Kuwaiti Pharmaceutical Company was formed on 25th June 1980
to manufacture, produce, distribute and trade in medicines and
medical appliances, with capital of KD 6 million (see Table 6.1);
its shares were not tradeable until the end of 1980. On 10th
December 1980 Offshore Kuwaiti International Company for Petrol
Investments was formed to work overseas in the petroleum
refining industry, transport and storage; the Kuwaiti Government
took 70 percent of the KD 100 million _capital and the shares were
listed on the Securities Market on 25th March 1982.
In spite of the lifting of the ban on the formation of new
companies only three were incorporated and the Government was the
largest investor. One reason may be that investors began forming
companies in other Gulf States once they realised that the
Kuwaiti Market was saturated with Kuwaiti companies, that market
prices had reached their peak and that obtaining a licence in
Kuwait was not as easy as in the other Gulf States21.
6.2.4 Consolidation of the Stock Market (1978-1980) 
During 1978 - 1980, the Kuwait Stock Market Consolidated its
position in the economy and enhanced its importanc-e to become a
major feature of local economic activities. Total market
capitalisation, represented in 1980 2.5 times the non - oil . GDP
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against 1.25 times in 1977 (see Table 6.5) which reflects the
growing relative size of the market. Even more significant was
the expansion of the stockholders base, particularly after the
share split. This was not, however, coupled with a parallel
development in the market's organizational and institutional
arrangements which might augment its efficiency.
The market has, nevertheless, acquired certain new features, some
of which are positively related to the improvement of the
market's organizational and regulatory aspects; others are an
outcome of the developments in the market structure and changes
in the local securities market following the appearance of the
Kuwaiti Gulf Stock Exchange22 where the stocks of Kuwaiti Gulf
companies and unlisted Kuwaiti companies are traded.
The main changes that took place in the sectoral diitribution of
the stocks of the Kuwaiti shareholding companies during 1977-1980
are illustrated in Table 6.6. Industrial companies replaced banks .
as the companies with the highest percentage of the total stocks
issue base, and of the total capital of the companies listed in
the Stock Exchange.
The imposition of a Government ban on new shareholding companies
in Kuwait for a period of two years led Kuwaiti investors to seek
alternative outlets with similar features to the domestic market.
During the ban period several companies were incorporated in Lhe
neighbouring Arab Gulf States with only minor non-Kuwaiti
participation. That led to the beginning of forming the Gulf
Public Companies, which we shall discuss in the next chapter.
6.2.5 Fourth Stage (1980-1986) 
During the early 1980's the securities market in Kuwait went
through various changes and moved towards a new dimension, that
of channelling domestic capital towards the establishment of Gulf
pub l ic companies. Dealers became interested in trading in the
shares of these companies and securities tradinE. markets came
into being - one official with rules and regulations, the other
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non-official and known as Al-Manakh market (Kuwait Gulf Stock
Exchange).
In the 1980's considerations were given to the construction of a
new building for the brokers and their businesses and to give
official status for the new market in Gulf public company shares.
Steps were also taken to organise the management and control of
the Kuwaiti stock market in a more formal manner than was
previously used. The government also saw the need to establish
the Kuwaiti stock exchange as an organised independent body.
Legislation was drafted to establish an independent public
corporation with its own governing body, with the Minister of
Commerce as chairman of its board of management. The board would
also be given the 'financial autonomy and the authority to levy
fees and charges sufficient to provide it with an adequate source
of revenue for its own needs'.23
During 1981, apart from Kuwait public companies, two new types of.
public companies were approved and included the local stock
exchange - the Kuwaiti Closed Public Companies and the Gulf
Public Companies.
1	 Kuwaiti Closed Public Companies
In 1981, and for the first time, the authorities opened the
market for the Kuwaiti closed public companies to offer their
shares to the public in the stock exchange under certain
conditions which we will consider later. By the end of December,
six closed public companies were allowed to put their shares to
the public with a total capital of KID 51 million. Specific
conditions for trading in these shares were set up by the
Ministry of Commerce and Industry:
1) The company should have a capital of no less than KD 5
million.
2) The Company should have been in operation for at least five
years and should have accumulated profits for its operations
in the last two years. .
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3) The founders of the new company are not permitted to dispose
of their shares until two years have elapsed since the date
of registration.
4) Any closed company thinking of trading its shares in the
stock exchange should submit a detailed financial report on
its activities and a balance sheet in at least two daily
newspapers.
2	 Gulf Public Companies
The market for Gulf public Companies (which will be discussed in
detail in the next chapter) shares grew in importance in 1981
when the authorities put forward certain conditions to allow
these shares to be quoted in the local stock exchange. Dealing in
the shares of Gulf public companies became important because of
the 'abundance of national funds seeking viable investment
opportunities with the .Kuwaiti economy, which is characterised by.
a limited absorptive capacity - combined with the instability and
crisis involving foreign investment outlets. '24
During that year, two of the companies - Gulf Real Estate
Investment Company and Gulf Agricultural Development Company -
were registered with a total share trading amounting to KD 33
million. However, unofficial trade in shares of Gulf public
companies in the local market did not stop, for several reasons
which will be covered in the next chapter. The heavy activity of
the shares of Gulf public companies demanded the setting up of
local offices to conduct transaction.25
The securities markets (both the official stock market and the
unofficial Al-Manakh) witnessed many developments in 1982, of
which those of Al-Manakh market are very important because of the
implications for the Kuwaiti economy in general, and the official
market in particular.
As we will see in chapter seven and eight, the establishment of
Gulf public companies by Kuwaiti initiative and capital made
the Kuwait dealers conduct their trade in an unofficial parallel
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market, Al-Manakh. Trading in the shares of these companies
brought sharp rises in prices. Also, in the absence of proper
control and supervision, the dealers acted irresponsibly, using
the loopholes to manipulate the market, thus giving rise to a
sharp crisis which was basically the result of forward
transactions.
The signs of crisis emerged in September 1982 when trading in the
Al-Manakh market sagged suddenly to 72 million shares against 602
million in the previous month (see Chapter eight).26 This sudden
development in the activity of the Al-Manakh made it clear to the
dealers, traders and observers that the already expected negative
consequences in this market had come true, 'leading a number of
them to fail to pay the value of their cheques related to the
heavy forward sales and a transactions they had concluded, while
many dealers in the market failed to discharge their financial
commitments' .v Several traders terminated payment of their
cheques thus causing the Al-Manakh crisis.28
This crisis greatly affected the official market.
'The negative effects resulting from the unusual
developments in the Al-Manakh market were not confined to
drops in the volume of trading and share prices, or the
failure of dealers to repay their debts, but also extended
to the efficiency of the Kuwaiti securities market.
especially the absence of 'market makers' who had dominated
its activity and steered its movement.'29
On 14th August 1983, the authorities issued a decree to regulate
the Kuwaiti stock market. Management of the market was given to
an independent committee with the Minister of Commerce and
Industry as its chairman and consisting of other members selected
from different Ministries. The committee's job was to deal with
the application of rules to regulate financial papers in the
market and supervise transactions covering such papers. Its job
was also to act in accordance with the laws against dubious
transactions; to take a decision on the epplicaticns submittd
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for the registration of brokers, shares of Kuwaiti shareholding
companies and other financial papers; and in cases of emergency,
put a temporary stop to deals in the market or in the shares of
companies.
The committee was also decreed to help the market follow and
analyse the prices of shares and bonds that were listed in the
market; evaluate forward transactions and the relation between
them and spot sales; and to analyse and publish data relative to
the market, traded financi31 papers and listed ccmpenice. Th-
decree limited membership in the market to Kuwaiti companies
which placed their shares for public subscription; closed Kuwaiti
shareholding companies, which the committee approved for
membership, and brokers of financial papers in the market.
Other by-laws were issued on 7th November 1983 dealing with a
number of subjects, such as the market's objectives, management
and membership; the registration, acceptance and negotiation of
financial papers; the budget, disputes, arbitration and
discipline. The by-laws also set the conditions to be satisfied
by any company licensed to engage in brokerage business, which
included the following:
1) Company and all partners must be Kuwaitis.
2) The brokers must be Kuwaitis with good qualifications,
experienced and trained in accordance with what the
committee sees fit, and having Agood reputation.
3) Those on the management side should not have any previous
prison sentence or have been declared bankrupt.
4) The market committee fixes the amount of paid-up capital
after the submission of a bank guarantee.
During 1984, the securities market witnessed a number of new
regulations and measures, in addition to the opening of the new
stock exchange buildihgs and the application of the system of
written bidding in trading transactions.
One 1?w concerning the disposition of public company shares and
-162-
financial papers aimed at recognising the kegitimacy of the
disposition of public company shares and of tradings covering the
unlicensed Gulf shares.
Another law concerning the rules and regulations governing share
trading in the market covered a number of matters. The market
management must indicate the times and places for the conduct of
transactions related to financial papers. They also adopted the
method of 'written bidding' in trade where the broker has to put
down on a special board the information relative to the
transactions he planned to conduct. The market management then
supervised the dealing arrangements.
Still another law was the Ministerial decision concerning the
preparation and submission of company closing accounts for 1984.
This decision was taken following the outcome of the Al-Manakh
market crisis to define the accounting procedures to be applied
by companies in preparing their balance sheets, as follows:
1 Post-dated cheques drawn on non-referred persons and until
settlement should be approved at their value. When settled
amicably, and involving settlements approved by the
arbitration authorities, they should be endorsed at the
value of such settlements. Post-dated cheques related to
forward share transactions and drawn on referred persons,
the value of whose dinars (KD) have been assessed, should be
endorsed at the dinar-value as set by the official
authorities.	 Bonds issued by the trust fund should be
endorsed at the current value.
2 Investments in the shares of Kuwaiti and Gulf public
companies should be evaluated at the total cost or the total
market value. The Kuwaiti securities market issues a list to
determine the share market value on the date of the balance
sheet. On the other hand, investments in the shares of
those companies which are registered with the Kuwaiti
securities market should be evaluated either at cost or at
the value given in the market. Those not registered should
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be evaluated either at cost or at the book value given in
the 1983 financial statements.
During 1986, the securities market witnessed a number of new
regulations and measures to help channel savings towards
profitable investments. The first of these strategies was to
make the local stock market concentrate on steadying the rate of
share turnover and restraining speculation. It was argued that
such an increase in demands for securities would be met through
increasing the capital of the companies by issuing new cheres COr
public subscription or by establishing new shareholding
companies, which in turn would channel domestic savings towards
real investment.
The second strategy was the installation by the Ministry of
Finance of a new set of rules to work the new exchange. The
first rule gave the suspension of the management of the stock
exchange to a committee which included the Minister of Finance,
representatives of the chamber of commerce, the central bank and
stock brokers. The second concerned avoiding wide price
fluctuations by dividing groups of shares into units of 500 to
100,000 shares. The fourth gave the authorities of the stock
exchange the right to examine the financial position of the
companies listed. The fifth stipulated that the stock exchange
would list 39 public shareholding companies and 7 closed
companies and that an official Al-Manakh market would be created
on the main floor which would list 30 gulf public companies. The
sixth made the companies listed on the exchange pay an annual fee
of KD 10,000 plus 0.001 percent of their capital. The seventh
forbade the ownership of stockbroking firms by individuals and
stipulated that stockbroking companies must have a minimum
capital of RD 100,000 and provide a deposit of KD 250,000 as
security against malpractice. The eighth licensed eleven
stockbroking firms and included training sessions of 16 weeks for
employees on trading and financial knowledge. The ninth allowed
only two companies to act as market makers. Finally, the tenth
admitted Kuwaiti dinar bonds for listing on the exchange.
-164-
In addition to those developments, during 1986-,the Central Bank
of Kuwait reviewed the financial standing of79 money changing
establishments and 38 investment companies. In October 1985,
trading in Gulf shares was suspended by the government until an
assessment of their values was made. Some 33 Gulf companies
listed on the new official parallel market were reviewed by the
central bank which advised the liquidation of four, the merging
of another four changing boards of directors of eleven, and
changing the executive managements of ten. In addition, 62 closed
companies were also reviewed and it recommended closing three,
liquidating 25 and merging five.
Supervision of the securities market was intensified during 1986.
A price unit system was set to soften the speculation. This
provided that price increments during the trading session should
not exceed five points. A share brokerage list was issued
specifying brokerage commission to be based on the share value of
any company concluded Within a day, while market commiscion was
determined as equal to 30 percent of the commissions. In
addition, terms were issued to regulate the brokerage profession
in the market. One of the conditions provided that the applicant
should be a partner or an employee of one of the registered
brokerage companies and should pass all theoretical and practical
examinations.
Several rules for regulating the stock market's activities were
issued by the authorities in order to improve efficiency. One of
these was Article No.5 on the rules governing the sale of forward
shares.This entitles the management to specify the brokerage
companies through which forward shares might be traded and
provided that the differential between the price of a forward
transaction and its spot price should not exceed 25 percent of
the total value of the transaction. Article No.16 on the listing
and regulating of the work of market makers stipulated that a
company should be shareholding or a Kuwaiti financial institution
and its paid-up capital should nol be less than KD 10m. Also, the
company must h2we financial, technical and AriministrAtive
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capabilities to carry out this type of activity. The decision
also specified the trading period of market makers after which
they were not allowed to trade in shares among one another,
unless through a registered broker.
A third rule was Article No.132 which amended the provisions of
the commercial companies law. The first amendment reduced the
minimum par value of shares which offered new channels for demand
of domestic financial papers; this had made the sector a strong
competitor . to other sectors of Kuwaiti companies due to the high
values of shares compared with non-Kuwaiti companies. The second
amendment reduced the procedures of share title transfer.
Transactions are now being entered in the register available in
the market hall provided that the market management furnishes the
company with data relating to transactions concluded on its
shares. This new procedure will speed up the conclusion of
transactions. A third amendment gave the shareholding company
the right to buy its shares which do not exceed 10 percent of the
total and stipulated that buying shares should not be financed
from the company's funds.
A fourth decree regulated the procedures of securities trading
settlements and the clearing room at the Kuwait Securities
Market. Applying the clearing system will minimise complicated
procedures such as title transfer, debt settlement and so on.
The clearing room is entitled to retain the securities registered
with and acceptable by the market for their owners, to be
delivered when they prove their ownership.The application of the
clearing system obligates traders and brokers to meet their
obligation and be disciplined.
6.2.6 Activities (1980-1986) 
This section will discuss in detail the major developments and
changes which took place in the Kuwaiti stock market during the
period 1980-1986, in terms of issue hace, price and value and
volume of trading.
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1 Issue Base
Shares issued by the Kuwaiti public-subscription companies by the
end of 1985 totalled around 1.1 billion MD compared with 1067
million MD in 1984, 1 billion KD in 1983, 837 million MD in 1982,
621 million MD in 1981, and 165 million MD in 1980.
By the end of 1985, total government share within the total share
Issue rose to 57 percent against 52 percent in 1984, 49 percent
in 1983, 36 percent in 1982, 38 percent in 1981 and 34 percent in
1980. The expansion in the issue base was a result of the
establishment in 1984 of new public .shareholding companies and
the issuing of new shares in the form of bonds shares, both free
of charge and at a premium.
In 1985 the bonus shares totalled 8.3 million shares and the
premium shares totalled 18.9 million. In 1984 the bonus shares
totalled 29.6 million shares, in addition to 34.1 million new
shares issued at a premium, while in 1983, the distribution of.
profits was limited to free bonus shares distributed among
shareholders and totalling MD 147 million without issuing any new
shares at premium. On the other hand, in 1982 the expansion of
shares was distributed among new companies (50 million), free
bonus shares (95.4 million), and at premium shares (66.3
million). This compares with 35 million free bonus shares and 26
million shares at premium in 1980.
The base shares were distributed among several local shareholding
companies in the following manner. The financial companies
constituting the banking, investment and insurance sectors always
came first in the years 1981, 1982 and 1983 with a percentage of
40 , 40 and 41 respectively. While the industrial companies took
second place in the same years, comprising 37 percent, 30 percent
and 32 percent respectively. The real estate sector came third,
having 10 percent in 1980, 13 percent in 1981, 15 percent in 1983
and 3 percent in 1984
2 Volume and Value of TradinR. 
Data available on share trabIng in the local stock exchange for
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the period 1980-1986 covered shares of 52 companies divided into
three groups: the Kuwaiti public-subscription shareholding
companies (43), the Kuwaiti closed shareholding companies (7) and
the Gulf shareholding companies (2). Here we will concentrate on
the Kuwaiti public subscription shareholding companies in
accordance with the weight-they carry in the economy." The other
two groups of companies will be referred to briefly.
During this period, 1980 saw a drop of 27.9 percent and 14.8
percent in the overall value and volume, respectively, of traded
shares compared with the previous year.
	
The volume of the
traded shares totalled 144.7 million in 1980 compared with 1.69
million in 1979.	 Also the value of traded share totalled
KD.1325.5 million in comparison with RD 1837 million in 1979.
(See Figures 6.2 and 6.3).
The decline in trading volume was more pronounced in the shares
of insurance companies, banks and industrial companies which
dropped by 70 percent, 41 percent and 34 percent, respectively.
1981 witnessed a record volume of trading in 246.8 million
shares, while the total value of dealings amounted to KD 1949.8
million. Eere the trading volume of the real estate companies
ranked first at 49 million, while the banks came last at 30.5'
million 'a fact reflecting preference on the dealers for trading:
in shares of companies whose prices are low, over trade in highly
priced company shares'.31
In 1982, the volume of trading totalled 183.9 million shares, of
which 183.9 million went to Kuwaiti public-subscription companies
while,its value of trading was RD 1860.3 million. During this
period, the weight of Kuwaiti public-subscription companies rose
in relation to the other two companies 'on account of the drop in
the nominal prices for the shares of the Gulf companies compared
to those for Kuwaiti companies, in addition to the sharp fall in
their market prices following the Souq Al-Manakh crisis and the
consequent market fall in the prices for the shares of Gulf
companies unlisted in the stock exchange.32
If we break the volume and value of tred i n3 into sector, we
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Table 6.7: Kuwaiti Shareholding Companies - public subscription:
volume of traded shares in 1980-1986
Volume (million shares)
Sectors .	 1980 1981 X 1981 1982 X 1982 1983 X
Banks 47.7 30.5 -36 30.5. 33.6 10.2 33.6 12.9 -61.6
Investment 24.5 42.8 75 42.8 35.6 -40.2 35.6 10.2 -60.2
Insurance 1.1 1.4 27 1.4 3.9 178.6 3.9 1.8 -53.8
Industrial 14.8 40.5 174 40.5 39.0 -3.7 39.0 16.2 -58.5
Transport 23.6 34.0 44 34.0 9.4 -72.4 9.4 3.3 -65.0
Services 9.3 47.8 414 47.8 10.6 -77.8 10.6 5.1 -51.9
Realty 22.7 49.8 119 49.8 .	 61.8 24.1 61.8 11.9 -80.7
Total 144.7 246.8 72 246.8 183.9 -25.5 183.9 61.4 -66.6
1983 19d4 1984 1985 1985 1986 X
12.9 8.4 -35 8.4 18.9 125.0 18.9 50.1 165.1
10.2 1.3 -87 1.3 0.8 -38.5 0.8 4.4 450.0
1.8 0.1 -94 0.1 0.2 100.0 0.2 0.8 300.0
16.2 2.3 -86 2.3 5.9 156.5 5.9 26.0 340.7
3.3 0.4 -88 0.4 - - - - -
5.1 2.8 -45 2.8 11.2 300.0 11.2 41.9 274.0
11.9 4.5 -62 4.5 3.8 -15.5 3.8 20.9 450.0
Total 16.4 19.8 -68 19.8 40.8 106.0 40.8
.	 .
144.1 253.2
Sodrce:Kuweiti Stock Exchange,- Annual Statiotics, various issues.
notice that, in terms of volume of traded shared, the real estate
companies ranked first with 61.8 million shares, while insurance
companies came last with 3.9 million.
The volume of trading of the Kuwaiti public-subscription
shareholding companies in the local stock exchange fell sharply
during 1983 reaching a total of 61.4 million shares with a value
of KD 478.9 million. The drop covered all company groups in
terms of volume and value of trading when compared with the
previous year. The volume of trading in the shares of Kuwaiti
public-subscription companies kept on falling until they reached
19.8 million shares at a value of RD 112 million in 1984. Bank
shares came first in terms of volume and value, with real estate
in second place.
In 1985, the volume of trading in the shares of these companies
had risen by 98 percent to reach 42 million shares with a value
of KD 112 million. Number of transactions had risen considerably.
to reach 10,310 transactions in 1985.
The volume of trading in the shares of the Kuwaiti shareholding
companies grew in 1986 to reach 123 million shares at a total
value of KD 354 million. Bank shares came first, constituting 41
. percent of the total, followed by the services shares at 34
percent. The number of transactions increased by 122.9 percent
to reach 23,000.	 See Tables 6.7 and 6.8.
3 Prices
The index for Kuwaiti public shareholding companies shows that
while in 1980 no remarkable change had occurred, significant
annual rises in 1981 and 1982 - 56 percent and 4 percent
respectively - and a decline •of 10 percent in 1983 became
noticeable.
During 1980, an 18 percent increase in the price level was
noticed in the second quarter to show a decline of 2 percent and
6.6 percent in the third and fourth quarters.
'This is attributed to a number of factors some of which are
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related to the war between Iraq and Iran and some too the
accelerated levels of international interest rates,
especially on the US dollar. '33
Those companies whose levels of prices declined were insurance
companies, industrial companies, investment companies and banks:
others, such as services companies, transport companies and real
estate companies, wilnessed an increase in their prices. The
prices of shares in the local market also fluctuated for several
reasons - distribution of share dividends, economic and
international conditions and crises, and motives of speculation.
The rise in the share price index for Kuwaiti public companies in
1981 was a result of the sharp increases in the share price index
of all companies, but particularly transport companies (113
percent), real estate (71 percent), investment companies (70
percent) and banks (55 percent).
'Speculation. together with the distribution of free bonus.
shares and new share issues, played a significant role in
pushing the prices upwards. '34
At the end of 1982, the Kuwaiti public subscription companies
showed a slight increase of 4 percent with the bank group having
the highest rate in;share price increases (18 percent) followed
by the investment companies (14 percent) and insurance and
transport companies (9 percent):
In 1983 the price index for shares traded in the stock exchange
decreased around 10 percent with only the investment companies
registering a price rise of 1 percent.
The prices of these shares fell further during 1984; insurance
companies dropped by 59 percent, banks by 51 percent and
transport by 5u percent.
In 1985 the price. index of shares traded in the stock exchange
reached 29.45, while banks reached 43.83, insurance companies
fell by 47.9 percent.
An increase was witnessed in 1985 in the share price index
-170-
27,17)97,71A177.
1111111111=1111111111111
COXOXIX•YAXO.
;
%.1N.1.110DMIDM
-
zaWCOXIMAWASONWAI7/17.17,171717,4
111111111111111111111M1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111WAX0.07.70:670707.74:0:67.X05:07674Y.47,076307:
•	 .	 -
1111MOMPANIPSWASS97./AStimmummenniumunum
reawiviwoom.
\\n\‘ \\, •.\\
11
0
L.
L.
.c
0
L.
0
.0
0)
(0
a)
0
'"(5
(e
CO
"" a
4.)
•r•I
CO 0
CO
•••••
C
MO*
S-0.6k*ZaZaZaf.W.:
moseamums
07.677M.	 //
111111111MIIMUMMUMM111111
gem..
	
rd rzeA rznA re
mummulimmimplummummwatumitt
.4554WW0.01.00:0A.0.030X..
\Zs: \\"..\\.\\":
wzos mmo9929 swinozeimmumumnumunnumemi
azweiremexemwzrm
KIAl277.029740§7J7
IMUMMUUMMI
mma&M.:
MNIMMOIDO
12 WA197, 7,1) Pli777,1117,17/4 99MM "MM) 7;
11111111111111111111111111M111111111111111111M11111111111
irill,q":1:11;i!TF1117.1;!3-
Table 6.9: Kuwaiti Shareholding Companies - public subscription:
share price index 1980-1986
smtora 1980
(January 1976 = 100)
/sm . 	 x	 1931 1982 x nea 1983	 %
Banks	 - 468 729 ' 55 729 862 18 862 727	 -16
Investment 242 412 70 412 470 14 470 475	 1
Insurance 694 813 17 813 885 9 885 812	 -8
Indistrial 212 298 41 298 301 1 301 296	 -2
Transport 140 298 113 298 325 9 325 256	 -21
Services 359 498 39 498 488 -2 488 411	 -16
Anelty 465 794 71 294 810 2 810 613	 -24
General Index 313 490 56 490 509 4 509 461	 -10
1983 1984 X 1984 1985 X 1985 1986
. - -
/27 354 -51 354 318_ -10.2 318 421	 32.4
475 196 -59 - 196 ' 36 -81.6 36 -	 162	 350.0
812 336 -59 336 240 -28.6 240 394	 64.2
296 172 -42 1.72 111 -35.5 1.11. 44	 -60.4
256 128 -50 128 - . -	 -
411 240 -42 240 31 -87.1 31 10	 -67.7
613 374 -39 374
_
182 -51.3 182 164	 -9.9
461 239 -48 239 153 -35.9 153 199	 30.1
Source: Kuwaiti Stock EXchange, Annual Statistics, verioua Leaven.
the service sector reached 49.2 percent and the banks 23.5.
percent (see Table 6.9 and Figure 6.4)
5.3 METHODS OF DEALING
Methods of dealing on the Kuwaiti market reflect the society
within wnich they are based. As Kuwait is socialiy a compact and
close-knit society, where everyone - especially the wealthy
merchant community - is known to everyone else, the system of
dealing in the market is conducted on a client to client basis,
'with the broker acting as no more than a record keeper and
referee'. Licensed stockbrokers have no mcnopoly on arrenging
deals. Deals are sometimes concluded in the broken's office or
privately by two clients who meet face-to-face when agreeing on a
transaction. Investors are not obliged to employ a broker when
1dmel!re-, i r they find it easier to des. among 	ecc:laintanr=s
-
Of course, brokers are sometimes employed by the client to find a
buyer; nevertheless, the final contract is regarded as being
between two clients, and brokers regard themselves as absolved
from any responsibility for seeing that settlement is duly
completed as is the normal practice elsewhere. In this system
shares are rarely offered openly on the market.
Because a deal is condudted between two identified persons, the
seller takes his share certificate and the broker's contract notc
to the company registrar where he gets a receipt. On the second
day of the deal, the seller gives the receipt to the buyer and
receives a cheque. In return, the buyer gives his copy of the
contract to the company where he receives a 'temporary note of
title pend i ng issue of the -Formal share certificate' . 36 in Avrh
a system, the broker does not guarantee either side, as they both
know who they are dealing with when the contract is signed.
In addition to the above-mentioned practices. there are two other
forms of dealing to discuss in relation to the Kuwaiti market.
One of these is the method of share-swaps. 'where a 1-d ock of
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25 units or go below the minimum of one unit.
The law also imposed on brokers the duty not to manipulate prices
-
give false or misleading information, and conduct deals not
Involving any change of beneficial ownership. But despite these
laws, the system is not sufficiently supervised to detect a
breach of the law.
6.4 FROBLE.IS
Prior to the issue on 14th August 1984 of the decree regulating
the securities market, the stock market faced problems which were
the result of the loopholes and the lack of regulations in the
market during the 1970's and early 1980's. One of the features
during that period was speculation, which was the result of the
desire on the part of dealers to make quick profits, thus
rendering share prices in the market inconsistent with their real
value and does not reflect the earning power of the company. In
fact, the high level of speculation which the local stock market
witnessed during that period contributed to the continuous
inflationary trends in the domestic economy, and hinders the
market's role in economic development.
Another problem was investor's rush to . subscribe without
knowledge of what they are buying and the risk they are taking.
In the 1970's and early 1980s the demand for company ghn-rq in
the primary market could have been used by the securities market
to mobilise and channel savings in the interest of the domestic
.economy. 'Nevertheless, this market phenomenon contributed to
the creation of e high level of speculation in funders' shares,
and the sale of eligibility to subscribe, which led to sharp
rises in share prices'-, 	 a rise which does not reflect the
earning power of the company.
But still this phenomenon s--- ...ded in concentrating ths 7,hares
In the hands of a Few big individual investors who were t: her. a!7!:-7.
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shares in one company is exchanged for shared in another at a
valuation with no money changing hands' . v Such deals occur
frequently and tend to be in large lines of stock. The other form
is the system of forward dealing where two dealers agree on a
forward deal at an agreed price, normally a premium on the
current market price, the seller then delivers the shares and
receives a post-dated cheque for the amount due (See Appendix A).
During the 1980's, attempts have been made by the authorities to
regulate the system of forward dealing, but to no avail as these
attempts were not accepted by big individual traders. Other
attempts to impose regularity laws on the system of dealing were
introduced in 1984 with the opening of the Kuwaiti stock exchange
building by the Kuwaiti Securities Market Committee. One of the
rules is that the market management specify the time.and place of
conducting transactions related to financial papers negotiable in
the stock exchange. Another is the fact that a dealer is not
allowed to choose for himself with whom to deal. To complement'
this, the brokers are put under the obligation of making a
settlement if their clients fail to do so. Although this method
does not meet the 'rule vis-a-vis the market, which is the
customary practice in every other world market, this is a novelty
in Kuwait and a distinct advance on the previous practice. '38
This was introduced to ensure that individual brokers combined
their business into stronger units.
Still another regulation (which might help in upgrading market
efficiency) is the adoption in trading of the method of written
bidding, where 'the broker must write down the information
related to the transaction he intends to conduct for the account
of his customer on the board for the purpose' . 39 After
completion of offers and bids, dealing arrangements should be
carried on under the supervision of the market management.
Article II stipulates that brokers are required, when regarding
price or volume quotation, to keep any variation in price
quotations within four units plus or minus the previous closing
price, and not to omr...ed the fixed maximum volume of dealing of
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to control the market activity.
Still another problem was the narrow domestic base for investment
in Kuwait which has given rise to speculation in shares and real
estate, because these constituted easy investment outlets giving
spontaneous high profit within a short time.
The market also suffers from the similarities of active traders,
who, because they share the same motivation, tend to push the
market in the same direction. As a result, the market is either
soaring upward on high volume or slumping down .. In addition, the
market suffers from the absence of formal, centralised price-
making mechanisms similar to those in other markets. Also,
brokers do not guarantee completion of the deal as is normally
practised elsewhere.
6.5 THE OPENING OF THE NEW KSE (1983) 
Under the Decree issued on August 14th 1983 concerning the
organisation of the Stock Exchange, and the Executive Regulation
to the Decree issued under Ministerial Order No. 35/1983, the
official Kuwaiti Stock Exchange was moved from its old premises
to a new tower building costing US$ 62 million.
	 It was formally
inaugurated on 29th September 1984. 	 The building was so vast
that the Hall was considerably larger than that of the London
Stock Exchange. The computer system cost over US$ 10 million.
The Director General of the Kuwaiti Stock Exchange declared that
business would close down at the old stock exchange on Saturday
29th September. At a press conference held the week before, on
the 22nd, he declared that no operation would ever be permitted
again outside the new stock exchange hall under any
circumstances.
The Stock Exchange Administration Committee applied a new
circulation system called the Written Auction on many companies
in July 1984.	 The new system adopted with some modification..
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the rules by a number of world stock exchangei, amongst others,
those of Manila, Hong Kong, Singapore and Sydney. Dealing in
shares, under this system, was through the recording of supply
and demand rates on display boards in the Hall. 	 The auction
bidding was by middle men or brokers, and the purchaser specified
the number of shares he wanted to buy. The new system suited
the nature of the Kuwaiti market and became a more effective
alternative for the present and the immediate future than its
predecessor.	 The main characteristics of the new system were:
- prices opened at a specified ratio to the former price.
- changes in the share price were at fixed ratios, up or down
- the broker was banned from dealing with himself if there W8
another broker recorded at the same price.
	
•
- the broker could not deal on his own account through his own
office.
no transaction had to he recorded outside the Hail. Air
transactions had to be recorded on the market display board,
together with offers to buy or sell
- strict equality was observed between dealers and brokers
regardless of status or volume of trading
1
- the number of transactions contracted by the client was
subject to a fixed ceiling , beyond that. the broker had to
stand down to the next client
- the broker was fully responsible for completion of a
transaction, transfer and payment
- If two brokers quoted the same prices, the one whose name
was on the display board would deliver the goods.
On September 29th at 10,00 a.m. an electric bell on the fourth
floor of the new tower building accommodating the Kuwaiti Stock
Exchange, sounded to signal the move from the old to the new
Stock ExchanKe The Big Bang).
The new premises contoilLed 65 brokers offices. A uumber
mergers took place which left eleven broking firms out of the
17 which had worked on the old stock exchangea. Brokers'
commissions were raised, registration fees for brokers also went
up, along with the bank guarantees that the brokers' firm had to
deposit these fees were set at a minimum of KD 250,000 (£500,000)
per firm and could go as high as KD 500,000 (El million) or even
KD 1 million (£2 million) •41 At the meeting held on 14th October
1984, the Kuwait Stock Exchange Administration Committee fixed
brokerage rates as follows. The rates below would provisionally
apply as per categories of share prices set against them:
Categoriea of Share Pricee 	 Brokerage %tee 
Vendor Buyer
Below 250 file WO 0.25)
	 % file	 % file
from 250 file to 1(1)1
	 34 file	 34 file
From FM to IC5
	 2 file	 2 file
From 1S5 to above
	 4 file	 4 file
Brokers' firms took 80 percent of commission due on e22
transactions concluded through their offices, the Stock Exchange
received 20,percent. Finally, all brokers were to charge the
prescribed rates of commission, on the basis of which the Stock
Exchange share was calculated.
Companies approved by the Stock Exchange were required to pay a
registration fee of KD 10,000 plus 0.01 percent per annum of the
company's capital, as the new Stock Exchange had to finance
itself. Trading was from 10.00 a.m. to 12 noon and from 5 p.m. to
7.p.m. Working days were from Saturday to Wednesday inclusive41.
6.6 ORGANISATION OF THE KUWAIT STOCK EXCHANGE MANAGEMENT
The Stock Exchange managed by an independent commitco
constituted under the chairmanship nf the Minister of CommPrr=
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and Industry and membership of each of the following:
	
. 1)	 The Stock Exchange Manager
	
2)	 A member, representing the Ministry of Commerce and Industry
	
q )	 A member representing the Ministry of Finance
4) A member representing the Central Bank of Kuwait
5) Two members to be nominated by the Council of Ministers.
6) Four members to be nominated by Kuwait Chamber of Commerce.
The main functions of this committee are:
1	 Formulating	 the	 organisational	 rules	 relating	 to
transactions in securities, enforce these rules an
supervise all the trading activities.
2	 Adopting the necessary action and measures regarding any
doubtful transactions or activities.
3 Looking into dealers and companies ao!ications for
registration, and giving approval for those who meet the
requirements.
4 To suspend provisionally the Stock Exchange transactions or
dealing in any stocks of one company or more in the event of
any contingent circumstances threatening the smooth and
regular process of work thereon.
5 Approving the annual budget estimates of the Stock Exchange,
its Balance Sheets and Final Accounts, together with the
appointment of the Accounts Auditors.
The President of the Committee is to submit oepoet5
quarterly to the Council of Ministers about the situation in
the market. See Appendix C for more information on tho
structure of the organisation of Kuwait Stock ExchanEe
Mansement
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Table -6.10 cent/
COMPANY NAME CLOSING CLOSING	 CLOSING CASH YIELD OPENING CLOSING CHANGE
PRICE TO PRICE TO
	 PRICE TO TO CLOSING PRICE PRICE RATEpcm-rr
	 DISIRIBUTED BOCK
	 PRICE(LOSS)
	 PROFIT/SH VALUEJSH
MOD SECTOR
Livestock Trading	 11.46	 18.33
	 1.72	 5.45
	 0.250
	 0.275 10.00
United Fisheries	 9,57	 ERR
	 1.33	 0.00
	 0.154	 0.154 0.00
United Poultry	 23.33	 23.33
	 2.24	 4.29	 0.255
	 0.230 9.80
Kuwait Foods	 18.16	 34.50
	 1.98	 2.90	 0.310
	 0.345 11.29Agricultural Produces	 0.00	 ERR	 0.00
	 ERR	 ERR
NON-KLUOITI SECTOR
First Gulf Bank '	 0.00	 0.00
	 0.00	 ERR
	 ERRBahrein Inter. Bank	 12.17	 1.51	 0.92
	 6.64
	 0.072	 0.073 1.39Bahrein M.E. Bank	 4.08	 ERR	 0.67
	 0.00	 0.0540 0.0530 -1.85
United Gulf Bank	 0.00	 0.00	 OM	 ERR	 ERRCoast Investment	 4.13	 19.04
	 1.30	 5.25	 0,096	 0.099 3.13
Arabian Investment	 14.00
	 14.14	 0.98	 7.07	 0.0410 0.0420 2.44
Bahrain & Kuwait Group	 20.40
	 28.10	 1.31	 3.56	 0.097
	 0.102 5.15
PARALLEL MARKET"
Pearl Investment 	 0.0)	 0.00	 0.00	 ERR	 cm
Gulf investments	 238.89	 ERR	 1.23	 0.00	 0.042
	 0.043 2.38
Gulf International
Insurance	 0.00	 ERR	 EAR	 ERR	 ERRArab International
Insurance	 0.00	 0.00
	 0.00	 ERR	 ERRShergeh Insurance	 '0.00	 ERR	 ERR	 ERR	 ERRGulf Union Insurance 	 0.00	 ERR	 0.00
	 ERR 	 --
Gulf Medical Products	 -2.86
	 ERR	 0,24	 0.00
	 0.014
	 0.0150 7.14%bite Cement	 3.30	 ERR	 0.25	 0.00
	 0.0170 0.0165 -2.94
Ajmen Cement	 ERR	 ERR	 ERR	 ERR	 EAR
FUgaireh Cement	 -1.15
	 ERR	 0.14	 0.00	 0.0070 0.0075 7.14
Shargeh Cement	 -0.60
	 ERR	 0.13	 0.00
	 0.0070 0.0090 28.57
Gulf Cement (100Z paid) 	 0.00	 ERR	 0.00	 ERR	 ERRUmmAl-Cleiwan Cement	 0.00	
-- 	 0.00	 ERR	 ERR
Table 6.10: Financial Information at the end of 1987
CatPANY NAME CLOSING CLOSING	 CLOSING CASH YIELD OPENING CLOSING CHANGE
PRICE TO PRICE TO
	 PRICE TO TO CLOSING PRICE PRICE RATE %
PROFrr
	 DISIRIBUIED BCCK
	 PRICE
(LOSS)	 PROFIT/SH VALUFISH
National Bank 28.33 37.78 3.32 1.76 1.01Q
	 1.020
	 0.99
Gulf Bonk 45.00 50.63 1.19 0.00 0.400	 0.405
	 1.25
Counercial Eenk 35.62 40.71 0.90 0.00 0.275
	 0.265	 3.64
A1-Ahli Bank 38.5 42.78 1.27 0.00 0.375
	 0.385	 2.64
Kuweit & Middle East Bank 31.5 35.00 1.13 0.00 0.280
	 0.315	 12.50
Reel Estate Bank 23.33 44.55 1.78 1.43 0.466
	 ' 0.490	 5.38
EUrgen Bank 31.67 35.62 1.05 0.00 0.285
	 0.285	 0.00
Finance House 41.67 45.45 3.03 0.00 0.520	 0.500	 -3.85
INYE:311•ENT SECTCR
Kuwait Investment 39.33 ERR 1.89 0.00 0.220	 0.236	 7.27
Foreign Investment 501.19 ERR 1.79 0.00 0.210	 0.210	 0.00
International Investment 19.60 ERR 1.72 0.00 0.180	 0.196	 8.89
Commercial Fecilities 16.30 29.33 2.84 1.36 0.435
	 0.440	 1.15
International Financial
Advisers 37.67 ERR 1.23 0.00 0.122	 0.136	 11.48
Kuwait Pearl Investment 16.94 25.20 1.22 3.97 0.120
	 0.126
	 5.00
:INSURANCE SECTOR
Kuwait Insurance 22.22 32.00 4.15 3.13
-0.780
	 0.800
	 2.56
Gulf Insurance 24.72 29.67 2.18 3.37 0.420	 0.445
	 5.95
Al-lie Insurance 22.59 33.89 2.85 1.48 0.610	 0.610	 0.00
Verb, Insurance 15.43 27.00 2.95 3.70 0.520
	 0.540	 3.85
REAL ESTATE SECTCR
Kuwait Reel Estate 16.11 8.53 1.78 11.72 0.290
	 0.290
	 0.00
United Real Estate -3.89 ERR 1.15 0.00 0.136
	 0.140
	 2.94
National Reel Estate 31.25 35.71 1.76 0.00 0.248
	 0.250	 0.81
Selhieh Reel Eetate 0.00 EAR 0.00 ERR ERR
Kuwait Products 0.00 ERR 0.00 EAR ERR
Real &tate Investment 0.00 ERR 0.00 ERR EAR
INDUSTRIAL SECTOR
Fictional Industries 16.15 31.50 2.16 3.17 0.580
	 0.630	 8.62
Metal Pipes 15.00 36.00 3.03 2.78 0.330	 0.360
	 9.09
Kuwait Cement 18.13 41.43 2.48 2.41 0.275
	 0.290	 5.45
Refrigeration Stores 14.46 33.75 2.65 2.96 0.406
	 0.405	 0.00
Gulf Cables 16.67 21.00 2.17 4.76 1.020
	 1.050
	 2.94
Pharun Industries 220.00 ERR 2.02 0.00 0.192
	 0.220	 14.58
Kuwait Shipbuilding 0.00 ERR 0.00 ERR ERR
Merine Services 19.44 23.33 1.92 4.29 0.300
	 0.350
	 16.67
55NrIM SECTOR
Land Treneport -5.00 ERR 1.05 0.00 0.30
	 0.100	 11.11
Netional Cinema 14.53 ERR 1.41 0.00 0.208	 0.218	 4.81
Ku....dt Motels 0.00 ERR 0.00 ERR ERR
Gerimroi Ahmrehousele 39.20 ERR 1.80 0.00 0.198	 0.196	
-1.01
Marketa Com:lc:ma 6.17 ERR 0.62 0.00 0.0180	 0.0185
	 2.78
Mobile Telephone, 10.53 17.19 3.23 5.75 0.400
	 0.400
	 0.00
Kuweit Computers 23.94 26.76 1.62 0.00 0.196	 0.196	 0.00
cont/...
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Figure 6.5: Development of Trading Activity in the Kuwait Stock Market
1985-1987
6.7 RECENT PERFORMANCE (1987) 
The market recently witnessed an increase in trading activity,
compared with the last year. The value of trading in March was
KD134 million issues, which is the highest in the year. This
increase is attributed to the decision taken by the KSE Committee
to split the share of all companies in ratio 1:10. Because of
this the average prices improved, and the average share trading
increased by 109.9% from last year. The value of trading and the
number of transactions also increased by 115.5% and 195.3%
respectively (See Figure 6.5). The companies sectoral composition
underwent changes compared to the previous period. The Banking
sector companies decreased their predominant position to the
service companies, who attracted more interest recently; the
turnover on its shares reached 112.7% which is considered a high
percentage comparing it to the other sectors (See Table 6.10).
The banking sector turnover was 32% and the real estate sector
was 29.1% of its trading, the overall turnover for the total
trading was 31.1% (see Table 6.11). This percentage is considered
high in comparison with the last years or with similar stock
markets in the area.
The value of stock trading during 1987 reached KD828.9 million
(see Table 6.8). The banking sector companies dominated other
sectors, with a total capital of RD 431.1 million, accounting for
52% of the total nominal capital. The service sector companies
came second, accounting for 17.1% of the total nominal capital.
Also, for the number of transactions, the banking section
attracted most of the investors. The number of transactions in
the market was 74,526; the banking sector companies accounting
for 29,932 (40.2%), the service sector coming second with 17,186
transactions accounting for 23.1% (see Figure 6.5).
The increase in prices covered all sector companies during the
first quarter of 1987, started to decrease a little after the
stock split (April 1987), and increal-led 	 in for most companieG
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until the end of the year (1987) in spite of what happened to the
world stock markets in the fourth quarter of 1987.
6.7.1 Annual Turnover
With regard to percentage of level of turnover, the Mobile
Telephone Company occupied the first position. with its avereep
chara turnover at 180.4%, then Public Wherehouse Combany,
151.87. for its share turnover average. Kuwait Commercial Complex
came next with 124.1%, followed by Kuwait Finance House - 101.7%,
Kuwait Fisheries - 83.2%, United Realty - 79%, Kuwait Computer
Company - 75.2%, Kuwait Pharmaceuticals Company - 58.5%, and
Kuwait Facilities Company with 43.5%.
These percentages indicate that the stock market aCtivities in
Kuwait cover all the sector companies, and not just one sector.
6.7.2 Comparing 1987 With 1986 
The numbers of traded shares in 1987 increased b y 102.9% compared
with 1986 and 442% compared with 1985 (See Table 6.12).
The value of traded shares increased by 115% in 1987::..ompared
with 1986 and 613% when compared with 1985.
The number of transactions incr== ori 195.3% and t363.9%'
respectively. This indicates the increasing activity i n the
-market, the sound financial position for the companies listed in
the Stock Market, and the confidence between the investors which
reflected on the stability of the Kuwait Stock Market as a whole
in 1987.
6.8 C^NCLUI^N
In Kuwait the stork market developed in the same way as the other
markets in the world developed. except that individual investors
In Kuwait are extr pmely rich and the sums of money exchanged
here are abnormally lat-6. The di...v ....ic .pmen r.of thE:
Exchange ic simil=r to that of the Stock Exrhan5.e i o London, but
that in London the media (especially daily new§papers) played an
Important part in the development of the Market. In Kuwait the
media was not involved in the development of the stock market.
The next chapter will present the development of the Kuwait Gulf
Stock Exchange, Al-Manakh, as a second stock exchange, including
the development of the Gulf public shareholding companies.
Chapter eight Will discuss in depth the 1982 crash of Al-Manakh.
Both chapters present what are considered to be some of the most
important factors affecting Kuwait stock market efficiency.
These factors might explain the results found on the weak form
test, and indicate that the conditions for an efficient stock
market are not present in Kuwait.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 6
1 M.W.Khouja and P.G.Sadler, The Economy of Kuwait:
Development and Role in International Finance, (London:
Macmillan Press Ltd., 1979)
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3	 KD1 = US$3.5
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shareholding company with Government equity participation.
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Airway Corporation.
5 Hazem el-Beblawi and Raid Fahmi, 'Role of the Stock Market
in Kuwait' paper submitted to the conference on the
Development of the Stock Market in Kuwait between 14th and
16th November 1981. (Kuwait: Kuwait Chamber of Commerce and
Industry, 1981) p.27
6	 El Beblawi and Fahmi, op.cit., p. 29.
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Kuwait, (Kuwait: ' Kuwaiti Chamber of Commerce and Industry;
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10 El-Beblawi and Fahmi, IBM papers, p.39
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Study, (Kuwait: Economic Association Press, 1974).
12	 This type of trading will be discussed in detail in Appendix
A
13 Hazem El-Beblawi, Economic Dictionary, supplement to
Economic Bulletin, (Kuwait: Ministry of Finance, 1977)
14 The sharp drop in future transaction came after the issuing
of the Ministerial decision No. 52 of 1974 by the Ministerof
Trade and Industry which made future transactions in
securities illegal.
15	 Central Bank of Kuwait, Economic Survey, 1969 - 1979, p.105
16	 Article 11 of Law No. 3/1975.
17 Annual Report, Kuwait Ministry of Commerce and Industry,
1976,p.36.
18	 Share price bulletin, Al Wei:An and Al gabs [Kuwait News-
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Companies.
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30 Kuwait Central Bank (1982) Economic Report, p.77
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Table 7.1 cont/...
Ccmpany Domicile Date of Authoriaed Paid-up
incorpor- Capital* Capital*
ation (million) (million)
Mining and Induetry Ajmen 1979 200 "	 70
Ajman Cement Aiman 1980 II 225 "	 225
Gulf Industries &	 Reel
Eatate Ajraan 1.980 100 , II 100
Petroleum Producta Mtn= 1981 400 111 200
Gulf Animal Resources Ainan 1982 200 11 200
Fujeirsh Cement Fujairah 1979 "	 350 225
EMI/rates Kalanker Fujairah 1981 "	 200 SO
UMmAl-Glaiwein Cement Umm Al-Caiwein 1982 11 500 11 500
Gulf Gee Exploitation Umm Al-Qaiwein 1981 200 11 200
Arab Company for Iron
and Steel . Bahrein 1980 USS ISO USS 150
United Gulf Industry and
Services Bahrein 1980- "	 150 "	 150
Gulf Group for Projects mnd
In&stry Mean /981 "	 /00 100
Ineurence
United Insurance Res Al-Khaimah /976 Dh	 20 Eh	 10
Gulf Union Ineurance Bahrein 1980 BD	 8 BD	 3
Arab International-Insurance Behrein 1980 MS 10 USS	 6
International Insurance Ajmen 1979 Dh	 20 Eh	 20
Sharjah Irmurance &
Re-aeaurence Sharjah /979 50 11 50
Banks
First Gulf Berk Ajman 1979 h120 Eh	 120
Arab Sahil Bank Rae Al-Khaimah 1981 11	 100 "	 50
United Gulf Bank Sabre in 1980 LES 250 USS 250
Behrein & Middle EMet Bank Bahrein 1981 I/	 50(1 "	 100
Bahrein International Bank Bahrein 1982 11	 300 II	 180
Arabian Investment Banking
Corporation Bahrein 1982 "	 500 11 '50
Remarks
Shares- not
traded in
Alanakh
Being
amalgamated
with FUjeirah
Cement
Shares not
traded in
Aimuskh
Fbunded as a
local company
in 1970
before
conversion to
Pan Gulf
* Authorised and paid-up capital figures are for year of foundation.
•
Source: Company Decrees, Articles of Aeaociation and Annual Reports; Exempted Public Companies in
Bahrein, Department of Commerce end Companies Affairs, Ministry of Commerce and Agriculture; Public
=Panics in United Arab Emirates. Federation of the UAE Chambers of Commerce and Industry.
Table 7.1: Gulf Public Companies 1976-82
cotpany Domicile Date of
incorpor-
ation
Authorised
Capita 1*
(million)
Paid-up
Capital*
(million)
Remarks
Investment
Sharjah Group
Gulf Investment & Reel Estate
Sharjah
Ajmen
1976
1977
Do 500
•
Do
"
250
75
Kuwait & Gulf Financial Centre
Gulf Reel Estate
Gulf Financial Centre
Res Al-ghaimeh Inveetment
Mum
Ajnen
Sharjeh
Rae Al-Khaimah
1979
1979
1979
1979
.	 240
"	 300
"	 200
"	 soo
"
IS
II
IS
120
200
200
500 Liquidated in
Coact Investment & 1981
Development Ras Al-Khaimah /980 II 80 SI 80
Aral, Company for General
Investments	 (Shust'e)
Pearl Investment
Arab Development Company
Gulf Investments
Dubai
Bahrein
Bahrein
Eel-wain
1979
1979
/979
1980
"	 700
US$
	 75
BD	 10
USS 250
"	 175
USS
	 23
BD	 10
US$ 125
Al -Jazire Contracting
& Investment Bahrein 1978 "	 53 13
Bahrein International
Investment Centre
Eshrein & Kuwait Investment
Bahrein 1981 "	 300 • 125 95% Kuwaiti
participation
Group Bahrein 1982 BD	 55 BD 55 Registered in
Duhai(Formerly
DUbei Group)
did not funct-
ion and
licence
cancelled;
later regis-
tered in
Bahrain
Industrial
The Gulf Agriculture
Development Company Sherjeh 1977 Do 200 Do SO
Gulf Industries Company Sharjah 1977 "	 120 30
Sharjah Cement &
IndUatriel Drvrlopment
Gulf Medical Projects
Sharjah
Sherjeh
1979
1979
150
75
150
75
Oriental Company for
ProdUotion & Distribution
United International Hotels;
Gulf Cement
Sharjah
Sharjeh
Pas Al -Hhaineh
1979
1979
/977
60
100
300
IS 30
100
150
Res Al-gheimeh Company for
White Cement & Construction
Meterials Industry
Gulf Drug induetriee
Reek Al-Khaimeh
Res Al-'.e jrini
1980
1980
"	 600
"	 100
"600
"	 100
Rae Al-Khaineh Poultry &
Fodder Pee Al-Khaimah /981 "	 40 "	 40
Gulf (elan/car Rae Al-Khalmeh 1982 USS 350 US$ 175
Gulf Livestock Pee Al-Khaimah. 1982 Do 400 Do 200 Sharee not
traded in
Mhnekh
conti...
. CHAPTER SEVEN
'KUWAITI GULF STOCK EXCHANGE (KGSE)
AL-MANAKH
.1 INTRODUCTION
Before discussing Al-Manakh (KGSE), the Gulf Public Companies
(GPC) which constitute the KGSE will be described. The
development, characteristics and Regulations of GPC will be
traced.
- Gulf Public Companies are actually joint venture companies owned
by different nationals of Arab Gulf States. The activities of
these companies differ according to the purposes they were
established	 for,	 see Table 7.1.	 There are investments,
industrial, services, real estate and agricultural. The Joint
venture character applies to these companies with regard to
administrative aspects and to capital which is participated in,
on one by Kuwait citizens and on the other by nationals of the
countries of origin.
7.2 GULF PUBLIC COMPANIES
The Gulf Public Companies began to be established in 1976 and
then stocks were presented for subscription in Kuwait in the same
year.	 They are actually Joint Venture Companies owned by
different nationals of the Arab Gulf States. The emergence of
these companies was the outcome of emigration of capital by a
number of Kuwaiti investors to some of the United Arab Emirates
(UAE), and subsequently to Bahrain. because the neighbouring Golf
7.2.1 Development of Gulf Public Companies
The main developments and reasons leading to the establishment of
these companies are:
1) Suspension of the establishment of new Kuwaiti public-
subscription shareholding companies in August 1977
2) Prohibition of increases on capital of existing
companies
3) Trading in the market slackened considerably in 1972
4) The limited stock exchange, and its inability to absorb
local capital
5) The absence of federal laws to govern the activities of
companies in the UAE, made it easy for Kuwaiti
investors to procure licences in the UAE.
6) The passive attitude of the authorities in Kuwait
towards the trading of Gulf Companies in the Kuwaiti
Stock Market persuaded Kuwaiti investors that Gulf
companies could enjoy both the status of local
companies in the Gulf countries of 'origin' and the
benefit of being traded in the Kuwait market, which has
rapid contacts with the rest of the financial world.
The Gulf companies were attracted to Kuwait because of its
financial circumstances. Kuwaiti ownership of such companies
ranged between 80-95% in 1982, and each company maintains an
office in Kuwait which can be described as the main office, since
the top management operates from Kuwait.
The companies are becoming less and less joint ventures between
individuals in different countries. The shares of these companies
are circulated mainly in Al-Manakhi which is the major, if not
the only market for such shares, with the serious consequences of
circulating the shares of foreign companies with Kuwaiti funds
while the economy of other countries gains the long term
benefits. Moreover, the shares of closed-end compan i es joinPo
this market in competition with those of the Gulf Public
-184-
Companies.
7.2.2 Characteristics of Gulf Public Companies
Gulf Public Companies attracted people from all walks of life.
Compared to other types of joint-stock companies in the Gulf
States, Gulf Public Companies have certain unique character-
istics:
1) Gulf Companies were the only investment institutions in the
Gulf States which attracted both the wealthy and more
limited income groups.
2) There was no precondition for a minimum number of shares
before one could trade in Gulf Companies, an almost
universally accepted practice in world stock markets; even
the Kuwaiti Stock Exchange forbids share trading by anyone
who owns fewer than 1,000 shares.
3) The founders of Gulf public companies are allowed (withr,nt.
any restriction) to sell their shares at any time.
4) Some Kuwaiti founders tended to consider the Gulf Public
Companies they set up as their private property. Thus they
would take special care to include in the Articles of
Association a section or sections designed to give them a
majority on the Board of Directors.
5) Although Gulf Companies were initiated and founded in Gulf
States other than Kuwait, their main offices were
established in Kuwait with branch offices operating in the
UAE and Bahrain to arrange transfers of share cards between
buyer and seller.
6) Invariably Gulf Share Companies paid minimum attention to
their original purpose, concentrating on share trading,
speculation and company information.
7) Participation in Gulf Companies was not confined to
individuals and companies; licence-Rrenting Government
-185-
Table 7.2: Differentials between Face and Market Values of shares in
Gulf Public Companies traded on the Al-Manakh Stock Market
in Kuwait.
Company	 Share Face
value
Value-
	 •	 Market Value
equivalent
	 (Kuwaiti File)
Differential
percentage
(nominated
currency unit)
(Kuwaiti File) (+)
Gulf Agriculture Development
	 Dh	 1 ao	 600 6501:
Sharjah Group	 USS 0.25 75	 545 626%
Pearl Inveatment	 US$ 1 300	 2.850 850%
Gulf Financial Centre
	 USS 0.25 75	 340 353%
Fujairah Cement	 .	 rh	 1 ao	 615 6654
Medical Projects	 Ch	 1 ao	 450 462%
Petroleum Products	 Dh	 1 80	 200 150%
Ras Al-Khaimeh Poultry & Fodder
	 Dh	 1 80	 220 150%
Al Jazire Contracting &
Investment	 USS 1 300	 1,700 466%
Mining and Industry 	 Oh	 1 so	 220 150%
The Coast Development & Investment	 UES 0.25 75	 350 366%
First Gulf Bank	 DH 10 800	 2.000 150%
Bahrein and Middle East Bank	 USS 0,50 150	 750 4001:
UmmAl-Osiwein
	 Dh	 1 ao	 235 193%
Gulf Reel Eatate	 Dh	 1 ao	 245 206%
Gulf Investments and Real Eatate	 Oh	 1 ao	 430 437%
-Sharjah Cement	 Oh	 1 801	 420 ' 425%
International Hotels	 Dh	 1 so '	 315 293%
Bahrein end Kuwait Group	 Oh	 1 ac	 400 40*3%
Kuwait and Gulf Financial Centre	 Oh	 1 so	 340 325%
Note: 1 Kuwait Dinar = 1,000 Kuweiti File
Source: Press- Bulletins in Al Glebes Deily (Kuwait): Al %sten Deily (Kuwait) end Al Kahaleej
Deily (UAE) an a given day. in Miarh 1962
Table 7.3: Gulf Company Profit and Loss Figures 1979-1983
Omireaw .	 Year Capital
(million)
Net Profit
(million)
Loss
(million)
Percentage
Gulf Investmet 1979 Ch	 75 0h54 72%
& Reel Estate 19605 .Lb 175 Ch 45 26%
1981 Ch 293 Ch 167 567;
1.982 Ch	 592 Dh	 5 0.847.
, 1983. Eh	 592 . Oh 284. (46%)
•
Sharjah Cement and 1979 Ch	 150 Oh	 18 12%
Industrial Development 1980 Eh	 180 .Ch	 29
.	 16%
1981 Ch 275 Dh	 71 26%
1982 Eh 481 Oh	 55 11%
1983 Eh 505 Oh 48 1.0%
Gulf Medical Projects 1979
(Inorporeted in 1979
,
1980 Oh	 102 0h54 53%
1981 Ch	 123 Ch 55 45%
' 1982 Eh 235 Lb 39 (17%)
1983 Ch	 235 Ch 47 (20Z)
Gulf Agriculture and 1979 Eh	 50 Oh	 11 22%
Development 1980 Eh	 99 Dh	 18 18%
1981 Dh	 115 Dh 128 1.11%
1982 Dh 200 Oh	 2
•	 19831
_ -
Sharjah Group 1979 Dh 250 Oh 54 22%
19802 US$	 82 USS 20 24%
1981 USS 130 US$ 60 46%
1982 US$ 199 USS /1 6%
USS 200 .	 USS 15 (63%)
Gulf Financial Centre _1979 -
(Incorporated in 1979) 1980 Oh 200 Lb 96 48%
19813 US$	 60 USS 47 78%
- 1982 - USS 110 USS -8 7%
1983 USS 110 USS 14 (13%)
First Gulf Bank 1979 Oh	 114 Oh	 10 9%
1980 Dh	 /19 Oh 30 257.
1981 Oh
	 /19 Lb 34 29%
1982 Dh	 119 Dh	 26 22%
1983 Dh	 119 Dh	 17 14%
Sharjah Insurance end 1979 •	 Eh6,900 rh	 3 0.42%
Re-insurance 1980 Eh	 49 Ch	 9 18%
1981 Ch	 50 Oh	 32 sax
1982 Eh	 100 Eh	 4 (4Z)
1983 Ch	 100 Ch	 16 (16Z)
1: 1983 buCget wee unpublished
heavy lessee.
2: in 1980 capital wee converted
3: In 1981 capital wee converted
•
because the company's activity slumped after incurring
from Dihrems to US Dollars
from Dihreme to US Dollars
Source: CoMpany Financial Statements and Annual Reports for the years 1979-1983
participated in varying proportions, depending on the
Importance of the company.
8) Fast capital growth was a striking phenomenon (see Table
7.2), as founder and shareholders tended to view this as a
method for automatically increasing the number of shares2
9) Some companies derived greater prestige than others in the
stock market from the names of their founders.
tO) Conscious of the interlocking interests of Gulf Public
Companies and the founders' practice of extracting
considerable benefits from their position, some founders
combined five or six directorships, whether the companies
concerned were industry, finance or investment, since there
was no law prohibiting multiple board membership3.
11) Some Gulf companies, particularly those seeking to further
their interests outside the region, would quote US Dollar
values for their shares. Another reason for quoting in the
internationally accepted currency was to open subscription
and trading to as large a number of Kuwaiti's as possible4.
Another device was to divide shares into smaller units at a lower
price; the additional shares were distributed to shareholders,
later up-graded into doliars,and split again, the following year
Into four US 25 cent units. The practice was intended to
benefit shareholders and attract investors seeking low priced
shares (See Table 7.3).
The initial impetus for the rapid growth in the number of these
Gulf Companies was the 1977 embargo on the flotation of any new
Kuwaiti Companies in an attempt to prevent the flow of money from
Al-Manakh (over the counter market). Unfortunately one or two
of the flotations led to changes being necessary regarding the
early selling of founders shares to the public. . The promoters
of some Gulf companies did not see why they should be bound by
this. This led to an absolute ban by the authorities in the Gulf
Stock Exchange (Al-Manakhs marke t-) trading in the shares of these
companies, which was later automatically extended to other .Gulf
-185-
Public Companies. In the meantime, these continued to multiply
even after the ban on new domestic flotations was belatedly
lifted as promoters found an off-shore incorporation to be a
shield against the well-intentioned but often heavy-handed
control of the Kuwait authorities over such matters as rates of
dividend distribution, the issue of shares to raise capital and
amendments to companies' articles and the scope of their
activities6.
7.2.3 Rules and Regulations for Gulf Public Companies 
Trading in the shares of Gulf Public Companies was conducted in
an disorganised manner and without any official regulatory
framework up until late 1981. The situation continued until the
government set out some conditions whereby such companies could
officially offer these shares by listing them in the Kuwait Stock
Exchange along with shares of Kuwait companies. Following is a
summary of the most informant conditions specified within the
regulations:
1). The registration of the company should be legally in one of
the Gulf States signatory to the Economic Agreement
concluded by the states.
2) The company should have been established for at least three
years.
3) The company should have realised profits resulting form its
activities and functions as outlined in its Memorandum of
Association.	 The profits should not have been less than
10% per annum in the last two years.
4) The company should be totally owned by Gulf Nationals Prid
institutions, provided the Kuwaiti share therein is no less
than 50%.
5) The capital of the company should not be less than five
million Kuwaiti Dinars, at the time of registration on the
Stock Exchange.
-187-
6 ) The Gulf Public Company, to which the conditions are
applicable, should undertake not to increase their capital
in any way other than by free bonus (shares) for three years
from the date of admission.
7 ) The prohibition of the admitted Gulf companies to establish
any subsidiaries for five years from the date of admission.
8 ) The aforesaid condition shall not be applicable to
applications for licensing trade in the shares of Gulf
Public Companies engaged in banking or insurance
businesses.At that time only two companies satisfied these
conditions. The regulatory framework did not solve the
problem of the Gulf Companies, especially with regard to
trade in their shares in the Al-Manakh stock exchange which
proved to be a fait accompli and which began to 'compete with
the official Stock Exchange.
In conclusion, an important outcome of the phenomenon of the Gulf.
Public Companies was the emergence in Kuwait of a special stock
market for these companies, which sprang up after Gulf shares
were banned on the Kuwait Stock Exchange. Known formally as the
parallel or Kuwait Gulf stock exchange, it is better known among
the share trading public as Al-Manakh. The speed with which this
stock market grew and flourished was startling; it soon became
with Kuwait Stock Exchange, the official market, one of the
largest in the world in terms of volume of trading, market value
of shares, and the volume of post-dated cheque transaciions.
7.3 KUWAITI GULF STOCK EXCHANGE (AL-MANAKH) 
7.3.1 Introduction
The recent innovation in the area of securities trading was
establishing the over-the-counter market.
The term 'over-the-counter' (OTC) he been used in Am c, r i,-. e i“
cover all dealings in securities in non-listed companies which
-188-
have complied with certain minimum Security Exchange Committee
. regulation requirements. The equivalent of the OTC in the British
market is the market which exists under the facilities of Rule
163(2). In fact the OTC market in the USA plays a more important
part in the development of companies than its equivalent in the
UE7.
The OTC market in Kuwait differs in terms of its historical
establishment and function, from those in the USA and UK. In the
UK, for example, Nightingale and Company Limited has beeu
operating an OTC market in which the shares of unlisted public
companies are traded. The Nightingale operation had hoped to
follow the large OTC market which has been a common feature of
trading in the United States for many years.
In Kuwait the prohibition of the Gulf Public CoMpanies from
trading their shares on the official Kuwait Stock Exchange was e
main reason for the creation of a Kuwaiti Gulf Stock Exchange
(OTC market). A limited range of shares can cause problems in any
stock exchange and may affect the level of efficiency. There is
great demand for shares in Kuwait, with a vast amount of cash
chasing the few shares available.
Another main reason for the development of the OTC market was to
provide a mechanism for this money to obtain portfolio investment
opportunities.
The OTC is ranked as a second market where there were two markets
dealing in shares. First, the official Stock Exchange. Second, is
the Kuwait Gulf Stock Exchange (Al-Manakh). At present the second
market is closed for trading by the Government after the Al-
Manakh crash in 1982, which will be discussed in the next
•
chapter.
Al-Manakh in Arabic means the place where camels must test after
a long journey bringing goods for sale. The Kuwaiti Gulf Stock
Exchange (Al-Manakh) was established near the Kuwait Stock
Exchange to facilitate the movement of dealers between the two
markets end keep them informed of the
	
prinp=, a =IPrvins
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which is missing in some under-developed cbuntries such as
- Nigeria8, Jordan, Brazi1 8 , Hong Kong, Kuala - Lumpur lo , Ivory Coast
and some of the Far East countries. Al-Manekh was not a legal
market since the authorities did not impose their regulations
upon it. The conduct of dealings in the KGSE was not supervised
by Government, and all the share dealings are governed by the
dealers, unlike the OTC in the UK and USA. In the UK, for
example, the Unlisted Securities Market is supervised by the
Quotation Department of the Stock Exchange, and all share
dealings are governed by the Rules and Regulations of the Stock
Exchange. In the USA, the OTC market is regulated by the
Securities and Exchange Commission, along with various state
enforced requirements and the self-regulation provided by the
National Association of Securities Dealers Organisabion (NASDO).
The Kuwaiti Gulf Stock Exchange started operating with the
cii.culation of non-listed Gulf Companies shares and later began
to handle the shares of non-listed Kuwaiti Closed Companies. it
remains a fact however, that the Kuwaiti Gulf Stock Exchange was
established to circulate the shares of Gulf ' Companies, the
listing of which became a controversial point in the Kuwait Stock
Exchange.
7.3.2 Development of Kuwaiti Gulf Stock Exchange
The Gulf Stock Exchange went through three stages of development.
The first stage was between 1976 and 1978, the second between
1978 and 1982 and the third stage from 1982 to date.
- First stage (1976 - 1978) 
The emergence of the Gulf Stock Exchange in Kuwait coincided with
the birth of the first Gulf Public Company. The site was a market
where shares of Kuwait incorporated companies were once traded,
known as the Al-Jet Market 11 . The first Gulf company offered its
shares allotted for general subscription in November 1976 12 in
Kuwait.SubQcribers responded in largp numhArA.ThA hAnks appointed
for the dealings were crowded with brokers publicising the new
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institution. Despite the enthusiastic welcome, irregularities
occurred. Gamblers illegally traded shares before they had been
sorted and allotted and before subscribers knew the number
allotted to them. Share prices increased to KID 4 on a face value
of 300 fils (KID 1 = 1000 fils). The illegal practice gave the
Kuwait Ministry of Commerce and Industry a pretext to intervene,
and the offering of the company's shares for general subscription
in Kuwait was banned by the ministerial resolution issued on 6th
December 197613 , on the grounds that this was not a one hundred
percent Kuwaiti company, unlicensed by the Kuwaiti Ministry,
according to Law No. 3/1975. It was the first official Kuwaiti
intervention to confront Gulf companies and the Kuwaiti Gulf
Stock Exchange (OTC). The subscription process was transferred to
the licensing authority of the Emirate of Sharjah. However, the
ordinary trading of the Companies Shares in the Jat Market
continued uninterrupted.
In 1979, Kuwait incorporated companies moved to the new stock.
exchange inaugurated that year. The striking success of the
first Gulf Company encouraged Kuwaiti investors to consider
founding similar companies in the UAE. 	 Four sprang up in 1977,
two in Sharjah, and one in Ras-Al-Kaimah and Aiman. This had
the effect of bringing the Kuwaiti investor nearer to the long
cherished goal of establishing Gulf Companies in the Gulf States,
using Kuwait itself as the market in which to trade the shares of
the new companies. The development opened the doors to the
creation of a stock market, similar to the Kuwaiti one, in other
Gulf States. As the Gulf Stock exchange showed no signs of
disappearing, the Government of Kuwait continued tacitly to
permit the shares of these companies to be traded. Away from
the official stock exchange, dealers and propagators of Gulp
shares continued, untroubled, playing their commercial game in
Al-Jat Market. Large profits began to pour in, with dealers
getting commissions of half a Kuwaiti fil for every share sold.
Share bears also took profits, as high as 300 percent of the face
value of the shares. The absence of laws and regulations alipwed
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he dealers unrestricted freedom in deciding the price of shares.
. For investors, it was difficult, if not impossible, to make a
meaningful appraisal of prices. Reliable information about
general trends in the market and authentic data about each
company did not exist.
Quantities traded grew steadily in 1976 at rapidly rising prices.
This followed a temporary recession in the Kuwait Stock Exchange
In 1974. The birth of the Kuwaiti Gulf Stock Exchange in 1976,
coinciding with this revival, reflected the growing demand for
shares. This, together with the establishment of the first Gulf
companies, could not have come at a better time and pioneer Gulf
companies rapidly profited.	 The year 1976 heralded a golden age
for both the-Kuwaiti, and the Kuwait Gulf, Stock Exchange.	 The
volume of trading at Al-Jet Market amounted to 19.8 million share
transactions in 1976. The boom stampeded investors into blind
speculation. Consequently, and without apparent reason, the stock
market began to slow down in early 1977: trading volume deeline.e.
by 31% compared to 197614.
The Government had to intervene to safeguard and stabilise both
the official market, and indirectly, the KGSE. One measure to
stabilise the market was a ministerial decree issued to organise
deferred-payment transactions under the supervision of the
Ministry of Commerce. In August 1977, two other decrees were
issued: one banned the establishment of more Kuwaiti public
companies, the other prohibited increases in company's capital
except within narrow limits. Nevertheless, the impact of
government intervention helped the market to shake off the
effects of the recession in 1978. Two years of share trading of
Gulf Public Companies in Kuwait were enough to convince investors
and company founders that the Kuwaiti Gulf Stock Exchange had
become a reality and was there to stay.
During this period, Gulf shares were acquired and traded by
almost every investor, particularly in 1978 when small investors
entered the arena in large numbers. It was time to enlarge and
consolidate thi8 Stock Exchange, and investors felt sure it bed
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outlived all threats to close it. The Kuwaiti Gulf Stock Exchange
(OTC), thus came of age, and developed unhindered.
2 Second Stage (1978-1982) 
In May 1978, the founders and brokers of the Kuwait Gulf Stock
Exchange moved away from the disorganised Al-Jat Market to the
new building known as Al-Manakh after the area in which it was
situated. Once the dealers moved in, it became Souci Al-Manakh, or
Al-Manakh Market. In formal documents, it came to be known as the
parallel market - parallel to the Kuwaiti Stork Market. The
market consisted of 16 offices engaging a total of 70 brokersi5,
most of these offices recognised by both the Chamber of Commerce
and the Municipality. Unlike other stock exchanges, there were no
electronic boards showing movements of prices in Al-Manakh.
Telephones however, were used by the brokers, to give information
or make transactions. These were the beginnings of Al-Manakh
Market (KGSE) in 1978, a year which witnessed record activity in
share trading.
When Al-Manakh revived, 1981 and the first eight months of 1982
witnessed a trading surge which surpassed all expectations, and
steadily increased the total value of traded shares. Trading in
Gulf shares reached 3,500 million shares at a face value of US$
200 million, but a market value of KD 68 million (US$ 6,000
million). It was a golden age during which speculation escalated,
prices rocketed, and shares multiplied, while Kuwaitis flocked to
trade in a market still considered illegitimate in the eyes of
the Government and law. The activity was unprecedented in Kuwait
since the creation of Public Companies and the establishment of
the Kuwaiti Stock Exchange during the 1950s. Together with the
Kuwaiti Stock Exchange, it became third amongst world stock
exchanges, with a volume of trading that sometimes'surpasseo tnat
of Londonis.
Eventually, Al-Manakh ' emerged as a cornerstone of the Kuwaiti
commercial structure, enjoying an autonomous status and
organisation. The founders and company owners acted almost
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without restraint, raising and bringing down pPices virtually at
will. A time came when everybody was connected with or affected
by Al-Manakh. The more the market flourished, however, the more
chaotic transactions became. Deferred payment deals in particular
grew strikingly. The Ministry of Industry and Commerce
Intervened, prohibiting brokers from offering shares of any Gulf
Company without prior approval from the Ministry. The contra-
ventions persisted.
By the end of 1981, the Ministry had to intervene. A consultativz
committee was set up, consisting of representatives of the Gulf
Companies, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, the Ministry of
Finance and the Chamber of Commerce and Industry. By early 1982,
it had started to re-organise transactions in the market,
requiring brokers' offices to show the date of every,transaction,
the names of buyer and seller and their signatures 17 . Copies of
all transactions were sent to the Ministry at the end of the
morning and evening business sessions, at 1.00pm and at 3.00pm..
In this way the Ministry was in a position to know at first hand
the numbers of shares sold, closing prices of every company share
and the nature of transactions, whether cash or deferred payment.
The Ministry analysed the data and prepared a daily bulletin for
publication in the newspapers which listed the company's name.
minimum and maximum prices and value of trading.
However, such monitoring measures failed to discipline the
market. Al-Manakh's brokers were ignorant about the nature of the
work of a stock exchange. Moreover, they were mostly interested
parties, since they took stakes in the companies they traded.
Stripped of the impartiality of disinterested advisers, they
promoted those companies in which they were personally
interested. Their daily profit ranged from KD 6,000 (L12,000) to
KD 100,000 (£200,000) or more.
By the beginning of 1982, the prosperity of the market seemed to
peak. The volume of trading reached fabulous proportions.The
phenomenon of deferred payment transactions s pread so fast that
deferred periods were extended frQm ix and twel v e months to
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years, and the interest rate on post-dated- cheques reached
. 300%18.
Al-Manakh had become a vast gambling casino; it attracted people
from all walks of life, from big businessmen to student, senior
and junior officials, the military and even women. All of these
became traders in the stock market, either selling or buying,
waiting for profits or employing shares for one year periods;
getting buyers to deal further in them and collecting in return a
post dated cheque. Crazed with fast profit-making, nobody stopped
to think about the outcome.
Eventually the market attracted scores of amateurs who added to
its growing dilemma. Despite the excesses, traders in the stock
market remained curiously optimistic about the future of the
market, believing that share prices were yet to peak,' quoting the
experience of the share prices of Kuwaiti-incorporated companies
which had, in the past, reached a level not yet attained by their
Gulf counterparts. On the whole, the majority of traders seemed
to look upon KGSE as if it were a future market. This may explain
why speculation at Al-Manakh was the dominant activity. The
mounting scramble for quick profits further distanced the market
from the impact of regulations governing the Kuwaiti stock
exchange.
3 - Third Stage (1982-1987) 
During the first six months of 1982 briskness of activity in KGSE
(Al-Manakh) reached record levels. Deferred payment transactions
and speculative practices proliferated and share traders
succumbed completely to market euphoria and indiscipline.
Interest on deferred payments increased to 400-500% for some
periods19 . The momentum continued until August. though mutual
confidence in dealing had begun to subside. In August of 1982,
the market collapsed, bringing everything to a tragic standstill.
As the Washington Post said:
'When the dust had settled, a hastil y-formed clearance
institution prepared a record of pod i dated cheques, : the
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size of the debts was calculated to be about US$ 90bn.,20
After August there was an anticlimax. Share trading slumped.
Share prices of Gulf companies closed and share companies in
general registered a sharp decline, in which market prices
slipped sharply below face value. The slump continued into 1983
and 1984. There were modest increases in share prices, but these
were attributed to government decisions in the aftermath of the
crisis, such as the decision for the Government to buy shares so
as to inject public funds into the official Stock Exch3ng2.
Daily price bulletins during . 1983 and 1984 reflect no significant
improvement in company stancea. The numbers of share traders
declined sharply and the stock market was largely deserted.
7.4 CONCLUSION
This chapter covered the Gulf public shareholding companies and
Al-Manakh, the Kuwait over-the-counter market (Kuwait Gulf Stock
Exchange) as a second stock market in Kuwait. We discussed the
reasons for the establishment, characteristics and rules and
regulation of Gulf public companies. The three stages of
development of the over-the counter market were discussed in
section two.
An important outcome of the phenomenon of the Gulf public
companies was the emergence in Kuwait of a special stock market
•for these companies, known as Al-Manakh (KGSE). It started
operating with circulation of non-listed Gulf company shares in
1976 and later, in 1981, began to handle the shares of non-listed
Kuwaiti closed companies
In conclusion, the conduct of dealing in the over-the-counter
market (KGSE) was not supervised by government, and all share
dealings were governed by the dealers, unlike the UK and USA
markets. In Kuwait the Gulf public companies, which constitute
the over-the counter market, are actually joint venture companies
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owned by different nationals of Gulf Arab states. The activities
of these companies differ according to the purpose for which they
were established. The most important factors behind their
establishment are the narrow local market and its inability to
absorb local capital, and the strict laws and regulations applied
to the establishment of Kuwaiti public shareholding companies.
In the next chapter we discuss the crisis in Kuwaiti Gulf Stock
Exchange (Al-Manakh), which may be considered one of the factors
that affected the efficiency of the Kuwait Stock Market,
including the factors behind the crash, development of government
action and the rules and regulations brought in to deal with the
crash. Finally, we examine the rescue plan instigated by the
government to solve the problems.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
THE KUWAIT GULF STOCK EXCHANGE CRASH
8.1 INTRODUCTION
In the aftermath of the Souq Al-Manakh financial crash in kuwait
in August 1982, Al-Watan, the Kuwaiti daily news states:
...the total value of post dated cheques (the volume of
trading amounted to KD 29bn, US$ 92 bn), estimated to be
more than three times the loans given by the IMF to the
whole world in 1981, and over a quarter of the accumulated
debts of third world countries (more than 100 countries) by
the end of 1980. The amount was more than 17 times the
official reserves of Kuwait, over 4 times those of Saudi.
Arabia (1980 figures), 14 times the international loans and
grants made by the OPEC states in 1980, equivalent to 31'2
times the official international loans and grants-in-aid
made by the member states of the OEDC in 1981, 11'2 times the
imports of each of UAE, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Libya
during 1979, and more than the total exports of the same
countries, including oil, for the same year.i
The most famous crisis was the wall Street Crash of 1929.
During the period 1921-1929, US investors rushed into a spate of
speculation which resulted in share prices soaring. The rise came
to an end in 1929, the year of the Great Depression in the US
economy. The Stock Exchange . of that era was known as the rush
market. There was intensive demand by investors for shares of
companies about which they knew very little, producing
commodities which the investors could not define. The situation
was fraught with danger. This description applies to a great
extent to the behaviour of investors buying shares on Kuwait Gulf
Stock Exchange (Al-Manakh) - a similarity sufficient for the
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Kuwaiti crisis to be seen not as a new experience, but as an old
phenomenon2.
The policy of laissez-faire towards private enterprise is an
established tradition in Kuwait. It became so deeply entrenched
that it created a fever of business activity motivated by a greed
on the part of individuals and corporations. Speculation in
shares became the leading investment activity, if not the only
one.
Lord Keynes said:
The speculators on the stock exchange could be of no harm if
they were no more than bubbles on a flowing river of
investment. However, the situation would become fraught
with danger if investment itself turned into bubbles on a
whirlpool of speculation. When capital growth in any
country becomes a by-product of gambling activity, the stock
exchange role becomes negative.3
That was certainly the case with the Kuwaiti Gulf Stock Exchange.
which was based on a working mechanism which consisted of three
main components.
First, a wave of exaggerated optimism on the part of investors
about the future of share prices, which was reflected in inflated
prices.
Second, almost no connection between information on the shares
and the decision to buy.
Third, easily available finance through payment by post-dated
cheques, backed up by banning facilities on a huge scale. As a
result the Kuwaiti over the counter market became a market for
forward buying on a vast scale, where speculation relied on the
investors' anticipation that share prices would go up. Normally
In such a market, optimism and pessimism balance out until share
value is close to market value.
In this chapter we shall discuss the causes of the crash of 1982,
both direct and indirect, the intervention by the Government
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including Laws and Acts issued, the abolition of the Kuwait Gulf
Stock Exchange, and the aftermath of the crisis to date.
8.2 THE START OF THE CRASH
The story of Al-Manakh Market has been portrayed as e greet
caper, a larger than life paper chase in Kuwait and the Gulf.
The Al-Manakh market crashed in August 1982, the date when many
of the post-dated cheques fell due. However, as early as July
of the same year, the market began to tumble. Business confidence
began to waver as traders presented cheques prior'to the date
they were payable, so as to meet their urgent need for liquidity
after the banks had refused to extend further cash facilities.
During that month share prices began to fall, but the situation
still seemed under control and some traders managed to cover
themselves. Already the failure of traders to meet their
obligations had shaken the money market where trading was based
on confidence. Throughout July, the crisis gathered momentum,
In August, it broke.
August 1982 was the beginning of the end for the unregulated Al-
Manakh Market. The collapse of the Al-Manakh caused a financial
tremor on a scale previously unknown in the Arab Gulf region and
a major scandal both inside and outside Kuwait.
8.3 FACTORS BEHIND THE CRASH
Several factors had coincided to push the market into a spiral of
reckless and uncontrollable growth. The enormous volume of shares
and wide scope of the market pushed the entire population, from
official down to Junior servanL, Lo  wid Lo iiiv!tsL thiv
life savings without thought of the consequences. Some of these
factors are as follows:
1)	 An absence of rules and regulations
• The Kuwaiti Government failed to ensure that law was observed in
spite of the fact that laws existed to govern both the foundation
of new companies, their management structure and their
regulations (Act No.15/1968 and Act No.3/1975) see Chapter Six.
These laws safeguarded the interests of Kuwaiti shareholders and
the regulation of Kuwaiti Public companies. Later, when the first
Gulf Company was formed, the Ministry of Commerce stopped all
.subscriptions to its shares in Kuwait and for a time,
paradoxically, the Ministry banned. subscription to a Gulf
Company's shares, while allowing the company to open a registered
office in the country'. It was only later that the Ministry
approved the publication of notices and balance sheets of Gulf
Companies in the Kuwaiti Press.
The government tried unsuccessfully to control the legal status
of the Gulf Companies whose shares were circulating in the.
official market, but the founders of these companies managed to
evade all restrictions. The Ministry of Commerce and Industry
designated Al-Manakh an unofficial market by putting it beyond
the reach of existing laws , but its officials were persuaded that
non-Kuwaiti Companies were not subject to Kuwaiti jurisdiction.
Amongst the contradictions was the sight of Government officials
who were issuing orders to stop dealing in the shares of such
companies, rushing out to play the market themselves and to
incorporate fresh ventures.
In November 1981, the Ministry of Commerce finally gave full
recognition to Al-Manakh. A consultative committee consisting of
representatives of the companies and the Ministry of Commerce and
Industry was set up to devise terms by which existing companies
could be admitted to the official Kuwait Stock Exchange and to
deal with the status of such companies during the period of
transition. The terms were no burden on the companies, more a
sign of weakness on the part of the Ministry.
The conditions included the requirement that every company should
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submit its annual balance sheet to the Mintstry which would
. monitor the information and attempt to curb the fragmentation of
shares. No new company could put its shares into circulation
without obtaining official approval before the announcement of
the formation of the company.
The committee began work on 6th March 1982, five months before
the crisis. The reforms made the Gulf Companies and Al-Manakh
function more chaotically than before, but within the :ramework
of the work. The Ministry did not redress abuse or establish
order, but simply followed existing trends. Al-Menakh had imposed
itself, with all its defects and problems, on the Government8.
2) Speculation and Forward Dealing.7
The Kuwait Stock Market had suffered from dishonest practices in
1973 and 1976, but investors refused to learn; imaginary
subscription, unrecorded transactions and artificially inflated
prices had all happened before. 8
	No sooner had Al-Manakh
ehaueted one r.ynla than inwaci-nr-c n,3/namA on	 1.anRe 	
same dishonest practices as before.
Buyers offered forward prices as much as 300 or 500 percent above
the current price, paying by a cheque post-dated three months, six
months or a year later, sometimes even longer. The buyer would
collect the shares immediately and dispose of them. The vendor
received the cheque, and either waited until the date it fell due
or transferred it to a third party from whom he had in turn
bought shares. Dealers made extensive use of this device, which
made it possible for speculators who had no cash in hand, to pay
• by post-dated cheque.
The use of post-dated cheques were one of the principle causes of
the escalation in share prices. It was not uncommon for prices
to double within a few hours. This encouraged hectic activity ict
the market, in spite of the fact that some banks were unable to
carry on extending facilities whi l e others showed reluctance to
offer F101 financing. The Central Bank i mnncael  trinent rOntr015
=nd f^r h=a d c, banks to extend excess credit.
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However, the speculators no longer needed banks: Having built up
their own 'futures. market', they could finance their trans-
actions with post-dated cheques, a new monetary structure which
escaped all contro1. 9 In May 1982, about four months before the
crisis, the aggregate value of post-dated cheques issued amounted
to KD 3,500 million, together with premiums of KD 1,225 million,
the outstanding total was KD 4,725 million. Most of the cheques
were dated to the end of 1982. It created an impossible
situation.
The situation led to a shortage of cash on a gigantic scale, made
worse because a number of speculators had exhausted their
borrowing limits both in Kuwait and in other Gulf States. The
shortage of liquidity led local companies to arrange Joint loans
for speculators. Investors suffering from acute cash shortages
when there was none forthcoming from the banks, presented-post-
dated cheques before they fell due, which started a chain
reaction: the drawers' bank accounts were overdrawn, they too'
presented post-dated cheques so as to bring their own accounts
into credit. Confidence collapsed. Prices tumbled and most
people suffered enormous losses.io
3) Easy to obtain Licence in UAE and Bahrain:
The Gulf Companies were the heart of the problem which led the
market to catastrophe. The Companies had dubious legal status in
Kuwait, and existed free from control by the licensing
authorities of UAE and Bahrain. They operated in a country which
had not granted them permission to operate, but survived and screw
by stealth and deceit. Obtaining a licence was so easy that
Kuwaitis rushed to acquire them, taking advantage of Kuwait's and
other Gulf States' free market approach. The absence of a joint
pin between th t1-tr.e  invcivd 
led the UAE and .Bahrain to issue licences to non-proauciive
companies.
4) The entry of inexperienced investors:
Investors hesen to include' . people without experienoe, which
-20c-
lowered dealer confidence. Such confidence was a vital
prerequisite for dealing in the market especially with post-dated
cheques.
5) Lack of information:
The brokers were trying anything to make profits. Companies which
were supposed to keep detailed records did little constructive
work, having only one end in view - to maximise income oven if
that meant supplying misleading information. The absence of any
contrrA on the activities of mediators And broker l e-P t T-h.m fre..
to disregard the customary practices of a stock exchangell.
It was possible to find discrepancies in the prices of shares
between one broker and another. The mediators' role could bE
ambiguous.
6) Political and Military Developments in the Middle East.
The Iraq-Iran war which started in September 1980 after the
expulsion of the Shah Of Iran in 1 979, created an Ptm.-_,..ph=r=
anxiety amongst dealers and investors which seeped from the Stock
Exchange into all sectors of the economy.
7) ' High Interest Rates in the US.
Interest rates of 20% in the US, set to attract the world's
dollar funds back to the states, created a dearth f' Foreign
currency revenues in many countries.
8) Inaccurate Reports and False Statements:
Accounting firms colluded with the Boards of Kuwaiti and Gulf
companies to submit inaccurate reports on their financial
standing. Some auditors presented false statements and balance
sheets that showed profits where there were none. One flaw in
romr,=nv Law was that auditors were a v,bo i nt=d at th=
general meeting for only one year. The short engagement made
the accountant vulnefable to the threat of non-renewal of the
appointment. The Accountant's Society had no statutory power to
protect or discipline, so malpractice involving many well-knpwn
and long established auditin firms we rampant.
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As the crisis hit, accusations were levelled against the
Government. Responsibility for the Crash-was laid squarely on
the State by analysts and even by the legislative authority of
the National Assembly represented by its elected members. The
accusations were addressed directly at the Government together
with demands for immediate intervention to solve the crisis and
to protect the reputation of Kuwait. People had become
accustomed to a Government which accepted heavy burdens as a
result of other people's mistakes in order to support the
.Traderd had gdmbled cr. the Gc. ..'crhmcht's ihterv:hina td
buy enough shares to compensate their losses and return prices to
their normal level.
When the crisis started and the market was disrupted, people were
not aware of its magnitude and the serious consequences that were
to follow.
nm/c"PMPNT OF THE a0VTT.NMPNT .11 -7 TrIN nN THr 
In spite of the outbursts against the Government, the official
authorities opted to wait and see. The first step that they
took was to summon all major investors to Kuwait, as most were
then resident outside Kuwait in their summer resorts.
The Government asked them to assume their responsibility, stating
emphatically that it was not going to intervene directly.
Several meetings were held between the Minister of Commerce and
major speculators to find a way out of the crisis. The Government
began to intervene gradually as the dimensions of the crisis
became apparent. On 17th August 1982 the Minister of Commerce and
indutry declared that urzent measures ar.- 4 steps woul-'
shortly.
1-STEll ONE:
A temporary ban was imposed on new private Com panies. Amongst the
moat important measures was one to set up an ( cfF	 venture
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between the local banks and the public investment house, while
the Kuwait Central Bank studied what credit facilities to make
available to the money market t2 . Both repercussions to the crisis
and counter measures were felt sooner than was anticipated,
reaching the proportions of a national crisis.
'...The dagger of the crisis has almost reached the arteries
of Kuwait's economic structure.'13
As Wall Street stated:
'All are involved in the Manakh crisis. It is easy to blame
eight or nine people for the crash, but the problem is that
if those fall, many others will join them.'14
In an attempt to intervene further the Kuwait Government turned
to the private sector and financial institutions as they were, in
the Governments eyes, the parties most directly concerned.
2-STEP TWO:
The Minister of Commerce and Industry announced on behalf of the
Council the formation of an offset company, through which local
banks and investment companies would liaise with the Central Bank
to study appropriate measures to make credit available to the
Stock Market. The offset company was to determine debts and
claims for settlement as they came and according to the dates on
which the cheques fell dueiS.
It was formed early in September. As the offset company and its
committees began work, it became clear that the market was ready
to come to grips with reality at last. Dealers announced their
intention to settle amicably, according to Kuwait's Commercial
traditions of honour, and to help the offset corrrnittees16.
3-STEP THREE:
In another step the Consultative Committee formed by the Kuwait
Government in early 1982 to supervise the market was asked by the
Ministry to meet dealers.
4-STEP FOUR:
The Government set up a public company to restore regular trading
within Al-Manakh, which led the way by keeping to the standards
recognised in international Stock Exchanges. Capitalised at KID
300 million (£600 million), held jointly by Kuwaiti firms (51
percent) and Gulf Companies (49 percent), the company injected
liquidity into the market and set a ceiling for prices17.
5-STEP FIVE:
The Government put funds into the Kuwait Offset Company so that
it was in a position to settle authenticated claims. It
instructed the Central Bank to ease restrictions on other banks
in order to provide liquidity to float investors and give dealers
the necessary facilities18.
In the first week of September, the Kuwaiti Offset Company
published a notice in the national press announcing that it has
instructed the Kuwait National Bank to monitor all offset deals,
.both administratively and technically.
6-STEP SIX:
The Government urged the Foreign Investment Corporation and the
Kuwaiti Investment Corporation, in financial cover to conduct
regular purchases of Kuwaiti shares. This was a departure from
previous practice, when Companies bought up as many shares as
possible of companies listed officially on the Stock Exchange
Rosters. The Government's aim was to dislodge share prices from
the high levels at which they had been frozen, and to move them
gradually and regularly downwards until they reached a level at
which the market could operate again19.
7-STEP SEVEN:
The major dealers were put under house arrest and ordered not to
leave the country. The Government stopped all transfers of assets
from Kuwait20. By 5th September, the Offset Company and
Committees saw the first concrete resultc of their work, when a
group of dealers; cnnonnrrad they had settled 	
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torn up their cheques.
8-STEP EIGHT:
On 12th September, the Government suspended all forward dealing.
The Ministry of Commerce set up a temporary Committee to regulate
forward dealing. The Committee asked all dealers to submit fresh
lists of credits and debits, some of which were to be registered
with Offset Company before 1.10.82,21
The problems persisted however, and the solutions were
inadequate. The Committee was caught in a vicious circle.
On 13th September, an economic delegation set up by the Merchant
Community delivered a memorandum to the Prime Minister of Kuwait,
putting forward three solutions.
1	 Holders of cheques falling due would get their right in full
as per the cheques in their possession.
2 The value of each cheque would be paid in three instalments:.
25% immediately, 25% 3 months later, the balance 6 months
later.
3	 Interest would not be added after payment had been re-
scheduled.
The proposal would satisfy the Government's desire to secure
maximum protection for small and medium-sized investors and to
provide liquidity to cover spot obligationsn . However, the
liability of many dealers far exceeded their shares in hand,
whose prices were dropping sharply. The Government came to the
conclusion that all measures taken thus far were unhelpful and
that the protection of Kuwait's financial reputation and economic
stability justified direct intervention23.
On 13th September 1982, the Minister of State for Cabinet Affairs
announced:
'The Cabinet has reviewed the circumstances of the market at
the present time and in the light of consultations and
recommendations the Cabinet had resolved that a decree shall
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be promulgated to tackle the issue under-review in such a
way as to secure the continuity of dealings, guarantee
fairness and restore confidence.'24.
From 20th September the Government's direct measures began to
appear. Sometimes in its own name, sometimes in collaboration
with the National Assembly, and the Kuwaiti Chamber of Commerce
and Industry, it issued a series of laws. Most dealt with one
element of the crisis, and failed.
Next we shall review the legislation passed from the start of the
crisis until the close down of Al-Manakh in November 1984.
8.5 THE DEVELOPMENT OF LEGISLATION
During 1982-1983 four laws were passed to help solve the crisis
and to bring confidence back to the Kuwait Stock Market. The
first, Law No.57/1982, involved forward dealing related to
company shares. The law consisted of nine Articles and was
passed on 20.4.82. See Appendix D for full details.
The second, Law No.59/1982, related to forward dealing and
protecting the rights of debtors. This law was signed into effect
by the Emir of Kuwait on 22.11.82. Law 59 consisted of 18
Articles, seven of which related to the regulation of the powers
of the Board of Arbitration, authorising it to settle disputes
without being bound to observe the rules laid down in the Civil
and Commercial Procedures Act. It granted the Board the power to
decide on issues of confiscation, house arrest, and withdrawal of
passport. The Board was also charged to refer a dealer to the
public prosecution authorities for bankruptcy proceeding end
imprisonment where it was established that they had concealed
property or transferred goods abroad and failed to comply with
the Board's decision to return money owed within the period
specified.
The other six Articles outlined the details of a fund to
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guarantee debtors rights.
Law 57 and 59 both assumed that the debtor should honour his
debts in full, under pain of being declared bankrupt. The
Arbitration Board took on the role of debtor and paid the
creditor through the fund. Both laws failed, however, to put the
market and the dealers on a healthier footing.
The third, Law No.75/ 1083 was passed on 20.4.83 and related to
the Settlement of Transactions connected with Forward Dealing.
It consisted of 25 Articles (see Appendix D).
The first established an independent judicial organisation
attached to the Ministry of Finance. Its purpose was the
settlement of transactions, the evaluation of the assets of those
referred to it, and the administration, liquidation, control and
implementation
	 of	 all	 settlements,	 bankruptcies	 and
reconciliations which came under the Law.
In npite of all measures, the mark et continued
Bankruptcies were still on th e i nr.rc,ece and =hare
virtually worthless. Efforts to deal with crisis had been short-
sighted and inadequate, concentrating on the symptoms rather than
the causes.
From the beginning of the crisis, until 1984, the Government
devoted all its energy to the market, devisin g first one solution
then another. Everything that could be calculated had been
analysed: size of debts, number of victims, bankruptcies end post
dated cheques. The Offset Committee had been set up, the
Security Fund, the Board of Arbitration and the Organisation for
the Settlement of Transactions and the promulgation of several
legislative instruments (Laws No.57,59 and 75), still 95 percent
of the prootem remained unsolved. In spite of this, the integrity
of the banking system was in no danger. Reserves and supplies
were adequate. The Government put several devices at the disposal
of the Central Bank to help the Commercial Banks to maintain
their liquidity.
The fourth Law, No. 10011983, was pussed u 14.8.63 as a measure
ntr:
-ala-
to restore confidence and to protect the market from a ,total
disaster. The new law involved some provision connected with the
settlement of transactions related to forward dealing. It was
one a year since the start of the crisis, and three other laws
had failed to control its spread. . The new law differed
essentially from the previous ones in that it was the first to
adopt the principle of reducing debts. This new law consisted of
ten articles and included a number of radical provisions (see
Appendix D for more information), on the development of the
legislation of the government during the crisis of 1982 in
Kuwait.
8.6 PLAN FOR OFFSET ARRANGEMENT
In January 1984 the Government focussed its attention on the
market again when the Minister of finance announced the =,--hrn.=
for Offset Arrangements, the biggest of all the plans in the
history of the Market's crisis. This scheme comprised the
following provisions: The Kuwaiti Corporation of Trade,
Contracting and foreign Investments, would, jointly with the
Offset Corporation, conduct offset arrangements and would use
Government funds to repay debts on behalf of both inter-related
dealers and those referred to the Committee.
The activities of the two corporations would be subject to the
supervision of a 'shadow board' which would consist of the
Chairman of Bergen Bank, the Director General of the Kuwaiti
House of Finance, the Deputy Chairman and Managing Director of
the Kuwaiti Corporation for Trade, Contracting and Foreign
investments, the Director General of the Kuwait Offset
Corporation and a member of the Kuwaiti Bureau of Auditors. The
Committee was to consider cases of insolvency that were still
outside the jurisdiction of the Corporation. It would have the
power to give instructions to the Corporation to repay the debts
of someone declnr pd Inso l vent. according to hi= mean .=4. The two
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Corporations would act in his name to collect money owing to him
. from those referred to the Board, or any others. The instructions
would be issued by order of the body's five-man Committee and
with prior coordination with the Board of Arbitration whose
Instructions would also be followed in respect of payment in
Instalments or the use of shares in part settlement25.
The submission of the Offset Scheme was intended to push the
crisis along the road to a final solution, to ease dealings
between estranged dealers through Government funds and to us,-
shares to absorb part of the crisis. A power of attorney was
prepared for willing dealers to sign, which authorised the two
corporations to pay on their behalf. The Minister of Oil and
Finance assured a group of dealers on 8th January 1984 that there
were going to be no further laws, and the dealers had to choose
between Offset or being referred to the Organisation for the
Settlement of Transactions.26.
In April 1984 the Council of Ministers approved three basic
funds. The first fund was for the purchase of the property of the -
referred dealers for the sum of KD 840 million at prices fixed by
the Financing House, the property Bank and a specialised
committee consisting of three authoritative members of the
market. The second fund began work the next day to pledge or buy'
property shares on behalf of the insolvent, to ensure they repaid
within a year and a half 27 . The third was to pledge the shares of
closed and Gulf Companies.
By the end of October 1984, several signs heralded the end of the
crisis. Bonds to the benefit of the creditors appeared and their
values were collected. Big creditors had been repaying their
debts. Disentanglement between big dealers moved towards
completion. The country started to enjoy higher liquidity and o
new Stock exchange . was opened.
8.7 CLOSING OF THE AL-MANAKH MARKET(KGSE)
At a press conference held on tne 21-1d of le. e tember	 the
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Director General of Kuwait Stock Exchange declared that Al-Manakh
was to close by late October or during the first week of
November. The financial position of the Gulf Companies was under
investigation as a first step towards a decision on whether to
allow their shares inside the new Stock Exchange (KSE). Those of
Kuwait companies were accepted for dealing. The Committee of KSE
had however, approved the circulation of the shares of eight Gulf
Companies, with the rest to be admitted later subject to the
provision of valid supporting details.
On 27th October 1984, the KSE Administration Committee opened its
doors to Closed Companies, but ordered that for every fomr
brokers' firms incorporated by the Closed Companies, one should
remain29.
The last day of Al-Manakh was 1st November 1984. De'alings ended
at 11.30 am, when over 1,000 of the market's customers and owners
gathered around a modest banquet which cost about KID 300,
collected with some difficulty from the offices and the market
fans. The last deal recorded was 500,000 shares of a Dubai
Company at 39 fils. Depression and gloom were evident. One guest
said:
'When I came to this market for the first time, all my
possessions were a dishdasha (an outer garment), beads and
an Arab headdress. Today I own KD 15 million (US$ 45
million) This is a sad and deeply touching occasion as we
remember with nostalgia and tenderness those happy days. '29
Although let November was the date on the death certificate of
this market, it had in fact died two years before, once the
crisis came into the open. Al-Manakh was bliss to some and
disaster to others. It will never be forgotten.
On 9th November 1984, the Director of the KSE announced the final
closure of Al-Manakh. As from 3rd November, all stock transact-
ions of Kuwaiti and non-Kuwaiti companies whose shares were
accepted for circulation by the Stock Exchange Committee would be
carried out in the (KGSE), at the Trading Hall on the fourth
floor of the Stock Exrhan ge tower building. The Stock Exchange
nic
Directorate threatened legal proceedings against brokers not
registered with the Exchange who conducted business, on the
grounds that they had contravened the conditions of their
licences.
On 14th October 1984 the Stock Exchange Committee had issued a
resolution to allow the Gulf Companies which had not been
admitted to the official market to have their shares circulated
in Al-Manakh (KGSE) market under the control and supervision of
the Kuwaiti Stock Exchange, with promise that any company that
applied for admission and complied with the conditions would be
accepted in the official Stock Exchange.
An hour and a half was set aside every evening for dealings in
company shares on the (KGSE) market (OTC), from 6.00 to 7.30pm,
i.e. after the end of the day's work on the official Stock
Exchange30.
Official acceptance of the Gulf and Closed Companies on the
official market was subject to the strength of the companies'.
balance sheets for 1984.
In October 1985 the Government temporarily suspended trading of
all Gulf shares until a full assessment of their values was made.
The Central Bank reviewed the 33 Gulf Companies listed on the new
official parallel stock market (KSE) and advised that of these 4
would be liquidated, 4 merged, 11 should change their Board of
Directors, and 10 change their executive managements. The Central
Bank also reviewed 62 closed companies and reported that only 6
were profitable, 3 had closed, 25 should be liquidated, 5 shon11
merge and 3 were in acceptable shape.31.
In April 1986, the Government did announce that Kuwait Investment
Office (KIA), the 'holding company' for the country's
investments, would start purchasing the shares of the closed
companies still in existence, and which have cooperated with the
Ministry of Finance32 . As of 22nd April 1986, the Government had
bought 367.7 million shares for a total of KD 121.302 million
(US$ 410 million), paid half cash and half in three-year non-
interest bearing Government Bonds.33.
In May 1986, KIA had finali:ped its purchase	 33 closed Kuwti
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and Gulf companies at a cost of KD 140.4 million (US$ 475
. million). KIA will liquidate 23 of these companies 34 . The cash
paid by KIA will help the bank reduce the bad debts of the bank
and comfort the economic system.
8.8 THE FINAL RESCUE PLAN OF THE CRISIS
In August 1986, the Minister of Finance announced a generous and
unconventional rescue plan in a bid to solve the problem of KD
2.26bn (USS7bn) non-performing loans by the .end of 1985 which
were the legacy of Al-Manakh. The plan was classified into two
groupings:
Group one: Debtors with negative cash flow shall sign a 10 year
non-interest bearing instrument amounting to the value of
collaterals pledged for the banks 6t the time of the original
loan and any other assets that are mortgaged at the time of new
settlement Tr the =vent that the value o ; the pledzed assets nrr.
less that the amount of the loan plus interest, debtors are
requested to sign another non-interest bearing promissory note
from the difference payable in 10 years from-the settlement date.
Group two: Debtors with positive cash flows shall sign an
interest bearing instrument for the amount of the pledged assets
payable in 15 years and carrying a maximum of 7 percent interest.
In case the non-performing loans including the unpaid Interest
exceeds the value of the pledged assets, the debtor will be
reveRt pd to sign a second non-interest bearing note for the
difference, payable in 15 years or earlier, depending on the cash
flow position of the borrowers.
Since the cost of the plan was enormous, and subject to abuse by
dishonest borrowers unless prompt strong measures are eaplied,
the Government came up with a settlement programme to ensure the
rescue plan. The settlement programme consisted of three stages:
Stage one: involved an invitation to delinquent debtors to
contact their banks to negotiate a settlement. Up to the end of
May 1987, 86 percent of the delinquent debtors presented
themselves.
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Stage two: involved the formal submission -
 of the debtors
. financial statements to their creditor banks. 91 percent of those
notified have responded, representing 86 percent of the
outstanding bad debts.
Stage three involves reaching an accord under the terms of the
programme. So far, more than 25 percent of the non-performing
debts have been rescheduled according to the settlement plan.
This low percentame i however. is due to the fact that there were
456 debtors who were formerly classified as in the red, who are
now enjoying a surplus position due to an appreciation of their
assets or the availability of sound siarantors to bail them out.
The Government and virtually all Kuwaiti bank officials expect to
close the final chapter on the debts problem caused by the Al-
Manakh crisis by the end of 1988. At the time of writing, almost
95% of the problem has been solved.
8.9 CONCLUSION
The problems created in Kuwait by the crash of Al-Manakh are such
that one can hope it will not happen again. On the other hand, it
seems as if the events of 1982 were almost fated. The regulations
which the Government issued in 1977 were devised to avoid the
exact problems which occurred in . the Al-Manakh Market.
Unfortunately, the regulations once issued, were not enforced. In
fact the regulations themselves, as mentioned, made the
speculators develop their activities in the OTC market, over
which the Government had no control. Many in the Government and
In the National Assembly were'mreatly active in the Kuwait Gulf
Stock Exchange (Al-Manakh) market, which may have decreased
substantially the Government's will to control the development of
that market, and Lhe uee of poel-LidLed cheques.
Overall, it appears that the problem of Al-Manakh was probably
due to the newness of the market, when faced with an immense
increase in personal income. Whatever regulations or controls
were imposed, they would most likely have been circumvented by
clever and imaqinative Kuwditi financiers. By the same token, in
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this present period of very low cash flow iff the region, the
incentives for developing new instruments and market techniques
are just not there.
This chapter has explained the factors which might have affected
the efficiency of the KSE and supported the result of weak form
test and runs test. . It has also shown the problems which have
been created by the development of Al-Manakh, and the problem
facing those regulating the stock markets in Kuwait, which might
suggest that despite the difficulties, the regulators have not
been as efficient as they should be. The capital markets do not
appear to be administered very efficiently.
The crash of Al-Manakh will certainly not be forgotten by the
Kuwaitis for some time. In the long run, however, it will appear
in the history books as a small chapter similar to those
discussing the South Sea Bubble in London.
In summary, a rapid sequence of events, many the result of direct
Government regulation, has created a stock market in Kuwait about.
which many questions can be asked. How successful is the KSE in
providing efficient and stable conditions for security trading?
Do prices listed on the Exchange fully reflect available
information or are the stock prices random?
Using data (daily and weekly) for the period 1983-1987, we will
test the weak form efficiency of the Kuwait Stock Exchange in the
next chapter, in an attempt to answer these questions, and be
concerned with how the performance of securities on the Kuwait
Stock Exchange reflect the success of the Kuwaiti Government and
business community in creating an efficient market for mobilising
investment in that country.
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CHAPTER NINE
TESTS OF MARKET EFFICIENCY
9.1 KUWAIT STOCK MARKET AND ITS EFFICIENCY: INTRODUCTION
The basic rationale for the theory of the efficient market stems
from the assumption that in such a market prices promptly adjust
to reflect all knowable information. The future price changes,
although a true reflection of changes in the earning power of
firms, reach the market randomly and are independent of the past
information. Future price changes, therefore, are random and a
function of future, not past, events.
Kuwait Stock exchange is considered a small capital market. There
are reasons for viewing a small stock market as less efficient
in the weak sense than a large one, (UK and US), implying that
stock prices in a small market are less likely to follow a random
walk. One factor is that a smell market is often less
elaborately organised technically (for instance, no ticker
tapes).	 Hence, information about stock price formation may
spread only gradually through the financial community
A small market may also be so 'thin' that attempts to exploit any
information about future prices contained in past price data may
simply not be worth the trouble. That is, it may be that only a
very small number of shares can be bought before the price
becomes affected by that very act of buying or selling, and
reflects the activity. Consequently, stock prices may display a
greater degree of non-randomness because traders are unable to
eliminate it.
Fame suggests that a few sophisticated traders who attempt to
profit from any dependencies in succesive price change, or in the
process generating new information about a stock, will eliminate
such dependencies, that is, they will tend to make price changes
independent. 1
 What is suggested here, however, is that traders
may not be able to do so in a 'thin' market and hence such a
market may display a greater degree of randomness.
In this chapter the Kuwait Stock Exchange will be examined. The
main purpose of this examination is to test the efficiency of
Kuwait Stock Exchange. The weak form test will be applied in
terms of the random walk model.
The random walk model state hat successive e'cock price chaut5ea
are identically distributed and independent random variables.
Whether stock price changes do in fact conform to this hypothesis
Is an interesting statistical question in its own right.
However, the main reason for investigating the random walk
hypothesis is obviously its economic implications fort the capital
market in Kuwait. If the random walk hypothesis holds for the
stocks traded in Kuwait stock market, then that is a sufficient
condition for the market to be weekly efficient. This means thet
past stock prices contain no information as to future price
movements. In other words, no abnormal returns can be made from
knowledge of past price changes.
The results of the test should help the Government in evaluation,
and improvement, of the performance of the market. Also, the
efficiency of Kuwait Stock Exchange is of concern to investors
and Government (policy makers) as a means of restoring confidence
after the crisis in the second stock market (Al Manakh) - see
Chapter Eight. Very little research has been done on Kuwait
Stock Exchange, and as far as its efficiency is concerned the
only empirical study on the Kuwait Stock Exchange which is
available is that of the author. It is worth mentioning that the
author did not use a semi-strong form of the hypothesis (instead
the weak form is used) because the Remi-strong form is rargi-fnr
markets in developing countries and some developed countries
because of the absence of data and dividends in a convenient form
and also due to the following:
First, a company will ottan release and circulate thc rciievant
information before the Annual Report is distributed, so the price
of stock has often already responded to the information before
the Annual Report is officially available.
Secondly, because of the above there is often no reaction to the
Annual Report at all because the price has already Fluctuated
before the Annual Report was released.
Thirdly, the Annual Reports of the companies listed in the T.:uwait
Stock Exchange are often unreliable.
Fourthly, because of the above the profits announced by them are
also questionable.
Finally, the market is highly volatile because of speculators an
also, because of the above, the long term investors leave the
market.
All the studies on the weak—Form test never prove that past
returns cannot be used to predict future returns since there are
an infinite number of ways that tne sequence of past prices can
be used to forecast future prices. All that can be done is to
test particular ways of combining past price data to predict
future returns. A huge number of tests of alternative price
patterns have been made using data on U.S., U.K. and other
security prices. The conclusion of the studies is that if there
is information on the past prices, it is insufficient to make
money (abnormal return).
9.2 THE DATA
The stock price data are published by the Kuwait Stock ExchenRe
(Public Relations Department). The stock price needs to be
corrected for all capital adjustment (split, rights, etc). This
feature can be very important in countries like Kuwait, where
very often payment to stock h-l-,ers takes the form of coital
adjuR tmPht rather than	 videndP :.tnd	 takes th Q form
Table 9.2
	
:
NO.
Price Series for the Individual Stocks*
CatPANY	 NUMBER CF PRIM MRIO
MAME
DAILY
	
WEEKLY
1 NBK 1800 258
2 Gs 1800 258
3 CBK 1803 258
4 AB 1800 258
5 BKME 1800 258
6 }<FEB 1800 258
7 EB 1800 258
8 KFH 1800 258
9 KIC 1800 258
10 KFTCIC 1800 258
ii }IC 1800 258
12 C"'" 1800 258
13 MINS 1.830 258
14 GINS MO 258
15 ADZ 1800 258
16 WINS 1800 258
17 KREC 1.800 258
18 URC 1745 250
19 NPEC 1800 258
20 SPEC 18C0 258
21 KPC 1610 231
22 KREIC 1900 258
23 NIC 1610 231
24 KMPC 1603 230
25 ICC 1800 258
26 RIC 18C0 258
27 GCEI 18C0 258
28 HPI 1100 158
29 KERC 1800 258
30 CMS 18C0 258
31 CLTC 1800 258
32 KNICC 1800 258
33 KHC 1800 258
34 KAC 1800 258
35 MTSC 917 131
36 KCMC 1800 258
37 MCC 1800 258
38 LTTC 1800 258
39 UFK 1800 258
40 KUPC 1610 231
41 KFC 1610 258
42 AFPC 1610 258
•
The number of price aeries varies according to the data of
listing the company in the acock market or treding in their
etock stopped by the government for different reesone.
Table 9.1 Kuwaiti Shareholding Companies Listed in Kuwait
Stock Exchange
°NNW NAME
	
INDUSIRY	 Com NO
NATICNAL HAW CF KUWAIT (NE()
	
Banking	 1
11-E GULF BANK (GB)	 Benking	 2
CCM4ER=C4L BANK OF:OMIT (CB()	 Banking	 3
AL AHLI BANK CF KUWAIT (AB)
	
Banking	 4
'ME BANE aFIONAIT AND MIDDLE EAST (EKME) 	 Banking	 5
KLWAIT PEAL ESTATE BAM( (EB)	 ' '
	
Banking '	 6
BUMAN BANK (1313)	 Banking	 7
KUWAIT FINANCE HOUSE (KFFD
	
Banking	 8
KUWAIT DWESIMETPCCMPANY (ICC)	 Investment	 9
KUWAIT FOREIGN TRADIN3, CIONIRACTINn &
INVE51104T COMPANY u+-rac)
	
Investment	 10
KUWAIT INDENATICNAL INVESTMENT COMPANY (KIIC)	 Investment	 11
CC4ERCIALFACILITIE3 CCMPAITI (CFC)
	
Ineurence	 12
KUWAIT INSURANCE CCMRANY (}INS)	 Insurance	 13
GULF INSURANCE CCPPANY (GINS)
	
Insurence	 14
ALAFTLIA.
	Ca4PANY (ADE!)	 Insurance	 15
WAR% INSURANCE CCMPANY (WINS)	 Insurance	 16
KUWAIT REAL ESTATE CCMPANY (KREC) 	 Reel Estate	 17
UNITED REALTY CCMPANY (URC)
	
Real Estate	 18
NATICNAL REAL TATE CZ-.ANY (NREO) 	 Reel Estate	 19
SALHIAH REAL ESTATE CCMPANY (SPEC) 	 Reel Estate	 20
KUWAIT PROJECT CCMRANY (KPC)	 Reel Estate	 21
KUWAIT REAL ESTATE INVESIIENT CCNSCRTIUM (KREIC) Reel Estate	 22
NATIGNAL INDUSTRIES CCMPANY (NIC)	 Industry	 23
papixtricrAL FIFES INCU:3TRIES CCMPANY OKKPC) 	 Industry	 24
KLMAIT CEMENT COMRAW (KCC)
	
Industry	 25
REFRIGERATICN IMXISIRY COMPANY (RIC)	 Industry	 26
	
GULF CABLE & ELECTRICAL INDUSTRIES CCMPANY (GCET) Industry 	 27
	
Kum= RiARAACEMICAL DEUSIMES COMPANY (EPI) Industry	 28
KUWAIT SHIPPIN3 & RERAIR YARD COMPANY (KERC) 	 Industry	 29
CCNTRACTIM & MARINE SERVICE:3 CCMPANY (CMS)	 Industry
ell=. 1 On TPAILqPCPT COMPANY (CL IC)
	
Services
	 31
112-4AIT NATICNAL CTral4AS CCYPANY (MCC) 	 Services	 32
KUWAIT 11L7t12 CCMPANY GM)
	
Services
	 33
PUBLIC VARE-OLEING CCMPANY CKAC)
	
' Services	 34
MBIIE. 'TEM:HOW SYSTO4 CCMPANY (HMV	 Services	 35
KLMAIT C14EFCIAL MARKETS OOK=LEX (KOC)	 Services	 36
KUWA IT CORP; TPR COERANY (KCOr :, 	 Services	 - 37
LT:, IOCKTRANSPCar: & IRADIN3 OCMPANY (LTPC)	 Food	 38
LNITED FISHERIES WJWAIT COMPANY (LEK)
	 Food	 39
hUWAIT UNITED saummtaWPANY (KUPC)	 Food	 40
hZMAIT FOODS OOMPAW Ch7C)
	 Food	 41
AllaluTirriAL FOOD FROarr3 CaVANY (AFPC)	 Food	 42
both capital adjustment and dividends, usually in a 50:50 ratio.
9.2.1 Data Series
Two types of data were employed in this study:
1. The daily closing prices for the 42 individual Kuwait Public
shareholding companies which constitute the Kuwait Stock
Exchange.2 This data obtained from the Kuwait Etc:
Exchange daily report on stock prices. 3 The daily series
covered a period of five years from January 1983 to December
1987 (N = 1800) for most of the stocks, where N is . the
number Of observation for most of the companies listed in
the Kuwait Stock Exchange (see Table 9.1 and 9.2)..
2. The weekly data for the 42 individual stocks were extracted
from the weekly report on stock prices published by Kuwait
Stock Exchange. The weekly series covered five years from
January 1983 to December 1987, and a total of 258 prices (N
= 258) were available for the majority of the companies (see
Table 9.2). The total number of observations used in this
study for all the two time series and their components came
to some 84,935 observations: 74,200 for daily prices and
10,730 observations for the weekly prices.
9.2.2 Data Cleanliness 
The application of some statistical tools to time series data
requires the data be 'clean' if the results are to be interpreted
with any confidence. The use of unclean data often results in
misleading conclusions about relationship not inherent in the
data. Data are said to be clean when adjustments have been made
to account for cash outlays, bonus and rights issue, dividends
etc. Several steps had to be taken after collecting the data and
before statistical analysis was possible.
	 Some of these steps
are as follow.
It was necessary to translate the data into English. This meant
translating all figures pertaining to the companies i.e., the
daily and weekly prices for forty two companies for five years.
All the prices were checked and re-checked against different
sources.	 For some years and some companies, prices were
subjected to adjustment. 	 On the 4th April, 1987 all the
companies listed on the Kuwait Stock Exchange were ordered to
split their shares in a ratio 1 : 10. In order to adjust for
this split we divided all pries by 10 from that date to the end
of December 1987.
For some companies the number of observations that had been used
in the sample is less than others. For example, Commercial
Facilities Company, Salhiah Real Estate Investment Consortium and
Contracting & Marine Services Co., have less observations because
the Ministry of Commerce stopped share trading for these'
Companies due to their financial problems. When they hecame
strong financially share trading resumed. Other companies were
not included in the sample because the financial futures were in
question. For example, the Government was forced to nationalise
the Financial Centre group, and Melamine Industrial, when they
began to flounder. But for the soundness of the test this
company would have been eliminated. Another important element in
this respect is that some companies have only listed in the
Kuwait Stock Exchange in the later period, for example Mobile
Telephone System Company listed in the stockmarket on 9.3.85.
Some companies receive subsidies from the Government.. The amount
of subsidies paid by the government in Kuwait to some companies
Is sUbstantial end influences the financial results of those
companies; therefore it was advisable to exclude them from the
test. In some cases the Government nationalised certain companies
for economic and political reasons, for example, the Petroleum
Investment Company (not included in the sample, see Chapter Six).
9.3 Logarithmic Transformations 
It can be proved that the models
P
t
 = P
t-1 
+ e
t
and	
Log et = Log et-1 + 4t
are approximately equal when e t /P
	 is small, as it usually is.
It is assumed that both residual series have zero means and are
non-correlated with earlier values. 4
 However, there are three
reasons for using changes in log price in place of simple price
changes:
i) the change in log price is the yield, with continuous
compounding from holding the security;S
ii) the variability of simple price changes for a given
stock is an increasing function of the price !Ave/. of
that stock.
	 Therefore, taking logarithms neutralises.
most of the price level effect;
iii) for changes less than 1: 15%, the change in the log
price is very close to the percentage price change.S
There are also additional justifications as Granger & Morgenstern
observe. The theoretical reasons are:
i) The distribution of prices is bounded from below at zero but
not bounded from above, but the log transformation gives a
distribution which is symmetrically unbounded. Hence the
latter is more symmetrical about the mean, although we are
not as concerned with the distribution of price changes as
their predictability.
ii) On the basis of investors' utility functions, the scale for
measuring prices should be such that a given change in'the
transformed variable yields utility which is independent of
the price level. If investors' utility depends on the rate
of return, then the logarithmic transformat i on achieves
this.	 Therefore, the hypothesis that Investors want tn
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maximise expected rate of return and capital gains may be
tested:
iii) If the random walk hypothesis is correct, then the
logarithmic first differences will be a well-behaved random
variable while the price levels are not.
The main empirical justifications are:
the transformed data he more symmetrical cud more nearly
normal histograms;
ii) the transformed data appears to be more stable over time in
terms of the first 2 sample moments;
iii) the transformed data appears to be much closer to being
independent observations for a random process."7
9.4 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
9.4.1 Introduction 
This study focusses on the weak form efficiency of the Kuwait
Stock Exchange and therefore the major weak form tests used in
the empirical work on other stock exchanges.
The statistical tests used in this study are:
1	 The Serial Correlation Coefficient Test
^
	 The Runs Tests
3	 Filter Rules Test
Since this study tests the notion of market efficiency, then the
question we aimed to answer was, "Is the Kuwait Stock Exchange
efficient in the weak sense?" In other words, are price changes
Independent random variables? The analyticj tools employed in
this study will enable us to answer this question.
	 Next,
discussion of the respective methods is presented in addition to
the Random Model.
9.4.2 Choice of Methods
The serial correlation coefficient test and the runs test are
'standard' statistical tools adopted to test the weak form
efficiency of stock exchanges, which are employed in this study.
It is felt, however, that the choice of filter rules requires
some justification. The reasons for adopting the method are:
1) To confirm or dispute the results of the first 2 tests:
2) it is a more sophisticated statistical testing method,
capable of detecting behaviour more complicated than the
random walk suggestsv
3) it has been developed and adopted successfully to be used
with confidence on time series data;
4) it has not been applied to data fron Kuwait StoCk Exchange,
9. 4 .3 The Pondm Walk Method
The random walk method may be expressed es:
E(10 j,t+1 /Pj,t-k ) = P j,t	 KO
where P
	
= the price of the jth stock at time t.
The above equation implies that today's price given the knowledge
of past prices is the best indication of tomorrow's price.
The essence of the model, however, may be stated as:
P..	 IP.	 .	 .	 (1)
J, c -1
and therefore, U. = 'P. - P
	 .
J,t	 J,t-1
where:
U
t
 = price changes
It is assumed that the residual series have zero mean ana are
nr.. n-correlated with earlier value
E (U t ) = 0
rOV (U TT	 ) - 0 ror all K # 0
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In the strictest form, the random walk theory involves two
hypotheses:
1	 successive price changes or changes in returns are
independent;
2	 these changes are identically distributed.
Most empirical work concentrates on the first condition with the
notable exception of Fama8 who also considers the distribution of
successive, price changes. In so far as prediction of price
changes is concerned, and from the stance of weak form
efficiency, once the first condition is met, mathematicians would
regard the process a random walk. As Malkiel notes:
"The next move in a series of stock prices is unpredictable
on the basis of past price behaviour. No matter what wiggle
or wobble the prices have made in the past, tomorrow starts
out fifty-fifty. The next price chan ge is no more.
predictable than the flip of a coin."8
It is important to note, however, that in spite of E(U t ) = 0 for
a K * 0, an absence of correlation does not automatically imply
an absence of dependence. io We may argue, as Granger and
Morgenstern do, that if two random variables from a bi-variable
normal distribution appear to have zero correlation, it is fair
to conclude that they are also independent.0
The question of the distribution of the residuals is out of the
scope of this study but as far as the validity of the statistical
tests go, Firth asserts:
"The main approach therefore appears to be that whilst the
distribution of share price changes are not normal, they are
near enough so for the standard statistical tools to be
applied. "12	 .
9.4.4 The Serial Correlation Coefficient Test 
One of the most straightforward methods for detecting. the
presence of serial dependence in the behaviour of share price
series is to compute the correlation coefficient between price
changes U t which are lagged 1,2, ...	 etc., time periods, by
employing serial correlation coefficient tests. The serial
correlation coefficient (r K) provides a measure of the relation-
ship between the value of a random variable in time t and its K
period earlier. The coefficient rK will take on a value in the
range -1
	
r
K	
+ 1 with zero indicating perfect serial indepen
dence.	 In the context of this study, if the coefficient is
found to be significantly different from zero, inefficiency is
suggested. More precisely, significant correlation between the
current period and K period's previous indicates that information
at present could be used to earn abnormal profits K periods
hitherto.13
The definition of the --„-lation coefficient 1.-va K is:
covariance (U
t
- U
t-K
)
r
K -
variance (U
t )
and can be computed by the following equation:
N-K
1	 (Ut	 11)(Ut+K	 U)
r
K - 
n-K t-1 
1	 I- 0) 2
n	 t=1	 "
where:
n is the number of price changes (n = N-1)
U t is the price difference at time t
0 is the mean =	 U In
t-1 t
K is the time lag .
It should be remembered that r
K is used to estimate the
population serial correlation coefficient 	 given by
p	 ECU t
	(U
t-K 
-
a
2
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The interpretation of the deviation of 	 r
K
 from zero which
suggests inefficiency is subjective.	 In essence the serial
correlation coefficient (r
K
) for price series is the conventional
auto-correlation of the first differences of share prices. In
fact in our analysis, the serial correlation coefficient obtained
by first obtaining the log first difference (U
t
) of the price
series then using SAS package to compute the auto-correlation
coefficient of these log first difference series for the requircd
number of lags (K), which vary from 1-25 in this study.
A test of significance can be performed on r K based on the null
hypothesis p = 0. For this purpose, the standard error of rK,
p
rK 
is calculated as:
r 
= I 1/(n-K)	 Kendall (1948)i4
This formula is valid if the distribution of " has a finite
't
variance, the sample is large and from a normal population and
the observations are independent.
The values outside the internal 	 1:11/n-K are statistically
considered as significantly different from zero. 	 Perhaps a
qualification is worth making at this point. 	 Fame (1965) has
suggested that the distribution of U t (price changes) is stable
paretian with characteristic exponent a less than 2. Thus thn
assumption of finite variance involved in this test might be
invalid, and the above equation is not a precise measure of the
standard error of r
K
 even for extremely large samples. Therefore
the results of serial correlation coefficient tests can only be
regarded as tentative, unless it is supported by other tests such
as the runs test. For a further discussion on this point, see
Fame (1965)15
. 9.4.5 The Runs Test 
The runs test is based on the idea that if a series of
observations is generated by a random process, then the actual
number of runs observed should equal the expected number of runs.
Thus, the test preserves the time order of the observations to
test the randomness of the seriee.16
A run is defined as a sequence of price changes of the same sign.
For example, the series
++ I- / + + + / 0 / - - / +1
1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6
consists of 6 runs. For share prices, we can observe either a
rise (+), a fall (-) or no change (0) from one period to the
next. Intuitively, we can form some idea of whether i number of
runs are too many or too few for a series of length n qay, fnr.
the series to be random. The null hypothesis tested here is R
(number of runs) = too many or too few.
The simplest way to analyse the randomness (or lack of it) of a
series is to compare the actual and expected number of runs in
total. Further analysis may take the form of considering the
number of respective price changes and the length of the runs.17
If we assume that the sample proportion of the respective price
changes are good estimates of the population and further assume--
independence between price changes, then it is possible to
compute the expected number of runs falling into each of the
categories and it is also possible to compute the variance or
standard error of these expected numbers. Thus it will become
relatively clear to accept or reject the hypothesis of whether a
series of price changes is purely random by comparing the
computed number of runs with the actual number of runs.
The total expected number of runs (Rp ) of all - igns for a price
series can be obtained from:
3	 0
[N(N+1) -	 n";
R
E =	
i=1 
where:
R
E
 is the expected number runs,
N is the total number of price changes,
n. is the number of price changes of each sign,1
i	 = 1,2,3, are the total (+), (-) and (0) price changes.
If N is large, the sampling distribution of R, is approximately
norma1,18 with standard error given by:
3
2	 3	 2	
3	 ,
I n i (	 ni + N(N+1) - N	 n - N3P
1=1	 1=1	 1=1 
am
N2(N-1)
From Fame's point of view, the runs test is superior to the
serial correlation test as a test of independence. In as much as
the asymptotic properties of the sampling distrihution	 R
not depend on the assumption of finite variance for the distri-
bution of price changes, the serial correlation test does.19
9.5 THE RESULTS
The results of the empirical tests are presented here as an
attempt is made to interpret and infer market efficiency.
9.5.1 Test One - Serial Correlation Coefficient Test Result:
In Appendix E, the results for all series are presented, where
the first 63 pages show the daily and weekly coefficients for the
individual companies listed on Kuwait Stock Exchange during 1983
1987.	 The results of the daily and weekly coefficients, are
summarised in Tables 9.3 to 9.7. 	 It is worth noting that the
dashed line (---) in each graph in Appendix E represents the
control limit which is equal to twice the standard 	 error
indicate any value for (r) significant from zero. 	 So if the
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Table 9.4: Values of r (1a$ 1
Coefficients twice
& 2) for Companies whose
or
DAILY
031PANY Lag 1 r 014PANY Lag 2 r
NBK +0.110 CBK +0.063
HIC +0.105 HPEP 0.100
HFTCIC -0.072 1TH -0.132
CFC -0.072 Pa -0.118
GINS +0.171 ITTCIC +0.106
WINS -0.125 KIIC -0.053
;GEC -0.071 MINS +0.056
URC +0.132 GINS +0.131
SPEC -0.114 WINS +0.101
HPC +0.053 URC +0.154
HPEIC +0.211* HABIG 0.123
NIC -0.140 }(PI +0.105
RIC -0.272* MSC -0.066
141 +0.111 KNC +0.165
}WC +0.210* KFC -0.123
CMS +0.054 AFPC +0.121
OLTC -0.054 AB +0.238*
KNC +0.154
MEC +0.243*
NTSC +0.143
HCMC +0.115
KCOC -0.075
LTTC -0.131
UFK -0.110
HUPC -0.103
KFC -0.310*
al These values are significant at 36
Table 9.3: Companies with Coefficients Twice their Computed
Standard Error
Price
Series	 Daily
Lag
1 NBK, KREP, HIC, KFTCK, CFC, GINS, WINS, KREC, URC, 5REC, KPC, KRE1C, NIC, RIC,
KPI, KSBC, CMC, CLTC, KNC, KMC, MTSC. 1(042, MCC, LTTC, UFK, KUFC, KFC, KHC
2	 IGAB, HREP, HFH, HIC, KFTCK, HIIC, 1W5, GINS, WINS, URC, HABIG, KPI, IORC,
KNC, K. AFPC
3 NBK, CH(, BKME, KFH, GINS, AINS, KREC, MEC, MEC, HPC, HMBC, HCC, KPI, CMC,
HWC, UFK, AFPC
4 AB. BKME, HREP, HIC, KIIC, CFC, HW5, HSEC, HPI, CMC, OLTC, MM, 11CMC, HCOC, UFK
5 NBK, AB, BKME, KREP, BB, HIC, CPC, GINS, N, HREK, KPI,	 KHC, MTSC, HFC
6 GB, AB, HREP, HIC, HEW, MINS, HAM, HNC, HHC, KUPG
7 GB, CBK. AB, EWE, CPC, HMS, WINS, URC, HREIC, 145B2, CMC, HNC, Lilt, AFPC.
8 NBK, CB(, AB, BKME, HREP, HIIC, CFC, GINS, WINS, NREC, HPC, HMBC, RIC, RIC, HPI,
HWC, HHC, MT5C. HCMC,	 KUPC, HCDC
NEK, GB. AS, ENRE, KIC. CFC, HINZ, GINS. WINS, URC, KREIC, HPI. CMC, HNC. KW5,
xmc, KFC
10 GB, AB, HREP, BB, CFC, HIM, GINS, AlNS, HPC, KREIC, HMOC, CMC. HNC, HWC, LTTC
11 NBK, BKME, HIC, HIIC, HENS, GINS, WINS, HREC, KREIC, KDI, LTTC. UFK, }<UPC. HFC
12 NBK, AB, HIC, GINS, HREC, SREC, HAG, YPI, OLTC, KWC
13 AB. HIC, GINS, AlNS, UPC, NREC, KMIEC, NIC, HMBC, CMC, OLTC, HHC, KCOC, UFK
14 GB. CEK, AB, BB, HIIC, RIC, RSBC, CMC, HHC, KCMC, HCOC, KUPC, AFPC
15 GB, CBK, KFTCIC, 	 URC, NREC, KFEIC, HPI, KMC, KWC,HROC. UFK
16 NBK, AB, KEEP, BB, ((IC, KIIC, GINS, WINS, URC, SF, RIC, GCE1, HPI, HSRC, CNC,
OLTC, KNC, HUG, MT5C, KHC, KCMC, Lilt, KF3, AFPC,
17 NBC, GB, HREP, BB, HFH. KFTCIC, HIIC, CFC, AINS, SPEC, HRBEIC, KMBC, KPI,KSBC,
OLTC, KHC, FLFK, KFC. AFPC
18 NBK, 04K, AB, BB, BKME, XF1tIC, H1N5, GINS, WINS, HRSEC, HPI, CMC, MSTC, HCMC,
UFK, WPC
19 CEK, ITEP, BB, KTH, KFTCIC, KIIC, CFC, AINS, SPEC, HPI, (Lit, KHC, HOS, LTTC,
LIFK
20 AB, 3W4E, MEP, BB, ((IC, PYTOPIC, ((INS, URC, HPC, HABIG, MEC, Gal, HPI, RAC,
MTSC, KCMC, HCOC, AFPC
21 NBK, CBK,AB, HIIC, GINS, AINS, WINS, NIC, MCC, HSBC, CNC, OLTC, KWC, HLOC, HUM,
KFC
22 MEP, PacH,	 KIM, GINS, AM. unc, MPEIC, MEC, RPI, OLTC, HHC, MTSC,
ICX., }CPC. AFPC
23 NaK, GE. caK, AB, FYNE, KFEF, KPH, ;47-WIC, XIIC, ((INS, KAM, 5PEC, KREIC, NFL .
KfPC. CNC. :INC, mrtr. 117c
24 GB, C2K, AS, BB, :ac, c7c, GINS, WINS, NFEC, HPI, OLTC, :CPC, HCMC
25 We RIIC, GINS, AIM, WINS, }<BBC, MC, q, cmc, XAC. MCOC, AFPC
computed serial correlation coefficient of- daily or weekly
percentage change is larger than twice - standard error which
presented by the (..x) line, then we can reject the hypothesis
that the true correlation is zero (random walk).
Daily Price Changes - Results:
The hypothesis of weak form efficiency should be rejected if
stock prices are serially correlated. The results as summarised
In Tables 9.3 and 9.4 show that twenty-seven of the first order
coefficients are statistically significant from zero while the
remaining fifteen are insignificant. For lags greater than (1),
the number of significant estimates decreases generally, but
still the number of coefficients which are statistically
significant from zero are high. Table 9.4 shows the coefficients
on daily prices that are large value and can be the base to form
profitable trading strategies. For example, the largest value of
serial correlation coefficient for lag 1 is 0.243 for the Kuwait
Hotels Company. This means that if the price of Kuwait Hotels
Company rose 10% in excess of the expected return on that stock
on one day it could be expected to rise at an excess of 24.3%
over the expected return on the next day. The expected excess
increase of 24.3% becomes significant when it is subtracted from
the expenses which includes brokerage commission of, say, 1.57.
out of the twenty-six coefficients whose value is twice the
standard error at Lag - 1, only five exceed the 3a limits.
The evidence from Tables 9.3 and 9.4 suggests that there
significant correlation on stock price. The largest number in
absolute value in Lag 1 from Table 9.4 (Appendix E) is (-0.310)
for the Kuwait Food Company. This implies that relating
yesterday's price to today's price explains (-0.310) 2
 or 9.61% of
the variation in today's price.
It might be worth .
 mentioning that Fame's results in 1965 faced a
different situation where eleven out of thirty coefficients were
significant From zero. In other words, Fame reported eleven out
of thirty coefficients larger in absolute value than twice their
4-.e.2.
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Table 9.7: Daily and Weekly Average (r, Lag 1) for Individual
Companies
Absolute Average
Daily	 0.104
Weekly	 0.127
Table 9.8: Serial Correlation Coefficient for Different Intervals
(Daily)
Lag No.of
observations
Negative sign	 Positive sign Large coefficient
in absolute value
/ 42 21 21 27
2 42 16 26 24
3 42 18 24 17
4 42 24 18 15
5 42 16 26 15
6 42 18 24 10.
Table 9.6: Values of r (lag 1 & 2) for companies
whose coefficients twice or
WEEKLY
CCMPAHV Lag 1 r CCMPANY Lag 2 r
NSK +0.211* GB +0.191
CSK +0.197 CSK +0.130
AB +0.152 AS +0.238*
SKME -0.133 HPEP +0.160
1TH -0.151 HFH +0.231*
HIC -0.165 INS +0.156
CFC +0.172 GINS +0.131
HINS +0.130 UPC +0.254*
AINS +0.161 MEC +0.132
WINS +0.225* HPC +0.301*
NREC +0.152 .HNC +0.165
HPC +0.193 HCOC +0.154
YPEIC +0.211* NIC -0.2110S
gir +0.198
KSAC +0.210*
OLTC +0.165
HNC +0.254*
l<WC +0.321
HCMC -0.154
X= +0.165
LTTC +0.231*
HFC +0.310*
AFFC -0.171
HCC +0.321*
A These values are significant at 36
_Table 9.5: Companies with Coefficients Twice Their
Computed Standard Error
Price	 Weekly
Series
Lag
1	 MSC CBK, AB, EWE, KFH, KIC, CM. PUNS, AINS, WINS, NREC, KPC, KREIC,
NIC, KSRC, CLIC, KNC, KAC, KCMC, KCCC, LITC.KPC, AFPC, PEG
2	 GB, (BC, AB, }<REP, KFH, KINS, GINS, URC, MEC, KPC, NIC, KNC, HCOC
3	 NBIC EKNE. CFH, KIIC. ?ZINC, GINS, ALM, URC, NREC, SREC, NIC, CMS,
CLIC, KHC, IC, Lilt, UFK, KCC
4	 EINE, KK, CFC, AINS, GCEI, OLTC, KNC, GC, MTSC, Lilt, UFK, KUPE, KOC.
RIC
5	 PF7t1C, CPC, MINS, PFEIC, SRC, CLTC, KNC, KHC, LTTC, UFK, AFPC
6	 CBK, AB, BB, KIC, KtIC, AIMS, WINS, KRES, URC, NFEC, 1PE1C, NEC, GCEI,
KPI. CMS, KNC, KHC, KCOC, KUPE, KFPC
7	 GB, KPH, KIC, CFC, KRES, URC, NIC, KSM, CLTC, GC, KAC, PEGG, LTTC,
HOC
8	 AB, EWE, KPH. *WIC, CFC, GINS. URC, SREC, KPC. NIC, GCET, KPI, WAG,
MTSC, KCMC, UR(
9	 CEK. BB, KIIC, CFC, AIMS, URC, MREC, KPC, NIC, KMEC, KSRC, KNC, KHC,
KAC, UFK, RIC
10	 AB, KFH, VIC, 141NC, PRES, N. NIC, PPM, GCEI, PI.KSBC. VNC, HCNC,
Lilt, UFK, KM, KCC
11	 Nat, GB, EKME, BB, PFH, paNs, AIMS, NFEC, S. KPC, PFEIC, GCEI, KPI,
HCMC, MCC, Lilt, UFK, KUPC, KFC, AFPC
12	 Na3( GB, CEK, EKME, KREP, KFH, 	 KIIC, GINS, NPEC, SPEC, KREIC,
GCEI. K5RC, CMS, (Lit, IC. HCOC, LTTC
13	 GB. IBC AB, EME, KFEP, CFC, GINS, NFEC, 1443C, CMS, MC,
	 UFK,
AFPC, RIC
14	 GB, CBK, AB, BB. KFH, EFTC1C. KIIS, N. C. HEM, CMS, KHC, HCMC,
WOOC, PUPS, KFC, KFP, AFPC, RIC
15	 EWE, KPEP, 1CNS, UM, HFEIC, GCEI, KSRC, K0C, HCOC, AFPC
16	 PREP, KFTCIC, HIIC, CPC, MINS, AIMS, URC, SPEC, GCEI, KPI, CMS, OLTC,
KNC, Lilt, KUM, AFPC
17	 HFH, GINS, WINS, HMS, URC, NIC, PGB, KPI, HSPIRC, CMS, OLTC, RUC,
KHC, PAC, HCOC, AFPC,HOC, RIC
18	 CBK, BKME, KPH, CFC, AIMS, WINS, KBES, URC, KPI, CMS, HNC, MTSC, KCPC,
Lilt, UFK, HUM, HFC, AFPC
19	 PIC, AlNS, PRES, NRES, HPC, XPEIC, CLIC, AFPC,
2G	 GB, CSK, NB, 1,4FH, VIIC, CPC, GINS, VPBC, VSM, CMS, FK, AFPC
21	 EKNE, KPH, PRES, SPEC, HABIG, NIC, GCE1, KCNC
23	 NBC, PREP, ICC, CFC: MINS, URC, SREC, NIC, ENEC, CPS, OLTC, KNC, RHC,
}CNC, KCOC, Lilt, HUPC, HFC, HCC
24	 KPH. KIC, tirmac, HIIC, GINS, URC. KPC, NIC, IERC, CMS, CLTC,
MTSC, HCMC, UFK, RIC
25	 BKME, }CC. GINS, HPES, URC, NI, S. HPEIC, NIC, MEC, KPI, ISSRC,
CMS, MC, KHC, KWC, UFK, KUPC, HFC, RIC
computed standard errors, and that is different from what we
found in the study for Kuwait Stock Exchange, where twenty-seven
out of forty-two coefficients were larger in absolute value than
twice their computed standard errors. Furthermore, the mean
absolute serial correlation coefficient for Lag 1 in Fama's study
(0.048) is smaller from the one for Kuwait.
The mean absolute serial correlation coefficient for Lag 1 for
Kuwait being 0.104 (see Table 9.7). Also, we can notice the
difference between Fama's study for New York Stock Exchange and
this study of Kuwait Stock Exchange is in the number of negative
correlation coefficients. Fama found eight serial correlations
exhibit negative signs, where this study found twenty-one serial
correlations with negative signs (lag 1)[see Table 9.8]
In Table 9.4, the serial correlation coefficients for Lag 1 are
generally larger than the corresponding coefficients in Fama.20
The study by Jennergren. and Korsvold, shows that the mean.
absolute serial correlation coefficient for lag 1 for Sweden is
0.109 which is almost equal on average to those reported for
Kuwait 0.104, and slightly smaller in the case of Norway 0.083.
In their study, Jennergren and Krosvold21 showed that eight out
of fifteen Norwegian stocks have serial correlation coefficients
for Lag 1 larger than two standard errors in absolute value. The
mean absolute serial correlation coefficient for Lag 1 for
fifteen Norway stocks is 0.083, with eight exhibiting serial
correlation coefficients for Lag 1 larger than their standard
error. The mean absolute serial correlation coefficient for Lag 1
in Sweden is 0.109.
Dryden22
 in his study of U.K. markets reported serial correlation
coefficients for Lag 1 also slightly smaller on average than
those found for Kuwait.	 His mean absolute serial correlation
coefficient for Lag 1 is 0.093.
	 In his study, out of fifteen
coefficients, six are larger than two standard errors and
fourteen are positive in si 6n.	 Solnik23 reported serial
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correlations almost equal on the average to that in Kuwait across
his eight major European Stock Markets.
The serial correlation coefficients in Table 9.2 for Lag 2 are
generally small, and with varying signs. There are, however, some
coefficients for Lag 2 larger than absolute value. Seventeen
exhibit serial correlation coefficients which are twice their
standard errors in absolute value. It is interesting to note that
sixteen out of forty-two Kuwait coefficients for Lag 2 are
negative, the serial correlation coefficients for different
intervals from 1 to 6, have been calculated and the results are
summarised in Table 9.8. Looking at Tables 9.4 and 9.8 one will
notice that the coefficients fluctuate in sign and value, with
some coefficients much more frequently in absolute value than
others. This does not necessarily mean more dependence. Jennergen
and Krosvold, 24 Fama25 and Dryden26 also found some serial
correlation coefficients fairly large in absolute value for the
longer intervals.
II Weekly Price Changes - Results
These results are presented in Appendix E and summarised in
Tables 9.5 and 9.6. Apart from the first order coefficients for
Lag 1, the remaining coefficients of the order 2 - 25 still
large number of the coefficients are statistically significant in
general as the same results show for daily price changes. For Lag
1 twenty-four stocks had coefficient values more than twice the
standard error, i.e., significant from zero, while the other
eighteen coefficients values are small. In the overall period
studied, eight estimates were found to exceed 36 (see Table
For Lags greater than (1), the number of significant estimates
decreases generally the same as the daily result. The absolute
average for weekly coefficients of the forty-two individual
stocks is 0.127 which is much higher than the average absolute of
the daily result (see Table 9.7). However, the weekly result of
this study again provides evidence that dependence on successive
price changes is existent and large.
Table 9.9: A Comparative Result
COWRIES U.S. U.K. KMAIT GERMANY SWEDEN NCRWAY
NAME CF -NYSE London KUwait Frankfurt Stockholm Cele
MCC:MANSE
NO. CF 30 15 42 54 30 15
=GO
MEAN 0.048 0.093 0.104 0.217 0.109 0.083
ABSCLU1E
CCRRELATICN
MEAN 1.52 -3.29 4.35 3.80 4.64 4.69
STANDARD=
VARIABLE
RESEARCHER Feme Dryden Table 9.2. C & J J & K J & K
Table 9.10
Again, it might be worth mentioning that Fame's results in 1965
showed that eleven out of thirty coefficients were significant
from zero. He said that this was a result of the standard errors
formula which underestimates the true variability of the
coefficient when the underlying variable isstable:Paretian with
characteristic - component <2. However, the daily and weekly
results of this study using evidence provided by the serial
correlation model, indicate that dependence on successive price
changes does exist, and that most of the individual stock changes
in Kuwait exchange are not random. This conclusion should be
regarded as tentative until further results are provided and
examined from other results.
9.5.2 Comparable Results
The scope and methodology of this study is comparable to the
studies of thirty stocks on the New York Stock Exchange from
Fama27 ; fifteen stocks on the London Stock Exchange from Dryden28,
fifteen Norwegian and thirty Swedish stocks from Jennergen and
Korsvold29 , and fifty-four German stocks on the Frankfurt Stock
Exchange from Conrade and Jüttnera . We will hence compare the
results arising from our study of Kuwait Stock Exchange with the
ones reported by these authors.
The mean absolute serial correlation coefficients for
differencing Lag 1 found in the comparable studies of six Stock
Exchanges are given in Table 9.9.
The results are quite surprising, particularly for the Kuwaiti
stocks. If we consider the serial correlation coefficient in
Table 9.9 below, the Kuwaiti stocks not only appear to exhibit
less deviation from randomness than the Swedish stocks, but more
disturbingly, also less deviation thatn the German stocks. Given
the significant difference in size between the German stock
markets And the Kuwaiti, this hardly supports the susucestion that
smAll markets are likely to deviate more from randomness than
large markets.
TABLE 9.11: Runs Test Results for Individual Stocks
CCMPANY
WEEKLY DATA
•ora N (+) N (0) N (-)RUNS
CBSERVED
RUNS
EXPEC1ED
1 NW 141.0000 171.6909 7.39 84.000 72.000 101.000 -4.01
2 GB 148.0000 168.6039 6.30 74.000 109.000 72.000 -3.36
3 CEK 112.0000 170.9098 7.37 75.000 82.000 98.000 6.69
4 AB 138.0000 161.5922 7.18 66.000 127.000 62.090 -3.08
5 BKME 88.0000 124.4980 5.32 37.000 183.000 35.000 -4.70
6 KREB 131.0000 158.8638 6.18 70.000 89.000 76.000 -3.67
7 BB 125.0000 171.5822 7.48 77.000 87.000 91.000 -6.36
8 KEH 120.0000 148.6608 5.98 77.000 52.000 98.000 -4.04
9 KIC 118.0000 148.8306 6.91 49.000 122.000 68.000 -4.32
10 KETCIC 121.0000 140.3048 6.42 40.000 159.030 57.000 -2.78
11 KIIC 133.0000 168.3096 7.45 88.000 65.000 103.000 -4.73
12 CFC 96.0000 114.5e38 5.33 38.CCO 184.000 34.000 -3.40'
13 KIM 61.0000 77.6119 3.65 22.000 211.000 22.000 -4.41
14 GINS 66.0000 86.2626 4.86 23.000 205.000 27.000 -4.87
15 AI 119.0000 147.7169 6.98 53.000 95.000 78.000 -4.04
16 wINS 65.0000 87.6510 4.23 23.CCO 204.000 28.CCO -1.96
17 KRBC 50.0000 55.6744 2.65 13.000 225.000 17.000 -1.96
18 URC 101.0000 128.4864 5.89 43.000 171.000 41.000 -4.25
19 NREC 107.0000 140.4980 3.43 50.000 157.000 48.000 -5.14
20 SREC 36.0000 36.8745 1.72 10.000 236.000 9.000 -0.22
21 IC 33.0000 34.8912 1.73 6.000 221.000 12.000 -0.80
22 *7EIC 132.0000 168.5765 7.46 65.000 98.000 92.000 -6.18
23 NIC 93.0000 108.9455 5.18 32.000 171.000 36.000 -2.79
24144PC 115.0000 148.8143 6.91 55.000 82.000 89.000 -4.75
25 KUCC 74.CCO0 88.2459 4.36 30.000 192.000 22.000 -3.23
26 RIC 113.0000 145.5123 6.87 46.000 118.000 70.000 -4.66
27 Gal 122.0000 152.2469 7.08 50.000 112.000 77.000 -4.21
28 II 8.0000 8.6905 0.64 1.030 80.000 3.000 -0.30
29 KSRC 33.0030 48.3787 3.84 12.030 11.000 25.000 -3.95
93 CMS 138.0000 164.9197 7.36 70.000 101.000 78.000 -3.59
31 CLTC 51.0000 56.6807 2.83 18.000 198.000 13.000 -1.82
32 MMCC 124.0090 155.0940 7.13 -67.000 72.000 95.000 -4.29
33 *IC 50.0030 58.7992 2.82 14.000 217.000 18.000 -2.95
34 NoiC 90.0000 104.3173 4.92 31.000 185.000 33.0(0 -2.81
35 MTSC 113.0000 160.2209 2.26 55.000 113.000 81.000 -6.41
36 KLNC 53.0000 83.4651 5.23 27.000 57.000 45.100 -5.73
37 KECC 129.0000 144.3333 7.00 90.000 40.000 98.000 -2.12
38 LTPC 134.0930' 157.8452 7.21 83.000 61.000 95.000 -3.24
39 UP/. 147.0000 162.4754 7.31 80.000 70.000 74.000 -2.05
40 KUPC 49.()000 80.5672 4.98 27.000 74.000 33.000 -6.24
41 KFC 34.0000 55.5224 3.66 23.000 100.000 11.000 -5.74
42 AFC 9.0093 10.5190 0.78 3.000 74.0(O 2.000 -1.31
Average -3.84
TABLE 9.10: Run Test for Individual Stocks
DAILY DATA
CCMPANY BUNS BUN
EXPECTED
am N(+) N(o) N(-)
1	 NEK 1150.0000 1198.7276 9.49 584 572 643 -5.03
2 GB 731.0000 771.3101 9.40 274 209 1316 -4.21
3 CEK 1063.0000 1140.7176 9.94 574 382 843 -7.68
4 AS 1143.0000 1181.3669 9.18 466 727 606
-4.08
5 EKME 1081.0000 1116.2318 7.35 737 283 779 -4.70
6 KREB 1146.0000 1187.9694 9.17 611 489 699
-4.52
7 EB 1094.0000 1162.4574 9.41 677 389 733
-7.12
8 KPH 961.0000 1001.8160 7.87 477 252 1070 -5.04
9 ICC 987.0000 1017.6381 8.81 549 222 1028
-3.32
10 KFTOK 1113.0000 1138.5875 8.43 340 659 800 -2.91
ii KIIC 1013.0000 1046.3118 8.64 988 565 246
-3.72
12 CFC 1110.0000 1142.6187 7.23 838 384 577 -4.40
13 KIN5 1098.0000 1130.3163 5.75 722 311 766 -5.41
14 GINS 954.0000 986.9955 6.61 523 205 1071 -4.80
15 MINS 1158.0000 1197.4235 8.81 653 595 551 -4.40
16 WINS 1037.0000 1071.4124 6.21 523 304 972 -5.31
17 KREC 1172.0000 1186.5953 4.46 513 725 561
-2.96
18 URC 957.0000 982.7393 7.66 343 271 1131 -3.25
19 NRSC 960.0000 1003.7726 8.24 1150 157 292 -5.14
20 SPEC 1157.0000 1177.0956 3.72 ; 710 436 653 -5.12
21 HPC 1269.0000 1274.4791 3.73 306 624 680
-1.22
22 KREIC 990.0000 1050.4274 9.64 532 271 996 -6.18
23 NIC 1071.0000 1085.5597 7.18 1055 182 373 -1.86
24 KMPC 1206.0000 1249.6692 9.01 230 592 781 -4.75
25 HCC 915.0000 946.9344 6.26 446 218 1135 -4.23
26 RIC 855.0000 906.2740 8.87 556 112 1137 -5.66
27 GOE1 959.0000 998.0428 9.07 1090 314 395
-4.21
28 HPI 1570.0000 1573.2340 2.64 320 416 364 -0.98
29 HSRC 980.0000 1004.0762 5.94 1013 613 173 -3.90
30 CMC 992.0000 1034.2501 9.63 213 612 974 -4.85
31 OLTC 1045.0000 1069.4824 4.73 710 215 874 -5.01
32 KNOC 1093.0000 1125.4669 6.92 770 301 728 -4.59
33 *IC 1173.0000 1191.0967 5.95 518 698 583 -2.82
34 HWC 1056.0000 1100.4596 9.73 667 272 860 -4.80
35 MTSC 1613.0000 1641.1867 6.82 314 250 353 -3.95
36 }<CNC 1056.0000 1076.1117 6.92 231 685 .883 -1.98
37 KCOC 1037.0000 1097.2357 9.26 555 320 924
-6.41
38 LTTC 1120.0000 1160.3096 7.25 527 457 815
-5.41
39 UFK 1047.0000 1032.4596 9.12 590 216 993 +1.92
40 KUPC 1220.0000 1247.4919 9.21 420 361 829 -3.21
41 1153.0000 1195.9416 5.98 580 670 549 -6.01
A.F.X.: P67.0000 1006.2073 6.66 470 262 1067 -5.71
Average: -4.35
9.5.3 Test Two: Runs Test Results:
For large samples the distribution of the total number of runs i
approximately normal with mean M and standard error m. Thus the
difference between the actual number of runs (R) and the expected
number can be expressed by means of the usual standardised
variable (K) where:
K = (R + Y2) - M
gm
The value of K then indicates how far any figure is from its
standard error. For example, if K = -4.0 for P t , this means that
P
t
 is four standard deviations below the value to be expected.
For this test we developed our own programme using TURBO PASCAL
(see Appendix F).
The daily and weekly results for the runs test are prssented in.
Tables 9.10 and 9.11. Table 9.10 includes the results of
individual stocks on a daily basis, while Table 9.11 contains
results of individual stocks on a weekly basis.
The daily results show that 37 stocks have K more than 2 which
means that the observed runs are more than twice the standard
error,i.e., they are statistically significant. Average value of
K is relatively high (-4.35). These results imply that daily
price changes cannot be considered to follow a random walk, and
the dependence assumption can be supported.
The weekly results show that thirty stocks have significant
values of K, and 12 are statistically insignificant, with an
average value of K = -3.4. From the results we can conclude that
the dependence assumption can be supported.
The weekly results show that thirty stocks have significant
values of K, and 12 are statistically insignificant, with an
average value of K = -3.4. From the results we can conclude that
thR dppendence assumption can be supported.
9.5.4 Comparable Results 
By way of comparison, Famaa found 4 out of 30 positive but quite
small standardised variables (K) for differencing interval 1 in
US stocks. He reports only 8 standardised varaibles smaller than
-2. The smallest one is -4.23. His mean absolute standardieed
variable is 1.53 (see Table 9.9). The result for Kuwaiti sto.:.kra
show much larger degrees of dependence than Fama's results, see
Table 9.9.
Dryden32 reports only negative standardised variables (K) for
differencing interval 1. His results also indicate larger
degrees of dependence for London stock market then Fame.
However, Dryden's K for differencing interval 1 are generally
somewhat smaller than the ones for Kuwaiti stocks. His mean
standardised variables (K) is -5.48, and 8 out of 15 are smaller
than -3.
Conrad and jUtner33 reported 53 out of 54 negative K For Geimarl
stocks. Their means absolute standardised Variable is 3.80. 31
(K) standardised variables are larger than 3 in absolute values.
Jennergren and Korsvold34 , in their study on Norwegian and
Swedish stocks, reported that all 45 stocks have negative
standardised variables, similar to what we have found for Kuwaiti
sto cks. The mean standardised variable of differencing interval
1 is -4.69 for Norway and -4.54 for Sweden.
Mean absolute standardised variables of runs for differencing
interval 1 were all given in Table 9.9. The runs test result
shows that there are staistically significances in the difference
between the results for the UK and German stocks, and between
Kuwait. Sweden and Norway stocks. Also, the table shows
difference results for the mean serial correlation coefficient.
It shows that the Kuwait market is less efficient than the New
York, London or German markets, nd slightly 7.1.:N r o efficient then
Swedish and Vw,rweFian market.	 W.= are nevarthplpAA,
with the fact that the serial correiation cdefficieht on tne 
	
standardised variables give conflicting rank orders of the six
capital markets. We suggest that one of the possible reasons for
this is that the mean serial correlation coefficients are less
reliable than the mean standardised variable of runs for the
particular purpose of comparing the degree of randomness of =tack
price behaviour in these capital markets.35
In sum, it appears that the runs test results were in lin p with
the serial correlation coefficient results, whereby daily changes
and weekly changes show relatively hign dependence and deviation
from random walk. As far as these teats are concerned, it would
seem that the price changes dependence is strong enough to be
used to gain abnormal profits. Finally, if we consider the
results of both tests the serial correlation coefficients and the
runs test, according to the results above, they would indicate
that the Kuwait Stock Exchange cannot be supposed to be an
efficient market.
9.6 TEST THREE - FILTER RULES
9.6.1 Introduction
As we stated in the earlier sections, the basic hypothesis of
random walk theory in stock market prices is that successive
price changes in individual securities are independent random
variables. Independence implies that the past history of a
series of changes cannot be used to predict future changes in any
meaningful way.
What constitutes a meaningful prediction depends on the purpose
for which the data cre being examined. For example, the investd.r
wants to know whether the history of prices can be used to
increase expected gains. In a random walk market, with either
zero or positive drift, no mechanical trading rule applied to an
individual security would consistently outperform a policy of
simply buying and holding the security. Thus the investor. who
must choose between the random walk model and a more complicated
model which assumes the existence of an excessive degree of
either positive dependence or negative dependence in successive
price changes, should accept the theory of random walks as the
better model if the actual degree of dependence cannot be used to
produce greater expected profits than a buy and hold policy.
In previous sections (see Section 9.5.1 and 9.5.3) the
Independence assumption of random walk model in Kuwait Stock
Exchange has been tested primarily with standard statistical
tools, (serial correlation coefficient method and Runs test), and
the results did not support the random walk hypothesis.
In this study the sample serial correlation coefficients computed
for successive daily, weekly and price changes were significantly
greater than zero (evidence for important dependence in price
changes).
Similarly, in this study, the analyses of runs of successive
price changes of the same sign also did not lend support to the
independence assumption of random walk model. Moreover, the
resulting serial correlation coefficients and runs lead us to
conclude that price changes are not independent random variables
in the case of the majority of the 42 investigated Kuwaiti
stocks. This implies that the random walk hypothesis is probably
not a very accurate description of share price behaviour on the
Kuwaiti Stock Markets.
A logical question is then whether the deviations from randomness
are so large that one can exploit them to make superior trading
profits. That question can be answered in the next section. In
other words, it still remains open whether the Kuwaiti stock
markets are, in fact, efficient or inefficient in the weak sense.
The relevant question from the point of view of stock market
traders is whether some mechanical trading rule can be found
which generates larger profits than a naive buy-and-hold port-
folio. Also, it could well be that the deviations from random-
ness found here are insufficient to offset the fairly significant
transaction costs that are often incurred through mechanical
trading rules. Only by applying a filter technique can we more
definitely settle the question of efficiency or non-efficiency in
the Kuwait stock markets.
9.6.2 Filter Technique - Method
The filter technique method was originally implemented by S.
Alexander in the US market in 1964, 36
 and later adopted and
Implemented by Fame and Blume, also for the US market, in 196637,
Dryden in the UK in 197038
 and Jennergren in 1971 for the
Norwegian and Swedish markets.38
The filter rule focusses on using certain specific trading rules
designed to exploit possible systematic patterns in share price
movements.
Filters are specified in percentages. For example, an X percent
filter is defined as follows. If the daily closing price if a
particular security moves up at least X percent, buy and hold the
security until its prices moves down at least X percent from a
subsequent high,' at which time, simultaneously sell and go short.
The short position is maintained until the daily closing price
rises at least X percent above a subsequent low, at which time
one should simultaneously cover and buy. Moves le sa thrl X
percent in either direction are ignored.
Alexander4D
 formulated the filter technique in the belief, widely
held among market professionals, that prices adjust gradually to
new information.
The professional analysts operate in the belief that there
exist certain trend generating facts, knowable today, that
will guide a speculator to profit if only he can read then
correctly. These facts are assumed to senerAte trends
rather then instantaneous Jumps because most of those
trading in speculative markets have imperfect knowledge of
thp eR
 facts, and the future trends of a price will result
from a gradual spread of awareness of these facts throughout
the market.41
In his earlier article42 , Alexander reported tests of the filter
technique for filters ranging in size from 5 to 50 percent. The
tests cover a time span from 1897 to 1959 and involved closing
prices fcr two indexes, the Dow Jones Industrial and Standard,
and Poor's Industrial.
In general, filters of different sizes and for all the different
time spans yielded profits significantly greater than those of
the sample buy and hold policy. This led Alexander to conclude
that the independence assumption of the random walk model was not
upheld by these data.
In statistical terms, the filter rules compare the'buy and hold
strategy and the trading under the filter rule. The rate of
return r1(J) with daily compounding on the transaction t of
filter i when applied to security j is computed as follows:
n ti (j)
P
ti	 Cl+r ti (j)]	 = P ti (j) + I ti (j)
where
P
ti (j) = the closing price of security j for the day on
which transaction t for filter i was initiated.
I
ti (j) = The total K Dinar profit on transaction t of filter
i when applied to security j. The profits are capital
gains plus dividend which are positive for long trans-
actions and negative for short transactions.
the duration in terms of total trading days of trans-
action t of filter i when applied to security j.
'Then we calculate the overall rate of return with daily (or
s weekly) compounding provided by filter i when applied to security
j. It is computed as follows:
T (j)
	 nti(j) 1
r(j)	 =	 [	 Cl+r
ti (j)3	
1,.(j)
t=1
where:
T.(j)
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N(j) =	
nt i (j)
t=1
N(j) = The total number of trading days during which positions
were open under filter i when applied to security J.
T (j) = the total number of transactions initiated by filter i
for security J.
Finally, the nominal annual rate of return for filter i when
applied to company j is compUted as:
R	 = 260 r (J)
where 260 are no. of days in the year and might be changed
according to each case.
On the other hand, the nominal annual rate of return from a buy
and hold policy during the time period for which filter i hap
open positions in security 	 is equal to:
bR (j) = 260 br
1
[ T(J)	 n
ti (j)} N t .i (j)
b	 bwhere r	 = { n	 [1 + r t CJ)]	 -1it=1
where 
b
r
ti
(J) = r 1 (j) if the corresponding filter transact-
ion is short.
In testing efficiency in Kuwait stock market by using filter
rules, the above - model ' should be developed to consider
transaction costs, so as to make the comparison between buy and
hold returns and filter returns more fair. In the case of
Kuwait, transaction costs are 0.2% of the value of transactions
(see B. Alnagib, 198143).
9.6.3 The Test 
In this study we will follow Fame and Blume's (1966) line 44 , and
the suggestions of Dryden (1970) 45 .	 A computer programmo was
designed on Fortran 77 - see Appendix G, to compare filter rates
of return with the buy and hold rates of return. Applying the
filter rule to a series of price shares in Kuwait stock market
results in the identification of a second series of prices,
namely those at which buy and sell decisions are taken.
This second series in turn allows profits to be calculated.
These take the form of rates of return, initially computed for
each transaction separately and then aggregated to produce an
overall rate of return. Finally this return is expressed in
terms of its equivalent annual rate of return.
In applying the filter rule to Kuwait stock market, transaction
costs were included by modifying the formulae presdnted in the
previous section in the following way:
The daily (weekly) rate of return r for the transaction on a,
filter is r:alculated from
FP = PS/(1+r-c)h
where
PP = the purchase price for each transaction
PS = the selling price for each transaction
o = transaction cost
n = the length of the transaction in days (weeks).
The the overall rate of return is calculated from:
(1+R) N = a (l+r) Ni
1=1
where:
T = the total number of transactions
= the 'total number of days represented by all
transactions
N;
N = ii (ltr)
1=1
R = the overall rate of return.
The final step is to convert this daily (weekly) rate of i-eturn
into its equivalent annual rate of return. Assuming (in this
study) approximately 260 trading days per annum (and 52 weeks per
annum), the equivalent annual rate of return is 260R (52R). Then
the value of R is multiplied by 260 for daily price series and by
52 for weekly price series to give an annual rate of return of
the filter at certain stock.
On the other hand, the buy and hold rate of return (B) is
calculated from
1
B = [(PP/PS) - (1 - C)] x D
where
PP = The purchase price for the first transaction under the
filter
PS = the selling price for last transaction under the filter
D = number of trading days (260) or weeks (52) per annum
C = transaction costs.
It is to be noted that the initiating price (and date) of the
first transaction and the terminating price (and date) of the
last transaction will generally vary with the size of the filter.
In this study four filter values were chosen for testing Kuwait
stock market efficiency: 4 percent, 6 percent, 8 percent and 10
percent46.
For each filter size these prices and the number of days (weeks)
separating them (N) allow the calculation of the buy and hold
rate associated with the corresponding filter. These rates are
computed in the same way as the rates for individual
transactions.
In conclusion, if the series of share prices in the Kuwait stock
market follows a random walk, then the appl i cat i on of the filter
rule described above would produce overall rates of return which
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Table 9.15:
Comparison of rate of return under the Filter
Technique (F) and under a buy-and hold policy (13)
CCMPANY
DAILY DATA
F(8%)
1	 NW -0.047 0.123
2	 GB 0.050 -0.039
3	 C2K 0.143 0.026
4	 AB 0.401 0.195
5	 EEME 0.036 0.101
6	 HPEB -0.015 0.038
7	 BB 0.012 0.001
8	 HER 0.159 0.159
9	 HIC 0.218 0.218
10	 KETCK 0.102 0.059
11	 KIIC 0.021 0.032
12	 CFC 0.008 0.078
13	 MINS 0.105 0.152
14	 GINS 0.135 0.057
15	 AIM 0.283 0.240
16	 WINS 0.080 0.094
17	 MEC 0.083 0.100
18	 UPC 0.093 0.131
19	 NREC 0.137 0.141
20	 SPEC 0.002 0.061
21	 HPC 0.033 0.131
22	 MEIC 0.170 0.210
23	 NIC 0.284 0.191
24	 WPC 0.476 0.160
25	 MCC 0.239 0.590
26	 PIC 0.067 0021
27	 GC2.1 0.051 0.060
28	 YPI -0.056 0.096
29	 HSPC -0.114 0.167
30	 CMS 0.022 0.070
31	 CLTC -0.173 0.010
32	 MCC -0.239 0.190
33	 HHC 0.412 0.173
34	 HWC 0.328 0.240
35	 MISC 0.144 -0.060
36	 KCMC -0.104 0.106
37	 KEDC 0.126 -0.017
38	 LTTC 0.320 0.109
39	 UFK 0.167 0.107
40	 '<UPC 0.329 0.201
41	 XP 0.078 0.011
42	 AFPC 0.178 0.061
AVERAGE 0.149 0.117
Table 9.14:
Comparison annual rate of return under the Filter
Technique (F) and under a buy-and-hold policy (B)
CCMPANY
DAILY DATA
R6X)
1	 NSK -0.178 -0.189
2	 GB 0.401 0.006
3	 CBK -0.226 0.070
4	 AB 0.076 -0.182
5 •	 EKME 0.270 -0.064
6	 HREB -0.195 0.178
7	 BB -0.211 0.139
8	 HEM 0.674 0.190
9	 HIC 0.184 0.210
10	 KETCK 0.152 0.172
11	 HIIC. 0.221 0.274
12	 CPC 0.211 0.195
13	 MINS 0.158 0.230
14	 GINS 0.421 0.344
15	 AINS 0.210 0.115
16	 WINS 0.301 0.312
17	 EREC -0.115 -0.255
18	 URC -0.233 -0.241
19	 NREC 0.384 0.224
20	 SREC 0.280 0.263
21	 KPC 0.339 0.187
V	 HREIC -0.128 -0.068
23	 NIC 0.115 0.104
24	 VMPC 0.132 0.122
25	 HUCC -0.106 -0.069
26	 RIC 0.241 0.022
27	 GCBC -0.057 0.074
28	 HPI 0.135 0.182
29	 }<SRC 0.170 -0.057
30	 CMS 0.059 -0.038
11	 0LTr 0.054 0.038
32	 HNCC 0.234 -0.015
33	 HNC 0.183 0.085
34	 HWC 0.069 0.013
35	 MTSC 0.013 0.069
36	 KCMC 0.084 0.250
37	 HEDC -0.063 0.093
38	 LTTC -0.070 0.092
39	 UFK -0.142 0.172
40	 HUPC 0.006 0.155
41	 XFC -0.034 -0.044
42	 AFPC 0.099 -0.124
AVERAGE 0.186 0.118
Table 9.13:
A comparison of annual rate of return under the Filter
Technique (F) and under a buy-and-hold policy (13)
CCMPANY
tkE13,1..Y DATA
F(4%)
1 NBK 0.341 0.291
2 GB 0.109 0.198
3 CBK 0.132 0.078
4 AB 0:086 0.G41
5 BKME
-0.052 -0.012
6 WEB 0.197. 0.168
7 BB 0.241 0.134
8 HEM 0.156 0.115
9 KIC 0.011 0.001
10 HETCK 0.053 0.039
11 }IC 0.165 0.199
12 CPC 0.016 0.021
13 }<INS 0.611 0.323
14 GINS 0.213 0.166
15 AINS 0.068 0.027
16 WINS 0.073 0.027
17 1,TEC 0.199 n.OR1
18 UPC 0.253 0.189
19 NRSC 0.077 0.013
20 SREC 0.179 0.211
21 ITC 0.142 0.113
22 HPEIC 0.171 0.102
23 NIC 0.192 0.211
24 EMPC 0.123 0.194
25 MCC -0.402 -0.113
2.6 RIC 0.482 0.111
27 GCEI 0.000 0.000
28 KPI 0.121 0.111
29 KSRC 0.186 0.177
30 CMS 0.069 0.011
31 OLTC 0.187 0.311
32 MCC 0.179 0.121
33 XHC 0.189 0.161
34 KWC 0.165 0.112
. 35 MTSC 0.572 0.231
36 14:MC 0.171 0.113
37 KECC 0.193 0.211
38 LITC 0.175 0.086
39 0.079 0.071
40 MPG 0.081 0.011
41 0.005 0.008
42 AFPC 0.086 0.132
AVERA 0.178 0.134
Table 9.12:
Comparison of annual rate of return under the Filter
Technique (F) and under buy-and-hold policy (B)
CCHPANY
DAILY DATA
(B)P(4.%)
1 0.086 0.011
2	 as 0.186 0.171
3	 CB( -0.026 0.111
4	 AB
-0.184 0.210
5	 EWE 0.221 0.112
6	 NREE 0.171 0.161
7	 BB 0.182 0.086
8	 HE• 0.258 -0.198
9	 HIC 0.114 0.160
to	 HETCK 0.022 0.070
11	 -	 KIIC -0.173 0.133
12	 CFC 0.089 0.136
13	 HINS 0.084 0.046
14	 GINS 0.134 -0.111
1 =	AlN5 0.000 0.000
16	 WINS 0.107 0.056
17	 XREC 0.171 0.101
t8	 URC 0.134 0.098
19	 NREC 0.081 0.040
20	 SREC 0.097 0.011
21 0.034 0.022
22	 KREIC 0.84 0.046
23	 NIC 0.851 0.153
24	 HMPC 0.344 0.168
25	 HUCC 0.338 0.201
26	 RIC 0.210 0.155
27	 GCE1 0.265 0.143
28 	 KPI 0.611 0.321
29	 HSRC 0.339 0.168
•NI	 r1/4 0.000 0.000
31	 OLTC 0.239 0.173
32	 MCC 0.412 0.192
33	 HHC 0.229 0.201
34	 HWC 0.329 0.201
35	 MTSC 0.177 0.061
36	 1V-C 0.113 0.089
3? 0.144 0.060
28	 LITC -0.109 0.013
39	 UFK 0.021 -0.001
40	 HUPC 0.081 0.121
HFC -0.153 -0.169
42	 AFPC 0.215 0.678
AVERAGE 0.193 (Lice
on average would be less than the corresponding buy and hold
rate. In other words, if the annual return from buy and hold
policy is higher than the annual return from filters, then that
leads us to conclude that Kuwait stock market is efficient, and
vice-versa.
9.6.4 Daily and Weekly Results 
On the basis of the last section, the rate of return was computed
for four filter values: 4 percent, 6 . percent, 8 percent and 10
percent. The daily and weekly result of 42 Kuwaiti companies
whose stocks are traded in Kuwait stock market are shown in
Tables 9.12 to 9.19 respectively.
For the daily and weekly 4% filter size, the results presented in
Tables 9.12 and 9.16 show that for most of the companies, the
filter annual return is much larger than the buy and hold return..
The daily results show that for 21 individual companies, (NB GB
CBK BKME BB KIC KIIC CFC KWS AINS WINS URC SREC KPC KREIC NIC
KMPC KPI KUCC CMS OLTC KNCC) annual returns from filter are
greater than the annual return from buy and hold. The average
annual return from filter for the 42 companies is 0.191 compared
with 0.102 for buy and hold.
The weekly results show 18 individual companies (GB CBK BKME BB
KEH KIC CFC KIIC GINS URC SREC KREIC KMPC LTTC CFC UFK KFC AFPC)
have an annual return from filter greater than the annual return
from buy and hold. The weekly average annual return from filter
is 0.169 compared with 0.101 for buy and hold.
For 6% filter size, the daily results show that the annual rate
of return from filter was larger than the annual return from buy
and hold for 18 stocks, see Table 9.13. The average annual
return from filter was 0.183 compared with 0.084 from a buy and
hold strategy. For weekly results, (see table 9.13) the average
annual return from filter was 0.171 compared with 0.110 from a
buy and hold policy, 17 stocks have annul rmt ps of return from
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Table 9.20: Comparable Studies
Researcher	 NO. of stocks	 Country	 Nene of
Exchange
Foams and Blume 30 U.S.A NYSE
Dryden 16 U.K. London
Jennergren 30 Sweden Stockholm
Tables 7.15-7.19 42 Kuwait Kuwsit
Table 9.19
Comparison of rate of return under the Filter
Technique (F) and under a buy-and hold policy (B)
CCMPANY
VEEKLY DATA
(B)F( 10%)
1	 NEK -0.150 0.060
2	 GB 0.000 0.000
. 3	 CEK 0.,123 0.194
4	 A8 0.483 0.110
5	 BKME -0.218 0.106
6	 EPEE 0.165 0.115
7	 EB 0.172 -0.181
8	 FEH -0.209 0.016
9	 ETC 0.401 0.101
10	 EETCK 0.192 0.151
11	 HNC 0.721 -0.201
12	 CFC 0.491 0.211
13	 XINS 0.376 0.117
14	 GINS 0.117 0.111
15	 AINS 0.159 -0.106
16
	
WINS 0.000 -0.000
17	 EREC 0.160 0.201
18	 URC -0.121 0.044
19	 NREC -0.171 0.102
20	 MEC 0.000 0.000
21	 XPC 0.274 0.171
22	 VREIC 0.267 0.137
23	 NIC -0.179 -0.211
24	 EMPC 0.211 -0.106
25	 HUCC -0.196 0.106
26	 RIC . 0.296 0.174
27	 GCEI 0.417 0.117
28	 EPI 0.121 0.041
29	 KSRC 0.143 0.115
30	 CMS 0.253 0.121
31	 OLTC 0.707 -0.211
32	 KWIC 0.340 0.250
33	 VHC -0.160 0.114
34	 EWC 0.243 -0.170
35	 }CSC 0.911 0.217
36	 ECMC -0.234 0.111
37	 EEDC 0.515 0.211
36	 LTTC 0.341 -0.081
39	 UFK 0.178 0.001
40	 WPC 0.134 0.101
41	 EFC 0.068 -0.034
42	 AFPC 0.106 0.211
AVERAI3E 0.201 0.132
Table 9.18:
Comparison of rate of return under the Filter
Technique (F) and under a buy-and hold policy (B)
.
CCHPANY
teB4LY DATA
F(810
1 NEK -0.158 0.120
-2 GB 0.169 0.161
3	 • CBK -0.179 0.121
4 AB 0.206 0.128
5 ME 0.710 0.198
6 KPEB -0.220 0.108
7 BB 0.156 0.114
8 KEH 0.222 0.115
9 HIC 0.681 0.311
10 KER3( 0.372 0.183
11 HIIC 0.187 0.131
12 CFC 0.281 0.106
13 paNs 0.142 0.192
14 GINS 0.000 0.000
15 AINB 0.181 0.151
16 WINS 0.000 0.000
17 MEC 0.672 0.101
18 URC 0.161 0.133
19 NREC 0.191 -0.011
20 SPEC 0.296 -0.118
21 HPC 0.127 0.171
22 HPEIC 0.201 0.101
23 NIC 0.121 0.111
24 KMPC 0.151 0.111
25 MCC -0.194 0.122
26 PIG 0.000 0.000
27 GCEI 0.001 0.001
28 HPI 0.069 0.111
29 KSPIC 0.165 0.111
30 CMS 0.147 0.211
31 OLTC -0.000 0.000
32 KNCC 70.193 0.299
33 YHC 0.131 0.115
34 KC 0.131 0.100
35 NM 0.791 0.211
36 KCkC 0.195 0.151
37 0.141 0.211
38 LTTC 0.171 0.111
39 URK 0.001 0.002
40 WPC 0.360 0.340
41 HFC 0.121 0.410
42 AFPC 0.171 0.611
AkIPD_Ar 0.198 0.102
Table 9.17:
Comparison of rate of return under the Filter
Technique (F) and under a buy-and hold policy (B)
034PANY
WEEKLY DATA
(B)F(6X)
1	 NB( -0.961 0.167
2	 GB 0.195 0.127
3	 CSK 0.185 0.113
4	 AB 0.211 0.138
5	 344E -0.678 0.190
0.908 0.237
6	 KPBB 0.192 0.103
7	 BS -0.232 -0.116
8	 KBE 0.221 0.218
9	 MIC 0.174 -0.150
10	 HETCK 0.265 0.143
1/	 KIIC 0.901 0.193
12	 CFC 0.230 0.155
13	 KIM 0.621 0.351
14	 GINS 0.210 -0.150
15	 AINS 0.657 0.301
16	 WINS 0.256 -0.112
17	 KREC 0.424 0.210
le	 UPC 0.656 0.067
19	 NPEC 0.851 0.133
20	 SPEC -0.593 0.089
21	 (PC 0.511 0.185
22	 KREIC 0.345 0.201
23	 NIC 0.211 0.088
24	 KMPC 0.339 0.168
25	 HUCC 0.170 0.131
26	 RIC 0.341 0.175
97	 GCET 0.329 0.161
28	 KPI 0.590 0.239
29	 KSSC 0.126 0.201
30	 CMS 0.166 0.901
31	 OLTC 0.177 0.421
32	 KNCC 0.067 0.323
33	 KHC 0.211 0.231
34	 KWC 0.001 0.611
35	 )TSC 0.331 0.601
36	 HCMC 0.106 0.213
37	 NED( 0.311 0.211
38	 LTTC 0.101 0.301
39	 UFK 0.243 -0.435
40	 KUPC 0.0161 0.211
41	 KFC 0.166 0.201
42	 AFPC 0.068 0.301
AVEERAU 0.261 0.089
Table 9.16:
Comparison of rate of return under the Filter
Technique (F) and under a buy-and hold policy (13)
CCMPANY
DAILY DATA
(B)F(10%)
.-. .
1	 NSK 0.050 0.026
2	 GB 0.015 0.009
3	 CSK -0.112 0.106
- 4	 AB 0.033 0.013
5	 BKME 0.259 0.116
6	 -	 HREB 0.213 0.038
7	 BB 0.221 -0.071
8	 HEH -0.158 0.256
9	 ICC 0.134 -0.144
10	 HETCK 0.285 0.120
11	 HIIC -0.150 -0.217
12	 CFC 0.036 0.169
13	 MINS 0.207 0.060
14	 GINS 0.000 0.000
15	 AINS 0.016 0.001
16	 WINS 0.1128- 0.056
17	 KREC
_
0.035 0.001
18	 UPC 0.070 0.161
19	 NREC 0.000 0.000
20	 SREC 0.089 0.136
21	 HPC 0.011 0.236
22 -	 HREIC 0.102 0.051
23	 NIC -0.018 0.066
24 .	 KMPC 0.085 0.020
25	 MCC 0.047 0.059
26	 RIC 0.000 0.000
27	 GCEI 0.011 0.001
28	 XPI -0.167 0.045
29	 KSIRC 0.037 0.022
30. 	 CMS 0.064 0.009
31	 OLTC -0.084 0.C.46
32	 KNCC 0.142 0.092
33	 HHC 0.172 -0.015
34	 KWC 0.101 0.104
35	 MISC -0.088 0.082
36	 KCMC 0.048 0.154
37	 HEDC 0.036 -0.040
38	 LTTC -0.128 0.013
39	 UFK 0.058 0.024
40	 HUPC 0.011 0.011
41	 ITC 0.008 0.096
42	 .	 AFPC -0.121 0.018
AVERAGE 0.118 0.097
the filters which are higher than from a buy and hold _strategy.
For 8% filter size, the daily and weekly results show for 15
stocks the filter annual rate of return is higher than the annual
rate of return from buy and hold, see table 9.14 and 9.18. The
average annual return for daily data stands at 0.123 from filter,
compared with 0.099 fro buy and hold. For weekly data the average
annual return from filter stands at 0.111 compared with 0.1101
for buy and hold.
In the same direction, the results for the 10% filter size show
that for 15 companies for daily data and 13 companies for weekly
data (see tables 9.15 and 9.19), the annual rate of return from
filter always exceeded the buy and hold annual rate of return.
The daily and weekly average annual rates of return from filter
were 0.104 and 0.098 compared with 0.074 and 0.061 for buy and
hold respectively. The two sets of data (daily and weekly)
menerate filter rates of return which tend to decrease with
increasing filter size.
The results above cannot support market efficiency in the weak
sense in Kuwait stock market, since abnormal profits are likely
by using mechanical trading rules. These results indicate that _
the use of past prices to predict future trends does not beat the
market and gain abnormal profits; in fact, the price movement
(according to these results) seems to be more predictable to the
point that the filter techniques provide greater return for most
of the stocks.
9.6.5 Comparable Studies
In this section we will compare filter rule test results applied
in other stock markets (see Table 9.20) with the results from
this study.
Fame and Blume47 (1966) filter analyses of each of the thirty
shares which comprise the Dow-Jones industrial Average produced
results which are roughly in agreement with whut would
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expected on the assumption (of efficiency).
 that prices follow a
random walk. For our purposes the key results are the following:
averaging over the thirty shares and twenty-four filters which
they employ the average rate of return is 1.85 percent but the
corresponding buy and hold rate of return is considerably higher,
namely 9.86 percent.
Dryden (1970) 48 applied filter rules to three sets of data of UK
stock market. His test results correspond with Fame and Blume's
results, and were: the average rate of return from filter is
lower than the average rate of return from buy and hold in most
cases. Dryden concludes that the most significant feature of the
results however, is the complete absence of the pattern of rates
which would be expected if prices followed random walks.
The study of Fame and Blume concludes that filter rules are not
profitable in . comparison to a buy and hold strategy, where
transaction costs are taken into account.
	 Their study hence.
supports
with
also
Fama's earlier conclusions (In New York Stock Market)
respect to the validity of the random walk theory. Dryden
found that most filter rules are unprofitable relative to
buy and hold, the exception being the very smallest filters.
This however, probably Is due to the fact that Dryden's study
apparently does not take into account transaction costs. Both
above studies (in US and UK) disagree with the results of thi s
study on Kuwait stock market, where four filter sizes are used.
All four filters produced an annual average rate of return higher
than the annual average rate of return from buy and hold
strategy. These rates of return tend to decrease with increasing
filter sizes.
Jennergren (1975) 49 , applied filter rules to the Swedish stock
market. He used daily closing prices of 30 stocks traded on the.
Stockholm stock exchange, October 1967-1971. Jennergren constr-
ucted a mechanical trading rule, although of the filter type,
which differs importantly in some respects from the filter rules
investigated by Fame and Blume. Dryden and this study. He
concluded that the smaller filters were on average not profitable
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relative to buy and hold, for the reason that they incurred heavy
transaction costs through very frequent transactions. The best
performing filters aee, hence, the larger ones. His results
agree with Fame and Blume's findings who report that the larger
filters were the best ones on average, taking into account
transaction costs.
In comparing the results of Kuwait stock market to the results of
New York stock market by Fama and Blume, London stock market by
Dryden, and Stockholm stock market by Jennergren, we conclude
that Fame and Blume fund very small deviations from
randomness, but these deviations are insufficient to outweigh the
heavy transaction costs incurred through a filter strategy.
Dryden50 found somewhat larger deviations from randomness, but
still not sufficiently large ones to result in clearly profitable
filter rules. Jennergrensl found even larger deviations from
randomness, so large that somewhat profitable filter rules may
exist.
The Kuwait stock market exhibits very large deviations from
randomness in comparison with the three studies above. For most
of the filter sizes the return from filter exceeded the return
from buy and hold. Hence, in this study, we can conclude that
the Kuwait stock market is less efficient than New York, London
and Stockholm stock markets.
9.7 CONCLUSION
The random walk hypothesis of stock market prices was stated in
the first section of this chapter. Successive stock price
differences are identically distributed and independent random
variables. It implies that by forming a trading rule the
investor cannot constantly make superior abnormal returns and
only by chance can he make these abnormal returns.
The independence part of the hypothesis has been tested by m.s. ,nns
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of serial correlation coefficient and runs tests, two standard
test types used in several earlier random walk studies. In
addition, a more sophisticated technique 'filter rule' also was
applied to test the efficiency of the Kuwait stock market.
The results from serial coefficient and runs tests lead us to
conclude that price changes are not independent random variables
in the case of the majority of the 42 investigated Kuwaiti
stocks. This implies that the random walk hypothesis is probably
not a very accurate description of share price behaviour in the
Kuwaiti stock market.
Moreover, the results from applying filter rules were in line
with both the serial correlation and runs test results. It would
lead us to conclude that the efficiency hypothesis cannot be
supported in the Kuwait stock exchange.
Despite this weak form evidence indicating that the Kuwait stock
market is inefficient, Solnik52 suggeats that smell markets tend
to have lower levels of efficiency than large, well--trdded
markets. He suggests that the reason for the lower levels of
efficiency is the discontinuity in trading.
Jennergren and Krosvold 53 test the hypothesis that the larger the
maIrket the greater the efficiency. They found that smaller
markets were less efficient.
The Kuwait Stock Exchange is firstly, a new market, secondly, it
is small and thirdly, lacks adequate regulation and information
disclosure. These factors Samuels54 suggests would lead to a
prior classification of an inefficient market.
The major conclusion derived from this study is that Kuwait Stock
Exchange is not efficient. This can be explained by a number of
factors as mentioned above.
First, the market is relatively new and at the development stage
and just out of the painful exparience of the unofficial market
(Al-Manakh) 55 . Some time will be needed to restore investors
confiden. Moreover, investors are still unfamiliar with stork
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trading.
Second, as suggested by Samuels 56 the most important factor
describing the market inefficiency is the lack of information.
As for the quantity and quality, the quantity is due to the
unwillingness of companies to release enough information, while
the problem with the quality is due to the weakness and inability
to enforce the law organising the flow and type of data. As far
as the country does not have a standarised accounting and
auditing system the data will not reflect reality and the market
will continue to be inefficient.
To improve the efficiency of the market mainly through the
enforcement of laws and regulations will ensure the systematic
flow of information both in terms of quantity and quality.
Efforts should concentrate on developing and maintaining a
situation where all investors enjoy equitable treatment.
Investors education and familiarisation with rules and regulatiorv
will help in enforcing the above.
Other factors might affect the efficiency of Kuwait Stock
Exchange:
(1) Short term returns: In the early days of any stock market
there is a danger that too many investors are looking for
short term returns. There are many inexperienced investors
Involved in stock exchange trading and a high percentage of
the trading is undertaken by speculators. This creates a
very volatile market which might affect the level of
efficiency.
(2) Institutional investors:	 The institutional investors have
not developed yet. It is the institutional investors with
their longer-term outlook who can iron out short-term
movements. If prices fall they may decide to hold because
they know they are below their intrinsic value, they may
even begin to buy.	 If prices rise dramatically they may
sell, realising the price is unrealistically high.
	
This
will help to bring down the price to what seems a more
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realistic level.	 The Kuwait Stock Exchange has suffered
from the lack of institutional investors. Only now are
institutions beginning to appear, with insurance and
investment companies entering the market.
(3) Dissemination of information: A further problem with a new
stock market concerns the process by which information is
spread. Kuwait, unlike many countries setting up new stock
exchanges, has the advantage of an excellent communications
system, which Kuwait has recently established. It is
possible for new information to be quickly made available to
all those interested. However, there are problems, one
being that with many inexperienced investors the information
can be interpreted in different ways. Without knowledgeable
security analysts undertaking research, the adjustment of
the market price to the new information may be less than
efficient.
For instance, in the United States, the existence of
financial analysts makes the market efficient by their
search for undervalued and overvalued stock.
Another problem with regard to information is that, as in
any market, one group of investors is bound to obtain the
information before another group and if the first group is
able to act quickly, as they are in Kuwait, they are able to
use thia information to their advantage. This happens in
all markets. A common investment tool is to observe what
all the insiders buy and sell and quickly do the same. This
technique exists in Kuwait as elsewhere.
When the market is in its early stages of development, small
investors may not be aware of their disadvantage. There is
a danger in new markets that small investors do not
appreciate the risk element attached to equity investment.
Kuwait market is a new small market which, when compared to
the US or UK markets. may not be price efficient. It is not
a fair game and it is the smaller, .less informed investor
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that suffers.
(4) Insider trading: In Kuwait the company law of 1962
prohibits insider trading. Stocks owned by the management
are to be registered at the time of purchase and sale to
facilitate monitoring and detection of irregularities.
However, despite what the law says, it is not strictly
enforced and stock owners evade it through many means and
ways. As far as the Stock Exchange Act in Kuwait is
concerned it is silent about insiders' trading.
(5) Creation of unsound companies: One danger, with a
government creating an atmosphere in which it is thought
they will protect investors and bail them out, is that
companies may be formed and floated on the stock exchange
which, from a business point of view, are not as sound as
they should be (see next chapters for more explanation).
The prime reason for their being created is not the creation'
of wealth for the economy, but to enable their founders to
make money.
6) Speculation: This can be seen through the substantial
fluctuation in the share prices and their oft-times
unwarranted high levels. The average trading ratio in KSE
(volume of shares traded officially in the stock exchange to
the volume of tradeable shares) amounted to 20% in 1981,
compared with 48% in the year earlier. This fact highlights
the effects of speculation and the tendency on the part of
dealers to carry out continuous and successive sales and
purchases, in order to benefit from speculation and realise
immediate profits, rather than to hold the shares for long
periods.
7) Lack of awareness towards risk: in the Kuwaiti market, aó in
other markets, the lack of awareness of risk, and the lack
of concern, of many investors, is a worrying aspect. In many
developing countries, the stock market in its early stages
of development is idcntificd with g . 7;vernment. The government
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is influential in setting up the market and there is a
belief that government will not allow investors to lose
money (see Chapter Six). Often for political reasons the
government cannot afford to allow a large number of people
to lose money. For example, in Kuwait, in 1977, the market
did begin to collapse, but the government intervened to
maintain prices. There is consequently a feeling in Kuwait
that if there is a downturn in the market the same thing
will happen.
Because of its nature; a stock market undergoes waves of
optimism and pessimism so that left to normal pressures,
share prices will fall as well as rise. However, there is a
danger from the feeling that the government will not let
investors lose money. In all new markets, but Particularly
acute in Kuwait, because such vast financial resources are
available, should the government wish to intervene to
control collapse it can do so. Perhaps the government were
doing no more than the institutions would have done in a
more developed market. This paternalistic attitude does
mean, however, that investors are not sensitive to risk and
that prices will always rise. Therefore the market does not
function as it should.
In conclusion, whatever the causes or consequences of factors
that affected the efficiency of the market, the various
statistical tests reveal than the hypothesis that the Kuwaiti
market is efficient cannot be supported.
Since the Kuwaiti stock market does not appear to be efficient we
shall investigate the relation of the three major factors:
information, government andexchange regulations and market
facilities, with market efficiency, in the next chapter.
Each of these factors is hypothesised to have a positive
relationship with market efficiency. If these hypotheses are
true, we can conceptualise; that any increase or improvement in
the quality of ihece factors will augment market efficiency
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Consequently, the study in the next chapter will be used as a
basis for recommendations to be made in Chapter Eleven.
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CHAPTER TEN
THEORETICAL ARGUMENT OF THE FACTORS IMPROVING
MARKET EFFICIENCY
10.1 INTRODUCTION
The result of overall efficiency in the Stock Exchange would be
greeter economic growth. We accept this ideal, but the question
should be asked, "What generates efficiency in the stock market?"
Most efficiency theories argue about the expected results of
efficiency, or prove the existence of efficiency under
competitive conditions. However, no body of theory to our
knowledge, explicitly explains the factors that improve and lead
to market efficiency. Most of these factors can be inferred
through comparisons of markets at various stages of development.
This is the manner in which the factors leading to improved
efficiency will be shown in this study.
It is generally accepted that efficiency in the stock market is a
function of the following factors: the nature of information, the
dispersion of information; the ease of entry into market
facilities and the amount of security regulation.
This chapter will discuss the investigation of the relationship
between each factor and market efficiency. In a theoretical sense
-
an overall efficient market is perfectly liquid, . and alloca-
tionally, operationally and informationally efficient.
Practically whatever enhances Any of these characteristics is
very likely to increase market efficiency. For instance, if the
quality of information is improved, this facilitates better
achievement of allocational efficiency. Market facilities as
well as government and exchange regulatIone can augment the
quality of information and, therefore; market. effirl..ncy.
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1) THE INFORMATION SYSTEM AND ITS ROLE
Systematic, timely , accurate and abundant information, which
encompasses channels of information such as new media, research
studies, educational efforts and the like, constitute the
cornerstone of an efficient stock market (capital market)i.
Ceteris paribus, the vital importance of the accuracy of the
information is not questionable because it comprises a basis for
price changes leading to market efficiency. Inaccurate inform-
ation may mislead the market participants. The more abundant and
timely the information, the more impetus it creates in stock
market activities since a useful piece of information triggers a
demand which, in turn, stimulates supply, and vice versa.
Furthermore, ' an appropriate flow of information may have a
positive impact on efficiency by . stimulating competition in
promising activities and by informing potential investors of
various opportunities in the market.
23 THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT
The market in the early stage of development might not be robust
and powerful enough to control the allocation of scarce financial
resources. The governmental role at this stage of development
seems to be more critical than in later stages, (which is the
case of Kuwait Stock Exchange) when the market has developed the
self-sufficient ability to dominate and supervise market
activities automatically.
Through the enforcement of laws, economic policies, price
stabilisation and regulation, the government can play an
important role in determining the economic conditions that will
affect the efficiency of the stock market.
Fiscal policy can play- a major role in channelling the fuads to
desired sectors, industries, or specific firms. Moreover, the
government's role in the formulation of regulation affects the
efficiency of the stock market 2 . Listing requirements,
qualifications of broker-dealers, investment bankers, auditors
transaction conditions and disclosure rules are some examples of
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the unquestionable influence that government regulations have on
promoting the number of market participants and. hence, improving
the market's efficiency.
3) SUPPORT FACILITIES
'Support Facilities' refers to the capacity of the organised
market to meet the large number of investors' demands for
securities, and firms demand for services required to qualify
them for listing on the market. Accurate information and correct
analysis of information are the main ingredients for generating
the supply and demand for securities	 the market. Information•
- can be accurate only if it reflects the financial position and
the true earning power of the firms. This may only be feasible if
a systematic planning, accounting and control system is
established in firms and followed by an independent auditing. One
of the major prerequisites to the listing of securities in most
of the countries with developed stock markets is the preparation
of accurate financial reports which is possible only if enough
qualified accountants and auditors are available.
Upon receiving any kind of information, the market should have
sufficient facilities to interpret it and establish new prices,
if necessary. This function is mainly performed by a market maker
or market specialist, which is missing on Kuwait Stock Market,
who also provides the market with liquidity. Broker-dealer
services and the investment bankers' function comprise some
examples of other vital prerequisitec to the market development
phenomenon.
10.1.1 New Evidence -
Market Efficiency draws its significance ultimately from its
practical implications for market participants, and these have
been shown from the evidence (chapter 3) to be potentially far-
reaching.	 Itdeed, the eoncepc of pricing efficieppy cannot
adequately be defined except 1r terms of i	 practluctl cc:ras-
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quences for investors, an efficient market being one whose prices
are such that investors cannot 'bent the market' other than by
chance. Considerable empirical evidence in the U.S., U.K. and
less developed markets (i.e. Germany, Sweden, Norway, Hong Kong,
etc) support the conclusion that the market responds efficiently
to new information, and that no significant opportunity exists for
investors without access to privileged information to outperform
the market. In this study we apply the traditional statistical
methods used in previous research to daily and weekly data in the
Kuwaiti stock exchange as a less developed market, and found that
the stock market in Kuwait is inefficient. The result (Kuwaiti
market is not efficient) of this study adds a new piece of empiri-
cal evidence with respect to research into the efficiency of stock
markets.
10.2	 INFORMATION AND MARKET EFFICIENCY - THE FIRST FACTOR. 
10.2.1 Theoretical arxument: The role of information
We argued that information is the central core of market
efficiency. This argument seemsto be at variance with hypotheses
of the efficient market model. According to this model (or a weak
form of the model), an investor cannot earn superior profits by
knowing the history of successive stock prices. Nor can he earn
superior profits by analysing annual reports, dividend
announcements, stock splits, and the like, according to the semi-
strong form of the efficient market model. Not only does an
efficient market reflect past information in prices, but it also
Impounds any knowable information about the listed corporation in
the prices.
One of the basic assumptions of the efficient market model is
that enough information about the firm is freely available to
ell, or at:least a sufficient number of investors. If so, a
security's price can be expected to reflect an approximation of
its true intrinsic value, which is the earning power of the firm,
because of the competition among market participants. Implied in
this assumption is the view that accurate and comprehensive
information has enabled the investors to predict accurately the
future outlook of the firms listed on the market. The efficient
market moael takes tne sufficiency and capability of the general
information system for granted3.
In actual practice, if the endeavour to learn about companies
whose securities are traded on the market as abandoned, or if
sufficient and accurate information were not available, then
market efficiency would vanish swiftly. This statement seems to
be at odds with the implication of the efficient market, which as
mentioned, asseri'= thet if an investor randomly selects some
securities for inv==stment, he will not be worse off than those
who are constantly in quest of undervalued or overvalued
securities by analysing the information available in the market.
Although the chance of detecting such securities is very small,
the rewards for one successful finding may be so great that the
expenses, though high, are justified. Only such a continuous
quest and the existence of accurate information, can maintain a
relatively high level of market efficiency 4 . Thus, relative
market efficiency is the consequence of the exhatistivR eFfnrt
financial analysts and the adequacy of information, which enables
them to maintain the prices of securities close to their
intrinsic value. As a result of the continuous search for under-
or over-priced securities, the market swiftly utilises knowledge
about the firm's prospects, with the result that current prices
converge, according to the theory. A market can only attain
efficiency if this condition is satisfied, and its satisfaction
depends upon the effectiveness of the information system. It
would not, therefore, be Illogical to claim that an effective
information system i the 'core' of an efficient market.
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According to the efficient market model, all securities prices
are based on their risk and return and underpriced or overpriced
securities will quickly adjust to their equilibrium values. This
argument does not deny the possible existence of underpriced or
overpriced securities,; rather, it holds that the adjustment to
equilibrium prices will swiftly follow the detection of such
prices. Since changes are always occurring in the earning
prospects of the firms, it logically follows that securities may
constantly move away from their equilibrium value. However, the
continuous quest for the detection of underpriced or overpriced
securities contributes to the move toward market efficiency.
Any mechanism (or information system) that facilitates this quest
and facilitates the conveyance of information concerning the
changes in the earning power or risk of the firm to the investing
public, helps augment market efficiency by its impact on prices
of the firm's securities.
10.2.2 Information System
The efficiency of a market hinges upon the accurate estimation of
the security prices of enterprises. Anything that can have a
material impact on the security price is relevant information in
the market, and if the market is to be efficient, it should
receive the relevant material information quickly. An efficient
information system is fundamental in conveying facts concerning
'corporate operation to the investing public.
As stated in Chapter Five, income, cash flow dividends, the
financial condition of the corporation (and anything that affects
these significantly, i.e. future prospects, managers, plans
etc.), are the major types of information about the company
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required for shareholders' investment decisions. In other words,
the earning power and risk of the corporation should be the sole
determinant of the firm's security prices and the market should
be informed of changes in this power as soon as it is felt that
such a change might be material.
In order that investors, through their buying and selling
activities, may establish prices more in accordance with the
changing fortunes of the issuing corporations, several
things are necessary. First, sufficient information must be
available concerning the corporation for the investors to
reach a logical decision; second, the information must be
accurate, and readily accessible; and thirdly, the investors
must know how to use this information to make evaluative
decisions .5
The information system in a stock market (capital market)
comprises three different segments. The first segment is the firm
and its internal environment, which snould have the capanility to
generate, as Robbins points out, sufficient accurate information.
Sufficiency of information depends upon the materiality of the
Information, and accuracy upon the skill of the firm's accounting
management. A second segment are the market facilities and the
speed with which these facilities can convey the information to
the users. Market facilities in the broadest sense include
skilled manpower, as we shall explain shortly. A final segment in
this information system are the security analysts' and
specialists organisations, which obtain such information and
interpret it. As Robbins explains, the investors must know how to
use this information. In the organised markets such ,a task is
delegated to the security analysts because the majority of
Investors lack the ability to handle large masses of data or to
interpret summarised accounting information to make their
investment decisions, regardless of the refinement of the
financial statements.
10.2.3 Informational Efficiency
Since the major determinant of the price of each security should
be the earning power of the corporation if the market is to be
efficient, price constitutes the thrust of the efficiency
phenomenon. Information, its interpretation and the speed with
which that information is disseminated in the market, play the
crucial roles in market efficiency. The market is said to be
informationally efficient 6 if it:
First, provided the investors with all' relev an* and mator.4e1
Information as soon as decisions giving rise to that information
were undertaken by the firm. Material information refers to
decisions that affect the market value of the firm. If material
and relevant information reaches the market quite late, after the
investment decision is made by the investing public, the
transactions consummated between the time of this decision and
the moment that the underlying decision reaches the market would
be less than optimal. Consequently, some investors may lose snr4
some may gain unduly. However, had the information been available
on time, none would have gained or lost at the expense of others.
Ordinarily, accounting information (a major type of information)
is made public yearly, semi-annually or quarterly. To the extent
that information does not reflect material decision or to the
extent that it is late in coming, the market further deviates
from efficiency.
Secondly, a market would be informationally efficient if it could
convey information accurately and transfer it to the investor in
such a way that different users could arrive at the same basic
conclusion from their interpretation 7 . Such efficiency depends on
the existence of skilled professional accountants who should
prepare the information. Using different terminology Lo convey
similar information relating to two different firms may be
misleading when interpreted by the market. The adoption of
different accounting systems may cause diff preni interpretations
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and, hence, lead to inaccurate earning power estimations for
business firms.
All three types of efficiencies are interconnected and necessary
for the generation of overall market efficiency. Informational
efficiency is an inseparable part of market efficiency and a
prerequisite to it. If such efficiency exists, them the market
may be efficient. If it is lacking, the market cannot be allocat-
ionally efficient for several reasons which were dieoussed in
Chapter One.
A market may also not be operationally efficient if it is not
informationally efficient. If sufficient costless information is
not available it will have a negative impact on the overall
market efficiency through its excessive cost on the price of
securities traded. Such a phenomenon will be inconsistent with
the efficient market model, which presumes the existence of
sufficient costless information.
In summary. each type of market efficiency protects the intere=t
of the i nvestors. This function could be fulfilled only if the
market were efficient with respect to information, operation
(transaction costs) and allocation. As stated, all three types of
efficiency are interrelated and are required to achieve overall
Market efficiency. Consequently, overall market efficiency which
guarantees the interest of both savers and users of funds,
deteriorates if any of these types of efficiency declines.
10.3 PRACTICE IN KUWAIT: INFORMATION MADE PUBLIC -
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS. 
In this section we shall examine the types of information made
public by the listed companies in Kuwait Stock Exchange (Bourse),
and for the purposes of comparative analysis, we shall discuss
the information made public by the US firms and main exchange
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According to the conditions of the Kuwait Stock Exchange's
listing requirements8 , any listed corporations should promise to
Inform the Exchange of the following events immediately upon
their occurrence:
(1) Any changes made in the Articles of Association of the
company whose shares are accepted for dealing therein
by the Stock Exchange Committee.
(2) Any proposal made by the Board of Directors which may
affect the value of their securities.
(3) shall furnish the Stock Exchange Administration with
statements showing any securities or shares held by any
member of their Boards of Directors In the capital
stock of companies whose management is entrusted to
such board members, within one month from the date of
their appointment to the Board of Directors or the
effective date of dealing the said shares in the Stock
Exchange.
(4) All listed companies in the Stock Exchange should
dispatch all financial information concerning the
Company within the following dates:
a) Annual financial information (balance sheet Ana
profit and loss account) should be dispatched in
no more than three months of the end of each
financial year.
b) semi-annual financial information should be
despatched no later than the fifteenth of August
of each yearg.
c) All listed companies should also supply the Stock
Exchange Administration a copy of the Report of
the Board of Directors General Meeting within
fifteen days of the meeting.
Any violation of these conditions moy result in thu remuvtil uf
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the Corporation from the Exchange list. The first three
conditions of the above requirements seem to be satisfactory. The
fourth condition however, can be improved as it may not provide
sufficient information to encourage faster achievement of market
efficiency.
If published only once or twice a year, the income statement and
balance sheet (as well as other financial statements) may lead to
suboptimal decisions by some investors. Quarterly publishing may
lead to better results because, in the first place. ll decisi^no
made by investors would be based on more current financial
statements which are more up to date lo . Secondly, if a firm's
income prospect changes, for better or worse, the sooner the
investors are notified, the closer to optimal their decisions
will be. The more optimal the decision, the • sooner the
achievement of market efficiency. Thus, the interests of the
buyers and sellers will better be served by the exchange, which
is one of its objectives.
In the relatively efficient United States Market, the listed
companies must provide the public with the information delineated
in Appendix Hu . One of the conditions of the New York Stock
Exchange listing requirements is that the listed company must
provide 'timely' disclosure to the public of the following:
1	 Earning Statements;
2	 Dividend Notices;
3	 Any other information which might reasonably be
expected	 to materially affect	 the market for
securites12
The word 'timely' is of vital importance. To aid efficiency in
general, information must be made public as soon as it can
materially affect the market value of the securities. Most of the
listed corporations comply with this rule, and their compliance
may partially account for market efficiency in the United States.
Some 99 percent of the Companies now listed on the Exchanges
publish their earnings statements every Liltv M011016,
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percent every six months. The few that report their earnings only
. once a year are dependent upon long-term contracts or upon the
growth and sale of crops in the annual cycle. The importance of
information stems from the fact that the interest of investors
cannot be served unless material information is made public as
soon as it becomes available. Otherwise, insiders may use such
information to make a profit. Even if insiders do not use this
information, some investors will suffer inevitably if it reaches
the market too late. Such a phenomenon, obviously, detracts from
market efficiency.
What information may significantly affect market value? New
contracts, stock dividends, stock splits, repurchase of shares,
big projects undertaken, ventures in new area of business, and
anything management know will significantly affect the market
value, constitute material information. Management may, however,
be reluctant to publish information that might have a negative
effect on the company. If such material information is withheld-
from the market. it impairs market efficiency and hence damages
the firm itself.
If Kuwait Stock Exchange adopts a policy of gradually requiring
the release of financial statements at shorter intervals than a
year or six months, then the above information may partially-be
embodied in the financial statement sooner. At this stage the
information in the annual or semi-annual report does not seem to
be of great value to the market because it reaches the market too
late.
Corporations' financial statements in some cases reach the market
after they are at least one year old. (In some cases they are
eighteen months old). 13
 The reason seems to stem from the fact
that the companies listed on the Exchange do not appear to submit
the necessary information in time.. For instance, the .first
condition of the fourth requirement will allow the firm to submit
their financial statement after three months from the end of the
year. Being twelve to eighteen months old, the information is not
as useful as that which is available immediately.
Even if this tardy information is partly useful to current
investors when it reaches the market, its value is already lost
to previous investors. They needed it when it reflected the
intrinsic value of the stocks traded and thus would have enabled
them to make better investment decisions. The delay in publishing
material information is probably a major cause of inefficiency in
the Kuwait Stock Market. The Kuwait Stock Exchange can at least
publish the financial statement-s it receives from listed firms at
the time it obtains them, either in its monthly reports or
separately.
10.3.1 Dissemination of Information
The second segment of the information system in Kuwait stock
market, the dissemination process, is composed of Stock exchanges
monthly Bulletin, which is published at the end of each month and'
contains the Exchange's activity and monthly news. The Exchange
also publishes an annual report which contains important
Information as well as balance sheets and income statements of
listed corporations.
Not until recently did the Kuwait Stock exchange start to publish
a daily Bulletin, which contains the volume of trading, prices
and number of transactions at the Exchange, weekly reports
contain the information but in a collective way, and will be
announced in the media; the Monthly Bulletin contains most of the
information related to the Stock Exchange as a whole. Also the
Exchange will be publishing an Investor Guide, which ' is a small
Bulletin containing the important financial information of the
listed companies.14
In addition to these publications, some daily newspapers in
Kuwait publish the .daily prices as well as the size of
transactions of each security together with Government Bonds and
Bills. National radio announces the daily transactions and
prices.
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There should be other methods of introducing the Stock Bxchange
to the people in Kuwait. Finally, it seems to be a good time now
. to prepare a monthly, even weekly or daily market index whIch.
does not exist as yet.
We conclude this section with a summary note. The role
information was generalised, and it was argued that if the market
Is to be efficient it should be provided with sufficient,
accurate and timely information.
We further argued that an information system (which generates,
disseminates and interprets information) would contribute to
efficiency. In the final part of this section, we briefly
analysed the information made public in Kuwait. We believe that
this information is insufficient and reaches the market late.
We also believe that such insufficiency and delaying may be
responsible to some extent for market inefficiency in the Kuwait
Stock Market (which is the result of week form test). In the next.
section we shall scrutinise the rules and regulations which we
suggested to be another important factor affecting the efficiency
in KSE the second major factor leading to stock market
efficiency, prior to analysing the market facilities in the final
section.
10.4 GOVERNMENT RULES AND EXCHANGE REGULATIONS -
THE SECOND FACTOR 
10.4.1 Theoretical Argument - Rules and Efficiency 
As a prerequisite to the disclosure of material, comprehensive
and timely information, regulation has been shown to be one of
the major factors in enhancing the stock market efficiency . The
role and the objectives of regulation are briefly analysed in
this section, followed by analysis of the types of information
and listing requirements of the Kuwait Stock exchange (Bourse) in
the next section.
The role of government regulation, especially in the earl y stage
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of stock market development, seems to be vital. It has been
demonstrated that in a more advanced market, legislation and
government regulation are chief factors in upgrading market
efficiency. Friend has taken the return and risk for twenty one
sub-samples, each of which covers a period of twenty four months,
a total period of forty two yearsis . The first sub-sample starts
In July 1926 and ends in June 1928 and the last one ends in June
1968. He has tested the market efficiency for each subperiod and
found gradual improvement in the United States market efficiency
• In Friend's words:
Both of these last two tests derived from market equilibrium
theory suggest an improvement in market structure from the
1920's to the period after World War II. Since they abstract
from factors affecting return on the market as a whole, they
supply some support to the thesis that changes in securities
regulation may have improved the efficiency of the market
for outstanding stocks.16
Accurate and comprehensive information can lead to a better
assessment of corporate performance. The closer this evaluation
to the intrinsic value of the company, the more accurate the
price of the security relative to its systematic risk. Exchange
rule, government regulations and disclosure laws play a pivotal
role by requiring the firms to provide the public with accurate
and comprehensive information, facilitating the achievement of
market efficiency. Friend emphasises the impact of regulations on
efficiency by stating:
...even moderate improvements [in efficiency] would have a
large pay off, and it is important to analyse carefully the
possibility of improving the market's valuation mechanism
through appropriate institutional changes. Thus, securities
legislation as a whole seems to have improved market
efficiency. 17 .
The objective of regulations may be to safeguard the investing
public's interest in minimising fraud and account manipulations.
The free market concept considers government regulation as on
intervention in the market operation and interference with the
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efficient allocation of scarce resources. However, in the actual
case, the situation is different. In many cases, unless firms are
forced to release information in due time, they may not do so for
competitive reasons. Traditionally, corporations have been
reluctant to release sufficient and comprehensive information
concerning their financial states, because of its private nature,
and because the truth might hurt them; also, in certain cases,
due to cost.
Despite reluc'tance, the information is justified in a free
capital market if such is to be efficient. Were there no
regulations, many firms probably would not release material
information needed by the investing public. To assist the market
in swiftly upgrading its level of efficiency, regulations should
be so designed that no investor is given undue advantage over
another. A regulation, for instance, can systematically result in
equal access to material information. If no one has exclusive
information, then the investors' decisions will be enhanced. cnd
such a regulation would be socially desirable. However, if
loopholes in the regulation provide some undue advantages to
certain investors, market efficiency will be diminished.I8
Another regulation possible is the limitation on price changes
(for example, as in the United States organised securities
market), preventing prices from fluctuating wildly from one
transaction to another. Such a condition is referred to as
'orderly' price change in securities exchange regulations. If the
market ignored ihis condition, prices might "...rise or fall
several points between transactions." 19 Abrupt and demoralising
events, such as President Kennedy's assassination, should not
cause sudden wild fluctuations in prices, such that panic
investors sell most of their investment as the result of an event
whose impact on the long run activity of the business firm is not
material. The consequences of such irrational investment
decisions would be a distortion of the relationship between the
price and true value of the firms.
Only regulatictle can keep the market in order and protect the
interest of overly anxious investors. Robbins states that:
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...regUlation is required to permit markets 'freely' to
reflect the attitudes of buyers and sellers acting in a
rational fashion. Without this type of regulation, price
fluctuations are likely to be unduly affected by calculated
wishes of a few, rather than the 'bloodless verdict' of the
many. 20
Our main argument about the concept of an efficient stock market
hinges upon the relationship between the price and intrinsic
value of the company. If such a relationship was established,
then pricei should not fluctuate unless the changes are caused by
changes in the company's earning prospects. To achieve such a
mechanism the Government may regulate the release of timely and
material information. Thus, regulation can be justified both by
the economic rationale and public interest.
Disclose of relevant information is necessary to regulate all
activities of an efficient capital marketa. The investing public
should have ready access to accurate, abundant and timely
information if its decision concerning prices is to be rational.
Accuracy, a major criterion of information, depends upon the
application of sound accounting principle's. The extent that
companies utilise these principles in reporting their
information, the information can reflect the true financial
status of the corporation.
In the United States, a number of different organisations
have some responsibilities and authority for shaping the
accounting and financial reporting practices of business
firms.22
Robbins'is referring here to the American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants and the Accounting Principles Board and
various similar regulatory organisations. In Kuwait where such
organisations are lacking, the Government can enforce the use of
established accounting principles. However, in the last decade,
several official accounting firms have been established in the
country.. Recently the companies listed on the Kuwait Stock
Exchange have had to comply with regulations concerning
accounting and financial information required by the Stock
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Exchange CoMmittee. Since the Stock Excharige Committee is
composed of various Government and financial experts, their
opinions and policies may underlie a framework for the
dissemination of uniform accounting information throughout the
country. Uniformity in the absolute sense may not be practicable
because of heterogeneity of the industries and the many varieties
of assets and liabilities. However, to the extent to which given
information can disclose a firm's financial status sufficiently
to enable the market participants to make rational decisions, the
information is consistent from one period to the next. It may be
more relevant to investors than absolute uniformity would
provide. Interpretation of financial information is no less
vital than the disclosure of information itself. Accurate
interpretation and analyses depend on accurate and comprehensive
data. A critical problem is that in a society where the security
business is in an early stage of development (as Kuwait), an
individual may not know how to analyse securities. Even in the
United States, the profession of security analyst is relatively
youthful and the number of informed investors is not very
large. 23 Such a problem warrants the creation of regulations
requiring comprehensive disclosure and attempting to ensure that
professionals in the security business are trustworthy : and
competent. Government regulation, supported by the law, is needed
to create public confidence in the securities business24.
Indeed, the history of the securities markets in the United
State , too recent to be ignored, points clearly to the
likelihood that in the absence of such restraints
(regulations] abuses will occur. These abuses could result
in severe investor losses, which could impede seriously the
efforts to create an investing class and foster capital
markets.
Additional regulatory factors to be considered include
statutory requirements to eliminate manipulation, provision
for continuing disclosure, prevention of insider abuses,
control of stock market credit, insurance of stockholders
participation in major decisions and formulation of minimum
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standards of members' ethical conduct and - knowledge of the
business .25
In concluding this section, we should like to add to the above
premise that the enforcement of regulation has some social costs,
which may be offset against its social benefits. Conceptually
there may be an optimum level of regulation at which social
benefits are equal to social costs. Beyond this level, the added
benefits are no longer justifiable given the added costs. In
practical terms, it seems almost impossible to find such a level.
In the case of Kuwait Stock Exchange, with its short promissory
history, whatever the high costs, the social benefit of
regulation would be enormous. This stage of development seems to
suggest the need for long-term regulating activities. The crash
of 1982, in which the lack of regulation and laws was one of the
main factors in speeding up the collapse of the stock exchange,
particularly demonstrates this point.
Thus, the more solid infrastructure of regulation the more•
protective the market and the higher the long-run social
benefits. Benefits accruing to society as a whole in the long
term from the enforcement of regulations is likely to more than
counterbalance the added costs of legislation.
Improvement in efficiency in allocating capital resources within
the economy may depend upon effective regulation in the market.
If this efficiency can be improved, the long-term pay off for the
economy as a whole would be so significant that it would
counterbalance expensive initial costs of legislation.
10.5 PRACTICE IN KUWAIT - A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
In previous sections- we briefly explained some of the
deficiencies in the information made public by the Exchange or
listed firms. Most of the problems, or deficiencies in
information discussed above can be solved by a disclosure law and
regulations that require business organisations to release timely
information needed by the public.
In the following section, we shell e.nelyse the listine,
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Table 10.1: A Comparison between USA
and Kuwait Listing Requirements
Net Tangible	 At*	 egate market Number of	 Number of
Assets (S)	 of publicly	 shares	 Holders of
held shares	 publicly held 1C-C; shares
(S)	 or more
USA	 16,000,000	 16.000,000	 1,000,000	 2.000
Kuwait	 Not epecified	 Not specified	 Not specified No less
than S
for any
number of
shares.
regulations that might have an impact on admitting companies to
the Kuwait Stock Exchange.
10.5.1 A Comparative Analysis of Some Conditions of Listing
Requirements 
Appendices I and J illustrate listing requirements for both the
New York and the Kuwait Stock Exchanges. Number (4) of the Kuwait
Stock Exchange Regulations is too general and probably results in
a lack of transactions in some securities. The number of
shareholders and the value of shares are two important factors
that might have an affect on the efficiency. However, the
conditions in number (4) may lead to the acceptance of a security
that may remain thin for a long time. Number (4) is very similar
to the number (4) condition specified in the NYSE 26 . Therefore,
those conditions, set forth in Table 10.1 will be compared with
number (4) of the KSE regulations (Appendix I).
The paucity of shareholders or the corporations size of equity
capital might sometimes be a factor in reducing efficiency in the
stock market. As the reader observes, the NYSE conditions are
specific, but the KSE does not specify any requirement. The third
and fourth conditions in the above table point to the need for
sufficient shares to be owned by the investing public. In
addition to its requirement that a minimum number of investors
must be owners of a corporation's stock, the fourth condition
specifies the minimum level of shareholding, which seems to be of
vital importance. The KSE requirement of 5 people is very low
compared to NYSE of 2,000 for 100 shares. The first condition
places a lower limit on the value of equity capital of the listed
company. Obviously, a cbrporation with a small amount of capital
cannot be expected to have stockholders with at least 60 shares
each. Thus, this 'condition may be seen as supplementary to the
third and the fourth conditions. The second condition seems to
support the first condition. If the hook value of the net
tangible assets were more than the cmount required in column one
of the above table, but the market value was less than the amount
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in column two, then the book value of the assets of the
corporation would be an overestimation of its real value and,
therefore, the company would not qualify for listing on the NYSE.
This condition prevents the listing of a corporation with a
balance sheet of inflated figures, i.e. when the book value of
the firm is greater than market value. The above analysis
illuminates the interdependency of all four conditions, each of
which established the norms by which only publicly held
corporations can be listed on the NYSE.
In summary, this section discussed some of the role of rules and
regulations in market efficiency through their impact in
published information. We also examined the shortcomings of the
information published by the listed companies on the KSE Market
Inefficiency may Partially be attributed to deficiency in
information. Some of these shortcomings can be overcome by
passing a disclosure law, badly needed at this stage of market
development in Kuwaitv. Finally we shall analyse mar!,:zt
facilities, the fourth factor hypothesised to influence market
efficiency.
10.6 MARKET EFFICIENCY AND MARKET SUPPORT FACILITIES
THE THIRD FACTOR
10.6.1 Introduction
We have argued than an appropriate pricing mechanism underlies
overall market efficiency. Appropriate pricing, in turn, depends
upon the efficiency of the information in systems built by
financial experts. Therefore, if the information system is to be
efficient', these experts must be sufficient in number and must
have the necessary qualifications for the task assigned to them.
The term 'market facilities' denotes much more than just the
human expertise needed for an efficient information system. By
this term we mean the capacity of companies and investors to
generate, disseminate and interpret information.This market
function requires the services of accountants, auditors, brokers,
dealers, specialists and financial analysts; it also
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Table 10.2:	 Commerce and Economic Graduation data for the period
1982-1987
1982/3 1983/4 1984/5 1985/6 1986/7
Female 226 185 183 216 '	 284
Male 207 146 203 194 256
Total 443 331 386 410 540
Source: Supplied by the Ministry of Planning, Central Statistical Office
(Annual Statistical Ahstract) 1967
-physical and financial capacities. It is assumed that physical
and financial capacity can be obtained without great problems.
Analysis is therefore limited to the former. The definition of
the stock market is generalised to include information because as
we argued earlier, unless the market is informationally
efficient, it cannot be allocationally efficient. The information
that comprises the backbone of market efficiency is first
generated by the company, next, disseminated in the market, and
finally interpreted by investors. These three phases collectively
constitute the market information system.
In the literature, reference is usually made exclusively to the
dissemination process, the assumption being that the generation
and interpretation processes function efficiently. This
assumption implicitly assumes the existence of q sufficient
number of financial professionals to generate financial
information and to interpret it.
Supposing the market does not posses such a human force?'
Obviously, if information reaching the market is persistently
inaccurate, insufficient and late due to inadequate manpower, it
will obstruct the achievement of market efficiency. Faulty
information results in the determination of incorrect earning
prospects of companies and hence incorrect securities' prices. To .
proceed with the analysis we shall first present some facts about
the supply of financially skilled manpower in the Kuwait
financial market.
10.6.2 Financially Skilled Manpower - Some Facts 
Table 10.2 shows data related to the financially skilled
manpower, appropriate for determining the manpower needs of the
business community in Kuwait. The actual data depicted in Table
10.2 of the Country Graduates (1982/83-1986/87) five year plan
related to accountants, finance, economic and to some other
persons skilled In business administration. Assuming that
graduate in finance and public administration have been and will
be absorbed by the banking system and government departments.
graduates of accounting, business administration and economics
MU n
I 1,7
-281-
are therefore those to be absorbed by all econbmic units in the
society. The total number of graduates in the five year plan,
(1982/3-1986/7) is two thousand.
The curriculum offered by many business administration and
commerce schools in Kuwait (including finance and public
administration) is often considered too general, with the result
that some graduates of these schools may not have the necessary
financial skills to be able to serve as experts. If we assume
that one half of the business and commercial graduates have the
necessary financial skills, then we arrive at a figure of about
1,000 who may be qualified for at least basic jobs in financial
areas at the end Of 1987.
This financial number must satisfy the demand of all economic
units such as banking, government offices, financial corpora-
tions, auditing firms, private and pablic business enterprises,
as well as private entrepreneurs. A large proportion of this
group of graduates has been absorbed by the banks, government,.
auditing firms and the large enterprises, which have appropriate
accounting and financial systems.
Based on the above premises and the total number of registered
companies in the country, which amount to around 3,000
companiesa , we may argue that most companies will not be able to
have even one accountant of financial expertise. If these experts
are allocated evenly, every three businesses can share one. If,
however, the large firms take the majority of graduates, then
several of the smaller ones will have no financial experts. SincP
the supply of professionals is less than the demand for them, the
services of this profession may tend to be very expensive.
10.6.3 Financial Experts and the Generation and Interpretation
of information 
Table 10.2, together with the discussion in the preceding section
are indicative of the total amount of financially skilled
manpower available to the country. This comprises the group that
. should generate and interpret financial information. Our
conclusion in the previouo section was that if the larger
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corporations do not hire most of these professionals, then every
three business firms can share one financial expert. This
scarcity of skilled manpower seems to be a threat to future stock
market efficiency in Kuwait, and hence to economic efficiency
because the generation of data, the first phase of the
Information system, will be retarded. Moreover, because of this
scarcity, few firms can qualify for listing on the market and
potential candidates will remain isolated from the market. Such
isolation would be in conflict with a concept of overall economic
efficiency which prescribed either that the companies possessing
a major part of the nation's wealth should be listed, or that
their stocks should be actively traded on an efficient market.
The third phase in the information system is the interpretation
process, assigned to specialists, brokers, dealers and security
analysts. Their interpretation of available infdrmation can
enhance market efficiency, or at least maintain the present level
of efficiency. Their total number in Kuwait does not seem to be
large, but recently there are eleven companies who have been
accepted as brokers on the KSE. In addition, the banks in Kuwait
possess branches all over the country and should be allowed to
render these services to their customers. As of the end of 1987,
seven banks with more than 159 branches and offices were
operating in Kuwait (see Table 10.3).
Furthermore, the banks traditionally are highly trusted by
Kuwaitis. This constitutes a vital factor and a positive step
toward gaining investor confidence in the developing stock
market. The query is whether or not the banks and other dealers
have sufficient human expertise to meet their customers' needs
efficiently, i.e. to have the ability to estimate the earning
power underlying the securities demanded by their customers. The
answer to this query hinges again on the figures provided in
Table 10.3. Like the creation of data, the interpretation should
also depend upon the total number of financial experts in the
country. Obviously, despite their large number of branches29,
the financial skills in this respect are limited to the bank's
share of the total supply. Since that supply does not seem to be
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sufficient,the bank may lack skilled manpower, creating a barrier
to the achievement of market efficiency. In addition, due to
insufficiently specialised manpower, the services of all dealers
may not have the necessary quality to drive the market toward
efficiency.
An obvious conclusion is that market efficiency is at stake,
because the skilled manpower called for at this stage of
development apparently is insufficient.
10.7 CONCLUSION
In this chapter we have examined the affiliation of market
efficiency with three major factors, namely, information,
government rules and exchange regulation, and market facilities.
The role of information, the first major factor, was
Investigated. The quality and quantity of information, which
appears to be insufficient in Kuwait, have a positive beerinR on
market efficiency. The study further showed that some information
reaches the market late, if at all. The observed inefficiency
which had been found on the result of a weak form test in Chapter
Nine, may be partially attributed to this problem. In addition,
the role of government rules and regulations, the second major
factor (where the lack lof them speeded the collapse in KSE in
1982) was studied. Our findings indicate that the current rules
and regulations are not adequate in requiring the business
community and companies listed in KSE to supply information
important for the investing public's decisions. This factor also
Is responsible for market efficiency in KSE. Finally, we looked
at the market facilities, the third major factor. In general the
lack of financially skilled human resources seems to be one of
the main barriers to achieving efficiency in Kuwait. Some
recommendations will be made in the concluding chapter.
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CHAPTER ELEVEN
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
11.1 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
This study has examined the efficiency of the Stock Exchange in
Kuwait by applying the weak form test of the efficient market
hypothesis. It has explored the impact of factors that relate to
market efficiency. The efficiency of Kuwait Stock Exchange was
tested by applying Serial Correlation, Runs Test and Filter Rules
techniques. This exploration has enabled the author to suggest
some possible approaches for augmenting market efficiency by.
drawing on both theory and practice in more developed stock
markets.
As the first step, the empirical review of literature of the
efficient market hypothesis was explored. The general conclusion
of most of the empirical studies of market efficiency is that the
European exchanges (not including U.K.) are less efficient than
the U.S.A. and U.K. exchanges, and that the exchanges of the Far
East and other developing countries are less efficient than the
European exchanges.
A key focus of the dissertation was the investigation of the
characteristics of an efficient market in a theoretical
framework. An ideally efficient capital market, in which most of
the firms possess a great proportion of the nation's wealth,
achieves informational, allocational and operational efficiency.
An overall efficient market reacts swiftly to information, feed9
back the results to the management of the listed companies,
gradually corrects poorly functioning firms and nurtures
efficiently performing business enterprises. Furthermore. in
such a market the securities are priced that the rates of return
on all securities, adjusted for their risk, are equivalent.
Thus, higher rates of return are Justified to the extent that
they are related to higher risk with the result that the prices
of securities traded in the market are in linear equilibrium;
such an efficient market serves the interests of both savers and
users of funds. Allocational inefficiency in an inefficient
market may bring about disastrous financial failures whose
aggregate results would be great financial losses to society as a
whole. Finally, by favouring efficient business enterprises, the
efficient market helps to move the other markets in the economy
toward efficiency.
Appropriate pricing plays a crucial role in allocational
efficiency. Following an investigation of the main, features of
an ideal efficient market, some of the theories concerning
valuation (pricing) were reviewed. Aside from several
controversies, the theoreticians implicitly or explicitly agree'
that price should be an accurate reflection of the earning power
of the business enterprise. Allocational efficiency is thus
feasible if, and only if, the pricing mechanism in the stock
market functions accurately. We further conceptualised some
problems inherent in the data needed by market participants.
Such problems which afflicted even the most rudimentary data,
obstruct market efficiency making the achievement of absolute
efficiency very difficult, if not impossible. However, the
relative efficiency of the market can be augmented by upgrading
the quality of information.
In Kuwait, the stock market developed in the same was as the
other markets in the world developed, except that investors in
Kuwait are extremely rich and the sums of money exchanged there
are abnormally large. The evolution of the Kuwait Stock Exchange
is very similar to that of the Stock Exchange in London. In a
small market it is unlikely that all the information is freely
available, but some studies show some level of efficiency in a
small market. The lawmakers in early days in Kuwait were not
Kuwaiti, so Kuwait commercial Law and Regulations have been
derived from a variety of different sources, leaving gaps and
loopholes which the Government is still trying to fill. 1977 is
the most important year in the history of the Kuwait Stock
Exchange. . In that year two major things happened: first the
market experienced the first crisis and secondly, the organised
official Stock Exchange was established.
Two sets of price data, (daily and weekly) from the Kuwait Stock
Exchange were applied using the serial correlation and Runs
techniques to investigate market efficiency for five years for
the period from 1983 to 1987. The weak form efficiency in KSE
has been tested. It is worth mentioning that tests using semi-
strong form of the efficient market hypothesis are rare for stock
exchanges in developing countries, perhaps because of the absence
of data in a convenient form and for other reasons as described
in Chapter Nine. The results of the tests signified that the
existence of market efficiency in Kuwait Stock Exchange cannot be
supported statistically.
The Kuwait Gulf Stock Exchange (Al-Manakh) was established near
the Kuwait Stock Exchange to facilitate the movement of dealers
between the two markets and to keep them informed of the latest
prices, a service which is missing in some under-developed
countries. Al-Manakh was not a legal market since it was not
supervised by government, and all share dealings were governed by
the dealers, unlike the over-the-counter market (OTC) in U.K. and
U.S. A high level of speculation, deferred payment (post-dated
cheques) and lack of regulation and financially skilled manpower
were the main causes of the crash in the Kuwait Gulf Stock
Exchange. Gulf public companies shares traded in the KGSE are
actually Joint-venture companies owned by different nationals of
Arab states. The most important factors behind the idea of
establishing Gulf companies were, first: the narrow local market
and its inability to absorb local capital. Second, the regulation
of the limitation of establishing more public joint stock
cynnyanio= .
 Thi rd. the risk involved in international markets.
The lack of proper rules and regulations, information and
financial human expertise in this ared in Kuwait Stock Exchange
and the KGSE were some of the main factors that led to the crash
of KGSE, and might have affected the efficiency in KSE.
To investigate the possible causes of market efficiency, three
factors were studied, i.e., information, government rules and
exchange regulations, and market facilities. The findings show
that all these factors have a positive relationship with market
efficiency, and each should be improved to augment it,
11.2	 RECOMMENDATIONS
11.2.1	 Introduction
This dissertation has investigated the factors associated with
market efficiency. All hypothesised factors were observed to he.
either insufficient or to possess some shortcomings. The
remainder of this dissertation will address some recommendations
deemed useful in augmenting market efficiency.
In a theoretical framework, some major characteristics of an
efficient capital market are delineated. Among other things, an
efficient market is highly liquid (resilient) and allocational
and operationally (or technically) and financially efficient.
Information, the first factor, underlies allocational efficiency.
Any improvement in the quality of the former contributes to
improvement in the latter. The second factor, rules and
regulations, influences market efficiency through its impact on
Information, transaction procedures, fiscal policy, listing
requirements. di c,-.1 ^ - lawc ,
 
etc.	 The third factor, human
resources, refers to the persons able to generate, disseminate
and interpret information. Such resources can also improve
efficiency through their impact on the quality of information.
In the foIlowing section, we shall make some recommendations
concerning the direction that the factors should take tn
improve market efficiency with the hope that even a slight
contribution may have a great return.
11.2.2 The First Factor - Information
One of the principle ingredients of market efficiency is
Information. Accuracy, timeliness and adequacy should be the
main attributes of information if it is to be beneficial to the
accurate determination of prices. Some information reaches the
market late and some may never reach it. We have conceptualised
certain problems inherent in information and concluded that the
achievement of absolute efficiency seems to be extremely
difficult. However, the augmentation of relative efficiency by
improving the quality of information is not impossible. Three
characteristics are essential in improving the quality of
Information. The first feature of information required for
market efficiency is timeliness. The Stock Exchange can release
information immediately upon its receipt. Currently in KSE some
of the information released is about 18 months old. All businqss,
organisations should be legally required to release their
financial statements, at least at the end of their fiscal
periods, to one newspaper in wide circulation, as well as to the
official newspaper, for public utilisation.
	
The shorter the
waiting period, the more useful the information will be. An
appropriate period is quarterly, bui semi-annual reports are
preferable to those issued annually.
It would be much more useful if the organisations would release
statements of at least three consecutive periods at a time. This
essential requirement is overlooked in Kuwait. Obedience to such
a requirement may be self-corrective for business performance.'
Not only may the absence of information or its late release be a
hindrance to market efficiency; but also some insolvent firms mdy
remain disguised and enjoy banking and trade credits because of
their owner's reputation or wealth. Obviously, such a
hypothetical organisation would , be a serious obstacle for
economic - efficiency in Kuwait.	 The second feature of the
information required for market efficiency is adequacy. Any
material information should be made public as soon as it becomes
available. Sufficient information attracts people's confidence,
a feature critical to market development.
In Chapter Six we expressed our opinion about the shortcomings
of the information reported by the Stock Exchange. Further, we
suggested certain additions to what is currently being made
public. In addition to what has been suggested specifically,
some general steps are imperative for market development. All
parts of the country should have access to mnrkst information as
well as an equal chance to participate in market opportunities.
The banks in Kuwait, with their widespread branches, can be of
great assistance in this respect. Newspapers, national radio,
national television and local radio and television can all be
helpful	 in	 informing	 the public of available market
alternatives. 2 Furthermore, these media can explain the
investments' yields, advantages, comparative advantages etc., in
simple language comprehensible to an investin g public not
familiar with the opportunities in the market. Moreover, this
information so released, should contain an educational content
for both firms and investors. Firms would know of possible
investment alternatives, superior to their 'own investment
opportunity set. The investing public would also be made aware
of superior investment possibilities. Only a continuous flow of
information can serve the interests of both - i.e. allocate the
funds to the most promising users who can provide the best pay-
off for the savers.
Traditionally only the income statements and balance sheets that
reflect the historical operation of the firms were released. If
the firms can present an estimate of the current costs of their
assets, reported in the balance sheet, and present them in an
additional column, this data would provide valuable information
to potential investors. A final, but most important, feature of
information required for market efficiency is accuracy. The
quality of the financial statements of many listed companies in
Kuwait was not satisfactory. As stated previously, many of these
companies tended to understate their profit, and these financial
statements are audited by unqualified auditors. this tendency is
another deterrent of market efficiency in Kuwait. The accuracy
of information provided by firms depends on their skilled
financial manpower as well as on the rigidity with which the
related rules and regulations are enforced. Consequently, in
addition to inherent problems in financial data, which are the
concern of accounting theory, we may attribute most of the
problems of the financial statements of listed companies to the
Inadequate numbers of financial experts.
11.2.3 The Second Factor - Rules and Regulations 
Generally, information is an inseparable part of decision making.
Traditionally, the firms have refused to release information
needed for investment decisions. Without sufficient information,
any decision . may be less than optimal. Disclosure law.
prescribing the type of data and the frequency of its release
should be enacted and rigidly enforced. The law should compel
business organisations to release information on time. It should
also provide appropriate punishment and penalties for insiders'
abuses of information. Another law is needed to correct the
capital structure of business firms in Kuwait. This law should
specify that the bank must gradually deny credit to companies
lacking satisfactory financial statements. This approach would
Improve the performance of the firms. Specifically, some
corrections are required in the Kuwait Stock Exchange's
Regulations for admitting corporations. These, regulations were
analysed in Chapter Ten.
11.2.4	 The Third Factor - Market Facilities
Market facilities are prerequisite to an efficient information
system. -We have shown that financially skilled human resources
are currently insufficient and constitute the main bottleneck in
market development. Unfortunately, .he solut On to this problem
requires long-term planning and it cannot be solved immediately.
Nevertheless, two measures seem to be imperative at this stage to
overcome the shortage of scarce resources. Immediate action is
needed to at least partially remedy this shortage. The Kuwaiti
government can provide technical financial and advisory
assistance to the firms. Establishment of seminars, symposia and
conferences at which accountants, financial analysts, corporation
managers and some students of finance and economics could
participate would be helpful in upgrading the quality of
knowledge in financial decision making. The government may
invite accountants, auditors and financial analysts from abroad
to assist business enterprises in establishing new accounting
systems and to give then advisory services. A long-term
consideration constitutes the next, but most vital, step to be
taken. Expansion of courses in accounting, finance (especially
about stock markets) and allied fields, establishment of new
business schools to offer all courses needed by businesses, end.
improvement in the quality of education, are some examples of
possible long-term improvements.3
As •
 the reader is by now aware, any enhancement in market
efficiency will lead to a significant improvement of the overall
economic efficiency of a nation. This dissertation has
identified several potentially fruitful areas for change in the
Kuwait Stock Market (overall Kuwait capital market). It is the
author's fond hope that the dissertation may be useful in guiding
the development of a more efficient stock market. The achievement
of that goal will make the effort and time invested in this
dissertation exceedingly worthwhile.
11.3 CONSIDERATIONS FOR ESTABLISHING A NEW STOCK MARKET
From this dissertation some points have arisen which should be
considered by other countries with new, small stock exchanges.
Firstly, it is vital during the early sta ges of the Ocyclopmeni
of a stock market that all laws and regulations referring to
market matters should be very carefully monitored and controllOd
by government. It is unlikely that legislation implemented in
other well developed capital markets could be adopted wholesale
by any other market because every country, and hence every
capital market, has its own characteristics which must be taken
into account by those who design the laws. 	 Also, laws and
regulations must be designed with an eye to the future.
A new market needs to be under such 	  scrutiny by the
government that any new developments which threaten it will be
quickly recognised and dealt with by new legislation if
necessary. In addition the government must enforce the law.
Secondly, the process by which information is circulated amongst
the investors is a major problem in . a new stock market. In any
market, one group of investors is bound to obtain new information
before another group, and if the first group is able to act
quickly, they can use this information to their advantage. The
.smaller new investor may not be aware of his disadvantage and may
not appreciate the risks attached to equity. investment. In the
early days of a new market great care must be taken to make sure
all information is circulated as widely as possible.
Thirdly, the lack of awareness of the risks involved on the part
of new investors is a worrying aspect in new markets. New
Investors are often more interested in looking for a quick profit
by speculation than long term investment.
Shares are traded about which nothing is known. The price an
Investor pays for a stock depends on any number of factors such
as general business conditions, the earnings of particular
companies, and the future prospects of those companies.
A new market must engage in some sort of investor education and
guidance and should produce a publication with as much
information about all aspects of the market as possible. It is
"cry important, especially in developing countries, to protpct
Investors money by becoming a member of a society, such AA thp
Securities Investor Protection Corporation in the USA, which
provides funds for use in the protection of both cash and of
securities which may be deposited with a member firm.
Fourthly, the institutional investors can control market activity
and protect it from volatility by bringing the price of a stock
down to what they see as an acceptable level. That is why it is
important to have institutional investors in any market. The
Kuwait Stock Exchange , for example, has suffered from a lack of
Institutional investors.
11.4 SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
Although the case study has been a pioneering investigation of
the efficiency of the Kuwait Stock Market, it has also opened a
discussion concerning the general factors leading to market
efficiency, which may be the subject of study for years to come.
Knowing the important role this market can play in both Kuwait
and the Gulf area, a lot of research could be conducted on it.
Further work need not, however, be focussed on the specific
situation in the Kuwait market, rather, any capital market can be
studied. To this end, each factor (i.e. information, government
rules and regulations, and market facilities) needs to be broken
down into several variables or elements whose impact on improving
the quality or quantity of that factor, and hence market
efficiency, can better be investigated.
Also, in order to study the informational efficiency of markets,
one may further break down the information system into three
phases of generation. dissemination, and interpretation. Such a
breakdown may enable the analyst to observe the shortcomings of
each phase. By this method the researcher may contrast what
needs to be done with what is being done, in order to cast some
light on the variables that may fnfluence market efficiency.
In addition, an investi gation of the types and quantity of
manpower needed in each phase and of the adequacy of market
facilities may also be beneficial in identifying variables
responsible for market efficiency.
Finally, a study comparing the kinds of rules and regulations
needed for information disclosure of those available may also
prove helpful in this area.
Of particular importance would be a case study of the stock
market of other countries at a stage of stock market development
similar to that of Kuwait.
11.5 Limitation of The Study
In testing weak form efficiency in Kuwait Stock market, two types
of data were employed, daily and weekly closing prices.	 The
results showed the Kuwait Stock market to be inefficient. 	 In
interpreting the results the reader should bear in mind the
problems concerning the data. The appreciation of the three
statistical tools to daily and weekly time series data on Kuwaiti
Stocks requires the data to be clean if the results of ineffi-
ciency of Kuwaiti market are to be interpreted with any confi-
dence.	 The use of unclean data often results in misleading
conclusions about relationships not inherent in the data.
11.5.1.	 Necessary Data 
To measure the efficiency of a market, data should have the
following features:
1. They should measure the actual trading prices of securities
listed on tha szlchange.
2. Closing prices of the securities sampled in the test should
be available.
3. The dates should be known of the following:
a. cash dividends
b. stock dividends
c. stock Splits
d. reverse splits
e. rights exercised
f.	 changes in paid-in capital of the firms listed on the
exchange should be accurately given by the exchange
Information.
4.	 In the absence of an actual trade, the bid and ask prices for
the security should be quoted.,
11.5.2 Data Problem and Adjustments 
The data used in the study lack some of the necessary
.	
characteris-
tics	 In some trading days, weeks certain securities were-not
traded.	 To include these inactive securities in the sample we
need the bid and asked prices. Therefore the sample was limited
to the relatively more actively traded securities in the market.
EvPr in the case of actively traded securitiec, some pl-ic=u
missing because of lack of trading on some trading days. 	 The
missing prices represent from 5 to 15 per cent of the total
observation for various securities.	 Lack of quoted bid and asked
prices for some securities in the sample caused a second problem
of missing price data for inactively traded securities. Efforts
were made to generate the missing data by differential regression
techniques, but in almost all cases the techniques tended to
project the trend of the price changes for the whole
period to the missing prices In a manner that seemed to over-
estimate or under-estimate these prices. Consequently, the
missing data were estimated on the assumption that the price
changes (either negative or positive) occurred evenly over time.
The price differential between two points of time for which the
data existed was divided evenly into the periods during which such
price changes occurred. Although a study using missing data is
not as strong as one where data are complete, the incomplete data
are a reflection of the market condition in the Kuwait Stock
Exchange. The Exchange Is In an early stage of development, and
tbe lack pi price data In uume periods may be the cc:ooze- --- of
the incomplete Information system that Is a characteristic of this
stage of capital development.
	 A second deficiency in the dote
was the absence of the dates of dividend payments.
	 This defi-
ciency further limited the sample size. A third deficiency is
the lack of a market index to reflect the general trend in securi-
ties' price movements on a day-to-day, hour-to-hour and even
minute-to-minute basis. Theoretically, the market index contains
the prices of all marketable securities but in practice an index
is so designed to otstitt ccrtain numbers or seculitiee to
represent the market movements.	 The marked index can benefit the
investors in making their investment decision. A fourth defi-
ciency in the available data is the lack of data of changes in the
amount of paid in capital of the Listed Corporation, particularly
during the early part of the weekly period undeistudy. This
information is of vital importance in construction of a market
index.	 A fifth problem is a lack of closing prices for the year
19R3. The Ex,L..se gives two sets of daily traded prices (Mail
and low) for weekly data and one set of daily traded prices.
Since the high or low prices do not imply that they are closing
price, we used the average prices (where average is defined as the
simple mean' of the low and the high prices). The above
constraints reduce the size of the sample in each period and might
affect the results.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 11
1 The requirement (of at least three-period reports) may
gradually improve the firm's performance because it may look
undesirable for a company to show profits (or losses) for
several years in a publicly read newspaper.
2 . A closed circuit television or bulletin boards posted in the
bank to inform people of the exchange's opportunities may be
highly beneficial. In addition to this educational effort,
occasionally some of the operations of the Kuwait Stock
Exchange can be shown on the television.
3 The Banking Study Institute in Kuwait could add some finance
and allied courses to its curriculum. The Stock Exchange
may supervise the creation of a new school in the area of
accounting and finance.
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APPENDIX A
Forward Dealing a Comparison between Kuwait and USA
APPENDIX A
FORWARD DEALING: A COMPARISON
Deferred payments is a system sometimes practised in stock
exchanges, particularly in futures markets, A typical transaction
Is for the cash price of a given share to be, say, Li. at the
time. The investor orders a certain numter, tut instead of
paying in cash he gives a post-dated cheque, say, for 6 months
time. The premium for the deferment is 25 percent, so the
transaction between the buyer and the seller closes at the share
price plus 25 percent. According to accepted practice on
international stock exchanges, the shares are not acquired by the
buyer until the period of deferment has expired and the cheque
has been paid, nor is the buyer entitled to deal in the shares.
AL the stock exchngs in Kuwa i t, i t as another
Immediately after giving his post-dated cheque to the seller, the
buyer began to deal in the shares while the seller waited until
the deferment expired. The only guarantee of payment was mutual
confidence. In fact the underlying contract between the seller
and the buyer is unenforceable, as in Kuwait the banking law does
not recognise post-dating of cheques. The seller can therefore
technically present the cheque at a bank at any time between the
initial deal and the date on the che que and he would do this if
he felt he was at risk.
The system in the USA and UK is a little different. A system
called 'short selling' is applied. Short selling in the
securities market is basically selling shares one does not own
and borrowing the same number of shares in order to make delivery
to the purchaser. When one buys the stock later to return to the
lender, one hopes to do so at a lower price, thus making a
profit. Short selling may not be Il c =r1 as a device to depress
security prices artificia ll y and there are rillos in tho MYSF tn
enforce this prohibition. • No short sale of a stock is permitted
-1-
except on a rising price. Brokers gladly lend stocks to others
since the borrowing broker pays the lender a cheque for the stock
borrowed in the amount of its market value. This represents in
essence an interest-free loan to the lender. On rare occasions
the lender needs to repossess this stock and if the borrower is
unable to borrow again from another source, the short seller will
be forced to re-purchase the short stock immediately. Despile
this being a well-publicised method of short selling, it is
actually quite a rare occurrence. Early in 1977 an attempt was
made in the USA to impose a regulated system of forward dealing
whereby the buyer was required to pay over the premium element at
once, and the balance on maturity, but would not receive delivery
until all payment had been completed. This system was close to
the system of option dealing used in London but lacked the
essential feature that the buyer could withdraw at the cost of
losing his premium.
An cation is a contract entitling
 the hr.- 14=r to buy or =e ll =
designated security called 'underlying security' at or within e
certain period of time (particular-date) called the 'expiration
date', and at a particular price. In fact there are a large
number of types of option contracts but they all have one element
in common. A 'call option' gives the buyer the right to purchase
100 shares of underlying security from the option writer at the
agreed price, call the 'exercise price' and a 'put option' gives
the buyer the right to sell. In either case, the option contract
may be exercised on or before the 'expiration' date in the case
of an 'American option', and only on the expiration date in the
case of a 'European option' ,1
The problem in Kuwait is that because the present system depends
on the fact that the buyer and the seller are personally known to
each other, it is difficult for new investors or smell
shareholders to get access to the market. If no one knows
them, no one may be willing to deal with them until they have
established their good name and reliability . . Occasionally in
these i-irrumstanc 0q a broker will give a helping hand by
-2-
guaranteeing a new entrant to the market.
A study has been made of the possibility of establishing a more
formal centralised system for handling orders based on that in
use in Frankfurt. Under this system all orders would be passed
to a neutral official price market who would match orders and set
quotations on the basis of the bids and offers received. The
small investors who wished to buy 1000 shares at one price would
rank ahead of a large buyer of 25,000 shares at a lower price. A
full blown market-making system such as the London Jobbing system
would stand no chance in the kuwait market as there is too much
action for a Jobber to operate profitably. The call-over system
as practised in Paris and elsewhere would be unacceptable to
Kuwait investors as it fixes only one price each day and gives no
scope for the continuous trading that is the life blood of the
Kuwait market.
NOTES
1	 See Elton & Grobev, 'Modern portfolio Theory and Investment
Analysis' for more description.
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APPENDIX B
RESOLUTION NO. 61-1976:
To organise the Stock Market the Minister of Trade and Industry
issued Ministerial Resolution No. 61/1976 in 25 Articles as
follows:
1) This order regulates dealings in the instruments of th2
Kuwaiti Public Companies (e.g. shares and securities).
2) There shall be formed a Commission under the description
'Securities Commission' to regulate dealing in the
Instruments specified in Article 1, to supervise such
dealings and to peve the way to create a Stock Exchange.
3) The Securities Commission shall discharge, within the limits
laid down in the laws and regulations l , all functions of
such a nature as to normalise transactions in such a way as
to safeguard investors and companies interests and shall, in
particular, do the following:
A	 Lay down regulating rules for the negotiations in
securities to include:
i) Ways and means of dealing in securities..
ii) Registration of Companies whose securities are
negotiable.
iii) Regulation of Spot and Futures contracts.
iv) Specification of the minimal date required to be
provided 'periodically by Companies authorised to
issue negotiable securities and issuing
periodicals in that respect.
v) The determination of the unit of dealing.
vi) Fixing commission rates
1
vii) Fixing dealing hours
viii) The provisional suspension of dealings in a given
Company's Securities due to abnormal changes in
the prices thereof, or in all articles and
securities should need arise and subsequent to
necessary investigations.
• Consider and decide upon complaints by dealers and
brokers
• Submit recommendations to raise the standard of dealing
in securities, to promote and propagate investment
consciousness.
• Submit studies to create a permanent Stock Exchange and
suggest the necessary legislation.
4)	 The Securities Commission shall consist of ten members as
follows:
A Two representatives of the Trade and Industry Ministry,
of which one shall be the Chairman, to be known as the
Government Delegate, and in the absence of whom the
other representative shall replace him with all his
powers.
• A representative of the Central Bank.
• Two representatives of the Kuwaiti Chamber of Commerce
and Industry, one of whom will be a Chairman of the
Board of a Company whose securities are negotiable, but
not being an investment company.
• A registered stockbroker representative, to be elected
by his peers:
• A representative of investment shareholding companies
incorporated by an Emiri Decree.
Three acknowledged experts.
5)	 The Chairman and Members of the Securities Commission shall
be appointed and their v=uneratioft :shall be determinsd
- 2 -
under an order by the Trade and Industry Minster for tIbtrae
years, renewable.
6) The commission shall convene at least ten times annually, at
the invitation of the Chairman.
7) The Stock Market Committee shall appoint an Executive
Committee under the Chairmanship of the government
representative and comprising three members from the main
committee, one of whom shall be a broker. Its task shall be
restricted to monitoring share trading transactions and
operations within the powers conferred upon it; it shall
submit interim reports about its activities to the Stock
Market Committee, and shall meet twice a month at least.
Its decisions shall be effective after endorsement by the
Ministry of Commerce and Industry.
8) A permanent arbitration committee shall be appointed from
amongst members of the Stock Market Committee to look dnto.
complaints and disputes from traders and brokers referred to
It.
9) The government representative shall be responsible for the
implementation of decisions and recommendations by the Stock
Market Committee after endorsement by the Minister of
Commerce and Industry; he shall also submit proposals and
studies to the Committee.
10) The Securities and Investment Department of the Ministry of
Commerce and Industry shall be entrusted with all executive
tasks concerning share trading including the issuing of
trading coupons, registration of transactions, the issuing
of handouts and pamphlets, control the activities of brokers
and checking their registers to verify compliance with the
Department rules; control over adjustments in registers • of
equity partners in companies whose shares are traded in
under the Committee's supervision, and any other tasks
deemed necessary for the implementation of decisions by the
Stock Market Committee.
- 3 -
The Securities Administration acted as the Executive Authority
for the Stock Exchange and consisted of four sections; brokers,
data and statistics, Companies, and dealing control. It had 16
members. The role of the Securities Administration can be
summarised as follows2:
1	 To distribute books and coupons of spot and futures dealings
among the brokers for a nominal fee.
2	 To receive and record transactions coupons from brokers
3 To record dealings and prices on noticeboards in the
operations Hall of the Stock Exchange and to display prices
on closed circuit television screens.
4 To keep records of transaction coupons, which are to be
retained and used as formal documents in the event of any
offence.
5	 To issue daily bulletins of the quantities in circulation
and the prices thereof for publication in the daily press,
the bulletins to be compiled subsequently to make weekly:
monthly, quarterly and annual bulletins.
NOTES
1 . Ministerial Resolution No 61/1976 on Organisation of Trading
in the Securities of Kuwait Public Companies, Kuwait Al-
Yawm, No.1108, 7.11.76 - See also Figure B.1
2	 Article No. 14 in Ministerial Resolution No.61/1976.
	
See
also Figure B.2
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APPENDIX C
Organisation of the Kuwait Stock Exchange Management
APPENDIX C
ORGANISATION OF THE KUWAIT STOCK EXCHANGE MANAGEMENT
A Membership
Articles No. 13 and No. 10 of the 1983 Act specify the Kuwait
Stock Exchange membership as follows:
1	 All Kuwaiti shareholding companies who shares are publicly
traded.
2	 Kuwaiti private companies whose shares are licenced by the
Stock Exchange Committee.
3	 Kuwaiti security dealers.
Members are to comply with all the rules and regulations of the
KSE Manual. This includes regular reporting and disclosure; KSE
management authority to look into share holders' books and their
holdings; and payment of registration fees and other annual fees.
The registration fee is 0.01% of capital and membership fee KD
. 10,000 (US$ 31,500).
B Technical Bodies
Article No. 46 of 1983 KSE Act calls for the establishing of a
financial and Economics Department comprising specialised
technical staff to assist the Stock Exchange management to
perform its function and realising its objective effectively as
follows:
1	 Price follow-up section. Assume responsibility of collecting
the data relating to all securities whether listed or
transacted in the Stock Exchange, besides preparing the
statistical indicators showing the movement and fluctuation
of prices of such securities.
2	 Credit-Sale-Control Section. Assume the duties of following
up the traffic of credit sales, besides proposing the
-1-
appropriate basis and rules required for 'rationalising and
directing the credit sale transactions regarding the volume
of dealings, their maturity date, prices, trends, and
variations in comparison with past prices.
3 Information Compilation, Analysis and Publication Section.
Assume the responsibility of compiling and analysing the
data and ' information concerning the Stock Exchange, the
securities and Pertinent companies, besides preparing the
relevant studies and issuing the daily bulletins on
transactions, prices and returns, as well as all periodical
publications comprising the data compiled in respect of the
pertinent dealings, the prices and companies whose
securities are transacted within the Stock Exchange in
addition to the publication of the financial. indicators,
showing the financial standing of the said companies.
4 Investigation Section. This section is to assume
responsibility for investigating all issues and matters the
Stock Exchange Directors may entrust it with, in order to
verify the extent of accuracy and authenticity of the
information and data issued by the companies whose
securities are under dealing in the Stock Exchange. This
Section will also conduct all necessary investigations on -
the disputes committed to the Arbitration Committee and then
submit a detailed report covering its findings on the
disputed	 issue,	 duly	 supported	 by	 all	 necessary
documentation.
C Market Income 
Article 12 of the KSE 1983 Act specified the following sources of
income:
proceeds of the services rendered by the Stock Exchange
-
The income of the funds invested by the Stock Exchange
-
The proceeds of the penalties imposed in accordance wihh the
provisions of this Law Decree of 1983.
2
- Any fee or charges imposed or levied for the benefit of the
Stock Exchange.
- Any other revenues approved by the Stock Exchange Committee.
Others.
D Abitration and Punishment 
The arbitration committee headed by a judge is responsible for
dealing with disputes concerning the Stock Exchange., Also, the
punishment committee is responsible for resolving disputes and
accusation of the dealers, brokers, and the registered companies
of misconduct and non-conformity with rules and regulations.
Punishment ranges from warnings to fines, temporary suspension of
the stock dealers, and dismissals.
E Brokers 
Security brokers are companies authorised to represent traders.
These companies who are accepted to carry on brokerage should.
satisfy the following conditions (Article 21):
1	 should be Kuwaiti public company with all shareholders of
. Kuwaiti nationality.
2 The brokers performing the functions of brokerage in the
company shall be Kuwaitis, having attained educational
qualification not lower than Kuwaiti General Secondary
School Certificate or its equivalent or having secured an
adequate experience with satisfactory training to a level
acceptable to the Committee.
3 The Director of the company, the partners authorised to
perform management functions should have not been declared
bankrupt, whether in Kuwait or abroad, nor should they be
convicted of any felony or imprisoned for any crime.
4 These companies are to comply with other conditions set by
KSE management regarding capital which is to be KD 100,000
and to have banker's guarantee.
K	 The company should satisfy the renni rement of Any further
3
conditions laid down by the Stock Exchange -Committee.
- At the time of practising the profession of stock-broking, the
brokers are to comply with the following:
Firstly, to abide by the provisions of the Decree regulating the
activities of Kuwait Stock Exchange, its by-laws (internal rules
and regulations) as well as all resolutions and instructions
issued by the Stock Exchange. Secondly, to strictly observe that
transactions are done within the Stock Exchange Hall during the
fixed official working hours, and meanwhile refrain from
practising any brokerage business outside the said Hall or during
non-official working hours. Thirdly, the brokers are not allowed
to carry out any business which may affect the reputation of the
Stock Exchange. Fourthly, a broker may not conclude any deals
for his own account. Fifthly, to refrain from cart-ling out any
work that may result in arranging or participating in the
creation of fictitious transactions not leading to a real
exchange of the securities under dealing. Sixth, the brokers are
not allowed to conduct any business that may prejudice his duties
as a broker responsible to execute securities transactions for
his clients at the best terms of sale or purchase available, duly
based on the information secured by him at the time of dealing
Seventh, he should not disclose any confidential information •
received by him by virtue of his office as a broker. Eighth, he
should not publish any comments or opinions relating to
securities and their trends in any manner. Ninth, the broker
should exert adequate efforts, duly cooperating with all brokers
for securing the best interest of the Stock Exchange and the
smooth running of its dealings.
Article 26 of the 1983 - Act calls for the brokers to keep
commercial books and records for registration of all dealings
made by them in a chronological order (date-wise) in the manner
specified by the Stock Exchange Administration.
The brokers should be Kuwaiti nationals, not less than 25 years
• old, and be of good conduct and behaviour.
-4-
A broker may be deleted from the Broker Register if he fails to
satisfy any of the conditions stipulated ' in Article 21 of the
1983 Act; in case of his failure to pay the registration fees or
settle the annual subscription, and if he fails to complete the
bank guarantee within the grace period determined by the Stock
Exchange Committee.
F Security Trading
The Kuwait Stock Exchange (KSE) manual states the following rules
regarding the trading of securities:
1 Only registered securities are td be traded, and trading is
to be held at KSE premises inside the trading room, through
a registered dealer and all deals are to be concluded and
recorded on the Kuwait Stock Exchange records.
2 A minimum of one controller from the Stock Exchange
Management is to be constantly available at the Stock
Exchange during the trading session. The controller shall
keep the Stock Exchange director informed of any disputed
transactions for the purpose of taking any necessary
measures.
3 The price section is to monitor the trading and price
movement and fix the rate of price fluctuations in order to
ensure the stability and systematic flow of dealings.
4 The KSE Committee announce the deals and the relevant
volumes transacted in each of the securities listed for
dealing, and any other information it feels necessary and
useful.
G Disclosure
The financial disclosure rules set by the Kuwait Stock Exchange
are mainly based on Act No 15/1960 which requires all commercial
cOmpanies to have a record of operations readily available for
investors. Besides, the Company should have a record containing
the names of all share holders together with their addresses,
size of holdings, the paid . up share, date of purnhnse nnd date of
sale. These records are to be open for 14W ally/
shareholder free of charge, and for a nominda. #4:*0 tt9 (SztritEir
people.
Recognising the importance of information for effiloEtittt3,Y Sff Otte
Stock Market, the Kuwait Stock Exchange management Itutii litiEtetP
working toward the strict enforcement of the above reqodatimaartta-P..
However, the KSE movement in this direction has been sno.w
of many obstacles that include the following:
1	 Lack of standardised accounting procedure in Kuwait-	 late
law does not call for that.
2	 Lack of qualified accountants in the concerned companies-
3	 Clear conflict as the auditors who are supposed to cheek an
the statements prepared by accountants are the • same peopne
who prepare the accounts. The law is not clear about thIs
issue.
4 The management of most companies, mainly die to ignorance,
is not aware of, or does not appreciate the important mile
of good accounting and honourable accounts.
The Kuwait Stock Exchange, in an effort to remedy the situation,
contracted the registered auditors and specified the objective of
the financial reports and the factors that should be taken into
consideration in the process of preparing financial statements.
These include:
1	 The financial reports should contain factual and true
information;
2 The information provided in these reports should be correct.
Detailed information should be provided about revenues,
expenditure together with dividend payments.
3	 Any financial information that affects securities tredins
should be provided to the KSE management.
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APPENDIX D
THE DEVELOPMENT OF LEGISLATION
1)	 THE FIRST LAW No.57/1982:
This involved forward dealings related to Company Shares.
	 The
Law consisted of nine Articles and was passed on 20.9.82.
Article No.1:
All dealings made on a long term basis for which post dated
cheques were issued or other method of payment agreed and which
were not settled, must be registered within 30 days from the date
of the Law. Registration would be done at places designated by
the Commerce Minister who would also lay down the procedures and
requirements. Any claim, request or complaint would not be
entertained or investigated unless registered within the
stipulated times.
Article No.2:
One or more Boards of Arbitration would be formed and this would
be decided by the Cabinet. 	 Each board would be headed by a
judge and would have five members. 	 The board would be the only
body authorised to settle disputes as stated in Article 1. The
board could take steps to prevent utilisation of funds or to stop
a person leaving the country.
Article No.3:
Registered deals would be transferred to the board and those
concerned would be notified. Undecided cases before the Courts
would be transferred to the board. All civil and other punitative
measures, including bankruptcy, were suspended.
Article No.4:
The board could settle dicputes without being restricted by
procedures of the Code of Commerci ,.. 1 end civil procedures. The
needs of the national economy would be borne in mind. It would
decide whether to cancel a deal. It would also decide the
instalments for settling dues. The decision of the board was
final. Those who did not abide by the decisions would be liable
to face civil procedures including notice of bankruptcy.
Article No.5:
The board had the right to alter the long term prices agreed by
contracting parties and bring the prices into line with the
market prite at the time of contract, plus a rate specified by
decree of the cabinet.
Article No 6:
Concerned parties could settle initially on condition that this
did not offend the rights of others..
Article No 7:
The Justice Minister would issue a decree detailing the work of
the Board of Arbitration.
Article No 8:
This decree would be in force for one year frcm the date of
enactment. It could be extended by another decree for one year
morel.
The Council of Ministers, having seen the result of registration
of forward dealing transactions, issued Resolution No.49/1982 on
24.10.82, which states:2-
1 The specification of the percentage to be allocated for
legitimate profit in Article 5 of Law No.57/1982 having been
left to the Council of Ministers to decide, the Council
ruled that the percentage to be added to the spot prices at
the time of contracting was to be the same percentage as the
one agreed between the two parties at the time of contract,
unless they had agreed to a lower percentage.
2	 The Council also decreed that if the date shown on the post
dated cheque was later thou 20.9.82, the value thereof was
-2-
• to be reduced to the spot price plus percentage of interest,
representing the balance between the price of forward buying
and the spot price in the proportion of the time elapsed to
20.9.82 to be paid, in cash or by the Fund.
Law No.57/1982 affected the regulation of security bonds for
forward dealing in shares. It complemented and confirmed
Resolution No.49, providing further elucidation especially in
relation to the categories to which the security fund should make
payments3 , which are as follows:.
- Transactions not in excess of KD 100,000 were to be paid
immediately on the declaration of the award by the
Arbitration Board.
- Transactions of over KD 100,000 but not exceeding KD 250,000
were to be paid in bonds maturing 6 months from the date of
the award by the Arbitration Board.
- Transactions over KD 250,000 but not exceeding KD 500,000
were to be paid in bonds maturing 12 months from the date of
the first award by the Arbitration Board.
- Transactions of over KD 500,000 but not exceeding KD 750,000
were to be paid in bonds maturing 3 years from the date of
the first award by the Arbitration Board.
- Transactions of over KD 750,000 but not exceeding KD 1
million were to be paid in bonds maturing 43 years from the
date of the first awards.
- Transactions of over KD 1 million but not exceeding KD 1.5
million were to be paid in bonds maturing 51 years from the
date of the first award of the Arbitration Board.
- Transactions over KD 1.5 million but not exceeding KD 2
million were to be paid in bonds maturing 6 years from the
date of the first. award by the Arbitration Board.
Within any of the classifications listed above, individual
amounts might be totalled if the aggregate sum exceeded the
maximum.
	 Any excess was carried forth into the next bond.
Law 57/1982 also ruled out that no payments due to any one person
should exceed MD 2m, and any application for payments in excess
of KD 2m would be disallowed.
Pursuant to Law No.57, the Minister of Finance issued Resolution
No.5/1983 to regulate what came to be known as the Fund for
Security and Share Transaction.	 It was established at a capital
of MD 500 million to be paid from the State Public Reserve. The
Fund was to collect 1 percent of the basic value of any cheque,
which was to be transferred to the State Public Reserve.
2	 The Second Law No.59/1982
This Law related to forward dealing and the protecting of the
rights of debtors.
	 This Law was passed on 22.11.82: signed into
Law by the Emir (President) of Kuwait. Law 59 consisted of 18
Articles, seven of which related to the regulation of the powers.
of the Board of Arbitration, authorising it to settle disputes
without being bound to observe the rules laid down in the Civil
and Commercial Procedures Act.	 It granted the Board the power
to decide on issues of confiscation, house arrest and withdrawal
of passport. The Board was also charged to refer dealers to the
Public Prosecution Authorities for bankruptcy proceedings and
Imprisonment where it was established that they had concealed
property or transferred goods abroad and failed to comply with
the Board's decision to return money owed within the period
specified.
Article No.6 set a period of not more than two years for
settlement of disputes submitted to it.
Six Articles outlined the details of a fund to guarantee debtors
rights.
Article No. 8 ruled that the Fund should be established
under guarantee from the Ministry of Finance with a capital
of MD 500 million, to be taken from the States Public
article No.9 outlined the objectives of the Fund, which were
to secure the rights of debtors unpaid as a result of
forward transactions in shares registered according to the
provisions of Law No.57/1982.
Article No.10 specified the functions of the fund as
follows:
a the repayment of debts resultant from the said
transactions under paragraph 1 of the previous Article
and , after delivery of the award to the creditor
against the debtor and the assurance of a decision by
the Arbitration Board formed under Article 1 of the
said Law, to refer the debtor to the Public Prosecution
Authorities for bankruptcy proceedings to be initiated
against him under Article 3 of the Act.
To invest the monies at the disposal of the Fund in the
way deemed most suitable.
To take all legal actions against the debtors to
recover whatever payments were made on their behalf to
their creditors.
To refund any surplus to the State Public Reserve.
Article No.14 and 15: ordered the Minister to implement the
Law, each according to his jurisdiction.
Article No.16: the Government undertook to submit a full
report of all the cases which were registered in time and
referred to the Board of Arbitration within 30 days of the
Law coming into effect and to submit a detailed report of
the Board's adjustments every three months.
Law 57 and 59 both assumed that the debtor should honour his
debts in full, under pain of being declared bankrupt. The
Arbitration Board took on the role of debtor and paid the
creditor through the fund. The laws failed, however, to put the
market and the dealers on a healthier footing.
At the beginning of January 1983, the Offset Committee and the
5
Board of Arbitration began work. The results of their first
week's research were as follows4:
- number of people who had registered with the Offset
Committee: 5,509
- number of cheques submitted to the Committee : 28,878
- Number of cheques for persons other than those placed
under interdiction: 1,200
- Number of cases of interdiction ordered by the Board of
Arbitration: 60
- Value of cheques submitted to the Committee: KD
2,676,712,427,625
On 19th January 1983, the Kuwait Offset Committee started to pay
out from the Security Fund to those entitled to it on account of
forward dealing, under Article 14 of the Minister of Finance's
decision No.5/19835
3	 The Third Law No.75/1983:
Settlement of Transaction connected with Foreward Dealing. This
Law was passed on 20.4.83. It consisted of 25 Articles 5 . The
first established an independent judicial organisation attached
to the Ministry of Finance. Its purpose was the settlement of
transaction, the evaluation of the assets of those referred to
it,	 and	 the	 administration,	 liquidation	 control	 and
Implementation	 of	 all	 settlements,	 bankruptcies	 -"
reconciliations which came under the Law. Law 75's 	 basic
objectives were:
1) To help the creditors of the bankrupt, since the long
wait while the bankruptcy assets w .?re sorted out macle
it difficult for them to repay their own debts.
2) The valuation of the financial commitments of every
bankrupt before the end of the lengthy bankruptcy
procedures, in order to sort out debtors end creditors.
3) To remedy the situation created by the two previouc
6
Laws, wherein the debtor of someone declared bankrupt
was bound to repay his own debts promptly although
unable to collect what was owing before the end of the
bankruptcy procedures.
4) To reduce cases of bankruptcy to a minimum.
5) To entrust the supervision of bankruptcy cases to an
independent body, so as to avoid the properties of the
bankrupt being put up for sale simultaneously.
The explanatory note to the Act stated that in order to achieve
the above-mentioned objective, the Law had provided as follows7:
1 To found the Organisation for the Settlement of
transactions related to Forwards Dealings in Company
shares.
2 To refer those whose financial position was disturbed
to the organisation, preventing them from disposing of.
their goods and property, and to appoint the
Organisation sequestrator (Article 4). The Organisation
would prepare a report to show their real financial
position (Article 5), the value of their money and size
of their debts arising from forward dealing.
3) To take prompt action to define the financial situation
of the debtor.
4) Friendly settlement: when the Board of Arbitration
referred a person of irregular financial position to
the Organisation, he would not be referred forthwith tc
the bankruptcy Court but the Organisation would
endeavour to arrange for a friendly settlement between
him and his creditors. If such a settlement was
preferred by a majority of three quarters of •the
creditors, it would be applied to all the creditors.
Any settlement achieved in this manner would be
referred to the Board of Arbitration for approval.
5:	 Referral to the Bankruptcy Cotfitt to be related yore
7
closely to the poor financial situation of- the
Individual.
6) Simplification of reconciliation procedures to prevent
bankruptcy.
7) Offsetting of debts would take place in spite of
bankruptcy (Article 17).
8) Simplification of the procedures for judicial
reconciliation, and reconciliation with the disclaimer
for properties.
9) All verdicts would be final. If a debt arising from
forward dealings in shares was disputed, due
jurisdiction to decide on such a dispute would be the
prerogative of the Board of Arbitration rather than the
Bankruptcy Court, which would refer such a dispute to
the Board of Arbitration for an award thereon.
10) The actual value of bonds would be determined once
repayments were completed, whether through settlement,
reconciliation or bankruptcy. Such bonds were liable to
discount or mortgage8.
On 17th April 1983, the Council of Ministers issued Resolution
No. 16/1983 in respect of the formation of the Board of Directors
for the Organisation for the Settlement of Transactions Related
to Forward Dealings in Company Shares. The Board of Directors for
the Organisation would be chained by the Minister of finance and
would include the following members (Article 1):
1	 A representative of the Ministry of Finance to be
nominated by the Minister.
2	 A representative of the Ministry of Commerce and
Industry to be nominated by the Minster.
3	 A judge to be nominated by the Judicial Council.
4	 A representative of the real Estate Registration
Department Fn be nominated by the Minister of Justice.
8
5	 A representative of the Kuwait Chamber of Commerce and
Industry to be nominated by its Board of Directors.
6	 A representative of the Offset Committee to be
appointed by its Board of Directors.
7)	 Three experts and competent members to be nominated by
the Council of Ministers for a period of two years.
Resolution No.14/21 of 1983, issued by the Council of Ministers,
with respect of the Organisation for the Settlement of
Transactions Related to Forward Dealings in Company Shares, which
specified the Organisation's procedural . and internal
administrative rules.
In spite of all measures, the market continued to collapse.
Bankruptcies were still on the increase and share 'certificates
virtually worthless. Efforts to deal with the crisis had been
shortsighted and inadequate. Concentrating on the symptoms rather .
than the causes.
From the beginning of the crisis, until 1984, the Government
devoted all its energy to the market, devising first one solution
then another. Everything that could be calculated had been
analysed: size of debts, number of victims, bankruptcies and post
dated cheques. The Offset Committee had been set up, the Security
Fund, the Board of Arbitration and the Organisation for the
Settlement of Transactions and the promulgation of several
legislative instruments (Law Nos. 57/1982 and 75/1983). Still 95
percent of the problem remained unsolved. In spite of this, the
integrity of the banking system was in no danger. Reserve and
supplies were adequate. the Government put at the disposal of the
Central Bank several devices to help the commercial banks
maintain their liquidity.
4	 The Fourth Law No.100/1983:
This included some provisions connected with the Settlement of
transactions rolated to forward dealins. This Law was passed
14.8.83 with the approval of the national Assembly. It was over A
9
year since the start of the crisis, and three other laws had
failed to control its spread.
The new law differed essentially from the previous ones in that
it was the first to adopt the principle of reducing debts. The
Government argued that this Law would have the following
results9:
1	 A solution to 60 - 70 percent of the problem, debts
reduced to 40 percent.
2 Seven people still in possession of a surplus of MD
40,000 would become insolvent, and a further two with a
surplus of MD 730,000 between them.
3	 Eighty one people would move from deficit to surplus.
4	 Eighty one people would move from deficit to surplus.
5	 The number with a deficit would be reduced to 548,
amounting to a total of MD 1,600 million.
This new law consisted of ten Articles and included a number of
radical provisions10:
Article No.1: Under the Law, all debts arising from forward
dealings in shares would fall due as from the date on which the
new law took effect, if they had not fallen due already.
Article No 2: stipulated that Offset should prevail as a rule
between all dealers if the person entitled thereto insisted upon
it.
Article No. 3: all awards and amicable settlements approved by
the Board of Arbitration prior to the new law should stand. As
for the debts due on those who ere referred to the organisation
prior to the new law taking effect, if the debts had already been
repaid by the fund, the provision in respect of the reduction of
the amount of debt should supply.
The new Law granted the Board of Arbitration the power to reduce
the percentage to 25 percent or even to abolish it should
circumstances warrant. The Board should use its powers after
reviewing the position of the debtor. The new Law No.100 departed
from the earlier ones in that it could enforce penal sanctions.
• The new Law also avoided the shortcomings of the Law No.75/1903,
-10 -
which set the end of 1983 as the date when all such debts would
fall due. While the previous laws ruled that the debtor should
repay his debts without modification, the new one decreed that
debts should be reduced to the spot price on the day of the
dealing, plus a percentage of profit to represent the difference
between the forward purchase price agreed upon and the spot
price, taking into account the time that had lapsed until the
date of maturation, provided that such a percentage should not
exceed 25 percent per annum of the spot price.
Article No.5: ruled that the Board of Arbitration should
reconsider the awards delivered prior to the new law coming into
effect in the case of those dealers who were referred to the
Organisation.
Article No.6: allowed the Board of Arbitration to form sub-
committees to be chaired by one of its members and to include one
or more of its other members and specialist experts whom it might
select from a roster to be issued by a resolution from the
Minister of Justice. The subcommittees would help with
preparation of cases, the compilation of necessary documents and
the submission of reports to the Board in the light of which the
Board would issue its award or decisions related to the relevant
case. Loopholes in the new law stirred controversy among dealers_
One problem was that lists of spot prices for Gulf shares were
not published every day during the two years 1981-82. The Board
of Arbitration tried to reach a compromise despite conflicting
records. The chairman of the Board of Arbitration made it clear
that the Board would not reduce the interest rate below 25
percent unless the debtor certified by an officially audited
balance sheet, was unable to meet his liabilities if interest was
charged at 25 percentil.
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tWE CGtIPAUY NeK
SERIAL CORRELATION COEFFICIINTS FOR FERCENTGE PRICE D IANE WEEKLY
PERIOD	 R -1.	 -.9 -.9 -.7 -.6 -.5 -.4 -.3 -.2 -.1	 .0	 .1	 .2	 .3	 .4	 .5	 .6	 .7	 .8	 .9	 1.0
1	 0.2100	 ...... I...X
2	 0.1110	 I	 	 XI
3	 -0.1300
4	 0.1060	 I	
	 XI
5	 0.1100	 I	 	 XI
6	 0.1040	 I	 	 XI
7	 -0.1220
8	 0.1210	 I	 	 X
9	 0.1050	 	 XI
10	 0.1120	 I	 	 XI
11
	
-0.1940	 X.. ......	 I
12	 0.1560	 I	 I  X
13	 0.1130	 I	 	 XI
14	 0.0550	 I	 ...X I
15	 -0.1100	 I
16	 0.1210	 I	 	 X
17	 0.1060	 I	 	 XI
18	 -0.1010	 I X....
1 9
	0.1090	 i	 	 X I
20	 0.1100	 I	 	 X I
21	 0.1190	 I	 	 XI
22	 0.1220	 I	 	 XI
23	 0.2070	 I	 I  X
24	 0.1100	 I	 	 X	 I
25	 0.1430	 I	 	 X
NAME COMPANY
SERIAL CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS FOR FERCENTOE PRICE CR44GE WEEKLY
PERIOD
	
R -1.	 -.9 -.8 -.7 -.6 -.5 -.4 -.3 -.2 -.1	 .0	 .1	 .2	 .3	 .4	 .5	 .6	 .7	 .8	 .9	 1.0
1	 0.1010	 	 XI
2	 0.1 9 10	 	  i..X
3	 0.1 960	 	 X
4	 0.1200	 	 X
5	 0.1160	 	 XI
6	 0.1200	 	 X
7	 0.2960	 I 	 X
8	 -0.1230
9	 -0.1060
10	 0.1110	 	 XI
11	 0.1580	 I  X
12	 0.1 990	 ...... I..X
13	 0.2120
14 
	
I	 	 X
15	 0.1010
	
I	 	 XI
16	 -0.1040	 IX....	 I
17	 -0.1470	 xl 	
18	 0.1210	 I	 	 XI
19	 0.1180	 I	 	 	 I
20	 0.1650	 I
21	 0.0170
22	 0.1280	 IXI
23	 . 	 I
24	 0.1430	 	 X
25	 0.092G	 ....x	 I
NAME MIMI( : C21(
SERIAL CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS FOR PERUNTGE PRICE CHANH WEEXLI
PERIODR -1.	 -.?	 • .8 -.7 -.6 -.5 -.4 -.3 -.2 -.1
	
.0	 .1	 .2	 .3	 .4	 .5	 .6	 .7	 .3	 .9	 I..
	
1	 0.1970	 I...... I..X
	2 	 0.1300	 I	 	  IX
	
3	 0.0680	 ...X
	
4	 0.1010	
	 X
	
5	 -0.1070
	
6
	 -0.1910	 X.. ......
	
7	 0.1090	
	 X
	
8	 0.1430	 	 IX
	
9
	 0.2030	 	 ...X
	
10	 -0.1270
	
11	 -0.1110
	
12	 -0.2090	 X.
	
13	 0.4200	 I 	 I 	 X
	
14	 0.2030	 	 ...X
	
15	 0.1230
	
16	 -0.1210
	
17	 -0.1270
	
18	 0.1873
	19	 0.1020
	
I	
	 X
	
20	 0.2040
	
21	 -0.1620	 XI 	
	
22	 -0.1330
	
23	 0.1880	 I	 	 X
	
24	 0.1350
	
25	 0.1310
NAME COMPAlif : A8
SERIAL CORRELATION COEFFICIE173 FOR PERCENTGE PRICE CHANGE WEEMLf
PERIOD	 R -1.	 -.9 -.8 -.7 -.6 -.5 -.4 -.3 -.2 -.1	 .0	 .1	 .2	 .3	 .4	 .5	 .6	 .7	 .8	 .9	 I.(
	
+- --+- -4-
I	 0.1520
2	 0.2280	 I 	 I 	 X
3	 -0.0400
4	 -0.1220
5	 0.1210	 	 X
6	 0.1630	 IX
7	 -0.1300	 X 	
8	 -0.2130	 X... 	 	 I
9	 0.0270
10	 0.1310	 	  iy
II	 0.0370	 -X 	1
12	 0.1160	 	 XI
13	 0.1820	 ...... I..X
14 0.1m
15	 0.1330	 	 IX
16	 0.1130	 	 XI
17	 0.1290	 	 X
18	 0.1200.	I 	 	 XI
19	 0.1150 	 X I
20	 0.1741	 I  Y
21	 0.1010	 I	 	 X I
22	 0.1220	 I	 	 XI
23	 0.1030	 I	 	 X I
24	 0.1320	 	 X
25	 0.1430	 I	 	 X
WE COMPANY 1 8K1E
SERIAL CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS FOR PERCENTGE PRICE CR4IGE WEEKLI
PERIOD R -1.	 -.9 -.0 -.7 -.6 -.5 -.4 -.3 -.2 -.1	 .0	 ,1	 .2	 .3	 .4	 .5	 .6	 .7	 .8	 .9
	
1	 -0.1330 1
	
2	 0.1170	 	 XI
	
3	 0.2100	 I...... I...X
	
4	 0.1570	 I	 I  X
	5 	 0.1100	 	 Xi
	
6	 0.1140
	
7	 0.1070	 I	 	 XI
	
8	 0.1700	 1...... 1..X
	
9	 0.1040	 	 XI
	
10	 -0.1010	 Ix..,.	 1
	
11	 -0.1910	 X.. ......	 I
	
12	 0.1520	 I	 1  X
	
13	 0.1790	 I	 ...... 1..X
	
14	 0.1050	 	 XI
	
15	 0.1450	 1	 	 IX
	
16	 0.1190	 I	 	 X
	
17	 -0.1190	 X 	
	
la	 0.4650	 1	 	  1 	 X
	
19	 -0.1400
	
20	 0.1420	 1	 	 X
	
21	 0.2080	 I	 I  x
	
22	 -0.1010	 IX....
	
23	 0.1630	 I	 	 IX
	
24	 0.1520	 I	 	 IX
	
25	 0.3520	 I 	 I 	X
NAME COMM.( ; KPEP
SERIAL CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS FR PERCENTOE PRICE 0 41440E AEKLY
PERIOD R -1.	 -.9 -.8 - . 7 -.4 -.5 -.4 -.3 -.2 -.1	 .0	 .1	 .2	 .3	 .4	 .5	 .6	 .7	 .8	 .9	 1.
	1 	 0.01 9 0	 I	 X	 1
	
2	 0.1:00	 I	 Ix
	3 	 0.1110	 I	 	 XI
	4 	 0.1200
	
	 X
	
5	 0.1130	 	 XI
	6 	 0.1110	 I	 	 XI
	7 	 0.1260
	
8	 0.1070	 	 XI
	9 	 -0,1120
	
lv....	 I
	10	 0.0990	 ....X I
	 1	 0.1010	 I	 	 XI
	
12
	
0.1 900	 I...... I..X
	13	 0.1860	 I...... I.,X
	
14	 0.1280	 I	 	 X
	
15	 -1.1310
	
16	 -0.1900	 Y 	
	17	 0.1090	 	 XI
	 8	 0.0190	 I	 Y
	19	 -0.0880	 I X...
	20	 -0.1130	 1 X.-
	
21	 0.1210	 1	 	 A
	
22	 0.11 40	 1	 	 X
	
23	 0.2060	 7
	
24	 0.1110	 	 X
	
25	 0.079 0	 I	 ....X
NA11E CCtIPANY : 98
SERIAL CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS FOR PERCENTH P RICE CHANGE WEEYLY
PERIOD	 R -1.	 -.9 -.8 -.7 -.6 -.5 -.4 -.3 -,2 -.I
	 .1	 .2	 .3	 .6	 .3	 .6	 .7	 g
1	 0.1180	 I	 	 XI
2	 0.1290	 I	
	 X
3	 0.1070	
	 XI
4	 0.1220	 I	
	 X
5	 0.2010	
	 XI
6	 0.3650	 I 	 I 	X
7	 0.1070
	 I	
	 XI
8	 0.1010	
	 XI
9	 0.1560	 I	 IX
10	 0.1160	 I	
	 XI
11	 0.1770	 I...... I..X
12	 0.1090	 I	
	 XI
13	 -0.0150	 I	 X	 1
14	 -0.1670	 X. 	
15	 0.1300	 I	 	 IX
16	 0.1290	 I	 	 X
17	 0.1260	 I	 	 X
18	 0.1110	 I	 	 X /
19	 0.1790	 I	 I	  X
20	 0.1030	 I	 	 X I
21	 0.1010	 I	 	 X I
22	 0,1260	 	 XI
23	 0.1450	 	 X
24	 0.1260	 	 XI
25	 0.1310	 	 X
NAME CONP44Y !MR
SERIAL CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS FOR PERC@IT 7JE PRICE CHANGE NEEKLf
PERIOD R -1.	 -.9 -.8 -.7 -.6 -.5 -. 4 -.3 -.2 -.1	 .0	 .1	 .2	 .3	 .4	 .5	 .6	 .7	 .8	 .9	 1.
1	 -0.1510	 .1 
2	 0.2310 I 	X
3	 0.1970	 	 x
4	 -0.1180	 :X....	 1
5	 -0.1100	 IX....	 .1
6	 0.1120	 I	 	 XI
7	 0.1480	 I	
	 IX
8	 0.2440	 I 	 I 	X
9	 0.0110	 I	 X	 I
10	 0.1340
	
I	
	 IX
11
	 0.2270	 	 1....X
12	 0.1320
13	 0.1250	 	 X
14	 0.3060
	 ;
	 X
13	 0./200
16	 0.0;51	 ....X 1
17	 0.2350	 I 	 I 	 X
18	 0.1680	 1	 	 IX
19	 0.1240	 1	 	 XI
20	 0.2690	 I	 	 X
21	 0.2080	 I	 I  X
22	 0.2110	 I	 I  X
23	 -0.0760	 1 X...	 1
24	 -0.1730	 X  i 	 1
25	 -0.0990	 I X...
CilfAiff
SERIAL CORRELA:?; COEFFEIENtS FOR PE R CEITGE co ICE !".k4410E
PERIOD
	 R	
-.9	 -.7	 -.6	 -.9	 -.4 -.3 -.1 1 -.I
	 .J	 .1	 .2	 .3	 .4	 .5	 .6	 .7	 .8	 .9	 1.0
	
1	 -0.1650	 X.I 	
	
2	 -0.1180
	
3	 -0.1120
	
4	 -0.1540	 'A 	
	
5	 -0.1280
	6 	 -0.1600	 :Cl 	
	
7	 -0.1330	 xi 	
	
8	 -0,1290	 A 	
	9 	 -0.1110
	
10	 -0.2110
	
11	 -0.0980	 1 X 	
	
12	 0.1240	 1
	
13	 -0.1150
	
1 4	 -0.0870	 1 X
	
	
15	 -0.1150
	
16	 0.1140	 I	
	 XI
	
17	 -0.1190	 1
	
18	 -0.1330
	19	 -0.4310	 X 	
	
20	 -0.1320	 X 	
	
21	 -0.1230
	
22	 -0.0040	 I	 X
	
23	 -0.1920	 X.'	
	
24	 -0.154 0	 XI .....
	
25	 -0.1750	 X.I 	
NalE CCMPA.gY : kFTCIC
SERIAL COR;ELATICfl COEFFICIEITS ;OR PERU:MTGE F REE CHAME ';E:!.Lt
PERIOD	 R -1.	 -.9 -.8 -.7 -.6 -.5 -.4 -.3 -.2 -.I	 .0	 .1	 .2	 .3	 .4	 .5	 .6	 .7	 .8	 .9	 1.0
	 A.	 4	 .4 	 4	 4	 4	 4	 .44	 ,
	1 	 0.1220	 	 XI
	
2	 0.1020	 	 X
	
3	 0.1122	 I	
	 X
	
4	 0.010	 I	 X
	
5	 -0.1670	 x1 	
	
6	 -0.1210	 ly 	
	
7	 -0.1000
	
8	 -0.2110
	
9	 0.1020
	10	 -0,1170
	
11	 -0.1330
	
12	 -0.2270
	
13	 -0.1290
	
14	 -0.3710	 V 
	:5 	 -0.1250
	
16	 -0.3240
	
1 7	 -0.0170	 IX
	
18	 0.0000	 X
	
19	 0.1030
	
20	 0.1250
	
21	 -0.1020
	
22	 -1.1951	 c 	
	
23	 -C.2710
	
24	 1.31:1	 	 X
	
25	 C.1170
NAME COMPANY
	 KI1C
SERIAL CORRELA110N COEFFICIENTS FOR PERCSITGE PRICE CIAIGE WEEKLY
PERIOD	 R -1.	 -.9 -.9 -.7 -.6 -.5 -.4 -.3 -.2 -.1	 .0	 .1	 .2	 .3	 .4	 .5	 .6	 .7	 .8	 .9	 1.0
	
1	 -0.1170	 IX....	 I
	
2	 -0.0530	 I X..	 I
	
3	 0.1450	 	 IX
	
4	 0.1130	 IYI
	5 	 0.1130	 I	 	 XI
	
6	 -0.1310
	
7	 0.0130	 I	 X	 I
	
. 8	 0.0650
	 I	 ...X	 I
	
9	 0.2110
	 I...... I...X
	
10	 0.1110	 I	 	 XI
	
11	 0.1060	 	 XI
	
12	 0.1880	 ...... I..X
	
13	 0.1250	 I	 	 X
	
14	 0.1670	 I	 IX	 .
	15	 0.1120	 I	 	 XI
	
16	 0.1660	 I	 I  X
	
AI	 0.1040	 1	 	 XI
	
18	 0.1120	 I	 	 X	 -
	
19	 0.1660
	
I	 ...X
	
20	 0.1760	 I	 IX
	21	 0.1210	 I	 	 X
	
22	 0.1470
	
23	 0.1030	 I	 	 X
	
24	 0.2110	 I	 I  X
	
25	 0.1120	 I	 	 X
NA:IE caTog,	 CFC
SERIAL CORRELATION COEFFICIERTS FOR PERCENTH P R ICE CRANGE !iEEKLY
PERIOD
	 R -1.	 -.9 -.8 -.7 -.6 -.5 -.4 -.3 -.2 -.1	 .0	 .1	 .2	 .3	 .4	 .5	 .6	 .7 - .8	 .9	 1.0
•----4--------+-4 	
1	 0.1 720	 	 I..A
2	 0.1170	 JI
3
	 0.1280	 	 X
4	 0.2110	 I 	 V
5	 0.2410
6	 -0.1210
7	 0.1650	 I  1
8	 0.1830	 	 I..X
9	 -0.2310	 X 	
10	 0.0540	 ...X I
11	 -0.1020
12	 0.1120	 	 Xi
13	 -0.3110
14	 0.1000
15	 0.1:70	 	 XI
16	 0.1300	 1IX
17	 0.1130	 	 vi	 •
18	 0.1860	 	 •
19	 0.1290
20	 0.1570
21	 0.1020	 i;
22	 0.1190
23	 0.1990 	 I  1
24	 0.1260	 1
25	 0.0110	 I	 •x	 I
NAME CCMPANY 	 KINS
SERIAL CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS FOR PERCENTGE PRICE CHP1IGE WEEKLY
PERIODR -1.	 -.9 -.8 -.7 -.6 -.5 -.4 -.3 -.2 -.1	 .0	 .1	 .2	 ,3	 .4	 .5	 .6	 .7	 .8	
.9	 1.0
1	 0.1300	 I	
	 IX
2	 0.1560	 I	 IX
3	 0.1760	 1 	 I..X
4	 0.1010	 I	
	 XI
5	 0.1470	 I	
	  IX
6	 -0.0980	 IX...	 I
7	 -0.1290
8	 0.1190	 I	
	 X
9	 -0.1050	 IX,...	 I
10	 0.1760	 I 	
 I..X
11	 0.1690	 I  X
12	 -0.0080	 I	 X	 I
13	 -0.1270
14	 0.1110	 	 XI
15	 0.1310	 	 IX
16	 0.1320	 	 IX
17	 0.1270	 I	 	 X
18	 0.1210	 I	 	 XI
19	 0.0110	 I	 X	 I
20	 0.1160	 	 X I
21	 0.1300	 I	 	 X
22	 -0.1150	 I Y,...
23	 -0,1760
24	 -0,1200
25	 0.1150	 I	 	 X I
NAME MANI GINS
SERIAL CORRELAT ICtl COEFFICIENT: RIR FERCE1T3E FRICE CUIGE t4EEKLY
PERIOD	 R -1.	 -.9 -.8 -.7 -.6 -.5 -.4 -.3 -,2 -.1 	 .0	 .1	 .2	 .3	 .4	 .5	 .6	 .7	 .8	 .9	 1.0
1	 0.1060
2	 0.1310
3	 -0.1890
4	 -0.1090
5	 -0.1221
6	 0.1140
7	 -0.1240
8 0.170
9	 -0.1120
10	 0.0110
11	 0.1290
12	 0.1870
13	 0.1300
14	 -0.1230
15	 0.1150
Id	 0.1270
17	 0.2110
18	 0.1220
19	 0.1080
20	 0.2060
21	 0.4130
22	 0.1250
23	 0.1290
24	 0.1930
25	 -0.2110
	 XI
	  IX
	
X..I ......	 I
	
11....	 I
NANE Cafkif t AIMS
SERIAL CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS FOR PERCEITGE PRICE CHANGE WEEKLY
PERIOD R -1.	 -.9 -.8 -.7	 -.5 -.4 -.3 -,2 -.1	 .0	 .1	 .2	 .3	 .4	 .5	 .6	 .7	 .8	 .9	 1.
I	 0,1610	 I	 I  X
2	 -0.1270	 0	 X 	
3	 0.1310	 1	 	  IX
4	 0,1300	 I	 	 IX
5	 0.1270	 	 X
6	 0.4310	 I 	 I 	X
7	 -0.1020	 I
8	 0.0150	 I	 X	 I
9	 -0.1310	 XI 	
10	 -0.1280	 X 	
11	 0.1670	 I	 I  X
12	 0.1220	 1	 	 X
13	 0.1110	 	 XI
14	 0.1210	 1	 	 X
15	 0.1280	 4	 	 X
16	 0.1890	 I	 	 I..X
17	 0.1310	 	 IX
18	 0.2100	 1	 I  X
19	 0.1950	 I	 IX
20	 0.1050	 I	 	 X
21	 0.1630	 I	 	 IX
22	 0.0540	 I	 ,..X
23	 -0.0010	 I	 X
	24 '-0.1080	 I X....
25	 1.1100	 I 	
NAME COMPANY : teiNs
SERIAL CORRELATION COEFFICIE1TS FOR PERCENTGE 'MOE CA44GE !.:EEFLY
PERIOD R -1.	 -.9 -.8 -. 7 -.6 -.5 -. 4 -.3 -.2 -.1	 .0	 .1	 .2	 .3	 .4	 .5	 .6	 .7	 .8	 .9	 1.
......1	 0.2250
2	 -0.1010	 i‘f 	 	 4
3	 0.1020	 	 XI
4	 0.1120	 I	 	 XI
5	 0.1150	 I	 	 XI
...... I...X6	 0.2110
7	 -0.1270
8	 0.1430	 I'X
9	 0.1330	 	 IX
10	 0.1210	 1	 	 X
II	 0.0020	 I	 X	 1
12	 0.1210	 I	 	 X
13	 -0.1280
14 	 I	 X	 I
15	 0.0760	 I....X I
16	 0.0960	 0I
17	 0.1640	 I  X
18	 0.4100	 I 	 I 	X
19	 0.1230	 I	 	 XI
20	 0.1190	 1	 	 XI
21	 -0.0760	 I X..,
22	 -0.0210	 I	 X
23	 0.0450	 I	 ..X	 1
24	 0.0310	 I	 ..A	 I
25	 0.1220	 I	 	 XI
NAME COMPANY ; KRES
SERIAL CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS FOR PERCNTGE PRICE CMIGE WEEKLY
	
PERIOD R -1.	 -.9 -.8 -.7 -.6 -.5 -.4 -.3 -.2 -.1
	 .0	 .1	 .2	 .3	 .4	 .5	 .6	 .7	 .8	 .9
	 +	 -+- -4- --+- --+-- -+- --+- -4- -4-n
	-4- -4- -4-- -4.n -4-	
-4- --4
1	 0.0720	 ....X I
2	 0.1110	
	 XI
3	 0.1060
	
	 XI
4	 0.0350	 ,.X	 1
5	 0.1230	
	 X
6	 0.1410	
	  IX
7	 0.2170	 	
 I...X
8	 0.1210	
	 X
9	 0.1210	
	 X
10	 0.2870	 I 	 X
11	 0.1310	
	 IX
12	 0.1240	
	 X
13	 0.0650	 ...X	 I
14	 0.0980	 ....X I
15	 0.1320	 I	 	 IX
16	 0.0090	 I	 X
17	 0.4100	 I 	 1 	X
18	 0.2210	 I	 	 X
19	 -0.1950	 Y I 
20	 -0.0070	 I	 X
21	 0.3280	
	 X
22	 -0.2160	 X  I 
23	 0.0120	 I	 x
24	 0.1320
25	 0.1750	 I	
	 X
NAME COMPANY : URC
SERIAL CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS FOR PERCENTGE FRICE CUIGE WEEKLY
PERIOD R -I.	 -.9 -.8 -.7 -.6 -.5 -.4 -.3 -.2 -.I
	 .0	 .1	 .2	 .3	 .4	 .5	 .6	 .7	 .8	 .9	 1.1*
	
1	 0.1320	 	 IX
	
2	 0.2540	
	 I 	 X
	
3	 0.1543
	
I	 IX
	4 	 0.1080	 I	
	 XI
	
5	 0.1170	
	 XI
	6 	 0.2180	 I	 ...... I...X
	
7	 0.1540	 I	 IX
	
8	 0.1740	 I	 ...... I..X
	
9	 -0.1870	 X. 	
	
10	 -0.0980	 I X...
	11	 -0.0030	 I	 X
	
12	 0.1210
	
13	 -0.0070
	
14	 0.1160	 I	 	 X
	
15	 -0.2130	 X 	
	
16	 -0.1870	 X. 	
	
17	 0.1890	 	 A
	
18	 -0.3100	 X 	
	
'19	 0.1050	 	 X
	20	 0.124
	 1	 0.1650	 	 IX
	
22	 0.1240	 	 X
	23	 0.2470	
	 X
	
24	 0.1760
	
25	 0.2650	 	 X
NONE CCNFAM t NREC
SERIAL CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS FOR PERCEITGE PRICE CH14151 WEEKLY
PERIOD • R -1.	 -.9 -.8 -.7 -.6 -.5 -.4 -.3 -.2 -.I	 .0	 .1	 .2	 .3	 .4	 .5	 .6	 .7	 .8	 .9	 1.
.....
I	 0.1520	 I  X
	
2	 0.1320	 	 IX
	
3 . 0.1640	 I  X
	
4	 -0.0760	 X...	 I
	
5	 0,0980	 I....X I
	
6	 -0.1410	 -
	
7	 0.1120
	
	 XI
	
8	 -0.0450	 I	 X.	 I
	
9	 0.1460	 	 IX
	
10	 0.1450	 I	 	  IX
	
11	 0.1530	 I	 I  X
	
12	 -0.2540	 X 	
	
13	 0.4200
	
14	 0.3200
	
15	 -0.1230
	
16	 0.0930	 I	 ....X I
	
17	 0.0520	 I	 ...X I
	
18	 0.1310
	
19	 0.2130	 I	 I  x
	20	 0.1320	 I	 	 X
	
21	 0.1360
	
22	 0.1570	 I . IX
	23	 0,1630	 I	 	 IX
	
24	 0.1540	 I	 	 IX
	
25	 0.1980	 I  X
CONPANY	 SREC
SERIAL CORRELATICN COEFFICIENTS FOR PERCENTGE PRICE CHANGE WEEKLY
PERIOD R-t. 	 -.9 -.8 -.7 -.6 -.5 -.4 -.3 -.2 -.1	 .0	 .1	 .2	 .3	 .4	 .5	 .6	 .7	 .8	 .9	 1.9
	
1	 0.0140	 X	 I
	
2	 0.1230	 	 X
	
3	 0.1760	 	 I..X
	
4	 0.1200	 	 X
	
5	 0.1420	 	 IX
	
6	 0.0020
	
7	 0.122a.	 	 X
	
8	 0.4120	 I 	X
	
9	 0.1210
	
	 X
	
10	 0.0340	 ..X
	
11	 0.1980	 	 I..X
	
12	 0.1620	 '  X
	
13	 0.1320	 	 IX
	
14	 0.0790	 ....X I
	
15	 0.1220
	
16	 0.2500.	 	  I,	 v
	
17	 0.1220	 	 X .
	
18	 -0.1320	 X 	
	
.19	 0.1650	 	 IX
	
20	 -0.1430
	
21	 -0.0310	 I	 X.
	
22	 0.2410	 I	 	
	
23	 0.4120
	
24	 0.09;0	 ....X f
	
25	 -0.3500
NAME COMPANY 	 (PC
SERIAL CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS FOR FERCENTOE PRICE CHANGE WEEKLY.
PERIOD	 R -1.	 -.9 -.8 -.7 -.6 -.5 -. 4 -.3 -.2 - 11	 .0	 .1	 .2	 .3	 .4	 .5	 .6	 .7	 .8	 .9	 1.0
	  +- -+- -+- -+- -+- -+- -+- --+- -+-
	 +- -+-
	
1	 0.1930	 I  X
	
2	 0.3010	 1 	 X
	
3	 0.1220	
	 XI
	
4	 0.1320	
	 X
	
5	 0.1430	
	 X
	
6	 0.1150	
	 X 1'
	
7	 0.1430	
	 X
	
8	 0.1650	
	  IX
	
9	 0.2110
	 I  X
	
10	 0.1310	 I	 	 X
	
11	 0.4210	 I 	 I 	 X
	
12	 0.0060	 I	 X	 I
	
13	 0.0120	 I	 X	 I
	
14	 -0.1510	 XI 	 	 1
	
15	 0.1310	 I	 	 X
	
16	 -0.0340
	 I	 X.
	
17	 -0.1220	 IX 	
	
12	 0.0210	 I	 .X	 I
	
19	 -0.1500	 X I 	 	 I
	20	 0.1230	 I	 	 XI
	
21	 0.1020	
	 X I
	
22	 0.0340	 I	 ..X	 I
	
23	 -0.1120	 I X....
	
24	 0.2110	 I I  X
	
25	 -0.1190	 IX 	
NAME COMPANY KREIC
SERIAL CORRELATICN COEFFICIENTS FOR PERCENTGE PRICE CHNIOE WEEKLY
PERIOD	 R -1.	 -.9 -.8 -.7 -.6 -.5 -. 4 -.3 -.2 -,1
	 .0	 .1	 .2	 .3	 .4	 .5	 .6	 .7	 .8	 .9	 1.0
	
1	 0.2110	 I	 ...... ...X
2	 -0.1230
	
3	 -0.1130	 IX 	
	
4	 0.1030	 1	 	 X
	
5	 -0.4520	 X 	
	
6	 0.1430	 I	
	 IX
	
7	 -0.1240	 X 	
	
8	 -0.1290
	
9	 0.0820	 I	 ....X
	
10	 -0.1260
	
11	 -0.1300	 X' 
	12	 -0.2310	 	 ; 	
	
13	 -0.1020
	
14	 0.1270
	
15	 -0.1430
	
16	 -0.1220	 X 	
	
17	 0.1000	 	 xt
	18	 0.1220	 Ixl
	
19	 -0.2220
	
29	 0.1050	 	 X
	
21	 0.2130	 IX
	
22	 0.1740	 I X
23 03050
	
24	 -0.3320	 I	 .
	
25	 -0.2120	 X 	
NAME COMPANY : NIC
SERIAL CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS FOR PERCENTOE PRICE C tIMGE UEEKL1
eERIOD	 R -1,	 -.9 -.8 -.7 -.6 -,5 -.4 -,3 -.2 -.1 1 	.0	 .1	 .2	 .3	 .4	 .5	 .6	 .7	 .9	 .r	 1.0
I	 9.1980	 I. .X
2	 -0.2113	 X.. .
-9,1760
	 X. 	
14	 0.1170	 I	 	 x
9 -o .1 on
-3,1510
7	 (1.1720
8	 -1).4130	 X 	
0• 3110	 I 	X
10	 0.:810	 I )1.
11	 0.124A	
	 X
12
13	 L.1320
14	 0.1110	 	 X
15	 0.1280	 	 X
16	 0,0210
	
I.X
17	 0,2390	 I.......
18	 0.1270.	 I	 	 X
19	 -0.1280	 IX 	
20	 0.1320
21	 -0.2540	 X 	
22	 -0.2130	 X 	
23	 -0.1860	 X. 	
24	 -0.1770	 X. 	
25	 -0.1640
1491E COMPANY : gin
SERIAL CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS FOR PERCE1TGE PRICE [RAGE uEEKLi
PERIODR -1.	 -.9 -.8 -.7 -.6 -.5 -.4 -.3 -.2 -.1	 .0	 .1	 .2	 .3	 .4	 .5	 .6	 .7	 .8	 .9	 1.8
1	 -0.1520
2	 -0.1020
3	 0.1420	
	 X
4	 0.1340	
	 X
5	 0.1200	 	 xi
6	 -0.0100	 X	 I
7	 -0.0320	 X.
8	 0.1140	
	 X I
9	 0.2130	 1  X
10	 0.2310	 .......
11	 0.1320	 I	
	 X
12	 0,1160	 I	 	 X I
13	 -0.1760	 X. 	
14	 -0.1300	 X....
15	 0.1320
16	 -0.0300	 I	 X.
17	 -0.3420
18	 -0.1230	 IX 	
19	 0.1420	 I	 	 X
20	 -0.1520
	
21 .-0.008D	 I	 X	 I
22	 -0.1320
23	 -0.2100
24	 0.1120	 IX I
25	 0.1650	 I1'4
WE COMPANY 1 KSRC
SERIAL CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS FOR PERCENTGE PRICE CHANGE WEEKLY
PERIOD	 R -1.	 .1	 .2	 .3	 .4	 .5	 .6	 .7	 .2
	
1	 0.2100	 ...... ...X
	
2	 -0.0650	 X..
	
3	 -0.1050	 X....
	
4	 0.0430	 I..X
	
5	 -0.3200	 4 	
	
6	 -0.0230	 X
	
7	 0,1540	 I	 IX
	8 	 0.1230
	
9	 -0,1320	 x 	
	
10	 -0.1540	 X. 	
	
11	 -0.1050
	
12	 -0.1540	 X. 	
	
13	 -0.1290
	
14	 0.2130	 IX
	
15	 0.1760	 I...... ..X
	
16	 -0.0760	 1 X...
	
17	 0.1420	 I	 	 IX
	
18	 -0.0430	 I	 X.
	
19	 -0.1430	 X 	
	
20	 0.2320	 I	 .......
	
21	 -0.1220	 IX 	
	22	 -0.1130	 I
	
23	 -0.1580	 I 	 	
8
	24	 0.4310	 1 	 I 	X
	
25	 0.1430	 I	 	 X
NAME COMPANY ; EMS
SERIAL CORRELATICII COEFFICIENTS FOR PERCEIITGE PRICE CHANGE WEEKL7
PERIOD R -1.	 -.9 -.8 -,/ -.4 -.5 -.4 -.3 -.2 -.1	 .0	 .1	 .2	 .3	 .4	 .5	 -A	 .7	 .1	 .2	 8.2
	1 	 0.0540	 ...X i
	
2	 0.1540	 1	 IX
	3 	 0.1320	 I	 	 IX
	
4	 0.1270	 I	 	 X
	
5	 0.1230	 	 X
	
6	 0.1410	 Ix
	7 0,:m	 I	 	 X
	
8	 0.5430	 I..X	 I
	
• 	 0.0930	 ....X I
	
10	 0.105/	 IXI
	
11	 0.0320	 I	 ..X	 1
	
12	 0.1650	 I	 	 X
	
13	 0.1540 	 1  X
	
14	 -0.1540
	
15	 -0.0540
	
16	 0.1760	 y
	17	 0.1430	 	 IY
	
18	 0.1750	 1	 IX
	19	 0.1390	 	 X
	
20	 -0.3210	 X 	
	
2:	 -0.129 0	 ix 	 	 1
	22	 0.1040	 1	 	 X I
	
23	 0.1530	 	 IX
	
2 4	0. 4320	 I 	X
	
25	 0.2780	 I 	X
NAME COMPANY
	 OCE1
SERIAL CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS FOR PERCENTOE PRICE CHNIOE WEEKLY
PERIOD	 R -1.
	
-.9 -.8 -.7 -.6 -.5 -.4 -.3 -.2 -.1
	 .1	 .2	 .3	 .4	 .5	 .6	 .7	 A	 A	 LI
•	
1	 0.1100	
	 XI
2	 0.1300	
	 IX
3	 0.0970	
....X I
4	 0.2110
	 	 I...X
5	 0.1150	 XI
6	 0.1540	 •y
7	 0.1230 . 	
	 X
8	 0.1450	 I	
	 IX
9	 0.0090	 I	 X	 I
10	 0.1920	 I 	
11	 0.1300 •
	 I	
	  IX
12	 -0.1650	 X. 	
13	 -0.0540	 I X..	 I
14	 -0.0540	 I X..	 1
15	 0.2130	 I...... I...X
16	 0.1320
	 I	
	 IX
17	 -0.1270
18	 -0.1300
19	 0.1120	 I	 	 X
20	 -0.0980	 I X...
21	 -0.1250	 IX 	
22	 0.2450	
.......
23	 -0.1430	 X 	
24	 -0.1C30	 I X
	
25	 -0.0120
	 I	 X
NAME COMPAtif : KPI
SERIAL CORRELATICN COEFFICIENTS FOR PERCENTGE PRICE CPANGE WEEklf
PERIOD	 R -1.	
-.9 -.8 -.7 -.6 -.5 -. 4 -.3 -.2 -.1	 .0	 .1	 .2	 .3	 .4	 .5	 .6	 .7	 .3	 A	 1.JS
1	 0.1110	 I	 	 X
2	 0.1050	
	 X
3	 0.1260	
	 X
4	 -0.1080
5	 0.1250	 I	 	 X
6	 0.4110	
	 X
7	 0.0020
8	 0.1870	 I	
	 IX
9	 -0.1220
10	 -0.2100	 X. 	
11	 -0.3100
	 X 	
12	 0.1020	 I	 	 X
13	 0.1190	 	 X
14	 0.0110	 I	 X
15	 -0.1120	 I Y	
16	 -0.1710	 XI 	
17	 0.2110	 I  X
18	 0.1850	 I
19	 -0.1520	 ty 	 1
20	 -0.1200	 I A 	
21	 0.0190
22	 -0.1320
23	 0.1830
24	 0.1120	 I
25	 -0.2140	 X 	
NAME CCOPAN'Y	 OLTC
SERIAL CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS FOR PERCENTGE PRICE CHANGE WEEKLY
PERIOD R -1.
	 -.9 ' -.8 -.7 -.6 -.5 -.4 -.3 -.2 -.1
	 .0	 .1	 .2	 .3	 .4	 .5	 .6	 .7	 .8	 .9
1	 0.1650	 I  X
2	 0.0320	
..X
3.	 0.1320	
	 IX
4	 0.1760	 	
..X
5	 0.2110	 	 ...X
6	 0.1020
7	 0.1500	 	 .X
8	 -0.0980	 I X...
9	 0.1070	
	 X
10	 0.0540	 ...X
11	 0.0070	 I	 X
12	 -0.1540 	 X. 	
13	 0.1060	 I	 	 X
14	 0.0210	 I	 .X
15	 0.1216	 I	
	 X
16	 0.2540	 I 	 X
17	 0.1540 	 I	 IX
18	 0.1290	 I	 	 XI
19	 0.1620
	 I	 	 IX
20	 0.0520	 I	 ...X	 I
21	 0.1360	 I	 	 X
	
22 0.1070	 	 X I
23	 0.3210	 I	 	 X
24	 0.1640	 I'X
25	 0.1020	 	 XI
NONE CCIIPOth : CC
SERIAL CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS FOR PERCENTGE PRICE CHANGE WEEKLY
PERIOD R -1.	 -.9 -.8 -.7 -.6 -.5 -.4 -.3 -.2 -.1	 .0	 .1	 .2	 .3	 .4	 .5	 .6	 .7	 .8	 .9	 1.
1	 0.2540
2	 -0.1650	 1. 1 	 	 I
3	 -0.0140	 I.	 X
4	 0.2100.	 ...... ...X
5	 -0.1640	 X. 	
6	 -0.1320	 X I 	 	 I
7	 0.1650	 I  X
8	 0.1040
9	 -0.1610
10	 0.4010	
	 X
11	 -0.1280
12	 -0.1070	 IX....
13	 0.1320	
	 IX
14	 0.1240
15	 -0.2340	 X 	
16	 -0.2080	 X... 	
17
	 0.1760	 ...... ..x
18	 0.1320	 1	 	 v.
19	 0.1130	
	 X I
20	 0.0430	 ..X	 I
21	 0.1410
22	 0.1210
23	 0.1540	 ix
24	 0.1220
25	 0.1 9 80	
	  '
..X	 I
	 XI
	 xi
1
.......
	 I
NAME CCVMPANY : KHC
SERIAL CORRELATI6N COEFF/CIENTS FOR PERCENTOE PRICE CHNNOE WEEKLY
PERIOD	 R -I.	 -.9 -.6 -.7 -.6	 .•.4 -.3 : .2 -.I	 .0	 .1	 .2	 .3	 .4	 .5	 .6	 .7	 .8	 .9	 1.0
	
I	 0.1430	
	  IX
	
2	 0.0540	 ...X I
	
3	 0.1540	 IX
	4 	 0.1430	
	 IX
	
5	 0.1760	 ,,,,,, I..X
	
6	 0.2040	 	 I...X
	
7 '0.1290	
	 X
	
0	 6.1250	
	 X
	
9	 0.2370	 I 	 X
	
10	 0.1260	
	 X
	
11	 0.1050	 	 XI
	12	 •0.1095	 x....
	
13	 0.1540	 f  X
	
14	 0.1320	 I	
	 IX
	
15	 1.1210
	
16	 -0.0650	 I X..	 t
	
17	 0.1700	 	 I..X
	18	 0.0210	 t	 .X	 I
	
1?	 3.1t17.1	
	 x I
	
20	 0.1235
	 I	 	 XI
	
21	 0.1760	 I	 I  x
	22	 0.1290
	
23	 0.1830	 I	 I  X
	
24	 0.0210	 I	 .X	 f
	
25	 0.3210	 I	 	 X
11ME COIPAth : WUC
SERIAL CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS FOR PERCE1T5E PRICE CHANGE WEEKLY
PERIOD R -. 1.	 -.9 -.8 -.7 -.6 -.5 -.4 -.3 -.2 -.I
	 .0	 .1	 .2	 .3	 .4	 .5	 .6	 .7	 .0	 .9	 1.5
---------------------
	
1 	 0.3210
	
2	 0.1220
	
3	 9.0070
4 0.0340
	
5	 0.1210
	
6	 0.1050
	
7	 0.1350
	
8	 0.2120
	
9	 0.1520
14 Lan/
	
11	 0.1060
12 0.1760
	
13	 0.121;0
	
14	 0.0000
15 0.1265
	
16	 0.1150
17 -0.225C
	10	 0.0540
6.1205
	
20	 0.1420
	
21	 0.1230
	22	 6.1210
23 0.1320
24 -6.3210
25 -0.2210
WE COMPANY : KTSC
SERIAL CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS FOR PERCENTGE PRICE CHANGE WEEKLi
	
PERIOD R -1.	 -.9 -.8 -.7 -.6 -.5 -.4 -.3 -.2 -.1	 .0	 .1	 .2	 .3	 .4	 .5	 .6	 .7	 .8	 .9	 1..
	 4	 -4- -4- -4- -4- •.4
	
1	 -0.1030	 I	 X 	
	
2	 -0.1210	 I X 	
	
3	 0.1650	 I	 	 XI
	
4	 0.2130	 I	 	 IX
0.1430	 	 X
	
6	 0.1030
	
' 7	 -0.1420	 IX 	
	
8	 -0.2310	 X 	
	
9	 0.0540	 ...X
	
10	 0.1200	 	 X
	
11	 0.1210,	 	 X
	
12	 0.0980	 ....X
	
13	 -0.1040	 X....
	
14	 0.1160	 	 X
	
15	 0.1320	 	 X
	
16	 0.1090	 	 X
	
17	 0.0790	 ....X
	
18	 0.2130	 	  IX
	
19	 0.0040	 X
	
20	 0.1540	 	 X
	
21	 0.1210	 	 X
	
22	 0.1130	 	 X
	
23	 0.1100	 	 X
	
24	 0.1940	 	 X
	
25	 0.1040	 	 X	 I
NAME COMM( : '<MC
SERIAL CORRELATIal COEFFICIENTS FOR FERCENTGE FRICE CHANGE 'ELY
	
PERIOD R -1.	 -.9 -.8 -.7 -.6 -.5 -. 4 -.3 -.2 -.1	 .0	 .1	 .2	 .3	 .4	 .5	 .6	 .7	 .8	 .9	 1.:
	
!	 -0.1540
	
2	 -0.1090	 • ....
	
3	 0.1870	 	 X
	
4	 -0.1090
	
5	 -0.1020
	
6	 0.1100
	
7	 0.0210	 ,X
	
8	 -0.1520	 ,(  • 
	9 	 -0.2650
	
10	 -0.17.60
	
11	 -0.4050	 X 	
	
12	 0.0430
	
13	 -0.1210
	
1 4 	 -0.1650	 f.: 	
	15	 -0.1090
	
16	 0.1030	 I	 	 XI
	
17	 0.1010	 	 el
	18	 0.4020
	
19	 0.1300	 	 X
	
20	 0.1100	 	 x
	
21	 0.1170	 1	 	 X I	 •
	
22	 0.1760	 I	 	 X
	
23	 -0.3110
	
24	 -0.:134	 • 
	25	 -0.1030	 I x....
NAME Ca1Paff : XCOC
SERIAL CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS FOR PERCENTGE PRICE Ci 4ANGE 'ABLY
PERIOD	 R -1.	 -.9 -.8 -.7 -,6 -.5 -.4 -.3 -.2, 	 .0	 .1	 .2	 .3	 .4	 .5	 .6	 .7	 .11	 .1	 1.1
	
1	 0.1650	 I  X
	
2	 0,1540	 I  X
	
3	 0.1100
	
4	 0.1230
	
5	 0.1090	 	 XI
	
6	 0.1540
	
7	 0.1300	 I	 	  IX
	
8	 0.1100	 I	 	 XI
	
9	 0.0980	 I	 •...X I
	
10	 0.1020	 I	 	 XI
	
II 0.2100	 I...... I.,.X
	
12	 0.1540	 I  X
	
13	 0.1030	 I	 	 XI
	
14	 0.1330	 	 IX
	
15	 0.3210	 I 	 I 	X
	
16	 0.0320	 I	 ..X	 I
	
17	 0.1400	 	 IX
	
le	 -0.0320	 4
	
19	 0.1320	 I	 	 X
	
20	 0.1040	 1	 	 X 1
	21	 -0.1340	 1
	
22	 -0.1320	 X 	
	
23	 0.2130	 I	 I  X
	
24	 0.1320	 I	 	 X
	
25	 0.1200	 I	 	 XI
NAME CCMPAN1 : Lirc
SERIAL CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS FOR PERCUTGE ; RICE DANGE WEEPLY
PERIOD	 R -1.	 -,9 -.8 -.7 -.6 -.5
	
-.3 -.2 -.I	 .0	 .1	 .2	 .3	 .4	 .5	 .6	 .7	 .8	 3	 1.2
	1 	 0.2310
	
2	 0.1030
	
3	 0.1320
	
4	 0,1340
	
5	 -0.1650
	
6	 -0.1120
	
7	 -0.1300
	
8	 0.0210
	
9	 0.1030
	
10	 0.1520
	
11	 -0.2010
	
12	 -0.2640
	
13	 -0.1020
	
14	 3.0180
	
15	 0.0020
	
16	 -0.3240
	
17	 -0.1230
	
18	 0.1420
	
.19	 -0.1300
	
20	 0.0870
	
21	 0.1100
	
22	 0.1330
	
23	 0.2200
	
24	 0.3430
	
25	 0.0050
I 	 X
	 XI
	  X •
	 X
x... ......	
IX
X
NAmE COMPANY : IJFK
SERIAL CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS F OR PERCENTGE PRICE CH44GE WEEwLY
PERIODR	 -1.	 -.9	 -.8	 -.7	 -.6	 -.5	 -.4	 -.3	 -.2	 -.1	 Al	 .1	 .2 .3 .4	 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1.0
1	 -0.1100
2	 -0.0210	 X
3	 -0.1540	 X 	
4	 0.1650	 I	 IX
5	 0.1850	 ......
6	 -0.1020
7	 -0.1130
8	 -0.1320
9	 0.1630	 I	 I A
10	 -0.2310
II	 -0.1540	 X.	 	
12	 -0.1050	 Ii....
13	 0.1760	 ......	 ..X
14	 -0.1210
15	 -0.0650	 I	 X..
16	 -0.1100
17	 -0.1010	 !X....
18	 0.1640	 I	 	 IX
19	 -0.1210
20	 -0.2200	 X 	 I 
21	 -0.1010	 I	 x....
22	 -0.1320	 X 	
23	 0.1010	 	 XI
24	 0.2110	 I	 	 X
25	 0.1530	 I	 	 IX
NAME CUIPANY 1	 KUPC
SERIAL CORRELATION COEFFICIEITS FOR PERCEITGE PRICE CHR4GE WEEKLY
PERIOD R 	 -1.	 -.9	 -.8	 -.7	 -.6	 -.5	 -.4	 -.3	 -.2	 -.1	 .0	 A	 .2 .3 .4 . ,.5 .6 .7 .9 .9 1.0
1	 0.1030
2	 1.5 4 20	 I	 ..X
3	 -0.1300
4	 -0.2010	 v 	
5	 0.1290	 I	 	 X
6	 -0.1620
7	 0.1020	 	 X
8	 -0.1310
9	 0.1400'
10	 -0.1320
11	 0.2130
12	 0.1030	 	 X
13	 0.1210	 X 
14	 0.1310
15	 0.0130	 X
16	 0.2210 	 	 X
17	 0.1040	 	 X
18	 0.2310	 .......	 ;...X
19	 0.1100	 	 X
20	 0.1230	 	 X
21	 0.1120	 	 X
22	 0.1230	 	 X
23	 0.3110 	  X
24	 0.0210	 .X
25	 0.3010 	  X
NAME COMPANY	 KFC
SERIAL CORRELATION COEFFiCIENTS FOR PERCENTGE PRICE CHANGE WEEKLY
PERIOD
	 R -1.	
-.9 -.8 -.7 -.6 -.5 -.4 -.3 -.2 -.1
	 .0	 .1	 .2	 .3	 .4	 .5	 .4	 .7	 .8	 .1	 g..;
1	 0.3100	
	 X
2	 -0,1230	 1
3	 -0.0430	 I	 X.	 I
4	 0.1120
5	 0.1010	 I	 	 XI
6	 0.0320
7	 0.1010	 I	
	 XI
8	 0.1230	 I	
	 X
9	 -0.0760
10	 -0.1450	 XI 	 	 1
11	 -0.1720 .
	X.. 	 	 I
12	 0.1200	 I	 	 X
13	 0.1120	 I	
	 XI
14	 -0.1320	 XI 	 	 I
15	 -0.1100	 I
16	 -0.1210	 X 	
17	 0.1100
	 I	 	 XI
18	 0.3210	 1 	 I 	X
19	 -0.1320	 X 	
20	 -0.0120	 I	 X	 I
21	 0.23:0	 .......
22	 3.0240	 I	 .X	 1
23	 0.2310	 I	 .......
24	 0.1210	 1	
	 XI
25	 0.2110	 I  X
NAME CCHPANY	 4FPC
SERIAL CORRELATICN COEFFICIENTS FCR PERCENTGE PRICE CMIGE WEEKLY
PERIOD R '1.	 -.9 -.8 -.7 -.6 -.5 - . 4 -.3 -.2 -.1	 .3	 .1	 .2	 .3	 .4	 .5	 .6	 .7	 .8	 .9
1	 -0.1710	 X..1 ......
2	 -0.1210
3	 0.1010•XI
4	 0.1020
	
	 XI
5	 0.1320	
	 IX
6	 0.1290	
	 X
7	 0.1030
	
	 XI
8	 0.1120	
	 XI
9	 0.124 0	 I	
	 X
10	 0.0 4 30	
..X	 I
11	 0.3200	 1 	 I 	 X
12	 -0.1010	 Y....
13	 -0.1470
14	 0.1530	 I  X
15	 0.1540	 I  X
16	 0.1650	 1  x
17	 0.1520	 '  X
18	 -0.1870	
. 	 	
I •
.19	 0.1890	 '  X
20	 0.1720	 I • ,
21	 -0.1200
22	 0.1320
23	 -0.1080	 1
24	 0.1190
25	 -0.1270
NAME COMPANY : (CC
SERIAL CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS FOR PERCENTGE PRICE CHANGE WEEKLY
PERIOD	 R -1.	 -.9 -.8 -.7 -.6 -.5 -.4 -.3 -.2 -.1	 .0	 .	 .2	 .3	 .4	 .5	 .6	 .7	 .8	 .9	 1.
	 4	 -+- 4-	 -+-	 4	 -i n
	-4.. 4
1	 0.3210	 I	
	 X
2	 -0.1430	 XI 	
3
	 0,1940	 I	 ...... ..X
4	 0.1320	 I	
	 IX
5	 -0.1230
6	 0,1200
7	 -0.1310	 XI 	
8	 0.1110	 I	
	 X
9	 0.0650	 I	 ...X
10	 -0.3010	 X 	
11	 -0.0450	 I	 X.
12	 -0.0210	 I	 X
13	 0.1040	 I	 	 X
14	 0.1210
15	 0.1200
16	 0.0870	 I	 ....X
17	 0.1320	 I	 	 IX
18	 0.1120
	
I	 	 X I
19	 0.1450	 1	 	 X
20	 0.1310	 	 X
21	 0.0870	 I	 ....X	 I
22	 0.1070	 I	 	 X I
23	 0.1520	 1	 	 IX
24	 0.1070	 1	 	 X I
25	 0.1090	 	 X I
NAME COMPANY : RIC
SERIAL CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS FOR PERCENTGE PRICE CHANGE WEEKLY
PERIODR -1.	 -.9 -.8 -.7 -.6 -.5 -.4 -.3 -.2 -.1	 .6	 .1	 .2	 .3	 .4	 .5	 .6	 .7	 .8	 .9	 /.
1	 0.1720	 ...... I..X
2	 0.1100	 	 XI
3	 0.0760	 ....X I
4	 0.1540	 I  X
5	 0.0540	 ...X I
6	 0.0320	 ..X	 I
7	 0.1220
8	 0.1220
9
	 0.2150
	
...... I...X
10	 0.0210	 I
11	 0.1060	 	 X!
12	 0.1100	 	 xl
13	 -0.1540
14	 -0.2010
15	 0.1070
16	 0.0760	 	 X .
17	 0.1900	 , 
18	 0.1050
19	 0.0060
20	 -0.0140
21	 -0.1430
22	 -0.1320	 4 	
23	 1.1090	 1 X 	
24	 0.1540
25	 0.2130
APPENDIX F
Runs Test - Computer programme TURBO PASCAL
7	 (* APPENDIX F *)
(* 	 	 	 *)
(* DESCRIPTION I -	 *)
(* THIS PROGRAM IS TO READ INPUT FILE (RUNS.DAT)
	
*)
(* WHICH IS CONTAIN NAME COMPANY ANO NUMBER OF	 *)
(* OBSERVED PRICE CHANGES. THE PROCESS IS TEST WEAK 	 *)
(* FORM EFFICIENCY E.( USING RUNSTEST AND PRINT OUT
	
*)
04.
 INTO OUTPUT FILE (Rums.our) .
	
*)
c * 	 )
PROGRAM RUNS(INPUT,OUTPUT);
TYPE
LIST=ARRAYE1..1000] OF PEAL;
NAME=PACKED ARRAYE1..153 OF CHAR;
VAR
	
OUTT.INP	 TEXT;
P,Y:LIST;
XRUNS.AX,AY,AZ,EAvERUNS,CUBE,ESO,SIGMA,SIG.AKFAA,BB,SO:REAL;
N,JA.L.J,LL,M,NM.NOsINTEGER;
OO:NAME;
CH:CHAR;
BEGIN
($1-)
ASSIGN(OUTT,"RUNS.O(JT');
REWRITE(OUTT);
	
writeln( 	 ioresult : ',ioresult);
ASS/GM(INPf.'RUNS.DAT');
RESET(INP);
WRITELN(' START WORK .. FLASE WAIT ...');
PEADLN(INP.f/0);
READLN(IMP,M);
WRITELN(' NAME CONRAN'? : ',00, MOMPER WEEKLY
j:=1;
FOR L:=t TO N DO
BEGIN
PEAOLN(INP.PCIA)
WRITELN(' COUNTER : ',L,' PRICE : ',PEL3);
END;
WRITELN(' ENTER ANY rEY TO CIINTIHNE 
AX;=0.0
AY:=0.0
A21=0.0
FOR J:=1 TO JA DO
BEGIN
L:=J+1
YEJ)PEL7 - PC37:
WRITELN(' V : ',YEJJ);
END;
WRTTELN(OUTT.'RUNS TEST RESULTS FOR INDIVIDUAL STOCKS
WRITELM(OUTT,'	 ''WEEKLY DAIPC);
WRITELN(OUTT'
WRITELN(OUTT);
WRITPLN(OmTT,'COMPANY ' . '	 ' I 'RUMS',' 'v'RUNtr);
,'OPSERVED'," ' 'EXPECTEO:" ','SIGWRITELN<OUTT,'
" K ');N(-)
WRITELN(OUTT);
Y.RUNS0.0;
NM:wa4;
WPITELN(' AFTER PR/NT HEADING LINES
FOR 3:-t1 TO JA DO
BEGIN
IP yIJJ. 6 THEN
BEGIN
M:=I
AY:=A)(4-1.0
END
ELSE IF YIJI=0 THEN
BEGIN
M:=E;
AYW0-1.0;
END
ELSE
BEGIN
IF 'ICJ) 0 THEN
BEGIN
M:=3;
AZ:=AZ4-1.0;
END
END;
IF NM e ,M THEN
BEGIN
NM N
XPUNS:=XRUNS+1.0
END;
END; (* FOR J *)
WRITELN( DONE BIG LOOP FOR XRUNS
WPITELN(' AX
	 .AX,'	 AY :',AY,' A: : ',A2);
ESO:=AX.4.AX+AY*AY+AZig-AZ
WRITEIN(' ESO ;',ES0);
At;:=JA-4-0.0;
N:=5A;
MB:=N*(N4-I);
Bet=N8+0.01
EPUNS:=(BB-P30)/AA;
WPITELN(' EPUNS : ',EPUNS);
CUPE:=AX*AX*AX+AY*AY*AY+AZ*A.240.2;
WPITELN(' CUBE : ',CUBE);
EA:=E50*(ESO+AA/(-(AA+)))-2*AA*(CU5E)-AA*AA*AA;
WPITELN(' EA ',EA);
SIGNA:=EA/(PA4AA*(AA-1));
WRITELN(' SIGMA :',SIGMA);
SO:=SIGNA;
WPITELN(' SO : ',SO);
SIG:=SORT(S0);
WPITELN(' GIG : ',SIG);
Ar:=(XRUNS*).5-ERUNT,) / Si(;
WPITELN(OUTT0,XPUNS,EPUNS,SIG,AY,AY,AZ.AP);
WRITELN(OUTT);
CLOSE(OUTT);
CLOSE(INP);
WRITELN(' END PROCESSING ... ');
($14-1.
END.
APPENDIX G
Filter Rules - Computer Programme FORTRAN 77
(* APPENDIX G *)
C	 (*TO TEST WEAK FORM MARKET EFFICIENCY USING FILTER TECHNIQUE*).
C	 (* 	 *)
C	 (* DESCRIPTION :	 *)
C	 (*	 *)
C	 (* THIS PROGRAM IS ADAPTABLE FOR ANY NUMBER OF DATA	 *)
C	 (* AURILABLE OH FILE,AND FOR ANY SPECIFIED FILTER SIZE. *)
C	 (* IT ALSO CAN PROCESS ANY NUMBER OF DATA FILE . 	 *)
C	 (* TO USE , RUN THE PROGRAM USING THE COMMAND: 	 *)
C	 (* (RUN YI—IN FO) WHERE Y1 IS PROGRAM FILENAME 	 *)
C	 (*	 FO IS DATAFILE NAME 	 *)
C	 (* THE COMPUTER WILL THEN ASK FOR NO. OF THE DATA ON	 *)
C	 (* FILE. THIS CAN BE ENTERED IN ANTY FORMAT 	 .	 *)
C	 (* THE NEXT QUESTION IS THE FILTER SIZE, WHICH CAN BE
	 *)
C	 (* BENTERED AS DECIMAL UALUE(HOT A PERCENTAGE). 	 *)
C	 (* THE RESULT WILL BE STORED IN FILE (Ti)	 *)
C	 (* 	 *)
PROGRAM FILTER
DIMENSION P(1,300)
REAL *0 F,Z,M,X,D,R,R,Q,U,Y,P,C,PP,PS,GP,SI,WW,FLAG,POINT,PM,TA
INTERGER*4,J,Y,L,M,N,NN,I,MM,JJ,
C	 READING THE DATA FROM THE FILE
WRITE(1,100)
100	 FORMAT(5X,/,EHTEA NO. OF DATA (N)
	 :I)
READ(1,*)N
READ(5,*)(P(1,J),J=1,N)
C	 SETTING THE FILTER SIZE ENTERED AS A DECIMAL UALUE.
WRITE(1,101)
101	 FORMAT(2X,/,'ENTER FILTER SIZE :P 1)
C
READ(1,*)
NH	 N — 1
C	 SETTING INITIAL HALVES
POINT =0.0
FLAG=1.0
C	 (FLAGMPOINT/ ARE MARrERS.FLAG IS USED TO INDICATE WHETHER STOCKS
C	 ARE RUAILHBLE (FLRG=0.0),OR HOT AURILABLE (FLAG=1.0),
C	 POINT IS USED TO INDICATE e. REGISTER DETAILS OF THE 1 51 TRANSACTION.
(* APPENDIX G: Continued 1 *)
MM=0
J=0
L=0
2=1.0
20	 J=J+1
C	 MOVING TO THE NEXT PRICE
JJ=J+1
C	 CALCULATE THE PRICE CHANGE DICTATED BY FILTER SIZE
U=F+P(1,J)
IF (J •E0. H) GO TO 56
C	 CALCULATING THE ACTUAL PRICE CHANGE & COMPARE LI/FILTER CHANGE
0=P(1,JJ)-P(1,J)
X=ABS(D)-U
IF (X ,LT. 0.0) GO TO 20
IF (0 .LT. 0.0) GO TO 60
IF(FLAG .11E. 1.0) GO TO 20
FLAG=0.0
IF (POINT .HE. 0.0) GO 10 24
C	 (FOINT=0.0) MEANS THAT IT IS THE FIRST TRANSACTION
C
PP=P(1,J)
C	 PP IS THE FIRST TRANSACTION PURCHACE PRICE
I=J
POINT=1:0
24	 K=J-L
PR=P(1,J)
IF(J ,GT. NH) GO TO 56
GO TO 20
60	 IF (FLAG ,EQ 1.0) GO Ti) 20
M=J-K
FM=FLOAT(M)
Q=1.13/FM
MM=M+MM
PS=P(1,J)
(* APPENDIX G: Continued 2 *)
C	 PS IS THE STOCKS SALE PRICE.
C	 IN CALCULATING R TRANSACTION COST OF (0.000)WAS CONSIDERED
R=((PA/PS)**Q)-0.998
C	 THE EXPRESSION "1.0 +(R-0.002)" CAN BE WRITTEN AS "R+0.998"
A=A+0.998
C
2=2*( A**N)
L=J
IF(J .GT. NM) GO TO 56
GO TO 20
56	 SI=FLOAT(N11)
Y=1.0/SI
C	 CALCULATE ANNUAL FILTER "RETURN" & "BUY t HOLD RETURN FOR 52 WEEKS
GR=((Z**Y)+1.0)*52.0
WW=L-I
W=1.0/WW
C	 IN CALCULATING (Ci , THE TRANSACTION COST WAS CONSIDERED TWICE,ONCE [if
C	 BUYING AND ONCE IN SELLING
C=MPP/P(1,L))**W0.996)*52
C	 OUTPUTTING THE RESULTS
C	 OPEN A FILE FOR STORING THE OUTPUT,
OPEN (UNIT.6,FILE-11,STHTUS-AFFEND)
WRITE(6,111)F
111	 FORNAT(26X,'FILTER SIZE	 ',F6.3)
WRITE(6,222)
222 FORMAT(26X,'***************',/)
WRITE(6,333).
333 FORMAT(12X, I FILTER ANNUAL RETUAN',4X,'BUY & HOLD ANNUAL RETURN')
APPENDIX 0: Continued 3 *)
WRITE(6,444)
444 FoRmT(12x,.*********************,,,m,,************************1
WRITE(6,600)
600	 FORHATU,18X,E11,4,10X,E11.4)
STOP
EHO
APPENDIX H
Dissemination of Information in USA
APPENDIX H
DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION (USA)
In the United States, 5,000 radio and T.V. stations announce the general
movement of security prices daily; some of these announcements are made
every half hour, and some are made once a day. In addition, thousands of
local newspapers publish security prices everyday for the people in the
United States of America 1 . There are two national and fourteen regional
exchanges in the USA., which have a common . purpose: to serve the public's
interest by providing orderly, organised, central facilities for investors.
To the person who wants to buy or sell securities on a major exchange,
opening an account with a broker is as easy as opening a savings account
with a bank. Selling and buying securities is almost as fast and simple as
making or withdrawing a deposit at the bank.
Brokerage firms that are members of the American Exchange operate more than
5,000 offices in about 900 cities in all fifty states plus twenty-four
foreign countries 2 . The corresponding data for New York Stock Exchange are
4,300,975 and 593 . The whole brokerage system is connected by telephone,
teletype and wire to the trading floor. These communication facilities,
including the ticker network, can almost instantly connect all the people
in the United States and in some foreign countries.
It takes four minutes to receive an order from an investor in the farthest
part of the country, to execute it on the floor, and, finally, to notify
the investor that his order has been fulfilled. The computer records this
information almost instantaneously and transmits the details of the
transaction to some 4,200 tickers (in the case of the NYSE) and display
devices in the United States and foreign countries. 	 In the NYSE, 20 to 30
million shares are traded daily.	 The data related to each transaction are
made available almost immediately to the public. 	 The maximum delay for
recording some transactions is not more than three minutes 4 . Of course,
such vast facilities and the particularly swift action of the market can be
of great assistance to the high efficiency in the United states Markets.
In addition to the stock exchanges with the above-mentioned facilities for
the dissemination of information, the United States has one of the largest
over-the-counter (or negotiated) markets for securities in the worldS.
Some 40,000 common stocks plus all of the corporate bonds and government
securities are traded in this market on a negotiated basis among a
multitude of competitors. In February 1971, an electronic mechanism was
established in this market to quote instantaneously the prices of some
3,000 securities that meet certain qualifications. Although the OTC dealers
are not physically together, the National Association of Securities Dealers
Automated Quotations (NASDAQ) unites, almost all of them by providing
instant access to up-to-the-minute quotations regardless of the physical
location of the dealers. The new quotations for bids and asks appears in
the NASDAQ system within five seconds everywhere in the nation. This highly
efficient system tends to insure a close convergence (and uniform prices)
between bids and asks throughout the United States. Indeed, inclusion of
NASDAQ, the mechanism of instant dissemination of quotation, in the OTC
market will have a great impact On market efficiency in the United States'
because these quotations certainly reflect the most recent information
available concerning the securities traded.
NOTES
1	 Market for Millions; The Role and Functions of a Stock Exchange in the
National Economy, Amex Publication, 1972.
2	 Ibidp.31
3	 Understanding the New York Stock Exchange, (published by) NYSE, 1969.
4	 Market for Millions, op.cit.
5	 This and the remaining discussion are based upon the information
published in the bulletin of NASDAQ and the OTC "How the NASDAQ System
creates an Electronic Stock Market in Over-The-Counter Securities"
(New York: NASDAG, 1972).
APPENDIX I
Listing Requirements of Kuwait Stock Exchange
APPENDIX I
ADMISSION REQUIREMENTS FOR LISTING OF
SECURITIES ON KUWAIT STOCK EXCHANGE
The shareholding companies (Public and private) should satisfy the
following conditions and qualifications in order to be registered (listed)
on the Kuwait Stock Exchange.
1	 The company should be a Public Shareholding Company, incorporated
in Kuwait.
2	 The closed Kuwaiti Company should have been accepted by the
Exchange Committee.
3	 The Company should have been established three years ago
4	 Share ownership of the Company should be distributed among a'
reasonable number of shareholders (no less than five people)
willing to offer their shares for transactions in the Exchange.
5 the public shareholding company should have issued at least three
audited annual financial statements in order for its shares to be
traded.
6 Books of accounts should be kept in accordance with prudent
principles of bookkeeping and comply with common accounting
practices.
7	 The company should have been making on the average 6% profit
during the last three years and distributed at least 5% dividend
during the last year in order to be listed on KSE.
8 The Articles of Association should be drawn up so that the rights
of minority shareholders are protected and no unreasonable
privileges are granted to any special group of shareholders.
9	 The paid in Capital should be no less than KD 5,000,000 million.
1
APPENDIX J
Listing Requirements of New York Stock Exchange
10	 A promise should be made by the company to increase its capital
not less that 10% from its paid in capital.
11	 The company should supply a brief statement containing its
history and financial position in accordance with the sample
provided by the Department of Registration, and should be
endorsed by the auditing supervisor.
Source:	 Kuwait Stock Exchange - Department of Companies' Registration,
' Kuwait. January 1988.
APPENDIX J
NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE
LISTING REQUIREMENTS
To be listed on the New York Stock Exchange, a company la expected to meet
certain qualifications and to be willing to keep the investing public
informed on the progress of its affairs.	 The company must be a going
concern, or be the successor to a going concern. 	 In determining
eligibility for listing, 	 particular attention is given to such
qualifications as:
1	 The degree of national interest in the company
2	 its relative position and stability in the industry and
3	 whether it is engaged tn an expanding indilstry with prospects of
at least maintaining its relative position
Initial ListfnK
While each case is decided on its won merits, the Exchange generally
requires the following as a minimum.
1 Demonstrated earning power under competitive conditions of $2.F;
million before Federal Income Tax for the most recent year and $2
million pre-tax for each of the preceding two year.
2	 Net tangible assets of $16 million, but greater emphasis will be
placed on the aggregate market value of the common stock.
3	 A total of $16 million in market value of publicly held common
stock.
4	 A total of 1,000,000 common shares held publicly.
5	 2,000 holders of 100 shares or more.
1
Continued Listing
The appropriateness of continued listing of a security on the Exchange
cannot be measured mathematically, and the Exchange may at any time suspend
or delist a security where it is considered that continued dealings in the
security are not advisable, even though a security meets or fails to meet
any specified criteria.1 For example, the Exchange would normally give
consideration to suspending or removing form the list a common stock of a
company when there are:
1	 less than 1,200 round-lot holders.
2	 6,000,000 shares or less in public hands.
3	 $5,000,000 or less aggregate market value of publicly held
shares.
4 $8,000,000 or less in aggregate market value of all outstanding
common stock or net tangible assets applicable thereto', combined
with an earnings records of less than an avera ge of $600.000.
after taxes for the past three years..
Listing Agreement 
The listing agreement between the company and the Exchange is designed to
provide timely disclosure to the public of earnings statements, dividend
notices, and other information wnicn might reasonably be expected to
materially affect the market for securities. The Exchange requires
actively operating companies to agree to solicit proxies for all meetings
of stockholders.
Voting Rights 
As a matter of general policy, the Exchange has for many years refused to
list non-voting common stocks, and all listed common stockshave the right
to vote.
Warrants
In 1970, the Exchange authorised the listing of warrants of companies with
common stock listed. 	 In general, listing standards include: maturity of
about 3 to 10 years; ownership of distribution comparable to common stock;
warrant exercise price not substantially above price of common stock at
time of issue; amount of warrants does not exceed 20% of common stock .
outstanding unless approved by otockholders; maximum is 50% of outstanding
common stock.
Source: New York Stock Exchange Fact Book, 13.30.
